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Abstract 
This thesis addresses the place of old age in British psychiatry, from 1835-1912.  It 
asks:  how were mental disorders in old age understood, categorised and responded 
to? It seeks answers to these questions in three sets of sources:  theoretical published 
works written by professional psychiatrists, the official reports of the bodies 
charged with managing the asylum at a national and local level, and in the patient 
records of Hanwell County Lunatic Asylum. 
It argues that the ‘senile’ became more clearly defined in the latter 
nineteenth century, in politics and in medicine, as a residual category of person:  too 
insane for the workhouse, too old for the asylum.  It shows that, during this period, 
older people in the asylum were increasingly likely to be viewed as ‘old’.  Through 
the increasing focus on internal pathology as an aetiological determinant of mental 
disorder, both engendered and reflected in changes to the asylum’s patient records, 
the inherent agedness of older people – with associations of inevitable decline, 
incurability and dependency – became central to the way that psychiatrists 
interpreted their mental disorders.   
The senile were a controversial group in nineteenth-century psychiatry.  The 
administrators of Lunacy made attempts to exclude them from the asylum, but 
families and workhouse officials continued to send them there.  The asylum played 
an important role in latter-nineteenth-century London as a pressure-valve for those 
whose behaviour made them unmanageable in other settings.  Without more 
specialised provision, the asylum was often the only institution which could 
manage the elderly mentally disordered.  Once there, aged patients worked and 
were cared for alongside the rest of the asylum population, usually until their 
death.   
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Introduction 
On July 19th 1900, three medical students sat down to take the examination for the 
Certificate in Psychological Medicine, accredited by the Medico-Psychological 
Association of Great Britain and Ireland (MPA).  The first question on the paper 
asked: 
What forms of insanity may occur in old age, and what is the 
prognosis in each? What conditions would make you 
recommend removal to an asylum in a case of senile dementia?1 
This was really two questions, each asking the students to draw on very different 
areas of knowledge and experience.  The first is theoretical and clinical, requiring 
knowledge of diagnostic nomenclature and classification.  If the students had read 
William Bevan Lewis’ Text-book of Mental Diseases in preparation for their exam, 
they would have been forewarned that, ‘The student is…too apt to assume that all 
varieties of mental ailments in the aged issue in senile dementia’.2  The question is 
helpfully worded to overcome that assumption, encouraging the students to take 
Bevan Lewis’ view that the insanity of old age could manifest in a great variety of 
ways, with a range of outcomes.  The second question is practical and political.  By 
1900, complaints about ‘senile’ asylum admissions were a regular feature in the 
MPA’s Journal of Mental Science.  Throughout the second half of the nineteenth 
century, many asylum officials were persistent in their attempts to keep such cases 
out of their institutions, and to delegitimise the claim that senile patients had to 
asylum care.  At the same time, patients diagnosed with senile dementia were an 
inescapable fact of asylum life:  no matter how much their presence was decried, 
new cases kept arriving.  The medical assessment of senile patients, then, was a 
political issue:  one in which the very meaning and purpose of the institution was at 
stake.   
                                                             
1
 'Notices by the Registrar', Journal of Mental Science, 46 (1900), p. 830. 
2 William Bevan Lewis, A Text-book of Mental Diseases:  with Special Reference to the Pathological 
Aspects of Insanity (London, 1889), p. 405. 
2 
 
This thesis seeks to illuminate some of the issues the students might have 
addressed.  It asks:  how were the mental disturbances of old age understood, 
categorised and responded to by Victorian psychiatry?  This introduction will begin 
by defining the object of study:  old-age mental disorder.  It will then discuss the 
locus of study: intellectual, institutional and geographical.  This is followed by an 
outline of the two major areas of historiography from which this thesis draws – the 
history of the asylum and the history of old age – along with some indications of 
where it is situated in relation to them.  Finally, an outline of the sources and 
approaches mobilised by each chapter is provided, along with a summary of the 
overall key themes and arguments. 
Defining the Object of Study 
Defining the object of study has been one of the primary challenges of this thesis.  In 
the 1960s, critical psychiatrists like Thomas Szasz, and historian and philosopher 
Michel Foucault, highlighted the instability of psychiatric categories.3  They argued 
that psychiatric categories – indeed, the categories of madness and mental illness 
themselves – are inherently embedded within their social, cultural and intellectual 
contexts.  Psychiatric categories are thus historically contingent.  Retrospective 
diagnosis – a clinical-historical practice which takes present-day psychiatric 
categories and attempts to apply them to people from the past – is therefore 
considered by many historians of psychiatry to be epistemologically unsound.4  As 
Sally Schwarz puts it, attempts to apply modern diagnostic categories to the past 
‘presuppose and proceed to confirm, in a tautological way, the existence of 
                                                             
3 Thomas Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct (New York, 
1961); Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: a History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (London, 
1965).  Attempting to classify Foucault in relation to established academic disciplines proves 
challenging, as he himself acknowledged, although ‘almost all his books are at least superficially 
classifiable as histories’.  Gary Gutting, 'Foucault and the History of Madness', in Gary Gutting (ed.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Foucault (Cambridge, 1994), p. 47.   
4 See, for example, James Mills, 'The Mad and the Past: Retrospective Diagnosis, Post-Coloniality, 
Discourse Analysis and the Asylum Archive', Journal of Medical Humanities, 21 (2000), pp. 141-58; 
Eric J. Engstrom, Wolfgang Burgmair and Matthias M. Weber, 'Emil Kraepelin's 'Self-Assessment': 
Clinical Autography in Historical Context', History of Psychiatry, 13 (2002), p. 98.  Even German 
Berrios, a clinical-historical practitioner whose work revolves around the examination of clinical 
categories, has suggested that historical diagnoses are ‘as valid’ as those drawn from current 
diagnostic nomenclature.  G. E. Berrios, 'Retrospective Diagnosis and its Vicissitudes', History of 
Psychiatry, 24 (2013), p. 126. 
3 
 
syndromes which are argued to remain stable over time’.5  A more critical approach, 
however, leaves historians of psychiatry to face, for themselves, ‘psychiatry’s 
knowledge problem – the elusiveness of certainty’.6  They must find ways of 
establishing the object of their investigation, without ‘presupposing’ the existence of 
certain categorical entities.   
Often, old-age dementia and Alzheimer’s disease are seen as exceptions to 
this ‘knowledge problem’.  Philosopher Ian Hacking has influentially contended 
that new psychiatric categories (and other categories relating to types of people) do 
not describe pre-existent entities, but ‘bring into being a new kind of person’.7  Yet 
he classifies Alzheimer’s disease, not as one of these ‘human kinds’, but as an 
unequivocally ‘natural kind’:  ‘an absolutely objective neurological condition’.8  
Historian of psychiatry, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, has criticised Hacking for not going 
far enough in his relativistic critique of psychiatric categories.  On the first page of 
his book, Making Minds and Madness, Borsch-Jacobsen firmly denounces the 
historical tendency to engage in ‘objectivist complicity’ with present-day 
psychiatrists and their categories.  Yet even this committed relativist makes 
exceptions for certain ‘mental disorders with a clearly organic foundation’, those 
which ‘escape from history’ by dint of their unequivocal organic basis.  He names 
Alzheimer’s disease as one such ahistorical entity.9 
The twentieth-century history of Alzheimer’s disease, however, shows that 
the ahistorical status of dementia and Alzheimer’s disease is not quite as certain as 
Borsch-Jacobsen suggests.  Alzheimer’s disease was first named in 1910, but the 
term did not come into regular use until the mid-twentieth century.  The adoption 
of this new category involved a re-conceptualisation of old-age dementia:  from a 
                                                             
5 Sally Swartz, 'Changing Diagnoses in Valkenberg Asylum, Cape Colony, 1891-1920: a Longitudinal 
View', History of Psychiatry, 6 (1995), p. 451. 
6 Elizabeth Lunbeck, The Psychiatric Persuasion: Knowledge, Gender, and Power in Modern America 
(Princeton, 1994), p. 4. 
7 Ian Hacking, 'Kinds of People:  Moving Targets', Proceedings of the British Academy, 151 (2007), p. 
285; Ian Hacking, 'Making up People', in Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna and David E. Wellbery 
(eds), Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality and the Self in Western Thought 
(Stanford, 1986), pp. 222-36. 
8
 Ian Hacking, 'Get Knitting', London Review of Books, 27 (2005), p. 20. 
9 Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, Making Minds and Madness: From Hysteria to Depression (Cambridge, 
2009), pp. 1-2. 
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product of the natural ageing process, to a potentially curable disease.  Historians 
such as Jesse Ballenger and Patrick Fox, and critical dementia theorist, Thomas 
Kitwood, have argued that this reconceptualisation was the result of a confluence of 
interests between medical researchers and lay campaigners.10  Simply put, it was 
easier to attract funding and attention for a clearly defined – potentially curable – 
disease category, than for a syndrome connected to the inevitable, and still largely 
opaque, process of old-age decline.  Through this historical narrative, Alzheimer’s 
and dementia emerge as deeply contingent categories, even if they have an 
‘absolutely objective neurological condition’ underpinning them. 
For these reasons, this thesis cannot be called a history of senile dementia, or 
a pre-history of Alzheimer’s.   Rather, it treats the categories of senility and 
dementia as objects of historical analysis, and draws attention to other categories 
which have been used to describe mental disorder in and of old age.  At the same 
time, it is inescapably a history of the present, forged in response to the discursive, 
political and personal impact of the twenty-first-century ‘ageing society’ and the 
‘challenge of dementia’.11 This project was undertaken in the hope that history could 
offer novel ways of thinking about this contemporary crisis.  This thesis is therefore 
primarily interested in mental disorders which appeared for the first time in old 
age, and were linked explicitly to the ageing process.   Chronic insanity and ageing 
in the asylum are mentioned only briefly in this thesis:  these are large and 
significant topics which require dedicated studies of their own.12  However, a 
                                                             
10 Jesse Ballenger, Self, Senility, and Alzheimer's Disease in Modern America: a History (Baltimore, 
2006), pp. 81-112; Thomas Beach, 'The History of Alzheimer's Disease: Three Debates', Journal of the 
History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 42 (1987), pp. 327-49; Patrick J. Fox, 'From Senility to 
Alzheimer's Disease: The Rise of the Alzheimer's Disease Movement', The Milbank Quarterly, 67 
(1989), pp. 58-102; Tom Kitwood, 'Dementia:  Social Section - Part II', in G. E. Berrios and Roy Porter 
(ed.), A History of Clinical Psychiatry:  The Origin and History of Psychiatric Disorders (London, 1995), 
pp. 63-71. 
11 ‘Apocalyptic demography’ is a politically-charged phrase, usually used to critique the widespread 
notion that our society is moving towards an age-based social crisis.  See Ellen M. Gee and Gloria M. 
Gutman, The Overselling of Population Aging: Apocalyptic Demography, Intergenerational 
Challenges, and Social Policy (Don Mills, 2000).  The ‘dementia challenge’ is a British policy-based 
phrase:  Department of Health, Prime Minister’s Challenge on Dementia (26 March, 2012).  This 
report predicts that 1.7 million people in Britain will be living with dementia by 2051. 
12 Vicky Long is currently undertaking work on chronic mental illness in post-war Britain, see Vicky 
Long, 'Rethinking Post-war Mental Health Care: Industrial Therapy and the Chronic Mental Patient in 
Britain', Social History of Medicine, 26 (2013), pp. 738-58. 
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complete separation between two phenomena – old age and chronicity – is neither 
practically possible, nor intellectually justified.   
Choosing a chronological starting point for old age is not straightforward: 
the life course is also afflicted with a categorical ‘knowledge problem’.  However, it 
has been necessary to set a point in order to collect a sample of patient records.  
Chapters Three, Four and Five are based on a sample of patient case notes from 
Hanwell Asylum between 1851 and 1912.  All of these patients were (or were 
believed to be) aged 60 or over when they were admitted. 13  Historians of old age 
have emphasised that, prior to the institution of widespread retirement in the 
twentieth century, old age was more likely to be defined by function and capacity, 
and other cultural markers, than by chronology.14 This being said, the use of 60 as a 
starting-point for old age has a long historical precedent.   Historian of old age, Pat 
Thane, has suggested that ‘sixty was long the age at which law or custom permitted 
withdrawal from public activities on grounds of old age’, an inference based 
primarily on the exclusion of the over- 60s from a variety of legal obligations under 
the 1349 Ordinance of Labours.15  The youngest person to be described as ‘senile’ in 
Hanwell’s case notes during the sample years was aged 60.  Selecting patient case 
notes by age, rather than diagnosis, has necessarily led to some conflation of 
chronicity and ageing.  However, widening the net to include patients who were 
not necessarily labelled as ‘old’ or ‘senile’, has revealed the growing importance of 
old age as a category in nineteenth-century psychiatry. 
                                                             
13 Historian James Mills is highly critical of the practice of creating age profiles from asylum case 
notes, noting that doctors often did not know patients’ real ages.  While this may be true, it does not 
seriously affect the meaning of the age data collected in this study. What matters here is how the 
perceived old age of a patient affected the way that their mental disorder was understood, 
categorised and responded to, more so than the actual age of the patient.  In cases where an age 
was entered on admission, and then an amended age given after a visit from a friend or relative, the 
amended age is used.  When no actual age was recorded, and the age is given as – for example – 
'appears 60', then that is the age which is used.  James H. Mills, Madness, Cannabis and Colonialism: 
the 'Native-Only' Lunatic Asylums of British India, 1857-1900 (Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 16-17. 
14Janet Roebuck, 'When Does "Old Age" Begin?: The Evolution of the English Definition', Journal of 
Social History, 12 (1979), p. 417; Susannah R Ottaway, The Decline of Life: Old Age in Eighteenth-
Century England (Cambridge, 2004), p. 17. 
15
 Pat Thane, 'Social Histories of Old Age and Aging', Journal of Social History, 37 (2003), p. 97; 
Shulamith Shahar, 'Old Age in the High and Late Middle Ages', in Paul  Johnson and Pat Thane (eds), 
Old Age from Antiquity to Post-Modernity (London, 1998), p.  43. 
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Defining the Locus of Study 
This thesis examines responses to, and understandings of, old-age mental disorder, 
from a particular perspective:  that of psychiatry.  Psychiatry in itself is an 
anachronistic term, which did not come into common usage until the 1890s.  As 
historian Janet Oppenheim has pointed out, echoed by literary scholar Helen Small, 
‘nomenclature for the medical doctor who tended to the insane was revised and re-
revised in the Victorian period’. 16  Some historians have chosen ‘alienist’ or 
‘medico-psychologist’ as their preferred term to refer to medical specialists in 
mental illness, in an attempt to preserve historical accuracy.17  This study follows 
Helen Small in adopting the anachronistic term ‘psychiatrist’, for the sake of 
simplicity, underscored with a clear definition.  Psychiatry in nineteenth-century 
Britain can be defined intellectually and institutionally.  Historian Ludwig Fleck’s 
concept of a ‘thought collective’ – ‘a community of persons mutually exchanging 
ideas or maintaining intellectual interaction’ – is useful here.18  The thought 
community, of what this thesis will call ‘psychiatrists’, interacted regularly through 
the pages of the Journal of Mental Science, and through the meetings of the MPA.  
Some of them published textbooks and treatises, in which they referred to and 
refined each other’s work.  In these texts, they produced a body of knowledge with 
a shared referent:  the insane person.   
As well as interacting through these shared forums, almost all of the 
psychiatrists who published in the Journal of Mental Science shared a common 
profession: Medical Superintendent of a lunatic asylum.  This thesis will refer to all 
asylum medical officers, who were professionally engaged in the care and treatment 
of the insane, as ‘psychiatrists’, even if they did not actively participate in the 
production of published psychiatric knowledge.  The asylum provided the locus for 
                                                             
16 Janet Oppenheim, Shattered Nerves: Doctors, Patients, and Depression in Victorian England (New 
York, 1991), p. 27, as referenced in Helen Small, ''In the Guise of Science': Literature and the 
Rhetoric of Nineteenth-Century English Psychiatry', History of the Human Sciences, 7 (1994), p. 32. 
17Gayle Davis, The Cruel Madness of Love: Sex, Syphilis and Psychiatry in Scotland, 1880-1930 
(Amsterdam, 2008), p. 15; Michael Anthony Finn, 'The West Riding Lunatic Asylum and the Making 
of the Modern Brain Sciences in the Nineteenth Century', (PhD Thesis, University of Leeds, 2012), p. 
46. 
18 Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (Chicago, 1979), p. 39. 
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the development of psychiatry as a medical specialism in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, and provides the institutional context for this thesis.19  
Nineteenth-century psychiatry was dominated by large pauper county lunatic 
asylums, funded by local rates, mostly accommodating those who could not afford 
to contribute to their own care.20  In 1808, the County Asylums Act empowered local 
Justices of the Peace to build asylums for the care and treatment of their pauper 
lunatics.  It was under this act that the institutional case study of this thesis – 
Hanwell Asylum in North-West London – was built.  In 1845, the County Asylums 
Act made this provision compulsory.  By 1854 there were 37 county lunatic asylums 
in England, rising to 63 in 1884, and reaching 97 in 1914.21   
 There are two main reasons for limiting this study largely to the theory and 
institutions of psychiatry.  Firstly, the focus on psychiatry is a product of the 
present-centric starting point of the project. Dementia, a category which remains 
current in the description and classification of old-age mental disorders in the 
twenty-first century, was a central category in nineteenth-century psychiatry, and 
was used to describe much more than just old-age mental disorders.22  In order to 
                                                             
19 Roy Porter, Mind-Forg'd Manacles: a History of Madness in England from the Restoration to the 
Regency (London, 1987), p. 167; Andrew Scull, The Most Solitary of Afflictions: Madness and Society 
in Britain 1700-1900 (New Haven, 1993), pp. 232-51. 
20The institutional care of the insane has a long history, particularly in London, where the infamous 
Bethlem hospital provided specialised care to the insane since at least the fifteenth century.  The 
eighteenth century saw the proliferation of private madhouses, run by savvy medical entrepreneurs.  
Private and charitable institutions for the insane continued to exist in the nineteenth century, taking 
in very wealthy patients (such as Ticehurst Asylum in Sussex), the respectable, but not wealthy, 
middle-classes (such as Holloway Sanatorium in Surrey), or paupers whose Poor Law Unions were 
unable to accommodate them (such as the Bethnal Green Asylum in East London). On Bethlem, see 
Jonathan  Andrews, Asa  Briggs, Roy  Porter, Penny  Tucker and Keir Waddington, The History of 
Bethlem (London, 1997).  On eighteenth-century madhouses, see Porter, Mind-Forg'd Manacles, pp. 
110-68; William Parry-Jones, The Trade in Lunacy: a Study of Private Madhouses in England in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (London, 1972).  On private and charitable institutions in the 
nineteenth century, see Charlotte MacKenzie, Psychiatry for the Rich: a History of Ticehurst Private 
Asylum, 1792-1917 (London, 1992); Anne Shepherd, 'Mental health Care and Charity for the 
Middling Sort:  Holloway Sanatorium 1885-1900', in Anne Borsay and Peter Shapely (ed.), Medicine, 
Charity and Mutual Aid the Consumption of Health and Welfare in Britain, c.1550-1950 (Aldershot, 
2007), pp. 163-82; Elaine Murphy, 'A Mad House Transformed:  The Lives and Work of Charles James 
Beverley FRS (1788-1868) and John Warburton FRS (1795-1847)', Notes and Records, 58 (2004), pp. 
267-81. 
21 Scull, Most Solitary of Afflictions, p. 369. 
22 Having said this, dementia was controversially removed from the new edition of the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V).  Due 
apparently to the stigma attached to the term, it was replaced with ‘mild’ and ‘major neurocognitive 
disorder’, provoking much discussion about the creeping pathologisation of ‘normal’ old age:  S. Katz 
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fully understand the meaning of this term in the nineteenth century, it must be 
placed within the context of psychiatry as a whole.  The second reason is the 
richness and availability of the asylum records.  Nineteenth-century asylum doctors 
and administrators prolifically produced material – printed and hand-written – 
relating to the management, treatment and care of its population23  Asylum case 
notes in particular are unparalleled in the depth of information they provide about 
the lives, and treatment, of ordinary mentally-disordered people.  Of course, not 
every person who suffered from old-age mental disorder entered an asylum, and 
not everyone who wrote about it did so from the perspective of psychiatry.  The 
focus on a county lunatic asylum also limits this thesis to an examination of old-age 
mental disorder among poorer people.  Alternative provision for the care of the 
aged mentally disordered with greater financial means – in private homes, private 
asylums, or through the employment of servant-carers – are not discussed.  This 
thesis, then, provides only a partial view of old-age mental disorder in the 
nineteenth-century, the implications of which are discussed in the conclusion. 
 As well as being limited to psychiatry, this study is limited geographically – 
to London.  Nineteenth-century London was, above all else, populous.  Between 
1800 and 1910, the city experienced a population explosion, going from just under 1 
million inhabitants, to 4.5 million (over 7 million if the increasing suburban sprawl 
of Greater London is taken into account),  making it by far the largest city in the 
world. 24 This population was characterised by high numbers of migrants – the net 
population gain in London through migration between 1841 and 1911 was 1.25 
million – and by a comparative youthfulness wrought by this migrant population:  
with a larger proportion of 15-34-year-olds than elsewhere in England and Wales, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
and K. R. Peters, 'Enhancing the Mind? Memory Medicine, Dementia, and the Aging Brain', Journal of 
Aging Studies, 22 (2008), pp. 348-55; Daniel R. George, Peter J. Whitehouse and Jesse Ballenger, 'The 
Evolving Classification of Dementia: Placing the DSM-V in a Meaningful Historical and Cultural 
Context and Pondering the Future of “Alzheimer’s”', Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry, 35 (2011), 
pp. 426-30; Tiago Moreira, Carl May and John Bond, 'Regulatory Objectivity in Action: Mild Cognitive 
Impairment and the Collective Production of Uncertainty', Social Studies of Science, 39 (2009), pp. 
665-90 . 
23 Jonathan Andrews, 'Case Notes, Case Histories, and the Patient's Experience of Insanity at 
Gartnavel Royal Asylum, Glasgow, in the Nineteenth Century', Social History of Medicine, 11 (1998), 
pp. 255-56. 
24 Michael  Ball and David Sunderland, An Economic History of London, 1800-1914 (London, 2001), p. 
42. 
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and a smaller proportion of over 55s.25  It was also characterised, in the 
contemporary mind, by poverty: a dangerous, unknown anarchistic type of 
poverty, engendered by a casually (un)employed and highly mobile population.26  
More recent historical investigations have questioned the extent to which London 
was genuinely beset by disproportionate levels of poverty.27  There was, however, 
an unquestionably high level of pauperism.28  In 1870, London contained 15 per cent 
of the paupers in England and Wales which, although proportionate to the relative 
size of its population, was particularly visible in the concentrated urban space.29  
The visibility of pauperism in London was enhanced by the tendency of London 
Poor Law Unions to administer relief via the workhouse, rather than through out-
relief payments:  by the early 1890s, 82 per cent of London’s paupers were relieved 
in the workhouse, compared with 34 per cent in the rest of England.30  This 
enormous workhouse population was not made up of the feckless, young, migrant 
poor, but by the aged:  in the second half of the nineteenth century, half of London’s 
workhouse inmates were aged 60 or over.31  There may have been fewer over 55s in 
London than in the rest of the country, then, but aged paupers were highly visible 
in London, and a major part of the problem with which London’s Poor Law 
Guardians had to contend. 
 London’s unique characteristics – its size, its wealth disparity, its large and 
diverse institutionalised population – led to certain innovations in social policy, and 
make it a particularly interesting place to study responses to old age mental 
disorder.  In 1867, the Metropolitan Poor Act established a new administrative body 
– the Metropolitan Asylums Board (MAB) – which was empowered to build 
specialised medical institutions for London’s paupers, funded by a rate levied on 
                                                             
25 Ball and Sunderland, An Economic History of London, pp. 44, 49. 
26 Gareth Stedman Jones, Outcast London: a Study in the Relationship Between Classes in Victorian 
Society (Oxford, 1971). 
27 Ball and Sunderland, An Economic History of London, p. 111. 
28 The number of people who received relief through the Poor Law. 
29 David R. Green, Pauper Capital: London and the Poor Law, 1790-1870 (Farnham, 2010), p. 191 
30 George R. Boyer and Timothy P. Schmidle, 'Poverty Among the Elderly in Late Victorian England', 
The Economic History Review, 62 (2009), p. 262. 
31
 Lynn Hollen Lees, 'The Survival of the Unfit:  Welfare Policies and Family Maintenance in 
Nineteenth-Century London', in Peter Mandler (ed.), The Uses of Charity:  The Poor on Relief in the 
Nineteenth-Century Metropolis (Philadelphia, 1990), p. 76. 
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each London Poor Law Union, with the amount contributed dependent on their 
income.32  By 1877, the MAB had opened five ‘isolation hospitals’ for fever and 
smallpox sufferers, and two ‘imbecile asylums’, at Caterham and Leavesden.  The 
MAB imbecile asylums were designed to cater for an ambiguously defined cohort of 
chronic and incurable lunatics and the mentally infirm.  They were technically 
workhouses – funded by the local rates and overseen by the Local Government 
Board (the central body which oversaw the administration of the Poor Law) – but 
entering them required a form of certification.  They thus occupied an intermediate 
space between the workhouse and the asylum.  Their ambiguous status made 
Leavesden and Caterham ideal institutions to deal with the similarly ambiguous 
senile population, but the MAB managers fiercely resisted this role.  The second 
chapter of this thesis examines the response of the MAB to aged patients, as an 
illustrative case study of the pervasive inertia and resistance of Victorian welfare 
providers in the face of an elderly mentally-disordered population.    
The major case study of this thesis is, however, the 1st Middlesex County 
Asylum at Hanwell (known simply as ‘Hanwell Asylum’ after 1889).33  Hanwell 
opened in 1831, and was the oldest – and, for much of the century, the largest – of 
London’s county asylums.    In the 1840s, Hanwell came to embody the early 
optimism of the asylums project, following the pioneering implementation of a 
policy of non-restraint.  After joining Hanwell as Medical Superintendent in 1839, 
Dr John Conolly renounced the use of physical coercion to control violent or unruly 
inmates.34  Conolly focussed on maintaining an efficient and impersonal orderly 
regime, with clear rules and disciplined attendants, operating within pleasant 
                                                             
32
 Gwendoline M. Ayers, England's First State Hospitals and the Metropolitan Asylums Board, 1867-
1930 (London, 1971); Green, Pauper Capital, pp. 235-45. 
33 Middlesex was the old county which comprised of most of what would now be considered London 
north of the Thames, as far east as Tottenham and Edmonton, as well as rural areas to the north and 
west.  After the 1889 Local Government Act, most of this was incorporated into the new county of 
London, and Hanwell came under the control of the London County Council.   
34 Andrew Scull, 'John Conolly:  a Victorian Psychiatric Career', in Andrew Scull (ed.), Social 
Order/Mental Disorder: Anglo-American Psychiatry in Historical Perspective (London, 1989), pp. 162-
213; Nancy Tomes, 'The Great Restraint Controversy:  a Comparative Perspective on Anglo-American 
Psychiatry in the Nineteenth Century', in William F. Bynum and Roy Porter (eds), The Anatomy of 
Madness: Essays in the History of Psychiatry,  Vol. III (London, 1988), pp. 190-225; Akihito Suzuki, 
‘The Politics and Ideology of Non-Restraint:  The Case of Hanwell Asylum’, Medical History 39 (1995), 
pp. 1-17 . 
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domestic surroundings.35 While the move towards non-restraint was initially 
controversial in medical circles, The Times lauded Conolly as a hero and, in 1842, the 
Duke of Cambridge declared Hanwell an ‘admirable institution’. 36   
However, the glory days of Hanwell were short-lived.  The number of 
resident patients quickly outstripped the available resources, reaching 1,000 in 1854.  
In 1856, four years after Conolly had left the asylum following a protracted period 
of disagreement with the managing Justices, a writer in the Journal of Mental Science 
declared that  
for our own honour it is necessary that [our fellow 
psychologists abroad] should know that the glory of Hanwell is 
passed away; that it is a very inferior and in many respects an 
ill-built, ill-adapted, and an indifferently managed asylum.37 
Hanwell’s reputation never recovered.  The asylum continued to grow, reaching 
1,500 patients in 1862.  In 1871, psychiatrist William Lauder Lindsey described it as 
a ‘monster’ asylum.38  In 1875, as part of a large-scale investigation of the state of 
provision for lunatics in the south of England undertaken for The Lancet, J. Mortimer 
Granville was damning of any pretentions Hanwell might have to the status of a 
curative or medical institution: ‘[Although] it may be available as a place of refuge 
for imbecile and chronic cases of mental disease…the notion of sending there acute 
or recent, and therefore possibly curable cases, should be wholly and at once 
abandoned’.39   It is perhaps no coincidence that one Hanwell Superintendent from 
the 1870s and 80s, Henry Rayner, went on to become a champion of out-patient 
                                                             
35 Suzuki, ‘The Politics and Ideology of Non-Restraint’, pp. 15-16. 
36 Scull, 'John Conolly', pp. 189-92; The Times, 8 March 1842, p. 13, as quoted in Scull, ‘John Conolly’, 
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mental health care.40  During the mid-nineteenth century, Hanwell had transformed 
from the embodiment of the hopes of the asylums project, to an indictment of its 
failings.   
By the turn of the century, when Hanwell reached its sixtieth year, it had 
long since entered its senility: crumbing, pitied and apparently irredeemable.  In 
1910, the spring meeting of the South-Eastern division of the MPA was held at 
Hanwell.  Long-standing Medical Superintendent, Percy J. Baily, chose to give an 
address on the topic of the asylum’s history, rather than on any new developments 
in asylum practice. 41 Like the stereotypical old man who ‘shrinks from new 
enterprises’ and ‘lauds the past, concerning which he has the memories of interest 
and policies and achievements’, Baily’s choice to focus on Hanwell’s long-past 
glories was an (unintentional) indictment of the stagnation which had occurred in 
the intervening decades.42  Hanwell’s latter-nineteenth-century incarnation as the 
old man of English asylumdom, its worldly achievements well behind it, makes it a 
particularly interesting place to study the aged and old age.  On one hand, Hanwell 
keenly felt the pressures of institutional overcrowding, and as such had every 
reason to protest against the admission of ‘undesirable cases’.  On the other hand, 
by the 1870s, the reputation of Hanwell as a receptacle for the incurable was 
assured, and its doctors and managers were forced to come to terms with their role 
as providers of care for the elderly mentally disordered and other unpromising 
patients.  Hanwell’s patient records suggest that, on an individual level, Hanwell’s 
medical officers were prepared to offer the best care they could to the older patients 
they were confronted with.   
The History of the Asylum 
The nineteenth-century asylum is already served by a rich historiography, which 
will be surveyed here.  The historiography of the asylum in Britain is often divided 
                                                             
40 R. Percy Smith, 'Henry Rayner, M.D.Aberd., M.R.C.P.Edin', Journal of Mental Science, 72 (1926), 
pp. 176-77; Henry Rayner, 'Mental After-Care', Journal of Mental Science, 70 (1924), pp. 358-62. 
41 'Medico-Psychological Association. South-Eastern Division', Journal of Mental Science, 56 (1910), 
pp. 558-68. 
42 This description of old age was written by psychiatrist Henry Maudsley:  Henry Maudsley, The 
Physiology of Mind (London, 1879), p. 537. 
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into three phases, characterised as ‘traditional’, ‘revisionist’ and ‘counter-
revisionist’.43  The oppositional claims of these historiographic approaches, and the 
debates they have engendered, have set the research agenda for most British asylum 
histories.  The first phase in the history of psychiatry was written by psychiatrists, 
seeking to account for the development of their own profession.  Secure in their 
belief that ‘history is made by men’, the accounts produced by these clinician-
historians were conservative and hagiographic.44 Kathleen Jones’ pioneering 1955 
text Lunacy, Law and Conscience, and its successor Mental Health and Social Policy, are 
anomalies amongst these early works.45  Jones’ area of specialism was social policy, 
rather than psychiatry, and her books constituted the first systematic examination of 
the lunacy reforms of the nineteenth century.  Ultimately, however, her work sits 
neatly alongside that of the clinician-historians: telling a narrative of benevolent 
progress, in which psychiatrists were thwarted in their attempt to offer humane and 
effective treatments by the unnecessary interference of the legal profession.46  
Although superseded by revisionist approaches, this clinically-oriented approach to 
the history of the asylum has not disappeared.  Edward Shorter’s A History of 
Psychiatry, for example, sought to ‘rescue the history of psychiatry from the 
sectarians who have made the subject a sandbox for their ideologies’, by presenting 
an account of the shifting dominance of different interpretations of the mind-body 
problem in nineteenth- and twentieth-century psychiatry.47  Psychiatrist-historians 
continue to publish clinically-oriented historical studies, seeking to apply 
                                                             
43 See, for example, Roy Porter, 'History of Psychiatry in Britain', History of Psychiatry, 2 (1991), pp. 
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retrospective diagnoses to asylum records; indeed, the only existent study of old 
age in an English asylum takes this approach.48 
As early as the 1960s, however, the narrative of benevolent scientific 
progress – along with psychiatry itself – was being challenged on a number of 
fronts.  In 1960, two young psychiatrists published works which began long careers 
of challenging the very existence of mental illnesses as imagined by the medical 
discipline of psychiatry:  Thomas Szasz  argued in ‘The Myth of Mental Illness’ that 
the phenomena we call ‘mental illnesses’ are not, in fact, ontological entities, but a 
mythical construct which attempt to capture multifaceted “problems in living”;  
while R.D. Laing’s The Divided Self  suggested that schizophrenia was not an organic 
entity, but a response to the existential problems of maintaining an authentic self. 49   
These direct challenges to the legitimacy of psychiatric knowledge significantly 
undermined clinician-historians’ attempts to chart its teleological development. A 
year later, American sociologist Erving Goffman published Asylums, a study which 
challenged the benevolence and effectiveness of institutional psychiatric treatment, 
arguing that the asylum was a ‘total institution’ which removed inmates’ personal 
agency, rendering them docile and passive, rather than ‘cured’.50 
 Michel Foucault’s 1964 Histoire de la Folie, an abridged version of his 1961 
doctoral dissertation, applied this critical stance to psychiatry and its institutions 
directly to their history.   Published in an English translation in 1965 – in a series 
edited by R.D. Laing – Madness and Civilization examined attitudes and 
understandings of madness across a broad sweep of European history, from the 
Middle Ages to the beginning of the twentieth century.  It is rich with insights, but 
perhaps the most influential is its elucidation of the interrelationship between the 
act of institutionalisation, the emergence of the psychiatric profession, and the 
conceptualisation of madness. The modern understanding of madness, Foucault 
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argued, was a product of the Enlightenment: a form of unreason, created in 
opposition to the new ruling value of reason.51  The division of unreason from 
reason ushered in a 'Great Confinement' of the unreasonable in the eighteenth 
century, in which all those who did not follow the path of ordered, rational 
bourgeois productivity - the sick, the vagrant, the otherwise deviant - were 
segregated and confined.52   From the ‘depths of confinement’ a new classification 
emerged at the beginning of the nineteenth century: madness was split off 
decisively from other forms of unreason, into a dedicated institution – the asylum – 
where the medical model of mental illness reigned.  Madness came to be seen as a 
pathology which could and should be recovered from, and psychiatry emerged as 
the autonomous profession which promised to restore the unreasonable mad back 
to productive reason.53  Psychiatry, then, was not a response to the problem of 
mental illness, but was constitutive of the problem itself.54   
 Madness and Civilization, though widely criticised for its lack of empirical 
rigour, was the seminal work of the ‘revisionist’ historiography of psychiatry and 
the asylum which emerged in the wake of these challenges to a teleological history 
of psychiatry in the 1970s and 80s.55  For the first time, the history of the asylum was 
being seriously investigated by professional historians (and sociologists), rather 
than clinicians, and thus a new narrative emerged which set the rise of the asylum 
in the context of the broad social, economic and political changes wrought by 
modernity.  Historians such as David Rothman, Klaus Doerner and David Mellett 
re-interpreted nineteenth-century lunacy reforms as an attempt to remove or 
confine deviant sections of the population, the restore them to productive work, and 
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to shore up the social order of industrial capitalism.56  While differing in emphasis, 
the revisionists were united in their sceptical attitudes towards the claims of 
psychiatrists, and their triumphant narrative of the discipline’s development. 
Over the last forty years, American sociologist Andrew Scull has emerged as 
the most prominent and tenacious of the revisionist asylum historians.  In his 1979 
book Museums of Madness, updated and revised in 1993 as The Most Solitary of 
Afflictions, Scull sought to account for the establishment and proliferation of 
institutions for the mad in nineteenth-century Britain, and the subsequent 
progressive increase in the number of incarcerated lunatics.57  In the early-
nineteenth century, he argues, the transition to a free-market economic system – in 
which poorer people gained their sustenance through wage-labour rather than 
through more localised systems of obligation – made a ‘family-based system of 
caring for the insane’ particularly difficult to sustain.58  These same structural 
changes, which saw the socially undesirable underclass emerge as a simultaneously 
dislocated and lumpen mass, encouraged the building of ‘institutions’ – 
workhouses, prisons, asylums – as the most ‘efficient and economical’ means to deal 
with a variety of social ills.59  The insane emerged from these institutional 
populations as a particularly problematic category of social deviant.60  An 
entrepreneurial cadre of medical professionals seized on the opportunity afforded 
by this newly visible institutional population, using it as the basis for ‘the 
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establishment of a new organised profession’:  psychiatry.  Through their efforts, in 
the early nineteenth century, committal to a medically-controlled lunatic asylum 
was reified as the only legitimate response to mental abnormality.61   
Scull’s grand narrative has come in for significant criticism:  most 
convincingly, on the grounds that his chronology relies on an out-dated narrative of 
modernity, and an overly simplistic view of the relationship between economic and 
social change. 62   He has been charged with ignoring the complex array of strategies 
of care which continued to be employed alongside the county asylum, particularly 
in Scotland.63  Nevertheless, Scull’s account offers several profound insights which 
remain useful.  One of the most interesting elements of his narrative is the way in 
which he ties together the activities of families who chose to institutionalise their 
loved ones, and those of the professionals who administered and promoted the 
asylum as the ideal response to insanity.  Scull has been justly criticised for over-
estimating the level of control held by asylum physicians in the admission of 
individual patients to the asylum.64 However, he is also more broadly interested in 
the role of both families and psychiatrists in negotiating the meaning of insanity, 
and in creating the conditions in which asylum admission came to be seen as an 
acceptable response to the problem of mental disorder.  He argues that, even 
though the proliferation of the asylum and the rise of psychiatry went a long way 
towards defining insanity, the precise location of the line between madness and 
sanity remained ambiguous.  Faced with an ambiguous target population, and with 
an eye to their own professional security, the original lunacy reformers adopted a 
stance of ‘incorporation rather than exclusion’.65  At the same time, the emergence of 
the asylum, as a legitimate alternative to struggling at home with an ‘intolerable 
member’, by its very existence, encouraged families to make use of it.  Thus 
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by offering another means of coping, [the emergence of the 
asylum] affect[ed] the degree to which people [were] prepared 
to put up with those who persistently create[d] havoc, discord, 
and disarray, as well as with those whose extreme helplessness 
and dependency creates extraordinary burdens for others.66 
In this way, families were themselves complicit in advancing an inclusive definition 
of insanity. 
  The second and third chapters of this thesis will build on and extend this 
argument, although it will place greater emphasis on the role of Poor Law officials, 
who are marginal in Scull’s account.67  The admission of the elderly disordered poor 
to the asylum was, it argues, a manifestation and consequence of the inclusiveness 
of the asylum, which was recognised and used as the legitimate site for the care and 
containment of people whose behaviours had rendered them unmanageable 
anywhere else.  At the same time, the pressures wrought by the increase in insanity 
encouraged the administrators of lunacy to advance a more exclusive definition of 
insanity, in which the manageability, incurability, and the supposed ‘naturalness’ of 
old-age mental disorder became grounds on which to contest their claim to asylum 
care. 
 Scull’s emergence as the only enduringly influential of the revisionist 
asylum historians (apart, of course, from Foucault), was partly due to his committed 
involvement in the debates which his critical stance engendered.68  However, the 
polarising nature of these debates prompted their own revisionist backlash, which 
saw Scull transformed from ‘enfant terrible…[to an] orthodox authority and Aunt 
Sally figure against which a new generation of scholars seeks to prove its mettle’.69  
                                                             
66 Ibid., pp. 352-53. 
67 Drawing on the work of Bartlett, The Poor Law of Lunacy. 
68 See, for example, Andrew Scull, 'Was Insanity Increasing? A Response to Edward Hare', The British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 144 (1984), pp. 432-36; Andrew Scull, 'Psychiatrists and Historical 'Facts'. Part 
One: The Historiography of Somatic Treatments', History of Psychiatry, 6 (1995), pp. 225-41;Andrew 
Scull, 'Psychiatrists and Historical 'Facts' Part Two: Re-writing the History of Asylumdom', History of 
Psychiatry, 6 (1995), pp. 387-94. 
69 Andrew Scull, ‘Rethinking the History of Asylumdom’, in Melling and Forsythe (eds), Insanity, 
Institutions and Society, p.  295. 
19 
 
In the 1980s and 90s, a new wave of asylum historians turned towards the sources, 
adopting an empiricist stance which implicitly or explicitly criticised the ‘overly 
ideologised and unconvincingly theorised’ approach of revisionist historiography.70  
One of the most active proponents of this counter-revisionist approach, Joseph 
Melling, has described his peers’ approach as ‘sceptical’ and ‘cautious’, rejecting 
‘ambitious model[s] of institutional transformation’, and emphasising micropolitics, 
discontinuities and the local.   71  Detailed institutional case studies form the 
backbone of this historiographic approach.72  While revisionist asylum historians 
tended to highlight the needs and interests of the political and economic elites in the 
creation and maintnance of the asylum, counter-revisionists have emphasised the 
social utility of the asylum ‘from below’.  By examining in more detail the precise 
mechanisms through which asylum patients were certified and admitted, counter-
revisionist historians have shown that figures outside the asylum – the doctors and 
Justices who authorised the certificate, and the Poor Law officials and families who 
arranged this certification – were by far the most important figures in determining 
who was admitted to the asylum.73  The implications and insights of this approach 
are discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. 
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Counter-revisionist histories of the asylum have been criticised for 
neglecting the importance of unequal power-relations in the asylum.74  This 
challenge has been answered, in part, by histories of the asylum which look at the 
influence of class, race and gender on psychiatric discourses and practices.  In the 
1970s and 80s the same broad political impulses which gave rise to the revisionist 
critique of psychiatry and the asylum, also gave rise to feminist critiques.75  Phyllis 
Chesler and Elaine Showalter elucidated the essentially patriarchal nature of 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century psychiatry, arguing that it operated as a tool to 
repress socially aberrant female behaviour.  They argued that modern madness 
constituted a Female Malady, disproportionately experienced by, and associated 
with, women.76  A ‘nuanced’ corrective to this critique has appeared in the last 15 
years, as part of the broader counter-revisionist movement. 77  David Wright, for 
example, has suggested that the gendered element of the behavioural changes 
which often preceeded institutionalisation, was merely a reflection of the habitual 
influence of gender roles in daily life.78  The new feminist historiography of the 
asylum, then, rejects the notion of the asylum as a site of female incarceration, but 
continues to build on the more general insight of the original feminist 
historiography, that madness was defined in part as a violation of gender norms.  
Catharine Coleborne, for example, has argued that nineteenth-century psychiatry 
‘[articulated] the meanings of sex difference…in ways that produced the patient as 
either male or female’.79   
In this thesis, gender is marginalised as a category of analysis, in favour of 
age.  This is partly in response to the de-gendering effect of age reflected in the 
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sources, as discussed in Chapter One.  The case notes of Hanwell reveal a certain 
level of gendered differentiation in the experience of old-age mental disorder – 
particularly with regards to spousal relationships – but not as much as one might 
expect.  There is, however, more to be said about the intersection between age and 
gender in nineteenth-century psychiatry than this thesis has found space to relate, 
and it is a topic in need of further study. 
In recent years, gerontologists have worked to establish ‘age’ as a major 
category of social analysis alongside class, race and gender.80  Old age has received 
little attention within the history of the asylum.81  When mentioned in broader 
asylum histories, the presence of the aged in the asylum has largely been offered as 
proof that it was being used as a receptacle for the unwanted and unproductive,   
thereby echoing  the arguments made by contemporary asylum managers, 
discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis.82  This position has been disputed by the 
only two historical asylum studies to look specifically at aged patients.  The first of 
these, by Canadian historian Edgar-André Montigny, looks at the admission of aged 
patients to a Toronto asylum in the latter part of the nineteenth century.  Montigny 
argues that the asylum constituted a ‘last desperate resort’ for families who chose to 
institutionalise their aged members. 83  The second is a largely quantitative study of 
aged patients admitted to two asylums in nineteenth-century Oxfordshire. Written 
by two clinicians, its principal finding is that the vast majority of aged patients 
showed a ‘florid and instantly recognizable psychopathology’.84  Although it does 
not situate itself within wider historiographic debates, their article essentially 
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supports Montigny’s argument: that aged patients were sent to the asylum because 
their behaviours sat comfortably within the boundaries of certifiable lunacy and 
presented significant challenges to the people around them.  
The counter-revisionist historiography of the asylum has quite deliberately 
distanced itself from the theoretical models and categories of psychiatry.   David 
Wright, in his influential 1997 article, ‘Getting Out of the Asylum’, argued that 
historians should start ‘separating the history of confinement from the history of 
psychiatry’.85  Even before this intervention from Wright, counter-revisionist 
histories of the asylum were primarily social histories, seeking to understand the 
place of asylums within the local communities that used them.86   In more recent 
years, a handful of historical studies have attempted to insert medicine back into the 
history of the asylum, and to reintegrate the theory and practice of psychiatry in the 
nineteenth century.  This has been done partly through studies of particular clinical 
and diagnostic categories.  Hilary Marland’s book, Dangerous Motherhood, uses a 
wide range of historical material to examine the medical understanding, treatment 
and experience of puerperal insanity amongst British women from across the social 
spectrum.87  In The Cruel Madness of Love, Gayle Davis examines the classification, 
management and treatment of General Paralysis of the Insane (GPI) and syphilitic 
insanity, situating the development of psychiatric knowledge about these 
conditions within a clinical context.88  This thesis follows the path indicated by 
Marland and Davis, taking seriously the social and practical aspects of asylum 
management, admission and care, but keeping in mind the status of the asylum as a 
medical institution.  Chapter Four in particular demonstrates the way in which, 
through internally and externally directed changes to asylum record-keeping 
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practices, the shifting categories and priorities of psychiatric theory encroached 
upon even the most conservative institutions. 
The History of Old Age 
The historiography of old age is somewhat less well-developed than that of the 
asylum, although interest in the topic has increased as the experience of ageing has 
itself become more widespread.  Studies pertaining to the history of old age first 
began to appear in the 1960s, but research into the field did not begin in earnest 
until the late 1970s.  Histories of old age have centred around two broad, 
overlapping themes:  responsibility and dependence, and social and medical 
problematisation.  Both have significant implications for this thesis. 
The first of these themes concerns the social realities of living to old age, and 
the political interventions which have mediated the problems a long life can bring.  
One of the earliest concerns of the history of old age was to debunk the so-called 
‘golden age’ myth, of an unspecified pre-modern past ‘in which older people were 
venerated by their community and cared for by their family’.89  In 1969, Peter Laslett 
famously announced that household size in England has been consistently small at 
least as far back as the sixteenth century.  He suggested that the average household 
size from this time until the nineteenth century was 4.75, precluding a widespread 
pattern of multigenerational cohabitation.90  Although this precise figure has been 
challenged over the last 50 years, even by Laslett himself, the broader conclusion 
that old people did not usually live with their children continues to be largely 
accepted.91  This has led to the recognition, not that older people have been 
historically neglected, but that the ‘locus of responsibility for the elderly’ spread 
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beyond the family, and included ‘the community, and older individuals 
themselves’.92 
Ideally, as Susannah Ottaway and Pat Thane have argued, older people in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries lived in a state of ‘negotiated 
independence’:  supporting themselves as far as possible, but drawing on a 
patchwork of familial, charitable and state  support if their own means, or their 
ability to work, failed. 93  Charitable and voluntary organisations – such as friendly 
societies, almshouses, and homes for the aged poor – have undoubtedly  played an 
important role in supporting the aged for many centuries, but the comparative 
sparseness of their records means that there is little known about the extent of 
charitable contributions.94  In contrast, there is much to be read and said about state 
interventions into old age.  Under the Old Poor Law, from at least the seventeenth 
century, a ‘significant minority’ of old people received some form of pension, paid 
from the local rates.95   According to Ottaway, the eighteenth century saw a 
significant increase in the proportion of older people receiving poor relief.96  By the 
end of the nineteenth century, when national statistics on old-age pauperism were 
first collected, three out of every ten people aged 65 or over were receiving 
assistance through the Poor Law.97  After the passage of the 1834 Poor Law Act, 
relief had increasingly moved indoors (into the workhouse), but out-relief remained 
the primary source of Poor Law support for aged paupers across England as a 
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whole.98  In London, however, as already discussed, out-relief was greatly 
restricted, and the majority of aged paupers were relieved in the workhouse.99   
Although older people made up a large proportion of workhouse inmates in 
London, entering the workhouse remained a deeply stigmatised and dreaded act, 
and many of the poorest elderly preferred to struggle on in the most abject poverty, 
getting by on the most menial of work with support from family and friends.100  
This came to light in the 1880s, through the poverty surveys undertaken by Charles 
Booth.  His systematic study of income and living conditions in London led Booth 
to conclude that ‘on the whole, people are poor because they are old’.101  This 
sparked a wave of political debate on the question of old-age poverty, and a Royal 
Commission was set up in 1895 to investigate the problem of the ‘Aged Poor’.102    
After two decades of public debate and political wrangling, a non-contributory state 
pension – designed to help, but not fully support, the respectable aged poor – was 
finally introduced in 1908.103  This was significant, in that it recognised the limits of 
thrift to ensure a comfortable old age, but it contained many limitations:  the 
pensionable age was set at 70, and residents of Poor Law institutions – including the 
asylum – were ineligible.104 
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Thus, the ‘golden age’ myth can be countered with a reverse narrative:  over 
the long nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, social policies were 
enacted which offered an increasingly generous and stable financial safety net to the 
dependent aged.  This narrative, however, is not always presented in such a 
positive light.  Much of the original impetus for the history of old age was driven by 
the recognition of a specific form of age-based discrimination, ‘ageism’.105  Thus, 
despite rejecting a ‘golden age’ myth, historians inspired by this political project 
have set out to account for the apparent social and cultural marginalisation of the 
aged in the late-twentieth century.106  Historians such as Andrew Achenbaum, 
Carole Haber and Stephen Katz have suggested that the creation of formal support 
structures was achieved at the expense of the dignity and cultural value accorded to 
old age.  The establishment of widespread retirement and pensions in the late-
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they argue, has fostered a social and cultural 
differentiation between old age and youth, and reinforced the image of old people 
as a superannuated, dependent burden.107   
‘Expert knowledge’, both social and medical, is key to these accounts of 
differentiation and marginalisation.108  Booth’s social surveys, and other projects 
and discourses which drew attention to the plight of the aged poor, are framed as 
part of a ‘modern movement away from understanding ageing primarily as an 
existential problem requiring moral and spiritual commitment, toward 
understanding it primarily as a scientific problem amenable to technical solution’.109  
The medical history of old age has been drawn into this narrative of marginalisation 
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and problematisation.  The term ‘geriatrics’ was coined in 1909, but numerous 
historians have dated the origins of a medical speciality in old age and ageing to 
early-nineteenth-century France.110  In the 1830s and 1840s, the pathological 
anatomists of the Paris School identified structural differences between old bodies 
and younger bodies which, these historians argue, created a new medical 
understanding of old people as ‘inherently separate and inevitably pathological’.111  
The subsequent development of a specialised medical literature on old age was thus 
a partner to the social investigations and interventions which defined the aged as a 
distinctive, problematic section of the population.    
This thesis shows that, while useful, this broader historiography of old age 
cannot fully account for the position of mentally disordered older people.  The 
‘senile’ emerged as a problematic group at the same time as the ‘aged poor’, but 
attitudes and responses towards them were very different.  Despite being amongst 
the most deserving of the indigent poor – a group whose sufferings were attributed 
to the ‘natural infirmity of old age’ –  the problem of the senile did not provoke the 
same sympathetic and enthusiastic response as the general aged population.  As 
will be argued in Chapter Two, the solutions offered to the problem of the senile 
poor were aimed entirely at displacing responsibility for their care, rather than 
seeking sustainable and humane alternatives.  The medicalisation narrative offered 
by Katz and Haber – the suggestion that old age became more decisively embodied 
over the course of the nineteenth century, with greater emphasis placed on the 
pathological signs of ageing – has offered a useful starting point for the 
understandings of old age examined here.  However, this thesis will show that 
‘pathologisation’ is an insufficient term to describe the changing understanding of 
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the ageing process in the nineteenth century.  Indeed, it was the very ‘naturalness’ 
of old-age infirmity which marked its sufferers as different, and as a problem. 
Sources, Approaches and Arguments 
This thesis draws on three main sets of sources: published articles, treatises and 
textbooks dedicated to the classification, treatment and pathology of insanity; 
administrative documents – particularly annual reports – relating to the 
management of asylums at a national and local level; and patient records from 
Hanwell.  Each chapter focusses on one of these sets of sources.  The final section of 
this introduction, then, will outline the sources and approaches mobilised in each 
chapter, along with the key questions asked, and arguments made.  Finally, the 
arguments of the thesis as a whole, cutting across all of the chapters, will be 
summarised.   
The first chapter of this thesis draws on psychiatric literature published 
between 1835, when the term ‘senile dementia’ first appeared in print, and 1910, 
when German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin coined the term ‘Alzheimer’s Disease’.112  
These include the major textbooks and treatises on insanity published by British 
psychiatrists during this period – identified through secondary research and 
through references within these texts – and articles in the Journal of Mental Science, 
Brain, the British Medical Journal and The Lancet – identified through key-word 
searches of digital databases.   Four key issues were examined within these texts:  
the place of senility and dementia in classifications of forms of insanity, the 
symptoms associated with dementia, the models of the ageing process which 
psychiatrists employed, and the use and meaning of the metaphor of second 
childhood. 
This chapter uses the shifting place of ‘senility’ within the classification of 
mental disorder as a starting point to examine the relationship between insanity and 
old age, and relates these shifts to broader changes within psychiatric knowledge.  
It shows how emerging theories within psychiatry – particularly cerebral 
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localisation and the theory of dissolution – drew on and influenced models of 
ageing and dementia.   It argues that these developments reinforced the existent 
resonances between the categories of senility and dementia, and thus argues that 
the emergence of senile dementia as the ‘prototype of senility’ at the beginning of 
the twentieth century was underpinned by a carefully considered and materially 
based psychiatric epistemology.  Senility before Alzheimer, then, was not ignored 
by psychiatrists, but held a central place in wider theories of insanity and mental 
disorder. 
On the 1st January 1851, there were 7, 851 patients resident in county and 
borough asylums in England and Wales.113  On 1st January 1901, there were almost 
ten times that number: 75, 916.114  At the end of the nineteenth century London’s 
asylum population was the largest in the country, even in proportion to its 
enormous overall population.115  The question of how and by whom such a large 
population, and the vast financial outlay it required, should be managed, was a 
deeply political one, cutting across the competing interests of various bureaucratic 
entities, from asylum managers, to Poor Law officials, to the local magistracy.  The 
second chapter of this thesis examines the ‘policy’ of psychiatry:  the way in which 
the groups charged with organising the provision of care and treatment for the 
insane went about their task, and their attitudes towards it.  This chapter argues 
that the administrators of lunacy strove to exclude senile patients from their 
institutions and, in doing so, fostered a particular understanding of old-age mental 
disorder:  one which de-legitimised the claim of senile patients to asylum care, and 
excluded them from the ranks of the ‘truly’ insane. 
The main source base for this chapter is a set of published administrative 
texts – annual reports and published minutes of meetings – produced by the 
national Lunacy Commissioners (who inspected and reported on the care and 
treatment of insanity across the whole of England and Wales), the MAB and its 
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individual asylum committees, and the managing committee of Hanwell.  This was 
supplemented by the annual reports of the medical officers of Hanwell and 
Caterham asylums, and by letters and articles published in the medical press, in 
which asylum Superintendents and Poor Law medical officers put forward their 
case for not taking responsibility for senile patients.   Together, these sources 
present an account of the steps taken to manage and mitigate the problems of 
dealing with the ever-growing asylum population – including a large and 
unwelcome contingent of age patients – but they also represent a discourse within 
which the ideal attributes of the asylum population was defined.  Chapter Two, 
then, examines the literal and discursive attempts to exclude the senile from the 
ranks of the insane.   
The third, fourth and fifth chapters of this thesis draw on the patient records 
of Hanwell:  specifically on the case notes of the 381 patients who were (recorded 
as) aged 60 or over at the time of their admission, in the years 1851-52, 1871-72, 
1891-92 and 1911-12.  This breadth of sample was chosen in order to reveal some of 
the changes which took place over the long term, while keeping the sample at a 
manageable size to allow for meaningfully deep qualitative analysis.  The case notes 
are rich, multifaceted documents, ‘themselves a form of record linkage’, which 
bring together demographic data regarding the patient’s age and status, the asylum 
medical officers’ impressions of their physical and mental condition on admission 
and during their residence, and narratives of the patient’s former life gleaned from 
their friends and relatives, with material produced outside the asylum, such as their 
medical certificates, and letters written by a variety of concerned parties.116   The 
potential of patient case notes is now widely recognised by historians and other 
scholars, as ‘the surest basis we have for understanding the changing nature of the 
experience of the insane in asylums’, as a ‘vehicle’ for examining ‘what 
physicans…did’ alongside what they ‘said’, and as the site where ‘the identity of the 
asylum patient was invented’.117  Patient case notes, then, are rich with interpretive 
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possibilities, offering insights into the discourse, practice and experience of 
medicine.  This thesis seeks to exploit these multiple possibilities, by taking a 
different approach to the case notes in each of the last three chapters. 
Chapter Three follows the methodology indicated by David Wright, using 
the case notes to ‘examine the interface of institutional and non-institutional care 
and control’.118  It seeks to understand why older people came to be admitted to 
Hanwell.  The case notes were thus examined for evidence of the patients’ domestic 
circumstances prior to their institutionalisation.  This evidence was then placed in 
the wider context of the history of the family, and the social and demographic 
landscape of nineteenth-century London.  This was used to build up a picture of the 
wide range of responses to the aged, mentally disordered poor within the family 
and community, and the events which eventually led them to Hanwell.  Thus, this 
chapter offers insight into the place of the dependent aged within the family and the 
community, as well as the reasons for which people came to enter a lunatic asylum 
at an advanced age.   
Chapter Four takes a very different approach, focussing less on the 
information contained within the case notes, and more on the structure of the case 
notes themselves.  It shows that the use of the word ‘senile’ to describe aged 
patients increased significantly at the end of the nineteenth century, as did the 
overall tendency to attribute older patients’ disorders to their aged state.  It places 
this change within the context of the changing structure of the case books and the 
admissions registers over this period, and the ways in which this shaped and 
reflected the activities and attitudes of Hanwell’s medical officers.  In doing so, it 
argues that the theoretical concerns discussed in Chapter One were reflected in, and 
contingent upon, asylum practice, and that this had a significant impact on the 
categorisation and description of older patients. 
Finally, Chapter Five blends the approach of both of these chapters, in an 
examination of the two routes out of the asylum:  the discharge of recovered or 
                                                                                                                                                                            
of the History of Medicine’, Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 22 (1967), pp. 
211-114; Coleborne, Reading 'Madness', p. 58. 
118 Wright, 'Getting out of the Asylum', p. 145. 
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improved patients, and the care of the dying.  This chapter uses the case notes to 
show ‘what doctors did’ to ill and dying patients in the asylum, and to gain insight 
into the factors which contributed to the decision to discharge older patients to the 
home, or to another institution.  At the same time, however, it recognises that the 
case notes offer us a mediated picture of what went on in the asylum:  they are 
‘innately jaundiced’, limited by the interests and concerns of the medical officers 
who wrote them.119  It shows that the most controversial and problematic instances 
of patient death and discharge – about which the most was written – alert us to the 
constructed nature of the case notes, as an official record of events more than a 
straightforward description of them.   
This thesis makes three key arguments.  Firstly, it argues that senility 
became a more important and prevalent category in psychiatric discourse over the 
course of the second half of the nineteenth century.  During that period, 
psychiatrists increasingly came to view older people as old:  old mentally-
disordered people were more likely to be labelled as ‘senile’, and their disorders 
linked explicitly to structural changes within their aged bodies.  This can be seen in 
the proliferation of different forms of senile insanities in both theoretical texts and 
in asylum practice, and in the increasing use of the word senile to describe older 
patients in asylum patient records.   At the same time, this increasingly visible 
cohort of categorically senile patients was described as a problematic group within 
the broader asylum population.  Indeed, it is partly through the problematisation of 
aged asylum patients that the senile patient emerged as a clearly-defined subject.  
 Secondly, it argues that, at the very end of the nineteenth century, dementia 
became the prototype of senility. That is to say, that dementia came to be seen as the 
only mental disorder which was truly an expression of the ageing process, and that 
older, mentally disordered people were increasingly likely to be labelled as 
‘demented’.  A corollary to this argument is that dementia was not always the 
prototype of senility.  For most of the late-nineteenth century, psychiatric texts 
contained many different categories of senile insanity, and old asylum patients were 
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similarly diagnosed with a variety of ‘senile’ mental disorders.  The limiting of 
senility to dementia did not only effect a change in nomenclature, it produced a 
particular idea of what a senile person was:  intellectually incompetent, 
evolutionarily regressive, irretrievably decaying, and essentially harmless.  This 
was particularly evident in the administrative discourses surrounding the 
management of the asylum, where a particular image of the ‘senile’ was 
propagated, in order to legitimate their exclusion from asylum care:  as manageable, 
incurable, and suffering from natural decay rather than a pathological condition. 
 Finally, this thesis argues that the senile represented an intractable problem 
in nineteenth-century society.  The examination of asylum patient records shows 
that old people ended up in the asylum because they had transcended the ability of 
the people around them – in the home, in the community or in the workhouse – to 
manage their behaviour.  There was no specialised institutional provision for the 
care of the aged, mentally disordered poor, and many of them ended up in the 
asylum by default.  This situation was not accepted by the administrators of senility, 
but neither were workhouse officials prepared to tolerate the presence of disruptive 
older people.  The senile were thus a residual group, perpetually displaced from 
one site of care and management to another – both rhetorically and literally – but 
never settling into a welcoming home.    
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Chapter One:  Senility, Dementia and Dissolution in Psychiatric 
Theory 
The student… is too apt to assume that all varieties of mental 
ailments in the aged issue in senile dementia… [Senile insanity] 
connotes a very large class of symptoms, embracing between 
them all the varied forms of insanity usually differentiated.1 
This warning, written by psychiatrist William Bevan Lewis (1847-1940) in 1889, is as 
useful to the historian as it was to the nineteenth-century student of psychiatry.  The 
term ‘senile dementia’ came into common usage in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Broadly speaking, a ‘senile dement’ from the nineteenth century would be 
recognised now:  a conspicuously old person, showing signs of confusion, memory 
loss and disorientation, eventually losing language and comprehension.  Yet this 
apparent continuity masks significant changes to the understanding and meaning 
attached to these terms which have taken place over the last 200 years.  As Bevan 
Lewis was keen to point out, ‘senile dementia’ was not the only recognised form of 
‘senile insanity’ in the nineteenth century:  many of his contemporaries thought that 
mental senility could manifest in a variety of different ways, and that any form of 
insanity which erupted from an aged body was inherently altered by it, ‘stamped 
with a special impress which more or less distinguish forms of senile alienation 
from the psychosis of earlier periods of life’.2  At the same time, the term ‘dementia’ 
did not always have to mean ‘senile dementia’: dementia had long been recognised 
as a process of severe mental deterioration which could affect people at any age, 
particularly the chronically insane. The relationship between these two categories 
was not stable at any point during this period, and this chapter seeks to chart and 
account for these shifts. 
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 William Bevan Lewis, A Text-book of Mental Diseases:  with Special Reference to the Pathological 
Aspects of Insanity (London, 1889), p. 405. 
2 Ibid., p. 406. 
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 In 1984 clinician-historian, German Berrios, first outlined his approach to the 
history of psychiatric theory, ‘the history of descriptive psychopathology’.3     This 
chapter broadly follows his call to ask ‘specific questions about the genesis of 
descriptive psychopathological categories and about their interaction with the 
psychological and philosophical context.’4  It will adopt the same method of tracing 
the classification and description of senility and dementia through published 
psychiatric texts, and setting them within their wider intellectual context.  The vast 
majority of the existent work on the history of dementia has been written by Berrios, 
and this chapter uses his work as a starting point for a number of themes.5  
Nevertheless, it cannot provide stable definitions suitable for the ‘calibration 
technique by means of which the language of psychiatry [can be] conceptually 
tightened’ that Berrios seeks.6  The ambiguity of dementia and senility as concepts 
are ever-present in this analysis, and should not be erased.   
There is no single story to be told about the way that the concepts of senility 
and dementia developed in nineteenth-century psychiatry.  Thus, this chapter takes 
a multi-stranded, thematic approach, looking sequentially at classification, 
symptoms, the ageing body, and the idea of ‘second childhood’.  There is, however, 
a common chronological narrative through which each theme is successively traced.  
The chronological narrative mobilised in this chapter has three stages, based around 
three key ideas which stimulated a change in the way that senility and dementia 
were understood in British psychiatry.  The first period technically begins with the 
first usage of ‘senile dementia’ in English, in James Cowles Prichard’s (1786-1848) 
1835 book, A Treatise on Insanity.  Its roots, however, belong in turn-of- the- century 
France, with the work of Phillipe Pinel (1755-1826) and his student, Jean Étienne 
                                                             
3 G. E. Berrios, 'Descriptive Psychopathology: Conceptual and Historical Aspects', Psychological 
Medicine, 14 (1984), pp. 303-13. 
4 Ibid., p. 308. 
5 See for example G. E. Berrios, 'Dementia:  Clinical section', in G. E. Berrios and Roy Porter (eds), A 
History of Clinical Psychiatry: the Origin and History of Psychiatric Disorders (London, 1995), pp. 34-
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Psychological Medicine, 17 (1987), pp. 829-37; G. E. Berrios, 'Memory and the Cognitive Paradigm of 
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Esquirol (1772-1840).  This is the least clearly defined period, but its most salient 
feature is a symptomological approach to psychiatric classification. This approach 
was challenged in the 1860s, initially by Auguste Morel (1809-73) in France, and by 
David Skae (1814-1873) in Edinburgh.  David Skae’s ‘natural history’ approach to 
psychiatric classification, first outlined in an article in the Journal of Mental Science in 
1863, was an ambitious attempt to classify mental diseases by their underlying 
physical cause.  Skae’s scheme cannot in itself be described as influential, as it ‘does 
not appear to have been seriously employed at any other asylum’.7  However, this 
chapter will argue that the ‘somato-aetiological’ approach to mental disorder, of 
which Skae’s work is an early manifestation, was widely approved of, with 
profound implications for the classification of old-age mental disorders.  The third 
chronological period in this narrative overlaps significantly with the second, 
beginning around the 1870s.  It centres primarily on the work of neurologist John 
Hughlings Jackson (1835-1911), and on research undertaken at the West Riding 
Asylum at Wakefield which became, in the 1870s and 80s, the centre of British 
scientific research into psychiatry and the brain.8  The key idea advanced in this 
period was that insanity was a form of ‘dissolution’, an evolutionary reversal in 
which the sufferer reverted to a simpler, less developed state.  This, too, had 
significant implications for the way that ageing and dementia were understood. 
This periodisation is not only overlapping, but also somewhat artificial.  William 
Bevan Lewis, for example, was very much a Wakefield man, and an adherent of the 
doctrine of dissolution, but his classificatory scheme was of the somato-aetiological 
type expounded by Skae and his student, Thomas Clouston (1840-1915).   
Nevertheless, it provides a useful analytical framework through which the diverse 
changes in the concepts of senility and dementia in British psychiatry can be 
understood. 
This chronology, then, informs each of the four thematic sections of this 
chapter.  The first section concerns the place of old age, and of dementia, in the 
                                                             
7 Gayle Davis, The Cruel Madness of Love: Sex, Syphilis and Psychiatry in Scotland, 1880-1930 
(Amsterdam, 2008), p. 86. 
8 Michael Anthony Finn, 'The West Riding Lunatic Asylum and the Making of the Modern Brain 
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classificatory schema produced by psychiatrists throughout this period. It argues 
that the categories of ‘senility’ and ‘dementia’ were significantly intertwined from 
the beginning of this period, but that this close relationship was disrupted by the 
somato-aetiological classificatory thinking which emerged in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.  At the end of the century, however, the theory of dissolution 
once again drew attention to the conceptual resonance between dementia and 
ageing, and ‘senile dementia’ became the dominant ‘senile’ classificatory category.  
The second section concentrates just on ‘dementia’, and on the way in which this 
condition was described and explained.  It argues that, at the beginning of this 
period, dementia was understood primarily as a failure of sensation, but that by the 
turn of the century, it was understood primarily as a failure of reason.  The third 
section looks at the different models of ageing (explanations of the ageing process) 
which were mobilised in these texts, particularly at the ‘vital energy’ model and the 
‘atrophic’ model.  It argues that both of these models of physiological ageing served 
to reinforce the relationship between senility and dementia.  The fourth section 
looks at one particular metaphor mobilised in these texts, of senility as ‘second 
childhood’, and argues that theories of dissolution and degeneration imbued this 
ancient metaphor with new meanings.  In concluding, this chapter will then turn to 
the issue which has animated historians of dementia and ageing in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries:  was mental degeneration and insanity in old age 
considered natural or pathological?  It will show that, although senility and 
dementia came to be viewed as structurally identical phenomena in the latter 
nineteenth century, most psychiatrists still worked very hard to maintain a 
qualitative distinction between natural senility and pathological senile dementia. 
If there is an overarching narrative present in this chapter, it concerns the 
effects of the increasing biologisation of mental illness in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, and of the evolutionary (and dissolutionary) thinking on which 
much of this neuro-psychiatric theory was based.  The former decisively tied the 
mental ailments of old age to the processes of physical disintegration, and the latter 
gave both form and meaning to the resultant mental degeneration.  The greater the 
emphasis placed on the physical dimension of mental ailments, the more important 
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became the conceptual congruence between dementia (a progressive stripping away 
of a person’s mental capacities), ageing (a progressive disintegration of the body) 
and, eventually, degeneration (a progressive undoing of the evolutionary process).  
Through this conceptual triangulation – of psychiatric, physiological and 
evolutionary knowledge – the senile dement was fixed as a person who was 
mentally inferior, primitive, childlike, and half-dead.     
The Classification of Senility and Dementia in Nineteenth-Century 
Psychiatry  
As Bevan Lewis’ statement above suggests, there were many types of senile insanity 
in the nineteenth century.  Senile mania, melancholia, and dementia were the most 
commonly mentioned, but other categories such as senile epilepsy, senile paralysis 
and senile imbecility also appear in these texts.  There were also several types of 
dementia:  acute and chronic, primary (appearing at the onset of insanity) and 
secondary (appearing after a long attack of a different form of insanity), epileptic 
and paralytic.  This section traces the emergence and disappearance of these 
categories in the classificatory schema published by British psychiatrists between 
the 1830s and the early twentieth century.  At no point during this period was there 
a universally approved system for the classification of insanities.  Although 
psychiatrists bemoaned the inadequacies of existent classificatory schemes, 
attempts to radically update them were met with bemusement or even hostility.9  
Nevertheless, a certain amount of classificatory development did take place, and the 
way in which ‘senility’ and ‘dementia’ were featured in these classificatory schema 
underwent a number of changes over this period.  German Berrios has argued that, 
although there were many types of dementia during the nineteenth century, the 
senile type eventually became the most important:  ‘By 1900, senility was the 
prototype of dementia’.  This section will examine this thesis.  As there were also 
many types of senile insanity during this period, this section will also look at 
                                                             
9 See for example James Crichton Browne, 'Skae's Classification of Mental Diseases: A Critique', 
Journal of Mental Science, 21 (1875), pp. 339-65. 
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Berrios’ claim from the opposite direction:  to what extent, by the turn of the 
century, was dementia the prototype of senility? 
James Cowles Prichard, and Dementia as Loss 
The term ‘senile dementia’ first appeared in 1835, in James Cowles Prichard’s 
Treatise on Insanity and Other Disorders Affecting the Mind, although the similar term 
‘senile demency’ had been used in another text, written by George Man Burrows 
(1771-1846), in 1828.10  Both were anglicisations of the French term démence sénile.  
The term ‘dementia’ on its own had a much longer history.  German Berrios has 
traced the English usage of the word ‘dementia’ to the late-seventeenth century, and 
the French usage at least as far back as the fourteenth.  He suggests that the concept 
of dementia – ‘cognitive failure, chronic behavioural dislocation, and psychosocial 
incompetence’ – developed under different names, and did not become attached 
exclusively to the word ‘dementia’ until the eighteenth century.11  Though no doubt 
informed by this longer history, Prichard’s and Burrows’ descriptions of dementia, 
drew explicitly on the same specific sources:  the work of turn-of-the-century 
Parisian psychiatrist Phillipe Pinel and his student, Jean-Étienne Esquirol.   
In both Pinel and Esquirol’s work, dementia was aligned with idiocy and 
imbecility.  Symptomatically, the two conditions were very similar.  Both rendered 
the sufferer ‘fatuous’: confused, unable to understand their surroundings, and 
unable to reason reliably.  However, while Pinel often conflated the two categories, 
Esquirol drew a firm line between them: 
The imbecile…have [sic] never possessed the faculties of 
understanding in a state sufficiently developed for the display 
of reason.  The victim of dementia was once endowed of them 
but has lost possession.12 
                                                             
10 James Cowles Prichard, A Treatise on Insanity and Other Disorders Affecting the Mind (London, 
1835), pp. 84-99; George Man Burrows, Commentaries on the Causes, Forms, Symptoms, and 
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Imbecility, according to Esquirol, was always congenital, whilst dementia was 
always acquired; idiocy was characterised by under-development, while dementia 
was characterised by loss.  This key point of differentiation – dementia as loss, 
rather than aberration or absence – was to be the central component of the dementia 
concept in British psychiatry for the rest of the century.  
Prichard dedicated his Treatise to Esquirol, and called his description of 
dementia ‘the best and most original that has been drawn’.  He also held loss at the 
centre of his own description of the disease.13  Dementia, Prichard suggested, would 
always progress through four stages, each characterised by the loss of a different 
mental function:  the first by loss of memory, the second by loss of reason, the third 
by loss of comprehension and the last by loss of instinct.  A dement in the first stage 
– ‘forgetfulness’ - would be unable to form or retain new memories, but would still 
be able to reason correctly using any memories they already held, or regarding 
matters immediately in front of them.  In the second stage – ‘irrationality’ - their loss 
of energy, which had already halted the retention of new impressions, would begin 
to impact on their ability to concentrate.  Unable to follow a train of thought, a 
dement in the second stage would be unable to reason.  In the third stage – 
‘incomprehension’ – the sufferer would be unable to comprehend and engage with 
the world around them, and would sink into blank inactivity or the ceaseless 
repetition of old habits.  Finally – in a state of ‘inappetancy’ – even the deepest, 
‘instinctive’ functions would be lost, rendering the sufferer barely able to control 
their own movements or ‘obey the calls of nature’. Not all cases would reach this 
final stage – due to recovery, plateau, or death – but any progression would always 
occur in this way.  Dementia, then, was a regular, determined, dismantling of the 
mind, through which the sufferer lost their mental faculties in a hierarchical fashion, 
eventually losing their mind entirely, reduced to ‘mere…physical existence’.14 
After Prichard, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the ancient 
categories of insanity such as ‘mania’ and ‘dementia’ were derided as mere 
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collections of symptoms, bearing little relationship to underlying 
psychophysiological disorders.15  For Prichard and his contemporaries, however, 
these categories signified distinct disease processes.  For Prichard, the progressive 
mental deterioration of dementia was more than a superficial symptomatic 
phenomenon. Rather, he saw this progressive disintegration as a fundamental 
component of the disease itself.   This underlined the relationship between 
dementia, ageing and decay, as processes which all involved progressive 
deterioration.  At the same time, Prichard expressed uncertainty as to exactly how 
close the relationship between dementia and ageing was.  On one hand, he 
recognised that many old people did not develop dementia.  On the other, he 
thought that senile dementia was ‘the change which time alone will perhaps sooner 
or later bring on, in those who long survive the allotted duration of man’s days’.16  
Thus, he suggested that dementia would ‘perhaps’ appear in anyone who lived 
long enough.  Prichard was unwilling to state explicitly that dementia was always a 
stage on the road to a ‘natural death’ from old age.  His tentative statements, 
however, constitute a hypothesis, that senile dementia was a rendition of the 
process of decay and disintegration which led inevitably to death. 
Prichard’s textbook contained other forms of dementia, and another senile 
disorder, named simply ‘senile insanity’.  Prichard categorised this as a form of 
‘moral’ insanity.  His insistence on the existence of moral insanities, is perhaps 
Prichard’s best-known contribution to psychiatry.17  He broke with a Lockean model 
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of insanity, in which madness is understood as reasoning from incorrect beliefs, by 
suggesting that a mad person could be entirely rational and free from delusion.  The 
moral insanities, he claimed, manifested in unusual or perverse behaviour, or 
uncontrolled or excessive emotion.  Senile insanity – as a form of moral insanity – 
was thus a disorder of the feeling rather than the intellect, and as such was entirely 
distinct from senile dementia.  It involved a marked reversal of the person’s long-
held character and tendencies:  ‘The pious… become impious, the content and 
happy discontented and miserable, the prudent and economical imprudent and 
ridiculously profuse, the liberal penurious, the sober drunken’.18 Prichard suggested 
that any moral insanity which appeared for the first time in old age should be 
considered a ‘senile’ insanity, but maintained that this was a rare event, and that 
senile insanity was not a common accompaniment of old age.  It was a ‘modification 
of madness’: altered by its appearance within an aged body, but not tied to the 
ageing of that body. 19   We might say that, despite what is suggested by their 
names, Prichard’s senile insanity was insanity in old age, while his senile dementia 
was insanity of old age. 
Dementia, then, was the form of insanity most associated with ageing in this 
period.  In his section on the relationship between insanity and age, Prichard 
repeated Esquirol’s assertion that the various forms of madness could be tied to the 
life course:  mania being characteristic of the young, melancholia of middle-age and 
dementia of the old.20  However, though ageing was associated with dementia, 
dementia was not exclusively – nor even primarily – thought of as a disease of old 
age.  In a table drawn from his practice at the Salpêtrière – again quoted by Prichard 
– Esquirol listed 21 different causes of dementia, from domestic grief, to blows to 
the head, to masturbation.  Prichard inferred from this that ‘[t]he causes which 
produce [dementia] as an original disorder are nearly the same with those which in 
other cases excite madness [here, meaning other forms of insanity] in the first 
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instance’.21  Unlike other forms of insanity, however, dementia was not always an 
‘original disorder’ – the first form of insanity to appear as a result of the exciting 
cause – but was often a ‘secondary affection’, arising immediately subsequent to, 
and as a consequence of, another form of mental (or occasionally, bodily) disease. It 
was the state into which a long-term insane person might descend, when they no 
longer displayed acute or positive symptoms, but were clearly mentally wrecked by 
their insanity.  This, Prichard implied, was the form of dementia most generally 
associated with the term:  ‘dementia…has been generally considered the result and 
sequel of [insanity]’.22  Broadly speaking, dementia was a disease caused by a 
weakening or loss of energy – as will be discussed later – which could be brought 
on by the exhaustion of mental or physical strain, intoxication, another form of 
insanity or by the ageing process.  Senility fit neatly into this aetiological framework 
but it did not, at this time, dominate it. 
Prichard’s Treatise was the authoritative text on insanity in Britain for at least 
20 years following its publication, and thus Prichard’s ideas about dementia – 
which were largely taken from Esquirol – came to be embedded in British 
psychiatry. 23  The influence of the section on dementia even outlived that of the 
Treatise overall.  The textbook which usurped the Treatise’s authoritative position – 
John Charles Bucknill (1817-97) and Daniel Hack Tuke’s (1827-95) Manual of 
Psychological Medicine, first published in 1858 – strayed little from Prichard’s 
description in its discussion of dementia.24    Tuke, who wrote all the chapters 
describing the different forms of insanity, did not present dementia primarily as a 
disease of ageing, but rather as a condition of the long-term insane:  the examples he 
gave in the second, 1862, edition were almost all middle-aged women who had 
been insane since their youth.25  He did, however, repeat Prichard’s four-stage 
progression of dementia, thus committing to the progressive loss model of the 
                                                             
21 Ibid., pp. 85, 88. 
22 Ibid., pp. 6-7, 85. 
23 Andrew Scull, Charlotte MacKenzie and Nicholas Hervey, Masters of Bedlam: the Transformation 
of the Mad-Doctoring Trade (Princeton, 1996), p. 204. 
24
 Bucknill and Tuke, Manual of Psychological Medicine, pp. 121-30. 
25 John Charles Bucknill and Daniel Hack Tuke, A Manual of Psychological Medicine (2nd edn, 
London, 1862), pp. 116-20. 
44 
 
disease (with its resonances with ageing).26  In his own section on the diagnosis of 
insanity, Bucknill reaffirmed that dementia should be understood as loss:  ‘In this 
form of disease, the mind [is] suffering from deprivation and not from aberration of 
function’.27  Thus, through the Manual, the early nineteenth-century understanding 
and classification of dementia forged by Pinel, Esquirol and Prichard was 
consolidated rather than overturned.  We can say, therefore, that, at least up until 
the 1860s, senility was not the prototype of dementia, but dementia was the 
prototype of mental senility.  In 1874, when James Crichton Browne (1840-1938) 
described dementia as ‘[the] one kind of mental derangement which is properly 
specified by the adjective senile’, he was drawing on this model of senility.28  He 
was, however, somewhat out of step with many of his contemporaries. Though the 
close association between decay, disintegration, weakening, dementia and ageing 
did not disappear, a fresh classificatory paradigm was introduced in the 1860s 
which opened up new possibilities for the understanding of old-age mental 
disorder, and threatened to disrupt the seeming inevitability of the 
dementia/senility association. 
David Skae and Somato-Aetiological Classifications 
The third edition of Bucknill and Tuke’s Manual, published in 1874, contained a 
brand-new section, on ‘The various forms of insanity from a somato-aetiological 
point of view’.  Written by Tuke, this described forms of insanity which were 
defined by the bodily state or process from which they had sprung; from physical 
illnesses (febrile insanity), to reproductive phenomena (puerperal insanity, ovarian 
insanity), to physically intoxicating or exhausting activities (alcoholic insanity, 
masturbational insanity) or the life course (adolescent insanity, senile insanity).29  
This was a significant innovation.  Twelve years previously, in the second edition, 
Tuke had expressed serious doubts that the ‘insuperable difficulties’ of forming an 
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aetiologically based classification of insanity could ever be successfully overcome.30  
In the intervening period, however, a wave of aetiologically based classificatory 
systems swept across Europe.31  This new commitment to aetiological and 
physiological classification had significant implications for the understanding of 
old-age mental disorder. 
 The life course featured heavily in these somato-aetiological classifications.  
In the absence of conclusive evidence as to the relationship between specific 
material changes and different forms of insanity, the stages of the life course 
provided easily identifiable – and hermeneutically rich – physical states, on which 
categories of insanity could be based.  The social and medical stratification of the 
life course intensified in the nineteenth century.  This made its way into theories of 
insanity, as a number of historians have shown.  Sally Shuttleworth has suggested 
that ‘childhood’ insanity emerged as a possibility in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, after Esquirol and Prichard’s concepts of monomania moral mania allowed 
a person to be judged insane, regardless of their intellectual capacity.32  Michael J. 
Clark has described the way that the older category of ‘masturbational’ insanity fed 
into a new category of ‘adolescent insanity’ in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, infusing that nascent life-course category with particular anxieties about 
purity and morbid introspection.33  Hilary Marland has described the emergence, 
and subsequent disappearance, of ‘puerperal’ insanity in Victorian psychiatric 
literature.34  Mid-nineteenth-century ideas about senile insanity should be set within 
this context:  old age was just one area of the life course thought to involve 
particular physical and mental attributes.  At the same time, strong pre-existent 
associations between old age and certain forms of mental deterioration made senile 
insanity one of the most prominent of these life-course-based forms of insanity.  
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 In Britain, David Skae (1814-73) was the seminal exponent of somato-
aetiological classification.  Skae was Medical Superintendent of Morningside 
Asylum in Edinburgh from 1846 until his death in 1873, during which time he also 
lectured to Edinburgh’s medical students on mental disease.  Historian Michael 
Barfoot has described Skae as a ‘scientific general practitioner of insanity’, who was 
committed to applying the empirical, inductive, scientific method of early 
nineteenth-century Edinburgh medicine to psychiatry.35  This led him to reject the 
standard, symptomatically based classification of insanity, and to develop his own 
somato-aetiological scheme, based on the bodily conditions which gave rise to 
mental disorders.  It was unacceptable to him that insanity – which was already 
broadly agreed to spring from dysfunction of the body and brain – was classified 
without reference to underlying physical conditions.  For Skae, the physical 
disorder was the true disease, of which the mental symptoms were ‘but the signs’.  
In an 1863 article in the Journal of Mental Science, he proposed a ‘natural history’ 
approach to insanity, employing the language of naturalism, in which ‘varieties’ of 
insanity were classified according to the ‘natural order’ of physical conditions to 
which they belonged, such as pregnancy or sunstroke.  One of these orders was 
‘senile insanity’.   
 Although not explicitly recognised at the time, this classificatory change has 
significant implications for the understanding of both senility and dementia.  It 
gave priority to physical states, as opposed to mental ones, in the classification of 
insanity.  Thus, under Skae’s scheme, the agedness of an old insane person’s body 
became at least as relevant as their mental symptoms to the categorisation of their 
mental disorder.  The symptomological categories of mania, melancholia and 
dementia did not disappear from Skae’s system, but he used them to refer to 
transient mental conditions, rather than types of mental disease. 36   They were 
clinical categories, he suggested, but not truly medical ones.  A person suffering 
from senile insanity might be in a state of mania one day, and dementia the next, 
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but the underlying reality of their disorder stayed the same: ‘those changes which 
take place…after a certain period of life’.37 Relegating terms like ‘mania’ and 
‘dementia’ to the status of mere symptomatic description undermined their 
relationship to primary physical processes.  This disrupted the close association 
between senility and dementia, though it did not destroy it entirely.  It unloaded 
some of the physical connotations – the progressive physical degradation and 
overall weakening – from the now purely symptomatic category of ‘dementia’.  It 
also allowed terms such as ‘senile mania’ and ‘senile melancholia’ to be used to 
describe excitement and depression in (and of) old age.   
 Although Skae’s particular classificatory system does not seem to have been 
adopted outside of Edinburgh, the influence of this somato-aetiological form of 
classification can be seen in many late-nineteenth-century psychiatric texts, 
particularly in the classification of the senile insanities.  In the decades following the 
publication of Skae’s 1863 article, and its extension in his posthumously published 
Morisonian lectures, ‘senile insanity’ was refracted in British psychiatric writings, 
and psychiatrists regularly referred to a multiplicity of senile disorders.  This 
simultaneously opened up and closed down possibilities for the understanding of 
insanity in old age.  On one hand, Skae’s system suggested that insanity in old age 
could appear in myriad forms.  Yet, on the other, whatever form this insanity took, 
it would always be ‘senile’, tied inextricably to the ageing process and the ageing 
body.  Insane old people might be excited like a maniac, or depressed and deluded, 
but these symptoms could now all be interpreted as a sign of the same disorder: 
senile insanity.  All signs of mental disorder in an old person could now be 
connected to their inevitable decay and decline.  While Prichard’s ‘senile insanity’ 
had not been insanity ‘of’ old age, then, Skae’s certainly was.  
 Skae’s ideas were spread through the enthusiastic advocacy of psychiatrists 
who had attended his clinical lectures at Morningside, and who had later found 
early employment under him as an assistant physician.  Some of them, such as John 
Batty Tuke (1835-1913) and David Yellowlees (1850-1904), became influential 
                                                             
37 David Skae, 'The Morisonian Lectures on Insanity for 1873 - Lecture III', Journal of Mental Science, 
20 (1874), pp. 12-13. 
48 
 
psychiatrists and important members of the Medico-Psychological Association in 
their own right.  Crichton Browne, himself a former student at Edinburgh, referred 
to this group scathingly as ‘the oecumenical council of Morningside’, for their 
supposed dogmatic adherence to Skae’s ideas.38  This was somewhat unfair.  
Though great defenders of Skae, his former students adopted the spirit of somato-
aetiological classification, rather than the particulars of Skae’s classificatory scheme.  
Foremost among these former students was Thomas Clouston, who took over as the 
superintendent of Morningside after Skae’s death in 1873, and compiled and edited 
his Morisonian lectures for publication.39  Clouston’s own textbook, Clinical Lectures 
on Mental Diseases, contained many life-course- based insanities: ‘developmental 
insanities’ (insanity of puberty and adolescence), ‘insanities of decadence’ 
(climacteric and senile insanities) and insanities relating to childbearing (puerperal 
insanity and insanities of pregnancy and lactation).40 In the 1890s, Clouston 
contributed an entry on ‘The Epochal Insanities’ to the monumental, encyclopaedic 
System of Medicine.   There, he explained that the ‘mental and bodily symptoms and 
accompaniments [of insanity] are influenced in such a way at each epoch that the 
cases have certain common characteristics, and may properly be classified 
accordingly’.41  For Clouston, then, the stage of life in which an attack of insanity 
appeared was often essential to its character.  He did not think, however, that the 
influence of the life course on insanity was uniform. In his Clinical Lectures, 
Clouston declared himself ‘quite astonished at the immense variety of symptoms’ 
presented in cases of senile insanity.42  He suggested that senile insanity, perhaps 
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even more so than other forms of epochal insanity, could appear in a variety of 
forms:  senile mania, melancholia and dementia.43   
 The influence of these somato-aetiological classifications spread from 
Edinburgh to the rest of British psychiatry.  In 1876, Clouston led the charge at the 
MPA for an officially recognised nomenclature of insanities to be used in their 
statistical tables.44  The eventual result, published in 1882, did not fully express 
Skae’s somato-aetiological approach, but it appears to respond to his criticisms of 
the traditional symptomalogical categories as insufficient in themselves to describe 
disease entities.  In this classificatory scheme, mania, melancholia and dementia 
were still the main diagnostic categories, but they were split into smaller sub-
categories, relating to duration, intensity, and cause.  Though few aetiological 
categories were included, ‘senile’ appears as a sub-category under all three of the 
larger headings.45  In this classification, senile mania and melancholia are offered as 
much legitimacy as senile dementia.  The refraction of senility, then, was one of the 
more enduring legacies of Skae’s work.   
Although Clouston broadly agreed with Skae, that ‘dementia’ was more a 
clinical condition than an underlying disorder, his overall understanding of 
dementia was quite conventional.  He described it as a mental enfeeblement 
brought on by the exhaustion of disease, shock, overwork, intoxication or age.  
Exhaustion was the central element of Clouston’s understanding of dementia and 
thus he considered secondary dementia – resulting from acute mental illness – to be 
its essential type: 
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It is the most characteristic, the most common, and the most 
important of all the kinds of mental enfeeblement, so that when 
you hear of a person labouring under dementia, it is usually this 
that is meant. It is dementia par excellence therefore [emphasis 
his].46 
For Clouston, then, secondary dementia was the ‘prototype of dementia’ – ‘dementia 
par excellence’ is his term – and he confidently suggested that this notion was widely 
shared.   Having said this, the categories of dementia and senility were not entirely 
separated in Clouston’s work.  Though he made it very clear that he believed that 
senile insanity presented in an ‘immense variety’ of forms, he conceded that ‘there 
is no doubt that [the] pure type [of senile insanity] is to be found in…senile 
dementia’.47  It seems, then, that even as a multiplicity of senile insanities were 
appearing in the literature of psychiatry, the association between the mental 
disintegration of dementia and ageing remained strong.   
 In  1889, William Bevan Lewis, chided medical students for being ‘too apt to 
assume that all varieties of mental ailments in the aged issue in senile dementia’.  By 
the 1880s, then, the term ‘senile insanity’ no longer referred to a specific type of 
moral insanity; it had become an umbrella term, encompassing all the varieties of 
senile mental disorder.  According to Bevan Lewis, senile insanity ‘embrac[ed]…all 
the forms of insanity usually delineated’. 48  The book in which these statements 
appeared, A Text-book of Mental Diseases, was praised by members of Skae’s 
‘oecumenical council’.49  Yet Bevan Lewis was not himself a product of 
Morningside.  His intellectual lineage was rooted in another school of thought in 
British psychiatry, one which formulated yet another way of looking at insanity, 
and which significantly reinforced the relationship between dementia and senility.  
This, too, can be traced back to mid-century Edinburgh. 
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Dissolution, Dementia and Senility 
The development of the theory of dissolution, by neurologist, John Hughlings 
Jackson, in the 1870s, provides the second chronological turning point in this 
narrative.  The roots of this theory, however, go back to the 1850s.  In 1855, having 
previously taught at the York Medical School, Thomas Laycock (1812-76) was 
recruited to a professorship at Edinburgh.  Though never an asylum 
Superintendent, he became one of the most influential figures of mid-century 
British psychiatry through his teaching and writing.  He lectured at York and at 
Edinburgh on medical psychology and mental pathology.  Many students at 
Edinburgh received instruction from both Laycock and Skae, including Thomas 
Clouston.50  Laycock’s former students described him in reverential terms; James 
Crichton Browne famously called him ‘a biological Socrates’.51  While Skae was first 
and foremost a clinician, who sought to influence the practice of clinical psychiatry 
in a very practical way, Laycock’s contribution to psychiatric knowledge was more 
theoretical, as a pioneer of physiological psychology.52 Though medically trained, 
his major publications were more concerned with the relationship between the 
mind and body than the practice of medicine.  He was interested primarily  in the 
structure and function of the nervous system, and its relationship to human (and 
animal) psychology.  From early on in his career, Laycock was an exponent of the 
reflexive, sensory-motor theory of nervous function and mental activity.  This 
theory had developed from a number of pioneering neuro-physiological 
experiments on animals which took place across the continent in the first three 
decades of the nineteenth century.  These experiments produced similar findings 
regarding the structure of the nervous system, from which a broadly agreed theory 
of the nervous system emerged.  Neuro-physiologists, such as Marshall Hall, 
suggested that the nervous system was made up of pairs of nerves, one ‘sensory’ 
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and one ‘motor’.  Bodily activity could be understood through the joint activity of 
these paired nerves:  the stimulation of the former led to a response in the latter. 
Physical movement, then, was understood as a product of automatic, 
physiologically produced, reflexes.53   
 Most early exponents of this theory stopped short of applying the reflexive 
response theory to the brain, and thus to the processes of mind.54  Laycock was not 
so cautious.  In an article published in 1844, ‘On the reflex function of the brain’, 
Laycock argued that the brain was composed of the same structural components as 
the rest of the nervous system, and was similarly governed by sensation and 
motion.  Thus, thought, emotion, and consciousness itself was the product of 
automatic reflex processes.  Laycock maintained that reflex actions governed all 
mental activity, not just the lower ‘instincts’.  Under this framework, all mental 
activity was brought into one continuous hierarchy.  Human consciousness was not 
unique, but simply an elaboration of the same nervous processes which governed 
the activity of animals.  As he wrote in 1844, 
The law of the unity of type and function in animals, applied ... 
to the function of the cerebro-spinal axis in man, has shown ... 
that the transmission of structure and function is gradual, and 
consequently no strong line of demarcation can be drawn 
between the manifestations of its various functions.  The 
automatic act passes insensibly into the reflex, the reflex into 
the instinctive, the instinctive are quasi emotional, the 
emotional intellectual.55 
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The four stages of nervous activity outlined here resemble a reversal of the stages of 
disintegration in dementia outlined in Prichard’s Textbook, published only ten years 
earlier:  from intellect, to instinct, to simple organic automation.  Laycock’s 
hierarchy was, however, more decisively embodied than Prichard’s.  While 
Prichard had implied that physical phenomena underlay mental disintegration in 
some way, Laycock’s belief in a continuous chain of sensory-motor structures and 
processes offered a precise physiological explanation of this relationship.  Laycock’s 
theory implied that a disintegration of mind was an expression of the physiological 
disintegration of the nervous hierarchy, which also constituted a descent –mentally 
and physiologically – down the evolutionary scale. This association between 
mental, physical and evolutionary disintegration had significant implications for 
the understanding of both dementia and ageing.   
 This idea was developed and extended in the work of another of Laycock’s 
erstwhile students, John Hughlings Jackson.  Hughlings Jackson encountered 
Laycock at the very beginning of his medical career, attending Laycock’s medical 
lectures whilst undertaking a medical apprenticeship in York.56  He then moved to 
London, where he completed his training and spent the majority of his career, 
devoted mainly to treating and researching nervous diseases from both a clinical 
and neuro-anatomical perspective.  He had strong connections with the 
neurological research at the West Riding Asylum, and was a cofounder of the 
journal Brain.  He has been credited with bringing order to the chaos of late-
nineteenth-century neurological knowledge, and his influence on modern 
neuroscience has been expressed by historians in the strongest of terms:  a 1998 
biography calls him the Father of English Neurology.    Like Laycock, he was not a 
psychiatrist, and never held a post at an asylum, but his work had a profound 
impact on the understanding of insanity in the late-nineteenth century, particularly 
on the understanding of dementia.57  
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Besides Laycock, Herbert Spencer was the other great influence on Jackson’s 
thinking.58  A true Victorian polymath, Spencer’s prolific writings touched on 
psychology, philosophy, sociology and biology.  These disparate works were united 
by his understanding of a universally applicable principle of evolution.  He was not 
as concerned as Darwin with why and how evolution occurred, but rather with the 
manner in which it occurred:   as a change from the homogenous to the 
heterogeneous, from the simple to the complex.59  This law, according to Spencer, 
governed development in all arenas of life, from organic matter, to societies, to 
languages.  Hughlings Jackson applied it to the nervous system.  He interpreted 
Laycock’s nervous hierarchy as a sequence of increasingly complex levels of 
neurological organisation: 
[E]volution is a passage form the most to the least organised, 
that is from the lowest, well organised centres, to the highest, 
least organised, centres; putting this otherwise, the progress is 
from centres comparatively well organised at birth up to those, 
the highest centre, which are continually organising throughout 
life.60 
More complex nervous layers were associated with the most sophisticated forms of 
mentation.  These could be expected to develop later in a species’ evolutionary 
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development, and later in the individual life.  James Crichton Browne, a friend and 
colleague of Hughlings Jackson, took up this idea enthusiastically.  In an article ‘On 
Old Age’, published in 1891, Crichton Browne suggested – drawing also on the 
work of Wakefield neurologist, David Ferrier, among others – that the frontal lobes 
of the human brain were the most recent and most sophisticated product of man’s 
evolutionary development, and as such were the last part of the body to reach full 
maturity.  They would, in fact, not reach their fullest perfection until late-middle 
age.  Being the most sophisticated parts of the brain, they were responsible for the 
highest mental faculties.  This being the case, ‘judgment and reason…come to their 
perfection… in all likelihood between the 55th and 65th years, and may be exercised 
justly till an advanced age’.61 Writing at the age of 51, Crichton Browne had decided 
that his best years were still ahead of him. 
Although it gave rise to this optimistic assessment of ageing, the 
evolutionary understanding of the nervous system mostly produced much more 
pessimistic descriptions of the ageing process.  In the 1880s, Jackson adopted 
another idea from Herbert Spencer’s organic philosophy, which he had named 
‘dissolution’. This, according to Spencer, was evolution in reverse: a process of 
decomposition from the most to the least complicated. 62   It formed a small part of 
Spencer’s largely optimistic oeuvre, but it became central to late-nineteenth-century 
psychiatry, after Hughlings Jackson used it to build his own theory of insanity.  
Insanity, he suggested, was itself a process of dissolution, whereby the more 
complicated and highly evolved layers of nervous organisation were removed, thus 
demoting the sufferer to a lower level of evolutionary development and mental 
functioning.  Higher layers of the nervous system performed two roles:  producing 
the higher mental functions and capacities, such as reason and morality, and also 
restraining the activity of the lower, less evolved layers. Because they were products 
of an earlier stage of development, the lower layers were incapable of adapting 
successfully   to external conditions, so the thoughts and behaviour they produced 
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were incoherent and bizarre.  In insanity, higher layers of the nervous system were 
damaged or rendered inactive, leading to a loss of mental function, described by 
Hughlings Jackson as the ‘negative symptoms’.  The insane person was therefore 
functioning through the operation of lower, less well-adapted layers, which had 
been left uncontrolled, producing ‘positive symptoms’ (such as ‘illusions, 
hallucinations, delusions, and extravagant conduct’).63   The lunatic was a simple, 
de-evolved person, unable to comprehend or adapt to a complex, rapidly 
progressing world.64 
Hughlings Jackson himself declared that his principle of dissolution was ‘of 
little use for [the] direct practical purposes’ of asylum classification.65  In spite of this 
disclaimer, the idea of dissolution was taken up enthusiastically by a number of 
psychiatrists at the end of the nineteenth century, and worked into classificatory 
schema and textbooks which were written in and for a clinical context.66  In these 
works, the old category of dementia became strongly identified with the new 
concept of dissolution.  Dementia, after all, was the existent clinical term used to 
describe a process of mental loss and disintegration.  In the clinically oriented works 
inspired by Hughlings Jackson, dementia was re-imagined as an expression of 
dissolution in its broadest and simplest form. 
Some psychiatrists began to use the terms ‘dementia’ and ‘dissolution’ 
interchangeably.  This conflation was particularly evident in the work of Charles 
Mercier (1852-1919), a London-based asylum physician and lecturer in mental 
diseases, who had been taught by Hughlings Jackson at the London Hospital in the 
early 1870s.67  In his 1902 Textbook of Insanity, he wrote that:  
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In all cases of insanity, the real and important aberration is… 
the degradation of activity to a lower plane; and it is this 
degradation that is indicated by the term dementia.68 
In Mercier’s work, then, dementia was synonymous with the ‘negative’ part of 
dissolution:    the term dementia was used to describe loss of function, while other 
terms – such as mania and melancholia – were used to describe insanities which 
produced ‘positive’ symptoms.  Thus, for Mercier, as for all those who preceded 
him, dementia was characterised by progressive loss and mental weakness.   
However, by conflating it with the neuro-physiological process of dissolution, 
Mercier added a concretely material element to the concept of dementia.   No longer 
a mere collection of symptoms, the theory of dissolution reified dementia as a 
patho-physiological entity, tied to a straightforward material process, with a 
predictable progression. 
Dissolution was also closely identified with the physiological process of 
‘natural’ ageing.  We can see this in the work of one of Mercier’s contemporaries, 
William Bevan Lewis.  Though educated at Guy’s Hospital in the 1860s, Bevan 
Lewis was really a product of Crichton Browne’s neuro-clinical research school at 
Wakefield, where he arrived as a clinical assistant in 1875, rising to the position of 
Medical Superintendent in 1884.69  His Textbook of Mental Diseases can be seen as the 
most thorough-going attempt to apply Hughlings Jackson’s insights – psychological 
and neurological – to clinical psychiatry.  For Bevan Lewis, all insanity was caused 
by local dissolutions.  The precise nature of the insanity would depend on its 
neurological location.  Only in ‘senescence’, he suggested, would dissolution occur 
in a uniform way across the whole nervous system, retracing the steps of psycho-
physiological development in their exact reverse order, ‘so that the mental wave 
recedes along the whole line of its former advance’.70  Here, he was equating 
dissolution with a natural process of ageing, inevitable at the end of a long life.  In 
the opening to his chapter on senile insanity, Bevan Lewis reminded students to 
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keep in mind the diversity of insanities which could arise in old age, and not to 
assume that senile insanity – for him, the pathological exaggeration of physiological 
senility – always assumed the form of dementia.  However, the resonance between 
the processes of ageing, dissolution and dementia were inescapable, and the 
development of the theory of dissolution encouraged the marginalisation of all 
other forms of senile insanity.  Thus, even Bevan Lewis proved unable to heed his 
own warnings.  In the discussion which follows his opening section on senile 
insanity, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, the boundary between the various 
forms breaks down, and he uses the terms ‘senile insanity’ and ‘senile dementia’ 
interchangeably.71  Both, he suggested, represented dissolution in its purest form: 
The decay of the intellectual is followed by failure of the 
sentient element of mind; emotion and feeling become slowly 
impaired, but at a much later date. Still, the patient may pursue 
his usual course of life, and all deeply-rooted sympathies, 
weaknesses, and prejudices may prevail in full force; the 
customary habits of a long life maintain their ascendancy; and 
though special aptitudes fail, the more general are still retained. 
Eventually, with their decline the subject is reduced to a mere 
vegetative state of existence. The whole process forcibly 
illustrates the law of dissolution, whereby the most-specialised, 
most-complex, and least-organised nervous arrangements 
suffer first, and the more-general, least-complex, and more-
organised and stable nervous-arrangements are the last to 
succumb; in other words, the dissolution takes the course from 
the least to the most stable arrangements.72 
This map for the progression of dementia is remarkably similar to the one set out by 
Prichard, over 50 years before:  a reversion from a state of intellect and will, to a 
state of habit, to a state of ‘mere vegetative…existence’.  However, Bevan Lewis’ 
version of mental disintegration is underpinned by a new set of concepts and 
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phrases, here expressed in unequivocally Spencerian terms:  a reversion from ‘the 
least to the most stable arrangements’.  Dissolution offered a new language with 
which to explain a long-recognised phenomenon, and reinforced the deeply 
embedded association between ageing, dementia, and progressive disintegration. 
The principle of dissolution, then, was aligned to both ageing and dementia, 
reinforcing the pre-existent connection between the two.  Charles Mercier took this 
connection the furthest, and explicitly conflated the processes of ageing, dementia, 
and dissolution.  For him, the relationship between ageing and dementia was 
unequivocal.  Unlike Prichard, he was prepared to state categorically that dementia 
was inevitable in old age.  Senile dementia was infrequently seen, he suggested, 
because ‘real old age’ was itself infrequently reached.  In most people, the ‘candle of 
life is blown out or extinguished’, before they reach their natural end.  Those who 
outlived accident or disease, however, would find themselves eventually subject to 
‘natural decay’.73   For Mercier, the mental degeneration of old age was not a form of 
insanity.  It was a straightforward physiological process, like sleep of intoxication, 
which led to an altered mental state.  Nevertheless, he named this phenomenon 
‘dementia’ and described it in dissolutionary terms: 
From beginning to end the process is a continuous, gradually 
progressing loss… affecting, first and most, the highest 
faculties, and leaving till the last those that are simplest, lowest, 
and most fundamental. The decadence of old age is, in fact, a 
dementia, a deprivation of mind.74 
As this statement makes clear, Mercier thought that ageing and dementia were the 
same thing:  a dissolution of the nervous system, from the highest structures, to the 
lowest.  For Mercier, then, dementia was more than just the prototype of senility; 
dementia was senility. 
Although the relationship between dementia and ageing was being 
described in such strong terms, other forms of dementia did not disappear from 
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psychiatric writings.  Primary and secondary dementia remained as forms of 
insanity in classificatory schema into the twentieth century. During this period, 
however, these non-senile dementias were described as an early expression of the 
mental degeneration of old age, brought on prematurely by external factors.  
Throughout the nineteenth century, all different forms of dementia were united in 
their aetiology:  an event or circumstance which exhausted the mind and body.  
Senile dementia was no different; it was viewed as a consequence of the exhaustion 
of living for a long time.  At the end of the century, however, ageing came to the 
fore, as the ultimate expression of this exhaustion.  Mercier, for example, stated in 
1890, that dementias at all ages were brought about by ‘a failure of energy, which is 
due to occur at the end of life, [and which] sets in prematurely’.75   
Joseph Shaw Bolton (1867-1946), a pathologist at the Claybury Asylum in 
London, who later succeeded Bevan Lewis at Wakefield, put this principle at the 
centre of his own classificatory system of insanity.76  As Bevan Lewis had done in 
his Textbook, Bolton sought to produce a grand synthesis of his clinical and 
neurological knowledge.  In a series of articles published between 1905 and 1908, he 
set out a new psycho-pathological classificatory system, based on a large-scale 
empirical study of asylum patients and their brains. 77   This system contained two 
overarching categories: amentia and dementia.  In Bolton’s classification, all 
insanities which were not congenital were classified as a form of ‘dementia’.  These 
dementias, he wrote, were all all ‘examples of natural involution of the cortical 
neurones, which occurs in the reverse order to that of their evolution’.78  This word 
‘involution’ – when used in this sense – originated in the work of the German 
Naturphilosophes, in the first half of the nineteenth century.  In this intellectual 
tradition, the word ‘Entwicklung’ (also described as ‘evolutio’ in German works and 
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translated as ‘evolution’ in English) was used to describe both embryonic 
development and growth, and the evolutionary development of the species.79  In 
1839, German physician, Karl Friedrich Canstatt, used the word ‘involution’, in his 
book Die Krankheiten des höheren Alters und ihre Heilung (‘The Illnesses of Old Age 
and their Treatment’) to describe the opposite process.  In this book, ‘involution’ 
means ‘ageing’, but it is imbued with the same associations embedded in 
‘Entwicklung’.80  As a contemporary English physician put it, ‘[Canstatt’s] 
“involution-period” is characterised, physiologically, by a return of the organism to 
the commencement of the evolution-period’.81  For Canstatt, then, ageing was itself 
a dissolutionary unmaking of a person, from their latest to earliest stages of 
development, evolutionarily and individually speaking.  This idea shared an 
intellectual lineage with Hughlings Jackson’s theory of dissolution, and was entirely 
compatible with it.  The word ‘involution’ entered British psychiatry in the early 
1890s, carrying with it these dual meanings of ageing and de-evolution.82  Thus, 
when Bolton described dementias as ‘examples of natural involution’, he was 
suggesting that all dementias were enactments of the ageing process, as well as a 
de-evolutionary dissolution.  Dementia at a younger age occurred when ‘extraneous 
causes’, or inborn weakness, brought on this ‘natural involution’ prematurely.83  For 
Bolton, then, all dementias were essentially senile dementia. 
This is the manner in which, in Berrios’ terms, senile dementia became the 
‘prototype of dementia’.  Theories of evolution and dissolution provided a unified 
framework, and a material basis, through which ageing and dementia could both be 
described and explained.  Through these theories, dementia came to be understood 
as an enactment – sometimes premature – of the natural process of ageing.  
Consequently, the way in which insanity in old age was categorised and described 
was limited.  This is demonstrated in the updated classification published by the 
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MPA in 1906.  This was drawn up to replace the classification published in 1882.  
The different ways in which ‘senile’ categories are featured in these two 
classifications illustrate the narrative of change described in this chapter. In 1882, 
there are three types of insanity:  senile mania, melancholia and dementia.  In 1906, 
only senile dementia remains.  The conceptual identity of ageing and dementia, 
underlined by the theory of dissolution, had thus overwhelmed the multiplicity of 
senile insanities encouraged by somato-aetiological classification.  Dementia had 
taken on a more material meaning, as a process of structural disintegration, which 
confirmed its identity as the only form of insanity which was also an expression of 
the decay of ageing.  There are still other dementias in the 1906 classification: 
primary and secondary.  However, as shown in the discussions of Mercier and 
Bolton above, these dementias were now largely interpreted as a premature 
enactment of the ageing process.  There had always been significant resonances 
between the categories of senility and dementia, but by the early twentieth century, 
they had become inextricably intertwined. 
The Symptoms of Dementia and the ‘Cognitive Paradigm’ 
The second thematic section of this chapter will consider specifically the category of 
dementia, and the symptoms ascribed to it.  The changing symptomatic paradigm 
of dementia has been of particular interest to historian-clinician, German Berrios.  
He has argued that the late-nineteenth century saw a 
narrowing down of the clinical scope of “dementia” … [which] 
culminated in the early 1900s with the consolidation of the 
“cognitive paradigm” i.e. the view that dementia consisted of 
an irreversible disorder of the intellectual functions.84 
This section will trace the emergence of the ‘cognitive paradigm’ in British 
psychiatry, but will add an interpretive layer to Berrios’ narrative of symptomatic 
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‘attrition’.85  It will mobilise John Hughlings Jackson’s concepts of ‘negative’ and 
‘positive’ symptoms: negative symptoms being those which involve a loss of mental 
functions, such as reason, memory or feeling; and positive symptoms being those 
which involve the production of a new behaviour, activity, mood, or idea, such as 
depression, excitement, delusion or hallucination.  This section will argue that a 
negative symptomatic paradigm was embedded in the concept of dementia from at 
least the mid-nineteenth century, but that it encompassed more than just the loss of 
cognitive functions.  Dementia was viewed as a slowing, weakening, and eventual 
obliteration of the mind in its entirety; ‘a gradually increasing decay of mind until 
there is nothing left that we properly call mind’, as Henry Maudsley (1835-1918) put 
it.86  No mental faculty would escape this obliteration.  Thus, emotional change was 
also brought into the negative symptomatic paradigm of dementia.  Up until the 
1880s, this section will argue, the primary losses of dementia were thought to 
involve the powers of sensation, attention and perception.  From these losses, it was 
thought, all other losses of dementia – of memory, of reason, of moral feeling – 
could be accounted for.  However, two intellectual developments at the end of the 
nineteenth century shifted the emphasis from a loss of sensation to a loss of reason.  
These were the adoption of the theory of dissolution, and the acceptance of cerebral 
localisation.  It was largely through the influence of these late-nineteenth- century 
ideas that the ‘cognitive paradigm’ of dementia emerged. 
 The attrition of the symptomatic paradigm of dementia, and its restriction to 
negative symptoms, can be seen clearly in successive editions of Bucknill and 
Tuke’s Manual of Psychological Medicine.  In the first edition, published in 1858, Tuke 
quoted two different descriptions of dementia:  one written by Philippe Pinel in 
1801, the other written some years later by Jean-Etienne Esquirol.  Pinel’s definition 
was quite broad: 
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[Dementia consists of] rapid succession or uninterrupted 
alternation of insulated ideas, and evanescent and unconnected 
emotions; continually repeated acts of extravagance; complete 
forgetfulness of every previous state; diminished sensibility to 
external impressions; abolition of the faculty of judgement; 
perpetual activity.87 
This definition contains negative symptoms (‘forgetfulness’; ‘diminished 
sensibility’; ‘abolition of…judgement’) and positive ones (‘rapid succession…of 
ideas’; ‘evanescent…emotions’; ‘acts of extravagance’; ‘perpetual activity’).  
Esquirol’s definition was far more limited: 
There exists… a form of mental alienation which is very distinct 
— in which the disorder of the ideas, affections, and 
determinations, is characterised by feebleness, and by the 
abolition, more or less marked, of all the sensitive, intellectual, 
and voluntary faculties. This is dementia.88 
Esquirol had thus jettisoned the positive symptoms attached to dementia by Pinel.  
This was a move strongly endorsed by Tuke.    He suggested that some of the 
symptoms in Pinel’s definition – the acts of extravagance and excitement – might be 
more appropriately categorised as signs of mania.  For Tuke, such outbursts in a 
generally demented patient should be considered ‘maniacal’: only the abolition of 
the faculties constituted dementia.89  In the second edition of the Manual, published 
in 1862, Pinel’s definition of dementia, along with any mention of positive 
symptoms, was removed altogether.90  The purely negative paradigm of dementia, 
which can be traced back to Esquirol, and was endorsed and enhanced by the 
Manual, supplied the contours of the psycho-pathological description of dementia 
for the rest of the century.  Throughout the nineteenth century, the dement was 
presented as a person who had been hollowed out, stripped of their mental faculties 
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one by one.  In 1884, George Savage (1842-1921) compared the dement to an 
abandoned, ruined house, whose four walls still stood, but whose interior was 
entirely empty.91 
Sensation, attention and memory 
Esquirol, then, can be seen as the source of the negative symptomatic paradigm of 
dementia in nineteenth-century British psychiatry.  Prichard, in his description of 
the symptomatic paradigm of dementia, quoted Esquirol at length: 
Dementia…deprives men of the faculty of adequately 
perceiving objects, of seeing their relations, of comparing them, 
of preserving a complete recollection of them; whence results 
the impossibility of reasoning.92  
For Esquirol, the failure of reasoning was secondary to one of perception.  Dements, 
he said, could neither create nor retain an accurate picture of the world around 
them.  This loss of the faculty of perception arose, he suggested, from three different 
systemic failures:  a failure of sensation, a loss of energy in the ‘organs of 
transmission’ which transferred these sensations to the brain, and a weakening in 
the brain itself, which no longer had ‘sufficient strength to receive and retain the 
impression which is transmitted to it’.  The demented failure of perception was thus 
primarily viewed as a physiological failure.  The parts of the body responsible for 
ushering ideas from the external world into the mind had lost the energy necessary 
for them to perform that task efficiently.  For Esquirol, it was this inability to take in 
new ideas about the world which led to the intellectual failure of dementia:  ‘unable 
to form a true and just idea of objects, these persons cannot compare them, or 
exercise abstraction or association of ideas’.93  Esquirol, like his teacher Pinel, took a 
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broadly ‘associationist’ approach to mental activity.94  Often linked to the work of 
seventeenth-century English philosopher, John Locke, associationism was an 
empiricist theory of mind.  Associationists held that there are no a priori elements of 
mind, that everything we know has been gleaned from the outside world via our 
senses.  All thought, they suggested, is made up of aggregates of these sensory 
impressions, which are associated with one another in the mind.95  Sensation was 
thus essential to thought and reason. Also essential to reason, according to Esquirol, 
was ‘attention’, the faculty of mind which acted as a ‘stamp…[to] fix and preserve 
the constancy of [external] objects’.96  The process of associating  ideas required the 
focus of attention, so that a train of thought could be followed.  In dementia, 
however, the ‘organ of thought’ was lacking in energy, depriving the sufferer of 
‘sufficiently strong attention’ to ‘exercise abstraction or association of ideas’.97 
 Prichard, who strongly endorsed Esquirol’s description of dementia, 
particularly emphasised this loss of attention.  He stated that ‘the fundamental or 
essential circumstance’ of dementia was ‘a failure of that natural aptitude… by 
which… one momentary condition of the mind follows in the train of its 
antecedent’.98  For him, then, it was not so much an inability to sense new objects, as 
a failure to link them successfully to others, which accounted for the ‘incoherence’ 
of dementia.  This was essentially a failure of will.  This difference in emphasis 
between Prichard and Esquirol can be explained by the influence of Scottish 
philosopher Dugald Stewart, whose lectures Prichard enjoyed as a medical student 
at Edinburgh in the early 1800s.99  Stewart and his colleagues broadly agreed that 
the principle of association governed the organisation of ideas in the mind, but 
argued that ‘the will’ governed the process of association.  For Stewart, then, an 
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inability to form associations was accounted for, not by a failure in sensation and 
perception, but by a failure of the will in organising these sensations.100   Prichard 
drew explicitly on this idea in his account of dementia.101  Though Stewart’s 
influence led Prichard to emphasise the failure of the will in forming associations 
between ideas, rather than the initial processes of sensation and perception as 
Esquirol had done, his conclusion was ultimately the same:  unconnected ideas 
made a weak impression on the ‘sensorium’, and could therefore be neither recalled 
nor compared. 
 Even psychiatrists who did not subscribe to the tenets of associationism 
described dementia in similar terms.  John Charles Bucknill, who viewed the mind 
as a patchwork of collaborating ‘faculties’, rather than a continuous stream of 
associations, also considered the failure of attention to be the primary mental 
disorder in dementia.  ‘In dementia,’ he stated, ‘no object impresses a distinct idea 
upon the perception, although the attention may have dwelt upon it for some 
length of time.’102  His insistence on separating the faculties of mind, however, led 
him to differ from Esquirol and Prichard in his assessment of the effect of dementia 
on the powers of reason.  ‘The fact is abundantly verified by experience’, he 
declared, ‘that in persons whose powers of mind are in an advanced state of decay, 
the judgement often remains sound.’  The faculty of reason, he suggested, could 
continue unimpeded in dementia, as it was entirely separate from the decaying 
faculty of attention.  Indeed, the continued integrity of the reason, he suggested, 
was what separated dementia from mania and other forms of insanity.  Despite his 
insistence on this point, however, he had to concede that it was very difficult to 
investigate the reasoning powers of the dement, given that they could not take in 
new information with which to make reasoned judgments.103  Ultimately, then, 
Bucknill agreed with Esquirol and Prichard:  dementia sufferers lost their powers of 
sensation and perception, which led to an inability accurately to judge the world 
around them.   
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 The failure of sensation and attention in dementia was also used to explain 
the failure of memory.  Even Bucknill, who saw memory as an entirely separate 
faculty of mind, conceded that the loss of attention could prevent the formation of 
new memories, as ‘a thing which is well observed is well remembered; while 
circumstances to which the attention has not been energetically directed, hold in the 
memory but a feeble and treacherous place’.104  Crichton Browne, who also broadly 
ascribed to faculty psychology, described the demented memory in similar terms.  
In senile dementia, he argued, ‘dullness of perception’, ‘imperfection in the 
processes of sensation’ and ‘enfeeble[ment] [of] attention’ were the primary 
symptoms.  Under these unfavourable conditions, ‘all new impressions made upon 
the mind are feeble and are speedily obliterated’.  Thus, the senile dement could not 
make or retain memories of new or recent events.  ‘Deprived of recent acquisitions,’ 
continued Crichton Browne, ‘the mind busies itself with older stores’.  Hence the 
tendency of senile dements to confuse the past with the present:  they were simply 
‘mak[ing] use of long past [and well-remembered] experience’ to help them make 
sense of a ‘confused and indistinct present’.105  Dementia, then, was characterised 
not so much by the loss of memories, as by the failure of memory. 
Dementia and Emotion 
Up until at least the 1870s, the loss of attention, sensation and perception were 
viewed as the primary mental failures of dementia, leading to a loss of reasoning 
capacity and a failure of memory.  These were not, however, the only faculties 
which were thought to be affected by the decay of dementia.  The emotions were 
not excluded from this general process of mental emptying.  Most psychiatrists 
suggested that the more elevated and developed ‘moral’ emotions would be lost 
first, as ‘the nobler and more complicated emotions of manhood gave way to those 
of a more rudimentary character’.106  Bucknill suggested that the essential character 
of a person was revealed through this process: these ‘rudimentary’ emotions may 
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manifest in a virtuous and happy way, if the underlying ‘disposition’ of the person 
were good.107  With characteristic pessimism, Henry Maudsley took a more negative 
approach to the emotional tenor of dementia.  The ‘moral feelings’, he argued, kept 
our essentially amoral selves under control.  Their loss would result in ‘peevishness 
and quarrelsomeness… obstinate self-opinion [and] dictatorial self-will’, amongst 
other similarly heinous traits.108  Crichton Browne suggested that the emotional 
attrition of senile dementia would mirror the failure of perception and sensation:  in 
senile dementia, the feelings were no longer formed in relation to others, and 
‘selfish, superficial, inconsequential emotions [were] alone manifested’.109  Left 
unable to fully take in the world around them, the dement’s points of reference 
became increasingly internal, both cognitively and emotionally. 
 Eventually, even these lowly, selfish emotions would lose their force.  ‘In the 
sphere of the emotions’, wrote Crichton Browne, ‘throughout the whole course of 
senile dementia, all tends towards bluntness and impotency’.110  This assessment 
echoed a classical characterisation of old age, as a time of calm reflection, free of 
emotional turmoil and excess.111  Maudsley invoked this tradition explicitly:  ‘by the 
ravages of decay [the senile dement] is brought to the philosopher’s ideal of 
freedom from passion’. Maudsley, whose attitude towards old age in general was 
exceptionally negative, was not being sincere in his reference to the ‘philosopher’s 
ideal’.  For Maudsley, the loss of emotion was but one part of the ‘common “ruin of 
oblivion”’ which rendered the dementia sufferer completely mentally impotent, an 
empty psychological wasteland.112 
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Dissolution and the Cognitive Paradigm 
The encroachment of the theory of dissolution into the concept of dementia in the 
1880s and 1890s had two consequences for the symptomatic paradigm of dementia.  
Firstly, as has already been discussed, it reinforced the relationship between 
dementia and negative symptoms.  Mercier, in particular, identified dementia with 
the negative element of dissolution: the loss of function.  However, he also 
recognised that dementia patients could display positive symptoms.  The 
dissolutionary loss of elevated nervous functions left the lower, uncontrolled, 
emotionally driven nervous layers to exert control.  Thus, ‘the display of emotion, 
that would normally be held in check by the controlling influence of the highest 
nerve regions, fails to be inhibited, and occurs from the excitation of trifling 
causes’.113  The consequences of this loss of control might include a quick temper, 
general irritability, and a tendency to weep at the merest provocation.  Far from 
becoming ‘freed from passion’, Mercier’s senile dement was in fact more in thrall to 
their emotions than ever.  However, if this irritability was exaggerated, and 
manifested in ‘uproar… foul language…abuse… [and] actual violence’, then 
Mercier considered there to be ‘something more than dementia’ at work.114  Such 
positive symptoms were not manifestations of dementia, but of a positive form of 
insanity.  
 The dissolutionary model of dementia also led to an increased emphasis on 
the loss of the intellectual faculties.  The principle of dissolution channelled the 
global decay of dementia through this hierarchical progression, giving priority to 
the loss of intellectual functions.  It drew on an evolutionary psycho-physiological 
hierarchy, with ‘judgement and reason’ at the highest point.115    In his 1889 Textbook 
of Mental Diseases, William Bevan Lewis stated that ‘the failing mental powers [in 
senile dementia] illustrate the law of dissolution, whereby the highest and last-
evolved members of a series fail earliest’.  For Bevan Lewis, this meant that the 
‘power of abstract thought’, and the ability to perform complex reasoning, would 
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fail first.  Next came ‘the association of ideas’, ‘the contrasting faculties’, ‘the 
creative operations’ and ‘the higher emotional states’.  Bevan Lewis placed all of 
these broadly intellectual capacities before the loss of memory in the progressive 
decay of dementia, although that too would come ‘sooner or later’.116  The 
hierarchical disintegration of dissolution thus placed the intellectual functions at the 
vanguard of the dementing process. 
The Localisation of Dementia 
At the end of the nineteenth century, this intellectual paradigm was co-opted and 
reinforced by localisationist neurologists.  ‘It is universally known,’ wrote Bernard 
Hollander, in a 1901 survey of ‘The Present State of Mental Science’, ‘that in senile 
dementia, and dementia of any kind… the greatest atrophy occurs in the frontal 
lobes.’117  In phrenology, the localised psycho-pathological theory which was 
influential in the early part of the nineteenth century, the frontal part of the brain 
was assigned to the faculties of intellect and reason.118  When neurologists returned 
to the idea of cerebral localisation in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the 
frontal lobe – physically situated at the very top of the nervous hierarchy – was 
again broadly defined as the seat of the highest intellectual functions.119  David 
Ferrier, one of the key figures in the revival of cerebral localisation in the 1870s, 
suggested that  
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The phrenologists have… good grounds for localising the 
reflective faculties in the frontal regions of the brain, and there 
is nothing inherently improbable in the view that frontal 
development in special regions may be indicative of the power 
of concentration of thought and intellectual capacity in special 
directions.120 
 Ferrier cautiously suggested that the frontal lobes were important factors in the 
development of advanced intellectual capacity.  In justifying his view of the frontal 
lobes as the seat of the intellect, Ferrier essentially created a ‘localised’ view of 
dementia.  In 1873, Ferrier had undertaken a series of experiments on macaque 
monkeys at the West Riding Asylum at Wakefield, under the invitation of James 
Crichton Browne.  On 2nd December, he removed the frontal lobes from one of these 
monkeys, chosen especially for his ‘lively and intelligent’ nature.  The monkey lived 
for five days after the operation, during which time he was closely observed.  
Ferrier noted that, after the operation, he continued to respond to stimuli, but ate 
and drank in a ‘mechanical’ fashion, ignored his surroundings and kept falling 
asleep.  ‘The condition resembled that of dementia,’ he wrote.  He claimed that the 
monkey’s faculties of sensation and motion remained intact, but noted that he failed 
to learn that he should not touch a burning match, and showed no interest in 
another monkey placed in his cage.121  Thus, this experiment, as well as apparently 
demonstrating the importance of the frontal lobes to the intellect, mobilised and 
reinforced a concept of dementia which consisted exclusively of cognitive 
impairment.  The faculties of sensation, previously a key part of the concept of 
dementia, played no part in this localised dementia.  Thus, the attribution of 
dementia to the wasting of the frontal lobes significantly reinforced a cognitive 
paradigm.    
 In the latter decades of the nineteenth century, a handful of psychiatrists, 
particularly those who were associated with Wakefield (where Ferrier undertook 
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his early research), drew on the principle of cerebral localisation in their discussions 
of dementia, mental weakness, and ageing.122  In the years following Ferrier’s 
experiments, however, many grew sceptical of the claims of cerebral localisation, as 
it did not provide them with the straightforward correlation between mental and 
encephalic pathology that they so desired.123  It was not until Joseph Shaw Bolton’s 
work in the early 1900s, that the principle of dissolution, the prefrontal localisation 
of the intellect, and the association of dementia with prefrontal wasting, were neatly 
drawn together into a comprehensive psycho-physiological picture.  Bolton – like 
Hughlings Jackson and the psychiatrists and psycho-physiologists who built on his 
work – relied on an associationism to explain mental processes.  Bolton divided the 
brain into three areas, roughly situated in ascending order from the top of the spine 
to the front of the brain.  The lowest region was responsible for collecting 
impressions from the senses, the next region organised these impressions into 
simple perceptions, and the highest region arranged them into complex thoughts.  
This highest frontal region, Bolton claimed, was both ‘the last part of the cerebrum 
to be evolved’ (in the development of the individual person and of the human 
species as a whole) and ‘the first part of the cerebrum to undergo dissolution in 
dementia’. 124 The primacy of the decay of the faculties of sensation which had 
characterised earlier descriptions of dementia, was therefore thoroughly 
overturned.  In Bolton’s articles, dementia was presented literally as ‘dying from the 
top’ – from the top of the brain, from the top of the nervous hierarchy, and from the 
top of the hierarchy of mental functions.125 
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 The cognitive paradigm of dementia also served to bolster the theory of 
cerebral localisation.  As one neurologist put it in 1904, ‘Histological investigation… 
does not help us in determining whether or not the frontal lobe is the seat of higher 
psychic functions or their nature’.126  A brain on a slab could not reveal the secrets of 
mental functioning:  for this, other types of evidence were needed, from either 
comparative anatomy, experimentation on living animals as practised by Ferrier, or 
from the comparison of a person’s mental attributes during life and their brain after 
death.  As sociologist Susan Leigh Star put it, in order to justify their claims, 
localisationist neurologists had to ‘triangulate’ evidence from the epistemologically 
disparate realms of clinical medicine, experimental physiology, neurosurgery and 
post-mortem investigation.  In doing so they ‘usually took evidence in an uncritical 
fashion’. 127   Uncertainties in the clinical identity of different mental disorders were 
flattened by neurologists seeking to justify their theories. Thus, a limited concept of 
dementia, as a loss of intellectual function, was used to justify claims about the 
localisation of these functions.  At the end of a paper published in Brain in 1903, in 
which Bolton presented the morbid anatomy of several brains which showed pre-
frontal wasting, he declared that   
The writer… considers it proved that the great anterior centre 
of association lying in the prefrontal region is underdeveloped 
on the one hand, in all grades of primary mental deficiency, and 
on the other undergoes primary atrophy pari passu with the 
development of dementia; it is therefore the region of the 
cerebrum which is concerned with the performance of the 
highest coordinating and associational processes of mind.128 
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For Bolton, as for Hollander, the wasting of the frontal lobe which was observed in 
dementia patients ‘proved’ that the frontal lobe was the seat of the intellect, which 
itself proved, in a somewhat circular fashion, that dementia was a failure of 
intellect.  Thus, together, associationist psychology, localisationist physiology, and 
the dissolutionary theory of insanity, produced an unequivocally cognitive 
paradigm of dementia. 
Models of Ageing  
The Bodily Economy; the Exhaustion of Life 
This section will turn from dementia to senility, and examine the ways in which 
different models and explanations of ageing were mobilised in psychiatric texts.  
One of the most significant was the ‘bodily economy’ model.129  The idea of that the 
body operates through a fixed vital economy, spending the energy endowed to it at 
birth, has provided one of the most enduring explanations of the ageing process.  
The slowing of physical movements, the visible shrinking and contraction of the 
body, and the seemingly inevitable fact of death, can all be explained by a 
depletion, and eventual exhaustion, of an innate vital force.  The idea of a fixed 
bodily economy was closely related to the vitalist theory of organic life – popular in 
the eighteenth century – which posited that organic life functions through the 
operation of a specific ‘vital’ or ‘animal’ power.130  This model should not, however, 
be conflated with vitalism specifically; as Daniel Schäffer has pointed out, the 
concept of ‘successive loss of inner, inborn vital principle… through a process of 
self- or external consumption’ has been a feature of discussions of ageing for 
centuries, and cuts across quite different theories of bodily function, from the 
humoral to the iatro-mechanic.131  When pathological-anatomical investigations 
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brought new insights into the structure of the ageing body in the early nineteenth 
century, the model of the vital economy still did not disappear.  According to 
Carole Haber, most physicians in England and America found ‘little conflict’ 
between the new pathological vision of the aged body and the older, vitally-
exhausted one.  The lesions and the bodily economy were ‘neatly combined’: ‘the 
tissue or cell degenerated which the organism systemically wasted away’.132   
The fixed bodily economy idea endured because it was adaptable.  New 
scientific and social ideas drew on the same economic principles.  The second law of 
thermodynamics, developed in the 1840s, posited that energy within a closed 
system was not perfectly conserved, but would always eventually dissipate.133  
Under this new physical law, running out of energy came to be seen as the fate of 
the universe, not just of the individual.  Historian, Anson Rabinbach, has described 
the way in which the second law of thermodynamics, and the idea of the bodily 
economy, were used in discussions of work and labour to tie bodily efficiency to 
mechanical efficiency.134  The bodily economy made it easy for bodily activity, and 
the effects of ageing, to be moralised and politicised.  The signs of ageing could be 
taken as signs of an exhausting lifetime of debauched, or simply improprietous, 
activity.  Self-preservation in old age necessitated the careful conservation of 
resources.  Historians, Thomas Cole and Anne-Julia Zwierlein, have connected this 
mid-Victorian interest in prudent vital spending to similar concerns for thrift in the 
middle-class household and in capitalist businesses.135  An unhealthy and 
impoverished old age was thus conceptualised as a consequence of wasteful 
expenditure, financially and vitally. 
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As these examples suggest, the idea of the bodily economy was pervasive in 
Victorian culture.  As a medical explanation of ageing, however, some nineteenth-
century physicians expressed concern over the logic of the fixed vital economy.  In 
the entry on ‘old age’ to his monumental Dictionary of Practical Medicine, James 
Copland explained that all visible and invisible signs of ageing were ‘more or less 
remote effects of the failure of the vital endowment of the frame’.  At the same time, 
however, he pointed out that ageing could not be caused by the progressive 
exhaustion of the energy endowed to us at birth, as ‘parents cannot possibly impart 
to the embryo more [energy] than they possess’.  Copland’s alternative was to 
suggest that it was the processes of nutrition which failed in old age; that old bodies 
were less efficient at replenishing their spent reserve of energy.136  Physicians who 
wrote specifically about the physical effects of ageing echoed Copland’s objections 
to the fixed endowment of energy model.  Psychiatrists, however, showed no such 
qualms.137  Thomas Laycock, who held explicitly vitalist views, suggested that ‘Old 
dogs and monkeys do not become irritable from experience alone, but from the 
decline of vital powers.  It is not otherwise in man.’138  As late as 1890, Charles 
Mercier described this expenditure of energy throughout the course of life in terms 
of classical mechanics: 
The impetus, that was given to the organism at conception, has 
carried it on through the process of development to manhood, 
has sustained it in activity throughout a long life, but with each 
year that has passed a portion of the initial velocity has been 
dissipated. The friction with the world has tended constantly to 
bring the organism to rest, and as its career approaches 
termination, it moves more and more slowly.139 
This ‘slowing’ in old age, according to Mercier, had physical effects in the 
‘diminished energy of movement’, and mental effects in the ‘diminished activity of 
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mind’.  Due to this loss of energy, he suggested, the process of thought literally 
slowed down, the intellect becoming ‘dull’ and ‘lethargic’.  The ‘inertia’ of the 
nervous molecules prevented new memories from being formed.  The model of the 
bodily economy thus neatly tied together physical ageing and the decline of the 
ageing mind.140 
 The idea of the fixed bodily economy was used to describe many mental 
conditions, at all stages of life.  ‘Neurasthenia’ was perhaps the characteristic 
disorder of the depleted vital economy in the nineteenth century.141  This was a 
protean disorder, whose symptoms included ‘anxiety, despair, 
phobias…insomnia…inattention, extreme fatigue, palpitations, migraine, 
indigestion, and impotence’.142  It was, then, significantly less severe than dementia:  
neurasthenia could incapacitate its sufferers, but would rarely lead to their 
complete mental disintegration, and was usually entirely curable.  It was also more 
refined than dementia, generally considered to be a disease of the middle classes.  
Like dementia, the heterogeneous disease of neurasthenia was held together by its 
aetiology:  a depletion of the vital nerve force.  This could be brought about by 
overwork or over-excitement, or anything else which taxed the body’s reserves of 
nervous energy.  It was variously described as the characteristic condition of 
modern, civilised man, and as an enfeeblement brought about by the exhaustion of 
having a female body.143  An American physician named George Miller Beard was 
widely regarded as the ‘father of neurasthenia’.  He emphasised the middle-class 
male type of neurasthenic, exhausted by ‘the fast pace of modern life’. 144   Beard 
also wrote extensively on old age, and included this research in his most famous 
book, American Nervousness.  Beard’s view of old age, the period in which the nerve 
force was almost spent, was very pessimistic.  Many of the world’s problems, he 
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suggested, could be put down to the ‘barbarous folly’ which allowed old, exhausted 
men to hold most of the power.145  For Beard, both the neurasthenic and the old 
person were left mentally and physically crippled by their loss of nervous energy. 
 Though neurasthenia was not itself conceptualised as premature ageing, the 
same explanatory model was used to explain why some people aged – physically 
and mentally – before others.  ‘The powers of all are limited’, suggested Prichard in 
his 1835 Treatise, and ‘a life of too much activity and… mental exertion… excessive 
anxiety and eagerness in pursuit of business, or intense and unremitted application 
to studies of any kind’ was liable to bring on senile dementia at an early age.146  This 
warning against over-exertion in work and business was difficult to reconcile with 
the Victorian values of hard work and unceasing productivity.  Zwierlein argues 
that mid-Victorian writers circumvented this contradiction by suggesting that hard 
work itself promoted efficient use of energy, claiming that ‘both excess and 
indolence could thus be fatal’.147  James Crichton Browne was a supporter of such 
prudent expenditure of energy.  In the 1870s and 1880s, he took a keen interest in 
education reform, with a particular concern for the nervous disease which might 
result from the pressures of over-education and over-examination, especially 
amongst the poor.148  In his 1874 lecture on senile dementia, he also warned of the 
dangers of ‘feverish brain-work’ in the old, as a potential inducement to mental 
failure.  At the same time, however, he was keen to emphasise that he did not 
advocate an idle life and idle old age:  ‘it is not pure brain-work, but brain-
excitement or brain-distress, that eventuates in brain-degeneration and disease’.  
Indeed, it was not the poor whom he considered to be most in danger at this time of 
life, but the idle rich:  
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No more pitiable picture can, I think, be conceived, than the 
retired man of business wandering about in listless ineptitude 
and dreary opulence… with the great burden of fatuity settling 
on his mind.  A lively bankruptcy must be delightful when 
compared with the state of that man. Struggling poverty would 
be a positive blessing to him.149   
Crichton Browne thus managed to marry a firm commitment to middle-class 
Victorian values of industry and forbearance, with an underlying belief in the need 
to conserve our vital forces.   
 The image of the senile dement presented here by Crichton Browne is not 
just middle class, of course, but male: ‘the retired man of business’.  This is an 
interesting choice, given the prominence of the vital economy in contemporary 
medical discussions of women’s bodies, including those written by Crichton Browne.  
Women’s reproductive systems were thought to be particularly taxing on their 
reserves of vital energy.  This reproductive exhaustion was used to explain 
women’s limited mental capacity, and to endorse the need for passivity and calm in 
their lives.150  When it came to old age, however, this model of women as exhausted 
and fragile broke down.  If women’s body economies are so greatly taxed during 
their reproductive lives, it logically followed that women will feel the effects of this 
massive expenditure – and thus age and die – earlier than men.  Yet nineteenth-
century observers could not ignore the mortality gap:  in the nineteenth century, as 
in the present, women generally outlived men.151  Indeed, the longer life-expectancy 
of women was explained by the particular stresses placed on men’s bodily 
economies throughout their lives and their exhausting public roles.  Crichton 
Browne, a great opponent of women’s education, wrote in 1891 that  ‘Women, who 
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have not yet to bear the brunt of competition as much as men, reach advanced ages 
in far larger proportion than men do.’152  
The stereotype of the powerful, intellectual men, brought low by dementia – 
exemplified by poet and historian Robert Southey, adopted as a case study in 
Bucknill and Tuke’s Manual of Psychological Medicine - was a trope in these writings, 
but was not all-encompassing.153  ‘Senile dementia has been spoken of as “the last 
infirmity of noble minds”’, wrote Crichton Browne (quoting Bucknill and Tuke), 
‘but experience will convince you that it is also the infirmity of minds which have 
no pretension to nobility’.154  If men were often presented as the ideal type of senile 
dement, the actual examples presented in these texts were more often women, 
presumably due to the greater numerical abundance of old women in the asylum, 
and outside it.  Certainly, old women (and men) were not immune to the effects of 
ubiquitous Victorian gendered stereotyping but, medically speaking, the aged had 
‘passed through that excitable and stormy period of nervous life which corresponds 
to the activity of the sexual functions’ and, in this sense, become de-gendered by 
their age.155  Where concerns about gendered behaviour were brought up in 
discussions of senile insanity, it usually reflected concerns about a change in 
habitual behaviour (which was necessarily gendered).156 Male sexuality was thought 
to be more persistent into old age than female sexuality, but in a precarious state, 
prone to perversion:  Crichton Browne warned of the ‘octogenarian celibate [who] 
seeks out an Abishag to comfort his chill decrepitude’.157 Certain psychiatrists 
implied that senility would have a feminising effect.  Advice for a mentally healthy 
old age often involved withdrawing from the cut-and-thrust of public life, into the 
quiet, rhythmic calm of the domestic sphere.  Henry Maudsley – ‘the high priest of 
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the fixed fund of energy’ - was particularly critical of old men who attempted to 
maintain their masculine public role beyond their mental capacity to perform it.158  
Charles Mercier, on the other hand, used the idea of an evolutionary gender 
difference to express the effects of senile dementia: 
When an old man's other faculties begin to fail, he becomes 
incapable of feelings of a high degree of elevation. On the 
occurrence of a cause celebre he fails to rise to the feeling of 
justice, but takes the feminine view that it would be cruel to 
punish the offender.159   
According to Mercier, then, the retrogression of old age brought old men onto an 
evolutionary par with women. 
 Throughout this period, as has already been discussed, dementia was 
broadly conceptualised as a loss of energy leading to a loss of mental capacity.  
Anything which exhausted the body’s reserves of vital or nervous energy – acute 
emotional shock, physical illness, or another long-term mental disorder – could 
bring on dementia. ‘Seeing that the pathological condition of dementia is an 
emptiness of the storehouse of energy,’ wrote Charles Mercier, ‘it is evident that 
anything which produces an excessive emptying of these stores may produce 
dementia’.160  Thomas Clouston gave one of the most comprehensive lists of those 
things which might empty this storehouse:  
[Dementia] frequently occurs in and after bodily diseases, 
especially after fevers. It also always occurs in the process of 
starvation to death. It frequently is seen after the exhaustion of 
long journeys, great exertions, severe campaigns, and great 
mental tension, strains, or efforts, such as business crises, 
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sieges, etc. It also occurs after sudden or great emotional 
shocks, such as loss of children.161 
He then described secondary dementia – ‘dementia par excellence’ – as the form of 
dementia brought on by the exhaustion caused by other forms of insanity.  
Clouston’s list of the causes of dementia thus included physical, mental, emotional 
and intellectual factors.  These causes could be acute or long-term.  Clouston’s list 
also included the longest-term cause of all, ‘the process of starvation to death’.  This 
aetiological model, of physical and mental exhaustion as the cause of dementia, 
allowed ageing to sit comfortably alongside these myriad other causes.  In 1867, 
Henry Maudsley classified the dementia of old age as a form of ‘secondary 
dementia’, because of the ‘unanswerable argument that it is secondary to the 
feverish disease of life’.162  German Berrios has described this classification as 
‘strange’ and Maudsley’s justification of it as a ‘bizarre way out’.163  However, far 
from being strange or bizarre, this justification was entirely consistent with the mid-
nineteenth-century understanding of aging and of dementia.  Dementia was 
thought to be generally caused by an exhaustion of the nervous system, and the 
progress of years was one of the things which could bring this on.  Some people 
would find themselves weakened when they were young, by illness, accident, or 
imprudent living, but eventually everyone would find themselves weakened by the 
exhaustion of a long life. 
 Carole Haber has described the concept of the bodily economy as a 
‘metaphoric model of ageing’.164  It was certainly a concept which leant itself to 
metaphoric description.  In the Manual of Psychological Medicine, Tuke used the 
metaphor of a flame to explain the consumption of energy in dementia, when ‘the 
oil which should have sustained the lustre of an entire life’, was reduced to ‘ashes in 
the socket’.165  Charles Mercier also likened ageing to a dying flame.166  Henry 
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Maudsley used the more up-to-date analogy of a steam engine.167  At the same time, 
however, most psychiatrists made it clear that they considered this vital or nervous 
energy to be much more than a metaphor.  They viewed the loss of vital energy as a 
material phenomenon.  ‘By the old writers,’ wrote Maudsley, 
 it was said that the “vital sprits” were secreted from the blood 
in the brain and were diminished or exhausted by frequent or 
prolonged use.  With the necessary change of terms, that is 
probably very much what happens.  The elements of nerve 
substance are secreted from the blood in the nerve-cells, and, 
undergoing decomposition during function, are diminished or 
exhausted by frequent or prolonged use.168 
Here, Maudsley suggested that the key components in maintaining vitality are 
‘elements of nerve substance’, carried by the blood to nourish the activity of the 
nerve cells.  Other physicians suggested different substances as the material basis 
for ‘vital spirits’.  Charles Brown-Séquard (1817-1894) was a French neurologist 
with an international career and reputation.169  In the early 1860s, during a period 
working at the National Hospital for the Paralytic and Epileptic in London, he was 
a key influence on John Hughlings Jackson.170  In the 1880s, as his own old age 
approached, Brown-Séquard turned his considerable talents to the amelioration of 
the ageing process.  In 1889, he caused a sensation by claiming to have rejuvenated 
his 72-year-old body with ‘an extract of animal sex-glands’.  Loss of seminal fluid 
had long been associated with a loss of vital energy in anti-onanistic literature.  
Brown-Séquard turned this discourse on its head, by suggesting that an injection of 
seminal fluids could re-vitalise the aged body.171  He died five years later. 
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  Blood often stood in as the material provider of this vital force.   For 
Thomas Laycock, an ‘abundance of [vital] force’ was indicated by ‘good blood 
circulating through a healthy lung, and within a healthy, well-formed brain’.172  
Thus, a lack of blood-flow, or a degradation of the blood’s quality, was often 
included in explanations or descriptions of the ageing process and its mental 
consequences.  In his 1870 article, ‘On certain nervous affections of old persons’, 
neurologist Francis E. Anstie (1833-74) argued that the nervous system, being the 
most elaborate part of the human body, relied on ‘the constant maintenance of a 
more perfect and elaborate apparatus of blood supply’ than any other part of the 
organism.  For this reason, he suggested, it was the nervous system which often 
‘exhibit[ed] the first effects of diminished vital power’ in old age.173 ‘If we could 
comprehend… the blood supply to the brain’, wrote George Fielding Blandford 
(1829-1911) in 1871, ‘we should go far towards explaining most of the phenomena of 
brain function and disorder’.’174  Restricted blood flow was thus seen as a 
characteristic of insane bodies, as well as aged ones.  The identification of blood 
with the bodily economy linked the loss of vital energy to the most commonly cited 
physiological alteration of ageing:   hardening and thickening of the arteries. 
Old Bodies:  Arteries and Atrophy 
The centuries-old saying ‘a man is as old as his arteries’ had, according to Carole 
Haber, ‘achieved the status of a maxim’ by the nineteenth century.175  Atheroma – a 
thickening and increasing rigidity of the arterial walls, restricting the blood flow – 
featured regularly in explanations of mental disorder in old age in the second half 
of the nineteenth century. In his Morisonian lectures, David Skae stated 
unequivocally that, ‘It is to this atheromatous state of the arteries… that we owe 
that series of symptoms comprehended under the name of Senile Insanity.’176  
Atheroma provided a physiological sign which could be easily identified by the 
naked eye (post-mortem, at least), and which clearly differentiated the aged body 
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from the younger adult body.  Atheroma could also be shown to restrict the blood 
flow to the brain, offering a clear structural explanation for the mental deficiencies 
of old age:  deprived of blood and its nourishment, the brain first began to function 
less efficiently, and then structurally disintegrated. 
 This disintegration was thought to take two main forms.  The first was 
commonly known as ‘softening of the brain’.  This ‘softening’ was another 
pathological phenomenon which was easy to identify in post-mortem, though it 
could, as Jennifer Wallis has pointed out, inhibit the identification of other 
pathological lesions in the brain.177  The ‘softened brain’ was soggy and effluent, 
swollen with excess fluid, falling apart when attempts were made to cut into it.  
When caused by a failure of blood supply to the brain, as in the case of 
athermoatous ageing, brain softening was thought to spread from the site of this 
deprivation.178  Some physicians and pathologists complained that the term 
‘softening of the brain’ was applied too liberally, as a non-specific name for mental 
enfeeblement of all kinds, and as a lazily identified cause of death.179  In spite of this, 
asylum pathologists continued to make use of ‘softening of the brain’ - even in the 
self-consciously scientific pages of the neurological journal, Brain – and it cannot be 
entirely dismissed as a meaningless phrase.180  William Bevan Lewis – an 
accomplished and dedicated histologist – described softening of the brain as 
 a general moist condition of the white matter, which is soft, 
almost pasty, clings to the blade, and is apt to tear away in 
shreds of a dirty white hue…[T]he cerebral tissue becomes 
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much infiltrated with serum [and there is] effusion [of fluid] 
into the ventricles and beneath the membranes of the brain.181  
This process of softening and moistening in old age resonated with the humoral 
model of the phlegmatic aged body, and continued to be taken as a general 
principle.182  Crichton Browne suggested that the overall softening of the brain in 
senile dementia corresponded with a similar softening and moistening at a cellular 
level.183  The pathology of cerebral softening served to link ageing to chronic 
insanity:  on the one hand, cerebral softening was said to be epitomised by ‘the 
water-logged brain of the chronic lunatic’; on the other, softening was considered 
the most common pathological feature in cases of ‘senile wasting of the brain’.184  
Softening was a physical embodiment of the loss of energy described above:  the 
brain, worn out by over-exertion, or by a lifetime of use, lost its firm, buoyant 
structure and disintegrated into a limp ‘boggy mess’.185   
The second form of encephalic disintegration described in these texts was 
simply called ‘atrophy’.  This was a wasting away of parts of the brain, a physical 
loss of brain material, or, as Crichton Browne put it ‘[the] simple and numerical 
atrophy – the necrobiosis – of the brain’.186  Psychiatrists and neurologists assumed 
throughout this period that brain size was an indication of mental capacity or 
function, and the practice of weighing the brain was a common feature of asylum 
post-mortem investigations.187  Comparative reports on the weights of large 
collections of brains, published in the Journal of Mental Science and Brain, indicated 
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that lunatics, the aged, women, and other inferior or degenerated persons, all had 
smaller and lighter brains than healthy, white, adult men.188  The loss of brain 
material observed post-mortem provided an easy explanation for the loss of mental 
function in old age and dementia.  In an article published in the 1850s, John Charles 
Bucknill suggested that the cerebral atrophy of senile dementia took place ‘in extent 
varying with the loss of mental power which ha[d] occurred’.189  Following a large-
scale study of the weight of insane brains, Crichton Browne argued that states of 
mental weakness – idiocy and dementia – were manifested in the lightest brains.  
Literally devoid of thought, the skulls of the demented and imbecile were as empty 
as their minds.  Later in the century, a more localised and compartmentalised view 
of the brain prompted post-phrenological comparative weight studies of the 
different areas of the brain, complicating this simple relationship between brain size 
and brain function.  190  As discussed above, attention shifted to the atrophy of the 
frontal lobes of the brain, as the pathological cause of the loss of reasoning capacity 
in the dementia of old age. 
In an 1898 address to the MPA on ‘The neuroses and psychoses of 
decadence’, Thomas Clouston called for further investigation into ‘the life-history of 
the neuron… in [its] stages of growth, development, and decadence’.191  At the time 
he was writing, new histological techniques were being developed, offering new 
ways of describing the aged brain.  However, as historians Edwin Clarke and 
Stephen Jacyna have argued, there was no simple relationship between these 
technological innovations and the development of new understandings of the 
structure of the brain.  They argue that the theoretical frameworks within which 
neurologists worked dictated their interpretation of what they saw: ‘conceptual 
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influence structured… histological observations’.192  There are many examples of 
new pathological discoveries in aged brains being taken as proof of existent 
theoretical models.  In the 1890s, pioneering Scottish neuropathologist, W. Ford 
Robertson (1867-1923), identified chromatolysis – the process by which the 
constitutive elements of the neuron broke apart and dispersed to the outer parts of 
the cell – as a common feature of the senile brain.  He interpreted this change as a 
stage of cellular disintegration, and of overall brain atrophy.193  Thus, in his 1900 
Text-book of Pathology in Relation to Mental Diseases, he wrote that physiological 
senility consisted of, not only ‘a complete disappearance of a large percentage of the 
cells’, but also a disintegration at a sub-cellular level:  ‘progressive atrophy of the 
protoplasmic processes, shrinkage of the cell-body and loss of its angular form, 
dissolution of the Nissl-bodies…and disintegration of the nucleus’.194  Other 
pathological appearances were identified in aged brains at the end of the nineteenth 
century.  William Bevan Lewis and another asylum pathologist, A. W. Campbell, 
both wrote about ‘spider cells’, commonly present in the brains of the senile insane. 
These were fibrillous intrusions, made visible by new staining techniques, 
‘throwing off numerous delicate fibrillar processes which entwine upon the 
vascular walls and meander among the nerve-elements of the cortex’.  Bevan Lewis 
interpreted these as harbingers and producers of ‘senile atrophy’, feeding off 
degenerating tissue, and furthering that degeneration by strangling the blood 
vessels and ‘seriously interfering with the permeability of nutrient supply’.195  Finer-
grained histological insight, then, did little to change the overall pathological 
paradigm of brain-ageing as brain-atrophy.  In lieu of any chance to observe the 
degeneration of the brain as it happened, psychiatrists and neurologists fell back on 
the established clinical picture of senile dementia to explain and describe the 
pathological process of cerebral degeneration.   In his article on ‘The Neuroses of 
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Decadence’, Thomas Clouston localised the progressive degeneration of ageing onto 
different parts of the neuron, just as David Ferrier and Joseph Bolton mapped 
dementia onto the different areas of the brain.  The ‘molecular structure of the 
protoplasm’ must, Clouston claimed, be the first neurotic element to degenerate, 
because the failure to assimilate new impressions was the first sign of senility.  The 
subsequent failure of the reasoning faculties, he hypothesised, demonstrated the 
subsequent ‘destruction’ of the ‘dendrites and their gemmules and the 
neuraxons’.196  At this stage, then, the new language and concepts of cellular 
neurology reinforced both the pathological concept of senility as a decay of the 
brain, and the psycho-pathological model of senile dementia as a progressive loss of 
function.  
At the same time – from the end of the 1890s into the first decade of the 
twentieth century – other histological investigations of senile brains, which would 
eventually shift the paradigm of brain-ageing, were taking place outside of Britain.  
The most famous of these was published by German neuro-pathologist, Alois 
Alzheimer, in 1907, in which he identified ‘neuritic plaques and neurofibriallry 
tangles’ in the brain of a demented 51-year-old woman named Auguste Deter.197  
Alzheimer was not entirely sure what he had discovered, though he felt it was 
something new.  These plaques and tangles became the key pathological markers of 
‘Alzheimer’s disease’, which was named, not by Alzheimer himself, but by his 
senior colleague Emil Kraepelin, in the 1910 edition of his Handbook of Psychiatry.  
Kraepelin interpreted Alzheimer’s disease as a severe form of senile dementia, 
which could also occur in pre-senile cases.198  The pathology of plaques and tangles 
represented a departure from the simple atrophic model of senile dementia of the 
nineteenth century:  they were focal lesions, unlike the systemic phenomena of 
softening and atrophy, and seemed to point to a specific disease process, rather than 
a generalised decay.  However, although the discovery of these new pathological 
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lesions was reported in the Journal of Mental Science, their immediate impact on the 
general psychiatric understanding of old age and senility was limited.199  Historian 
Martha Holstein has argued that neurologists in the early twentieth century were 
keen to keep Alzheimer’s disease separate from senile dementia.  As long as 
Alzheimer’s was considered a separate disease entity, it could be distanced from the 
messy uncertainties surrounding the relationship between ageing, disease and 
mental deterioration.200    The analysis presented in this chapter suggests a 
somewhat different reason for the slow adoption of Alzheimer’s disease, in Britain 
at least.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, the connection between 
dementia and ageing had a strong, multifaceted theoretical basis.  The theory of 
dissolution, the symptomatic paradigm of dementia as a loss of function, the model 
of the bodily economy, and the pathological model of brain atrophy, all served to 
reinforce the connection between ageing and dementia.  It would take a significant 
paradigmatic shift (and, as historians of Alzheimer’s disease have argued, a strong 
political and financial incentive) for this relationship to be disrupted. 201 
Second Childhood and the Phylogenic Metaphor 
The Lebenstreppe 
The metaphor of old age as a ‘second childhood’ drew on and reinforced the 
association between ageing, dissolution, and primitivism, as this section will 
describe.  ‘The common law of life’, wrote Henry Maudsley in 1883, ‘is slow 
acquisition, equilibrium for a time, then a gentle decline that soon becomes rapid 
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decay and finally death’.202  This ‘common law’ underpinned all of the models of 
ageing described above:  whether caused by arterial degeneration or a loss of innate 
vitality, ageing was an inescapable part of life, as inevitable as growth from 
childhood.  The developmental curve – a trajectory with a hopeful, upward 
evolution, mirrored inevitably by a sad decline – was a central image in fin-de-siècle 
science and culture, but it had many historical precedents.  The image of the 
Lebenstreppe – the ‘life steps’, or ‘life curve’ – was one of the most enduring pictoral 
representations of Maudsley’s common law of life (Figures 1 and 2).  It depicted the 
life course as a series of orderly steps, going up from birth to maturity, and back 
down towards death.  It originated in sixteenth-century Holland, and by the 
nineteenth century had become a popular and familiar iconographic trope across 
Europe and America, appearing on pamphlets and prints, beer mugs and board 
games.203  The message of the Lebenstreppe may have changed somewhat over time 
(earlier examples stressed the timelessness of the Christian soul, while later versions 
had a more secular emphasis on health and prudence) but the essential structural 
features remained remarkably stable.204   
This life curve did not exist only in the realm of popular culture:  by the 
mid-nineteenth century it had entered the burgeoning medical study of ageing.  In 
1853, a London doctor, Bernard Van Oven, used two diagrams to represent different 
models of the life course, in his book On The Decline of Life in Health and Disease 
(Figure 3).  Though they illustrated different versions of the development curve – 
one strictly symmetrical, the other showing a more rapid and destructive decline at 
the end of life – both were suggestive of the rise and fall of the Lebenstreppe.  The 
Lebenstreppe were also rhetorically present in nineteenth- and early twentieth- 
century psychiatry.  The most negative elements of the Lebenstreppe image – such as 
the apparent physical diminishment of the ageing person as they descended back 
down the life curve – was particularly congruent with the cultural pessimism 
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prevalent at the turn of the century.  The old person shrank back down towards the 
stature of their infancy, towards total disintegration.  ‘As old age creeps on,’ wrote 
F. Graham Crookshank in the Journal of Mental Science in 1906, ‘ the maturity of 
middle life gives place to second childishness and whittles down to the vanishing 
point of mere oblivion.’205 
 
Figure 1.  (Artist Unknown) ‘Life and age of man: stages of man's life from the cradle to the 
grave’ (New York:  Currier and Ives, between 1856 and 1907). Library of Congress, cph 
3a04025 
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Figure 3. Detail from Bernard Van Oven, On the Decline of Life in Health and Disease (London, 
1853), p. 36.  
Second Childhood 
Thus, the symmetrical iconography of the Lebenstreppe justified and reinforced the 
ancient characterisation of old age as ‘second childhood’.  Growth and decline 
visually mirrored each other, as did the first and last stages of life:  from a babe on 
his mother’s lap, to a dying centenarian on his daughter’s (Figure 1); from cradle to 
death bed (Figure 2).   The metaphor of second childhood predates the Lebenstreppe, 
going back at least as far as Aristotle,  and has endured in the face of shifting 
Figure 2. Detail from ‘The Stages of Life’, (London:  James Catnach, c. 1830).  British 
Museum, 1992,0125.31, AN347203 
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cultural and physiological models of ageing, taking on different meanings 
according to the needs and milieu of the writer.206  Its resilience may reflect its 
flexibility:  social, legal, behavioural and even physical analogies have been drawn 
between the first and last stages of life.  According to Janet Roebuck, the nineteenth 
century saw the early development of a chronological, legally codified definition of 
old age.  Mostly, however, old age continued to be defined ‘functionally’:  ‘old’ 
people were those who could not fulfil their adult role and lived, therefore, in a 
state of dependence.207  As Theresa Mangum has pointed out, the dependent status 
inherent in the nineteenth-century understanding of old age was a key part of the 
‘second childhood’ analogy.208  In the Lebenstreppe image above (Figure 1), the infant 
and the centenarian both sit astride a female carer.  In a discussion of lunacy and the 
law, published in 1868, Thomas Laycock used the ‘second childhood’ analogy to rail 
against the official status of the ‘weak-minded’ as legally competent.  Senile 
dementia, he argued, placed its sufferers ‘in the same position to property as infants 
and minors’.209 
The status of senile dependents was – as we shall see in the next chapter – a 
political issue in the second half of the nineteenth century.  Lunacy Commissioners 
and asylum superintendents described the senile as people who were undeniably 
dependent, but nevertheless unsuitable for asylum care.  The senile, they argued, 
did not require the apparatus of care afforded to lunatics, but only such care as was 
suitable for children; ‘a kind of senile nursery supervision’.210  Such a ‘senile 
nursery’ would, it was implied, closely resemble an infant nursery, as the senile 
were themselves so ‘childish[] in manner’.211  According to Charles Mercier, senile 
dements showed ‘an irritability of temper, a petulance and impatience, which 
                                                             
206 Covey, 'A return to infancy', pp. 81-90. 
207 Janet Roebuck, 'When Does "Old Age" Begin?: The Evolution of the English Definition', Journal of 
Social History, 12 (1979), p. 417. 
208 Theresa Mangum, 'Little Women:  The Aging Female Character in Nineteenth-Century British 
Literature', in Kathleen M. Woodward (ed.), Figuring Age: Women, Bodies, Generations 
(Bloomington, 1999), pp. 61-62. 
209 Thomas Laycock, 'Suggestions for Rendering Medico-Mental Science Available to the Better 
Administration of Justice and the More Effectual Prevention of Lunacy and Crime', The British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 14 (1868), p. 336-37. 
210
 'Medico-Psychological Association of Great Britain and Ireland', Journal of Mental Science, 47 
(1901), p. 622. 
211 Henry Maudsley, The Physiology and Pathology of Mind (London, 1867), pp. 355-56. 
96 
 
reproduce the peculiarities of a spoilt child’.  Any good nursery nurse could calm 
them down, however, as, ‘like the child…they are easily coaxed into a good humour 
again’.212  The senile, it was suggested, lost the emotional control and decorum they 
had developed in adulthood.  ‘In the cerebral decay of old age’, wrote Bucknill, ‘the 
nobler and more complicated emotions of manhood give way to those of a more 
rudimentary character; and the state of mind, from this change, derives its popular 
name of second childhood’.213  Thus, the ‘loss’ model of ageing and dementia in 
nineteenth-century psychiatry reinforced the regression model present in the 
iconography of the Lebenstreppe.  Through ageing and dementia, the senile lost the 
psychological gains of their maturity, and returned to the simpler, less developed 
state of their childhood. 
Asylum Superintendents and the Commissioners of Lunacy sought to 
undermine senile dements’ claim to asylum care by emphasising the ‘naturalness’ 
of their condition.  ‘Second childhood’ was a useful metaphor in that regard: an old 
person with limited capacities was, it implied, no more diseased than an 
undeveloped child.  Making such a point involved taking the metaphor of second 
childhood beyond social and behavioural similarities.  Many nineteenth-century 
psychiatrists – particularly those who were influenced by evolutionary models of 
development and insanity – considered old age and childhood to be structurally 
analogous states.  As Thomas Laycock put it, ‘when…we speak of old age as second 
childhood, it is because there is the imbecility of the unformed brain in the senile 
organ’.214  The language and concepts of dissolution, developed by Herbert Spencer 
and Laycock’s student, Hughlings Jackson, gave late- nineteenth-century 
psychiatrists a theoretically unified way of describing and explaining this psycho-
physiological regression.  In 1890, Charles Mercier explained that:  
In the term "second childhood", which is so generally applied to 
[the senile dement], we see recognised the fact that it is a 
                                                             
212 Mercier, A Text-book of Insanity, p. 110. 
213
 Bucknill and Tuke, Manual of Psychological Medicine, p. 291. 
214 Thomas Laycock, 'On the Naming and Classification of Mental Diseases and Defects', Journal of 
Mental Science, 9 (1863), p. 160. 
97 
 
degradation, a reversing of the order of evolution, a return to a 
more elementary and undeveloped state of things. The dotard 
who has lost his highest controlling regions is actually in much 
the same condition as the child whose highest controlling 
regions are not yet developed.215 
In senility, according to Mercier, ‘the dotard’ retraced the development of their 
growth, eventually coming to resemble their childhood selves, physiologically and 
mentally.  Furthermore, the state to which they would eventually be reduced, 
reached back even further than their own childhood.  The decline of senility was 
more than a reversal of growth; it was ‘a reversing of the order of evolution’.  Both 
the child and the dotard embodied ‘a more elementary and undeveloped state of 
things’. 
Ontogeny and Phylogeny 
The analogy between the growth of the individual on the one hand, and the 
evolutionary development of the species on the other, was a key part of nineteenth-
century evolutionary thought.  The most famous formulation of this ‘recapitulation 
theory’ was published by German biologist, Ernst Haeckel, in the 1866, although the 
general idea had been circulating for some decades prior to this.216  Haeckel 
summarised recapitulation as the law that ‘ontogeny [individual growth] 
recapitulates phylogeny [the evolution of the species]’.  He believed ontogeny and 
phylogeny to be identical, and undertook numerous embryonic investigations to 
show how foetuses resembled, indeed embodied, lower forms of life.217  Drawing on 
the work of German embryologist, Ernst Von Baer, Haeckel suggested that both 
ontogeny and phylogeny constituted a hierarchical development from a simple 
form to a more complex one, from homogeneity to heterogeneity. 218  As previously 
discussed, it was through the work of Herbert Spencer that this model of 
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evolutionary development became prevalent in later-nineteenth-century British 
psychiatry and the biological sciences more generally.   
From the mid-nineteenth century, then, the curve of the Lebenstreppe was 
overlaid with new meanings.  A parallel curve was now imagined:  one which 
depicted the growth of the individual as a re-enactment of the evolutional 
maturation of the species.  Appearing around the same time, and reaching its height 
in the fin-de-siècle period, a fear of evolutionary degeneration ‘permeate[d] 
nineteenth-century feeling with a model (or series of models) of decline 
and…images of decay.’219  Individuals, societies, races, and even planets could 
degenerate.  Degeneration was a reversal of the evolutionary process, thus 
degenerate peoples occupied a space lower down the evolutionary scale from 
healthy, white European males.  Degeneration provided the phylogenic mirror to 
evolution, sitting alongside ageing on the right-hand side of the life-curve.  Thus, 
children and old people (along with women, lunatics, the drunk, the immoral, the 
poor, the homosexual, and anyone who was not white) represented evolutionary 
throwbacks, sitting towards the bottom of the scale alongside humanity’s 
phylogenic ancestors.220   
Thomas Laycock was the first British psychiatrist to draw together these 
parallel analogies – between ontogeny and phylogeny, childhood and old age, and 
ageing and degeneration –  and to use them to explain and describe the decline of 
old age.  When he outlined the retrograde characteristics of the aged body and mind 
in the 1860s, Laycock slipped between ontogenic and phylogenic comparisons.  In 
old age, he claimed, the encephalic tissues returned to a state of infancy, causing the 
brain’s owner to return to ‘the drawing, the handwriting, and even the spelling… of 
his childhood’.  Meanwhile, the aged body would cease to produce the chemically 
evolved waste product of ‘urea’, and instead begin to produce ‘uric acid’, a 
nutritional by-product more commonly found in birds and reptiles.221   After 
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Laycock, the phylogenic metaphor of ageing reached its fullest expression in the 
theory of dissolution.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, many psychiatrists at the 
end of the nineteenth century adopted John Hughlings Jackson’s dissolutionary 
model of insanity, and used it to explain both dementia and ageing.   They 
described senile dementia as a progressive undoing of ontogenic and phylogenic 
development; a regression back down the evolutionary hierarchy.  ‘After maturity,’ 
wrote F. Graham Crookshank in 1906, ‘the normal order of succession of sums of 
states of consciousness is, for each individual, the order of progression from the 
unstable to the stable, from the complex to the simple, from the differentiated to the 
undifferentiated, from the co-ordinated to the unco-ordinated - the order that is, in 
fact, the reverse of the order of evolution.’222  Following the dissolutionary 
disintegration of senility, the ‘elaborate nervous mechanisms’ of mature, evolved 
adulthood gave way to ‘the simpler rhythms regulating the activities of simpler 
forms of life’.223   
Ontogenic and Phylogenic Memory 
If the decay of old age constituted a regression, a return to a former state, then the 
chronological progress of ageing actually involved moving backwards.  The 
phylogenic metaphor thus upheld the deep-rooted association of the aged with the 
past.  Memory had long been at the heart of this association:  old people represented 
a gateway to knowledge of the past, as the holders of the collective historical 
memory.224  This idea resonated with evolutionary and paleontological concerns:  
just as geological strata could be excavated for fossilised traces of the past, so might 
the psychophysiological strata of the aged mind and brain contain artefacts of 
human history.  While this role might confer some authority on the old, it could also 
have the effect of turning them into fossils themselves, as living relics of the time 
they were called upon to remember and to represent.  Memory loss, the most 
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characteristic feature of senility, further affirmed the sufferer’s status as a vestige of 
a bygone era.   
The memory loss of old age was generally thought to consist of two stages:  
a diminished ability to form new memories, and a progressive loss of existing 
memories, from the most recent to the oldest.  Henry Maudsley emphasised the 
former process, to characteristically pessimistic effect.  Unable to take on new ideas 
and impressions, old people, he said, were stuck at an earlier stage of historical 
development, throwbacks to the intellectual climate of their younger years.  An old 
man cannot make a reasoned judgment on the present, Maudsley argued, as he 
cannot comprehend it.225  Thus, the ancient stereotype of the old man complaining 
about the loss of a glorious past was given an organic basis:  the past would always 
seem to him more vivid, fuller, and more comprehensible, as his impressions of it 
were formed when his physiological ability to appreciate the world was at its peak.  
If the memory loss progressed, and forgetfulness devolved into senility, then the 
sufferer would lose their memories in the reverse order of acquisition, retracing the 
steps of their own life.  In senility, the 'memory was thrown back on the far past... 
going back further and further, as the mind approached nearer and nearer to its 
second childhood’.226  Stripped of their ability to form new memories and the 
memories of their adult life, the dement 'lives his childhood days over again'.227  
Dissolutionary second childhood thus represented a reliving, as well as a re-
embodiment, of the first. 
Memory was sometimes considered to be analogous to inheritance, as 
inherited characteristics were echoes of the past retrieved in the present.  Thomas 
Laycock took this analogy the furthest, suggesting that developmental 'memory' 
was stored in the sperm and egg to be 'retrieved' by the developing embryo.228  At a 
lesser extreme, the idea of an 'ancestral memory' ('organic memory theory', as Laura 
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Otis has called it) was widely accepted.229  This theory suggested that we inherit 
some memories from our forebears, which appear in the form of instincts.  If this is 
true, then our phylogenic position dictates not only the structure of our bodies and 
the capacities of our minds, but also what we know.  Helen Small has noted the 
presence of the elderly in discussions of this theory, but has concluded that 'the old 
were rhetorical straw men' in the ancestral memory debate.  If ancestral memories 
were inherited at birth, she argues, then 'age was an irrelevance' in their retrieval.230  
However, when we place ancestral memory into the context of recapitulation theory 
and the phylogenic metaphor - as Laura Otis does - age takes on greater 
importance.  The theory of recapitulation suggested that children and old people 
were physiologically similar to their evolutionary ancestors, and were thus more 
highly governed by their instinctive, ancestral memories.   According to a 
Spencerian evolutionary framework, those memories acquired earliest 
(phylogenically speaking) would be the simplest, the most organised and thus, the 
most robust and enduring.231  The theory of ancestral memory, then, further 
reinforced the low place of instinct in the psychological hierarchy which, as we have 
seen, was already considered one of the later stages of senile dissolution.  When an 
old person finally lost the memories of their childhood, only those memories 
acquired by their ancestors - those they were born with - would remain. 
Conclusion:  The Natural and the Pathological 
This chapter has argued that the understanding of both dementia and senility 
underwent significant changes between 1835 and the beginning of the twentieth 
century.  At the beginning of this period, dementia was seen as a state of mental 
incompetence, driven by an inability to successfully sense and perceive the wider 
world, which could result from a wide variety of exhausting physical and emotional 
circumstances.  By the end of it, dementia was viewed as a state of psycho-
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physiological dissolution, beginning with the intellect and moving down the 
evolutionary hierarchy, which was itself a rendition of the process of ageing.  Thus, 
the lines between the pathological insanity of dementia, and the natural decay of 
old age, became significantly blurred.     
This adds an interesting dimension to the historical narrative of Alzheimer’s 
disease, described in the introduction to this thesis. Historians, campaigners and 
medical researchers alike hold the twentieth century as a key turning point in the 
medical understanding of old-age mental disorder, when ‘senility’ – a generalised 
category describing an inevitable physical and mental decline – became 
‘Alzheimer’s disease’,  a disease with clear pathological markers which could 
theoretically affect people at any age, and was therefore theoretically treatable.  This 
narrative is predicated on a particular – somewhat limited – interpretation on the 
late-nineteenth-century understanding of old-age mental disorder.  Gerontologist 
Martha Holstein, for example, in her account of the reconceptualisation of dementia 
in the twentieth century, suggests that ‘senility, decline and decay were 
synonymous to the [Victorian] medical mind’ and that physicians ‘us[ed] the words 
senile dementia and senility interchangeably to describe mental deterioration in old 
age and rarely distinguished between simple forgetfulness and its more malignant 
form’.232  Holstein’s claims – if applied to the end of the nineteenth century only – 
are not incorrect, but are incomplete.  The texts written by the British psychiatrists 
reveal a significant level of equivocation over the question of the relationship 
between ‘simple forgetfulness’ and ‘its more malignant form’.   This ambivalence 
was underpinned by the tension between their conviction that there was a 
distinction between the two, and their adherence to a dissolutionary model of 
senility and dementia which rendered that distinction problematic. 
In his Clinical Lectures, Thomas Clouston described senile insanity as a 
‘special intensity or irregularity in the physiological decay of the brain’.233  For 
Clouston, then, there was a normal type of physiological senility, the type of decline 
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that all people would eventually experience, providing they lived long enough.  
This normal senility, however, could be perverted or intensified, becoming then a 
pathological form of insanity.  Senile insanity, then, was closely related to natural, 
old age decline – being a ‘special intensity or irregularity’ of this process – but it was 
not the same thing:  normal old-age decline was different from pathological senile 
mania, melancholia or dementia.  However, when Clouston attempted to account 
for this difference, he found that he could not, claiming: ‘Dotage [physiological 
senility] must be reckoned as natural at the end of life.  It is not actually the same as 
senile dementia, but there is no scientific difference’.234  Thus, he continued to insist 
on a categorical difference between natural senility and senile dementia, but could 
not fully explain the nature of this difference.  By ‘no scientific difference’, Clouston 
presumably meant no material difference; senile dementia and senile dotage were 
produced by the same structural changes, but differed in ‘intensity’.  The normal 
senility of dotage thus differed quantitatively from senile dementia.  As Crichton 
Browne put it, in far less torturous terms, ‘dotage is simply senile dementia in a 
mild form, and senile dementia is advanced dotage’.235   
At some point then, normal senility intensified to the point that it crossed 
the boundary of the physiological, to become a pathological form of insanity.  The 
precise location of that boundary, however, was almost impossible to discern.  As 
Bevan Lewis put it: 
Were we to attempt to define the boundary betwixt the 
physiological and pathological form of senility, between the 
ordinary second childishness of old age, and the dementia 
resulting from the senile atrophy of disease, we should find the 
task a difficult if not an impossible one. No such limit exists; the 
one form passes by such gradations into the other, that it is, at 
times, impossible to say that the physiological retrogression has 
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been respected, and that the symptoms imply no genuine 
pathological change.236  
Clouston, Bevan Lewis and Crichton Browne’s statements echo the conception of 
the normal and the pathological described by French historian and philosopher of 
the life sciences, Georges Canguilhem.  He argues that, in the nineteenth century, 
the relationship between health and illness was reconfigured.  Previously, health 
and illness had been viewed as ‘qualitatively’ different states, different in kind, and 
diametrically opposed, like Good and Evil.  However, he argued that the desire of 
modern man to master nature and himself encouraged an ‘identity’ between the 
pathological and the physiological, which came to be viewed as quantitative 
variations of the same underlying processes.  Health thus became ‘normality’, and 
disease became a quantitative variation from that norm.237  This did not, however, 
remove the distinction between the two; health and illness, Canguilhem suggests, 
continued to be qualititatively differentiated, as they were still experienced as 
opposing states.238  Thus, Clouston and Bevan Lewis insisted that they could discern 
the difference between normal senility and pathological dementia, even though 
they understood them to be variants of the same process.  In other words, they 
suggested that senility and dementia were structurally identical, but qualitatively 
different.  However, as Canguilhem himself recognised, and as French medical 
ethicists Daniel Dreuil and Daniel Boury have expanded on, this model of the 
normal and pathological is insufficient to fully account for the problems of ageing.239   
The normal, physiological status of old-age decay is to an extent self-evident, but far 
from assured.  Ageing is an apparently normal phenomenon which limits activity, 
causes suffering, and leads inescapably to death.  Our experience, then, tells us that 
the state of old age – even physiological old age – already differs qualitatively from 
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a state of normal health.  Old age thus exists in a realm somewhere between the 
physiological and the pathological: an ‘intermediate step between life and death’.240   
The structural identity of dementia and ageing thus rendered a distinction 
between them almost untenable.  Indeed, Charles Mercier, who was particularly 
insistent that ageing and dementia constituted identical processes of psycho-
physiological dissolution, did away with the distinction between normal and 
pathological senility.  For Mercier, senile dementia was ‘the natural condition of 
man in his declining years’.241  He described dementia, along with sleep and 
intoxication, as a ‘wholly normal phenomenon’, though one which ‘exhibit[s] an 
unmistakeable kinship to insanity’.242  Indeed, as described in the first section of this 
chapter, Mercier understood dementia at any age to be a rendition of the normal 
ageing process, which ‘may set in earlier in life, if the life have been subject to 
severe drain upon its energies [sic]’.243  Similarly, in his 1906 classification of mental 
diseases, Joseph Bolton suggested that all dementia were ‘examples of natural 
involution of the cortical neurones’.244  Dementia, then, was pathological in youth, 
but merely a ‘natural involution’ in old age. 
Thus, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the boundary between 
natural senility and pathological dementia – between ‘simple forgetfulness and its 
more malignant form’, in Holstein’s terms – had almost entirely collapsed.  Yet the 
manner in which those phenomena were conflated was more tortuous, and more 
ambivalent, than Holstein’s characterisation suggests.  In 1908, in the latest textbook 
included in this study, Wiliiam H. Stoddart wrote that ‘the normal mental 
deterioration of old age is itself early senile dementia’, but that the location of the 
line between the former and the latter was ‘the question that cannot be answered’.245   
In practice, however, firmer lines needed to be drawn.  When it came to the 
determination of whether an older person was insane enough to deserve admission 
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to a lunatic asylum, the question of the line between natural senility and senile 
dementia became a political one:  the answer could dictate which institution should 
take responsibility for this small but difficult population   As the next chapter will 
argue, pressures on the asylum, at a national and local level, made it politically 
expedient for psychiatrists, in their role as asylum superintendents, along with the 
Lunacy Commissioners and individual asylum managers,  to advance a definition 
of old-age mental disorder which emphasised its inevitable, natural, and essentially 
harmless nature. 
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Chapter Two:  The Politics of Lunacy and the Exclusion of 
Senility 
The ambiguities discussed in Chapter One were largely flattened in the 
administrative discourse surrounding the provision of care for the insane.  Here, 
more than anywhere else, a ‘senile’ patient emerged who was clearly defined:  
decrepit, incurable, and naturally deteriorating rather than pathologically insane.  
While Chapter One examined theoretical definitions of insanity and senility, this 
chapter will begin to discuss working definitions, forged through the classification 
and organisation of the insane population.  This chapter, then, is about the politics 
of welfare:  who decides which institution should take responsibility for a certain 
dependent group?  How is this decision justified?  What effects does it have?  In his 
lectures on Psychiatric Power, Michel Foucault described the way that disciplinary 
institutions – institutions which rely on and enforce normativity – create ‘residual’ 
groups.  These are made up of people who did not conform to the norms of any 
institution:  ‘the irreducible, the unclassifiable, the inassimilable’. These failures in 
classification, according to Foucault, produce new categories of people. 1  This 
chapter will suggest that, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the senile 
emerged as one of these residual groups:  too behaviourally difficult for the 
workhouse, too aged and decrepit for the asylum, and too marginal and 
unpromising to be given a normative institution of their own. 
The increase in insanity – the unceasing growth in the number of people 
officially recognised as insane over the course of the nineteenth century – is a well-
documented phenomenon.2  As the county lunatic asylums became ever more 
crowded and miserable in the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
administrators of lunacy at a national and local level sought explanations for the 
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apparent failure of the asylums project.  The asylum population came to be viewed 
in terms of ‘desirable and undesirable’ cases, and the aged and senile fell decisively 
into the latter category.3    The people who managed and oversaw the care and 
treatment of lunatics accused intolerant families and parsimonious Poor Law 
officials of offloading unsuitable cases onto the asylum and, in doing so, with 
expanding the meaning of certifiable insanity.  The administrators of lunacy 
responded by asserting their own, restricted, definitions of insanity and senility.  
They described the senile as a group whose mental infirmity was incurable, 
manageable and, crucially, natural.  This, they argued, unambiguously excluded 
them from a claim to asylum care.  This chapter examines the emergence and 
impact of this exclusionary discourse of senility. 
This discursive exclusion was extended to, and reinforced by, attempts to 
physically exclude old people from institutions dedicated to the care and cure of 
insanity.  The senile were a perpetual classificatory residuum:  too weak and 
unresponsive to adhere to the norms of the asylum regime, yet too challenging in 
their behaviour to conform to that of the workhouse, and too dependent and devoid 
of promise to be classified with trainable ‘imbeciles’.  Aged and infirm patients were 
described as a problem to be solved, or an encumbrance to be rid of, but rarely as a 
group whose particular needs should be catered for.  The case of the senile 
highlights a contradiction at the heart of nineteenth-century welfare policy and 
rhetoric:  a group which embodied the ‘deserving poor’ in almost every way  – old, 
incapable, and mentally troubled – was one for which no public institution was 
prepared to take unequivocal responsibility. 
The final irony shown in this chapter is that the exclusion of the senile 
ultimately failed.  Despite repeated attempts to deny responsibility for them, senile, 
aged, demented cases continued to arrive at the gates of the asylum, and long-term 
cases continued to age and die within their walls.  The asylum demonstrably 
provided a useful resource for families and communities in their attempts to deal 
with old-age mental illness.   But by casting the presence of the senile as an 
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aberration, rather than a fact of asylum life, the administrators of lunacy could 
continue to present the asylum as an institution whose potential was being 
thwarted, rather than one which was fundamentally flawed. 
 This chapter begins with an examination of this discussion at a national 
level, particularly as it played out in the annual reports of the Lunacy 
Commissioners.4  This first section of the chapter will also draw on comments made 
by individual psychiatrists – many of whom appeared in Chapter One – in national 
medical publications.  The chapter will then move on to look at how the managers 
of two asylums, Hanwell and Caterham , imagined and dealt with the issue of aged 
admissions.  Hanwell was a county lunatic asylum, while Caterham was an 
imbecile asylum, run by the MAB.  Their objections – and responses – to the 
problem of senile admissions, are examined in the second and third sections of this 
chapter.   
Although they often disagreed significantly, all of these groups – the Lunacy 
Commissioners, the asylum physicians who published their complaints in the 
Journal of Mental Science, and the managers and medical officers of Hanwell and 
Caterham asylums -  will at times be collectively referred to as the administrators of 
lunacy.  This is to differentiate them from the group they maligned in these 
discussions:  the administrators of the Poor Law.  This other group includes 
workhouse medical officers and other officials, Poor Law Guardians, and the 
national Poor Law Board (after 1871, the Local Government Board).  They, 
unsurprisingly, took a rather different view of the suitability of senile patients for 
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Harvey, ‘A Slavish Bowing Down:  the Lunacy Commissioners and the Psychiatric Profession, 1845-
60’, in William F. Bynum, Roy Porter and Michael Shepherd (eds), The Anatomy of Madness:  Essays 
in the History of Psychiatry, Vol. II (London, 1985),  pp. 98-131; Peter Bartlett, The Poor Law of 
Lunacy: the Administration of Pauper Lunatics in Mid-Nineteenth-Century England (London, 1999), 
pp. 197-237.  For a local example of the Commissioners’ influence, see Joseph Melling and Bill 
Forsythe, The Politics of Madness: the State, Insanity and Society in England, 1845-1914 (London, 
2006), pp. 197-237. 
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asylum care.  That being said, they too participated in the exclusionary discourse of 
senility, being as unwilling as asylum managers to take responsibility for disruptive 
or difficult old people.  The final section of this chapter will examine this alternative 
view of the senile problem, from the workhouse. 
The Lunacy Commissioners, Incurables and the Senile 
Contemporary and historiographical accounts of the Victorian asylum are haunted 
by an ill-defined, yet inescapable, class of problematic patients. This so-called 
‘incurable residue’ was a heterogeneous group – consisting of ‘harmless imbeciles’, 
idiots and epileptics, demented persons, and ‘those labouring under chronic 
insanity’ – but it constituted a unified threat.5  Incurable patients were described as 
a drain on asylum resources, blocking beds that could be used for more promising 
cases, and undermining the legitimacy of the asylum as a curative institution. 6   
Leonard Smith has suggested that this group was identified as a problem as early as 
the 1820s, when asylum Superintendents came ‘increasingly to lament the 
accumulation of hopeless and “incurable” patients’.7  In 1858, in one of the earliest 
editions of the Journal of Mental Science, editor John Charles Bucknill complained 
that the wrong people often made it to the asylum:  quiet, curable cases of mania 
and melancholia stayed in the workhouse, while ‘troublesome’ but incurable 
epileptics and senile dements were removed.8 The problem of the incurables was 
thus a part of the professional, asylum-based discourse of psychiatry from its 
inception.   
The Lunacy Commissioners first referred to the increase of insanity in their 
report of 1855.9  As concern about this issue grew in subsequent decades, the 
                                                             
5 The Twenty-Seventh Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1873), 
p. 18. 
6 P. McCandless, '"Build! build!" the Controversy Over the Care of the Chronically Insane in England, 
1855-1870', Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 53 (1979), p. 555; L. J. Ray, ‘Models of Madness in 
Victorian Asylum Practice’, European Journal of Sociology, pp. 229-64; Scull, Most Solitary of 
Afflictions, pp. 371-72. 
7 Leonard Smith, Cure, Comfort, and Safe Custody: Public Lunatic Asylums in Early Nineteenth 
Century England (London, 1999), p. 113. 
8
 John Charles Bucknill, ‘The Custody of the Insane Poor’, Journal of Mental Science (April, 1858), pp. 
460-72. 
9 The Ninth Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1855), pp. 32-36. 
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volume and nature of complaints about the incurable residue intensified.  It was 
common, from the 1870s onwards, for the Lunacy Commissioners and JMS 
contributors alike to complain of the 'altered character' of asylum admissions, with 
bodily infirmity on the rise and curability diminishing.10  Year after year, the 
Commissioners reported a substantial worsening in the problem which, by the turn 
of the century, was said to have ‘much accelerated’.11  Taken as a whole, the Lunacy 
Commissioners’ reports give the impression of an entire nation of county asylums 
groaning under the weight of an immovable but harmless resident population, 
while they repeated the same statements of objection in an ineffectual attempt to 
defend themselves against a ceaseless barrage of yet more benign, decrepit, 
incurable patients. 
Incurable people, it was argued, did not need asylum treatment, 'requiring 
little medical skill in respect to [their] mental disease', yet they took away resources 
from curable lunatics who might actually benefit from the costly facilities an asylum 
could offer.12  Thus, incurable lunatics represented a present and future burden:  
wasting expensive asylum care now, and keeping it from those who, without swift 
intervention, might also join their incurable ranks.  As the problem of asylum 
overcrowding worsened, and the number of recorded lunatics continued to 
increase, focus intensified on incurable lunatics as the cause of the asylums' 
problems.  Moreover, the presence of incurables in the asylum was offered as proof 
that the increase of insanity was a mere statistical artefact – ‘only a multiplication of 
numbers’ – rather than an epidemiological trend.13 The paradox of the county 
asylums – the fact that the proliferation of supposedly curative institutions had 
apparently led to a marked increase in insanity – threatened seriously to undermine 
the asylum project, and the authority of the Lunacy Commissioners and asylum 
                                                             
10 See for example The Twenty-Seventh Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord 
Chancellor (1873), p. 18; The Thirtieth Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord 
Chancellor (1876), p. 13; The Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the 
Lord Chancellor (1878),  pp. 39-40; The Thirty-Fourth Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy 
to the Lord Chancellor (1880), pp. 116-17. 
11 The Fifty-Fifth Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1901), p. 8. 
12 The Eleventh Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1857), p. 12; 
The Twenty-First Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1867), p. 67. 
13 Special Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor on the Alleged Increase of 
Insanity. (1897), pp. 2, 26-28. 
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doctors alike.14  By focussing their complaints on an intractable 'incurable class', the 
administrators of lunacy could deflect the blame onto those who had ‘wrongly’ sent 
such cases to the asylum in the first place, and onto the patients themselves.  
Increasingly, incurability was portrayed, not as a state into which patients might 
fall, but as an essential feature of certain patients. Incurables were thus framed less 
as an indictment of the asylum’s status as a curative institution, but more as an 
externally-induced barrier to the fulfilment of its curative potential. 
The aged were doubly implicated in this incurable class:  a lunatic who 
proved incurable would remain insane, and in the asylum, into their old age, while 
insanity which first appeared in old age was generally considered to be inherently 
incurable.  In the late-nineteenth century, aged and senile patients began to emerge 
in this administrative discourse as a problem group in their own right.   In the 
1870s, the Commissioners began to bring back concerned reports from the asylum 
visitations, commenting on the high numbers of aged patients resident in, and being 
sent to, county asylums.15 In 1880, these concerns finally made their way into the 
main report.  'In many instances,' they wrote, 'an inclination exists to send off to an 
Asylum old chronic cases, because they are a little troublesome and difficult to 
manage.'16  In this statement, no distinction is made between those who were aged 
because they were incurable, or incurable because they were aged.  Increasingly, 
however, senile admissions – those whose mental infirmity was a product of their 
age specifically – were singled out as inappropriate cases, and as a serious 
impediment, a danger even, to the functioning of the asylum.  In 1881, the 
Commissioners described the admission of a large number of 'old feeble people 
                                                             
14 Vieda Skultans, English Madness:  Ideas on Insanity, 1580-1890 (London, 1979), pp. 118-19. 
15 See for example The Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord 
Chancellor (1871), pp. 130, 144; The Twenty-Eighth Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to 
the Lord Chancellor (1874), pp. 208-186; The Twenty-Ninth Annual Report of the Commissioners in 
Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1875), pp. 181-82. 
16The Thirty-Fourth Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1880), pp. 
116-17. 
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whose unsoundness of mind arises, not from any active form of insanity, but from 
natural decay', as an 'evil'.17 
The Enumeration of Senility 
In the 1890s, and into the twentieth century, the Commissioners’ concerns about the 
phenomenon of aged asylum admissions became more intense, and more 
statistically-oriented.18  They were committed contributors to the so-called 
‘avalanche of printed numbers’ and, in keeping with the late-nineteenth-century 
enthusiasm for social data as a means of solving social problems, looked to these  
numbers as an authoritative means to test (and legitimise) their opinions.  A lasting 
consequence of these ‘enumeration practices’ more broadly was the creation and 
reification of different categories of people.19  Historians of old age, such as Stephen 
Katz and Karen Chase, have argued that ‘old age’ was one such category; ‘the aged’ 
became a more clearly-defined and knowable section of society in late-nineteenth-
century Britain, partly through data-gathering activities such as Charles Booth’s 
social surveys.20  The greater emphasis on statistics also brought a new urgency to 
the difficult questions surrounding the definition of insanity: who should count as a 
lunatic?   
 In 1895, the Commissioners turned their statistical investigations towards 
the problem of aged asylum admissions specifically.  They did not collect any new 
data, but examined the returns of the county asylums from the preceding 30 years, 
                                                             
17The Thirty-Fifth Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1881), p. 
264. 
18 The Commissioners collected their statistics by collating information from the census and from 
individual asylum reports, and by sending out their own returns to be filled in by asylum doctors and 
managers.  They began to publish these numbers in tabular form in 1869, starting with general 
statistical tables showing the geographical and institutional distribution of all the lunatics in the 
country, and overall rates of admission, discharge and death.  In the late 1870s, they began to 
interrogate these large numbers more closely, adding smaller categories to their analyses, such as 
marital status and occupation.  By 1904 there were over 50 tables appended to the Lunacy 
Commissioners’ annual reports, covering diverse phenomena from the forms of disorder suffered by 
each registered lunatic in the country, to rates of diarrhoea in the county asylums.  The Twenty-Third 
Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1869), pp. 1-10; The Fifty-
Eighth Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1904), pp. 2-16. 
19 Ian Hacking, 'Biopower and the Avalanche of Printed Numbers', Humanities in Society, 5 (1982), 
pp. 279-95. 
20 Stephen Katz, Disciplining Old Age: the Formation of Gerontological Knowledge (Charlottesville, 
1996), p. 73; Karen Chase, The Victorians and Old Age (Oxford, 2009), pp. 240-47. 
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in order to ‘test…by figures’ the opinion that the increase in insanity was due ‘in 
part to the reception in recent years of more cases of mental decay arising solely 
from old age’.  They concluded that there had been a ‘gradual, but continuous 
advance’, disproportionate to the overall increase in insanity, in the number of 
asylum patients aged 60 or over who were being admitted annually to the county 
asylums of England and Wales.  They also claimed that there had been an increase 
in the number of patients whose insanity was attributed to their old age. 21  The 
Commissioners’ decision to statistically investigate the admission of patients over a 
certain age – without any inquiry into their mental condition or physical health – 
both reflected and reinforced the tendency to see age alone as grounds upon which 
to question an individual’s claim to asylum care.  Over the next 15 years, the 
Commissioners continued to regularly remark upon the proportion of aged patients 
being sent to the asylum which, according to their statistics, was steadily increasing.  
This further fuelled the exclusionary discourse of senility. 
 The question of whether there actually was an increase in aged asylum 
admissions remains unclear.  The few historical studies to address this question 
have concluded that there was no significant increase in the number of elderly 
admissions to the asylum in the second half of the nineteenth century.22  The 
officially published statistics of Hanwell, however, do suggest an increase in both 
the number of patients aged 60 or over admitted, and the proportion of the overall 
number of admissions that these older patients represented.   Figure 4, below, 
shows that patients aged 60 or over only ever made up a small proportion of 
Hanwell’s annual admissions, and suggests that the fluctuations in the number of 
aged admissions mirrored the fluctuation in the number of admissions as a whole.  
The number of aged patients admitted to Hanwell began to increase in the 1860s, 
and then increased significantly again in the 1890s.  Figure 5 gives a more detailed 
picture, showing the percentage of the total admissions who were aged 60 or over 
                                                             
21 The Forty-Ninth Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1895), pp. 
3-4. 
22 J. L. Crammer, Asylum History: Buckinghamshire County Pauper Lunatic Asylum--St. John's 
(London, 1990), pp. 117-22; Graeme Yorston and Camilla Haw, 'Old and Mad in Victorian Oxford: a 
Study of Patients Aged 60 and Over Admitted to the Warneford and Littlemore Asylums in the 
Nineteenth Century', History of Psychiatry, 16 (2005), p. 401. 
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during this period.  It shows that, prior to 1865, the proportion of admissions aged 
60 or above was generally below 10 per cent.  Between 1865 and 1880, the 
proportion stayed around 10 per cent, before moving towards and above 15 per cent 
at the turn of the century.23  The Hanwell statistics, then, generally support the 
Commissioners’ claim, that there was an increase in aged admissions over this 
period.  In any case, the most important issue for this chapter is not whether or not 
the Commissioners were justified in their conviction that the number of aged 
admissions was increasing, but the effect that this conviction had on their attitude 
towards aged patients. 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                             
23 A contemporary study of the national lunacy statistics also concluded that there had been a 
‘marked increase’ in the number of aged patients being admitted to England and Wales’ lunacy 
statistics which, the writer (former registrar-general of the post office, not a psychiatrist) concluded 
indicated ‘an increased tendency to transfer cases of senile dementia’ from workhouses to asylums.  
Noel A. Humphreys, ‘The Alleged Increase of Insanity’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 70 
(1907), pp. 218-20, 229. 
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Figure 4.  Annual admissions to Hanwell Asylum, 1850-1910.  Figures taken from Annual 
Reports of the Committee of Visitors of the County Lunatic Asylum at Hanwell (1850-1888) and 
The Annual Report of the [London County Council] Asylums Committee and the Sub-committees 
of [various] asylums (1889-1911). 
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Figure 5.  The proportion of annual admissions to Hanwell Asylum reported to be aged 60 
or over on admission, 1850-1910.  Figures taken from Annual Reports of the Committee of 
Visitors of the County Lunatic Asylum at Hanwell (1850-1888) and The Annual Report of the 
[London County Council] Asylums Committee and the Sub-committees of [various] asylums (1889-
1911). 
 
Explaining the Increase:  the Four-Shilling Grant 
As with the increase in insanity generally, the administrators of lunacy rejected the 
suggestion that old people were becoming genuinely more susceptible to mental 
infirmity.  If more old people were arriving at the asylum, they argued, it was 
because people were becoming more inclined to send them.  Recognising that it was 
families and workhouse officials who identified potential asylum cases and secured 
their admission, the Commissioners pointed to a decreasing willingness to tolerate 
and care for those who were ‘troublesome from senile dementia, [and] dirty in 
[their] habits’.  'A change of feeling has undoubtedly occurred in the poorer classes’, 
they reported  in 1894,  'which now leads them, without reluctance, to see placed in 
asylums insane and mentally worn-out members of their families whom they 
would formerly have retained in their homes’.24  It was the workhouse officials who 
received the bulk of the Commissioners’ ire, for using the asylum to ease their own 
burdens.  After 1867, they could point to alterations in asylum funding practices to 
explain the apparent change in workhouse officials’ attitudes and actions. 
                                                             
24The Forty-Eighth Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1894), p. 6.  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
18
50
18
54
18
58
18
62
18
66
18
70
18
74
18
78
18
82
18
86
18
90
18
94
18
98
19
02
19
06
19
10
Percentage annual
admissions aged 60 or
over
117 
 
Under the Metropolitan Poor Act of 1867, a Common Poor Fund was set up 
in London which centralised the provision of funding for care of insane (and 
infectious) paupers outside of the workhouse, spreading the cost of payment 
amongst the vastly unequal London Unions.25  In 1874, a national four-shilling grant 
was introduced which extended this principle to the rest of the county.  The four-
shilling grant was paid to Poor Law Unions for each of their chargeable paupers 
who were housed in an asylum.  It came from a centrally-collected fund, thus 
partially relieving local rate-payers of the expense of maintaining asylum lunatics.  
In 1876, the Commissioners first raised a concern that the ‘pecuniary advantage’ 
offered to Unions by the four-shilling grant may be encouraging them to send larger 
numbers of paupers to the asylum, thus contributing to the increase in Lunacy that 
year.26  In the decades to follow, the Commissioners displayed an unwavering 
conviction that the four-shilling grant had given fiscally-motivated Guardians an 
excuse to offload any slightly troublesome workhouse inmates onto the asylum.  It 
was cited as a cause of almost all of the asylums’ problems, including the continued 
presence of aged, senile patients. 
 Some historians have agreed that these financial incentives contributed 
significantly to the increase of incurable lunacy in the asylum.27  ‘No wonder’, 
writes Elaine Murphy, ‘the rate of "insanity" rose dramatically in London over the 
next few years’.28  While the logic of this argument seems compelling – 
overstretched workhouse officials were being given the opportunity to relieve 
themselves of a financial and practical burden – it has not always stood up to more 
detailed scrutiny.  Robert Ellis, in a case study of two county asylums, has 
concluded that there is little evidence that this particular administrative change 
                                                             
25 David R. Green, Pauper Capital: London and the Poor Law, 1790-1870 (Farnham, 2010), pp. 238-
39. 
26 The Thirtieth Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1876), p. 3. 
27 Kathleen Jones, Asylums and After : a Revised History of the Mental Health Services from the Early 
18th Century to the 1990s (London, 1993), pp. 115-17. 
28 Elaine Murphy, ‘The Lunacy Commissioners and the East London Guardians’, p. 520.  David 
Cochrane similarly suggested that the Metropolitan Poor Act largely accounted for the particularly 
high volume of asylum admissions in London:  David Cochrane, ‘”Humane, Economical and Medically 
Wise”: The LCC as Administrators of Victorian Lunacy Policy’, in William F. Bynum and Roy Porter 
(eds), The Anatomy of Madness:  Essays in the History of Psychiatry, Vol. III (London, 1988),   pp. 251-
52. 
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made any recognisable difference to the rates of chronic lunatics admitted to the 
asylum. He argues, therefore, that it was simply a ‘hackneyed’ feature of the 
Commissioners’ and asylum officers’ rhetoric, which absolved them of 
responsibility for the worsening conditions of the county asylums.29  It should be 
noted that Ellis only counted ‘chronic’ patients who were recorded to have been 
insane for at least twelve months prior to admission.30  While aged patients were 
generally considered chronic, in that they would never recover, and had often been 
displaying symptoms of mental disturbance for several months or years before their 
asylum admission, they would not all have fitted into the category of ‘chronic 
lunatic’ as Ellis defined it.  Hanwell’s official statistics show an increase in aged 
admissions at the beginning at the 1870s (see Figure 4, above), which may have been 
stimulated by the Common Poor Fund.  A similar effect cannot be detected, 
however, following the introduction of the four-shilling grant.  The London case 
was complicated, of course, by the opening of Caterham and Leavesden Imbecile 
Asylums, which potentially took in a number of cases who may have otherwise 
gone to Hanwell. 
 Certainly, not all contemporary observers agreed on the effect of the grant.  
Unsurprisingly, workhouse officials denied that it had induced them to act 
improperly in their own interests.  At the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and 
the Relief of Distress, the familiar accusations – that senile dements were sent from 
the workhouse to the asylum purely for the sake of the money, and to save the 
officers some trouble – were put directly to John Mott, Chair of the Fulham 
Guardians.  He answered that he was ‘sure’ that such considerations never entered 
into the decision to seek certification for an older patient:  ‘It is quite true that a 
number of aged persons go from the workhouse to the asylums,’ he stated, ‘but that 
is not because of the four-shilling grant; it is because they are almost intolerable in 
                                                             
29 Robert Ellis, ‘The Asylum, the Poor Law, and a Reassessment of the Four-Shilling Grant: Admissions 
to the County Asylums of Yorkshire in the Nineteenth Century’, Social History of Medicine, 19 (2006), 
pp. 55-71. 
30Ibid., p. 64.  Edgar Miller also concluded that the four-shilling grant made little appreciable 
difference to the steadily increasing rates if insanity  Edgar Miller, ‘Variations in the Official 
Prevalence and Disposal of the Insane in England under the Poor Law, 1850–1900’, History of 
Psychiatry 18 (2007), pp. 25-38. 
119 
 
the workhouse’.31  This feature of workhouse officers’ rhetoric will be examined at 
the end of the chapter.   
The Meaning of Insanity and the Exclusionary Discourse of Senility 
According to some asylum doctors and administrators, the four-shilling grant 
actively contributed to an expansion in the meaning of lunacy.  With the promise of 
extra funding for asylum cases, Poor Law medical officers were encouraged, they 
claimed, to certify patients who would never previously have been considered 
insane.  In 1877 Henry Maudsley wrote that, because of the grant, ‘Parish and 
workhouse officers willingly saw lunacy in forms of imbecility and illness in which 
they would never have dreamt at one time of doing so’.32  In his annual report for 
1886, Thomas Clouston responded to the suggestion that the increase in admissions 
of patients over 60 at Morningside Asylum was caused by a general increase in 
mental deficiency in the aged population:  ‘This would be fallacious.  We believe 
that more people in their restless and troublesome dotage… are now sent to 
asylums, and so come under the category of technical insanity, than formerly.’33  
These leading lights of the psychiatric profession, along with the Lunacy 
Commissioners, perceived an expansion in the range of behaviours and afflictions 
being categorised as ‘insanity’, as both a cause and a consequence of the growing 
tendency to send aged cases to the asylum.  A classificatory re-ordering was going 
on, they claimed, but it was driven by agents external to the asylum. 
 The historical record calls into question the validity of this assessment.  The 
determination of who was and was not a suitable case for asylum care had never 
been straightforward, and neither asylum doctors nor the Lunacy Commissioners 
had always acted as strict gatekeepers of a firmly limited set of admission criteria.  
The inclusive approach of the early lunacy reformers towards their target 
population forms an important part of Andrew Scull’s thesis on the rise of the 
                                                             
31 Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress. Appendix Volume I. Minutes of Evidence 
(1st to 34th days) Being Mainly the Evidence Given by the Officers of the Local Government Board for 
England and Wales, (Cd. 4625, 1909), p. 620. 
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 Henry Maudsley, ‘The Alleged Increase of Insanity’, Journal of Mental Science (April, 1877), p. 51. 
33 Thomas Clouston, ‘Decrease of General Paralysis, and Increase of Insanity at Advanced Ages, In 
Edinburgh’, British Medical Journal, 1 (1886), p. 901. 
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asylum.  Faced with the ambiguous boundary between sanity and insanity, he 
argues, psychiatrists and lunacy reformers were driven by a belief in the 
humanitarian benefits of their project, and by professional self-interest, to pursue a 
policy of ‘incorporation rather than exclusion’.34  In other words, they were 
prepared to adopt a broad definition of insanity.  Though he has been criticised for 
placing too much emphasis on the power of professionally imperialist psychiatrists, 
Scull recognised that the real agents in the committal process, and thus in shaping 
the practical definition of insanity, were those outside the asylum walls:  ‘it was the 
lay conception of what was and was not behaviour which could be borne which 
fixed the boundary between sane and insane.'35  Families and workhouse officials, 
then, were complicit in maintaining an inclusive definition of lunacy, originally 
fostered by the early lunacy reformers.  The case of the aged in the asylum is 
supportive of, and illuminated by, this idea.  In order to enter the asylum, a patient 
had to be officially certified as a ‘lunatic’.  Thus, when families and Poor Law 
officials chose to send their troublesome old people there, they were enacting the 
belief that an old person could be a lunatic, and that senility could be a form of 
insanity.  Whether or not they had envisaged a situation in which old people would 
be a significant presence on asylum wards, the early lunacy reformers had 
demonstrably created an atmosphere in which Poor Law officials felt justified in 
sending to the asylum cases of ‘restless and troublesome dotage’ . 
Legally, Poor Law officials were quite within their rights to send such cases 
to the asylum, as the Commissioners themselves had once been at pains to point 
out.  Far from expanding the meaning of ‘technical insanity’ beyond its legal limits, 
it was the workhouse officials who seemed to be adhering to the spirit of the law.  
There were three categories in the legal language of insanity:  ‘idiot’, for a person 
with a permanently ‘deficient mind’ from birth; ‘lunatic’, for those who were only 
sometimes non compos mentis; and ‘person of unsound mind’, for someone who was 
                                                             
34 Scull, Most Solitary of Afflictions, p. 380. 
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 H. Freeman, 'Psychiatry in Britain, c. 1900', History of Psychiatry, 21 (2010), p. 313; J. L. Crammer, 
'English Asylums and English doctors: Where Scull is Wrong', History of Psychiatry, 5 (1994), pp. 103-
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‘incapable of managing his affairs… a person of weak mind’.36  According to these 
criteria, the senile were encompassed under the latter category, and were 
unambiguously separated from the category of ‘lunatic’.  The 1845 Lunacy Act, 
however, did not mobilise these distinctions in any meaningful way and, for the rest 
of the century, these categories continued to be used fluidly.  Both ‘lunatic’ and ‘of 
unsound mind’ were used as umbrella terms for all three of these categories.  
Following some confusion in a trial in 1848 over the legality of confining a non-
dangerous lunatic, the Lunacy Commissioners wrote a clarifying letter to the Lord 
Chancellor, stating,  
It is of vital importance that no mistake or misconception 
should exist… that, according to law, any person of unsound 
mind, whether he be pronounced dangerous or not, may 
legally and properly be placed in a county asylum, lunatic 
hospital or licenced house.  
This rendered the tripartite division essentially meaningless.  In their annual report 
of the same year, the Commissioners complained that the current estimation of the 
number of people ‘of unsound mind’ in the country was almost certainly too low, as 
it did not yet include those ‘”Imbecile” persons, having been so from birth, or 
become so from senility.’  Such persons, they argued, although not requiring the 
same treatment as other lunatics, were ‘incapable of managing their affairs in an 
efficient manner’.  Thus, they required ‘in effect nearly the same protection... as 
ordinary Lunatics, and should therefore properly be included in any estimate of the 
number of persons of Unsound Mind’.37   
This would suggest that it was the administrators of lunacy, and not the 
Poor Law officials, who were seeking to change the status quo in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, by defining certain groups as unsuitable for asylum care.  
Guardians and families were not seeking to expand the definition of insanity, as 
                                                             
36 Charles Palmer Phillips, The Law Concerning Lunatics, Idiots and Persons of Unsound Mind 
(London, 1858), pp. 1-2, as quoted in David Wright, Mental Disability in Victorian England: the 
Earlswood Asylum, 1847-1901 (Oxford, 2001), pp.15-16.   
37 The Second Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1847-8), p. 54. 
122 
 
Maudsley and Clouston claimed, lunacy administrators were in fact seeking to limit 
it.  Elaine Murphy has suggested something like this, in her work on the workhouse 
care of lunatics in mid-nineteenth-century East London.  For Murphy, the 1862 
Lunacy Act - which gave statutory legitimacy to the practice of removing incurable 
cases from the asylum to the workhouse – was a decisive moment.  She argues that 
the 1862 Act saw the Commissioners abandon their project to see all lunatics 
confined under their jurisdiction, and relinquish their commitment to care for 
anyone who was mentally disturbed.  Thus, the 1862 Act represented a significant 
break from the inclusive terms of the 1845 Act, one that sprang from a new 
recognition that ‘insane persons came in desirable and undesirable forms’.38  This 
was matched by a broader commitment on the part of the Lunacy Commissioners to 
attempt to exclude ‘undesirable’ lunatics – including the senile – from the asylum. 
The ambiguity surrounding the pathological status of senility allowed the 
administrators of lunacy to reject the claim of aged patients to asylum care on 
grounds that they were not, in fact, insane. Thus, from the 1870s onwards, the 
Commissioners frequently undermined the legitimacy and severity of old-age 
mental infirmity with references to ‘mere senile dementia’.39   Increasingly, they 
complained about ‘aged persons who are not properly lunatics, but suffering only, 
or principally, from the decay of faculties incident to old age’.40  This represented a 
significant shift in the Commissioners’ attitude and approach.  Although the lunacy 
reforms of the 1840s explicitly stated that unsoundness of mind arising from natural 
decay should be counted as a form of lunacy, the later administrators of lunacy 
continually invoked the ‘naturalness’ of senility as a way of discrediting their claim 
to asylum treatment.  The Commissioners of 1848 had stated that any accurate 
count of the number of paupers who were unsound of mind must include those 
who had been rendered so by senility.  The Commissioners of 1884 took the 
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opposite position, decrying the practice of classifying cases of ‘mild or harmless 
dementia’ in such a way, arguing that, ‘To include such persons in the returns as 
being of unsound mind tends unduly to swell the statistics of insanity [emphasis 
mine]’.41 
This suggests an extension to Scull’s thesis about the inclusive nature of the 
lunacy reformers’ attitude towards insanity.  In the latter part of the century, faced 
with the reality of these cumbersome, expensive institutions, the Commissioners – 
and other administrators of lunacy – tried to advance a more exclusive definition of 
insanity, and to police the boundaries of insanity more strictly.  In 1891, they 
congratulated themselves for seeing many senile workhouse patients removed from 
the lists of the insane.42  This was a small victory.  It was too late, it seems, to 
overhaul the established patterns in the way the asylum was used.  As long as the 
boundary between sanity and insanity – like the boundary between natural ageing 
and illness – was ambiguous, the practical classification of insanity was driven by 
institutional needs.  As will be discussed in the next chapter, it was families and 
Poor Law officers who drove the admissions process, and it was their needs which 
drove the definition of a suitable asylum case.  We can see the exclusionary 
discourse of senility as an attempt by the administrators of lunacy to re-assert their 
own needs.  By emphasising one particular interpretation of old-age mental debility 
– that it was a natural, fairly benign phenomenon, not a pathological insanity – they 
could justifiably reject responsibility for aged care. 
The Commissioners’ Solution 
The previous section discussed the ways in which the Lunacy Commissioners, and 
other administrators of lunacy, talked about the problem of senile asylum 
admissions.  This section will look at what they intended to do about it.  As early as 
1857, the Commissioners began to consider a ‘fresh classification and redistribution 
of patients’ to deal with the problem of the overcrowded asylum.43  Though there 
was a cautious acceptance that some classes of lunatic might be better cared for in 
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the workhouse, in the 1850s and 60s the Commissioners’ preferred solution to the 
problem of the chronic residuum was the creation of a middle ground; new 
institutions, or separate buildings within the asylum estate, 'intermediate in 
character between the asylum and workhouse'.44  They would be suitable for 
patients who, though 'quiet and harmless', might still be 'unfit to be at large or 
placed in Workhouses'.45  Most importantly, they would be cheaper than the county 
asylums in every way, from their construction to their administration.  They would 
not need the 'expensive arrangements and appliances ' of the general asylum, and 
would reflect a simpler architectural style.46  The treatment of curable lunatics, it 
was implied, was expensive, but the care and custody of incurables need not be.  As 
well as cheap, these asylums were also presented as potentially 'cheerful' places.  
They would be spacious, bright and well ventilated, and designed along more 
domestic lines, as small apartments or cottages, without the large dormitories which 
characterised the county asylum.47   It seems that the Commissioners were hoping 
that these institutions would provide an antidote to the warehouse-like image of the 
county asylum which had already begun to dominate.  However, the initial concern 
about cost proved decisive in the final design of these buildings.  When Caterham 
and Leavesden asylums – largely inspired by these plans, despite being built under 
the auspices of the Poor Law Board and not the Commissioners – were built at the 
end of the 1860s, featureless and densely populated dormitories were their key 
organising principle.  Elaine Murphy has described them as 'a testament to mean-
spirited committee thrift’.48   
  The opening of Caterham and Leavesden also confounded the 
Commissioners’ expectations of the type of patient that would enter these 
institutions.  In 1857, at the height of the Commissioners' enthusiasm for 
intermediate asylums, they claimed that they would house two types of patient:  the 
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'harmless and demented' and the 'orderly and convalescent'.49  The initial plans for 
these institutions were very much geared towards the latter group.  In 1856 they 
were described as separate buildings within the asylum grounds, placed closer to 
the washrooms and the workshops than the rest of the dormitories, so that their 
residents could more easily go about their 'industrial pursuits'.50  Their occupants 
were thus imagined to be physically healthy and easily managed, able to benefit 
from the new opportunities for self-control afforded to them by a domestic and 
industrious setting.  Insofar as the aged were generally classed as 'harmless 
dements', or 'of the imbecile class', then we can assume that the Commissioners 
hoped that aged patients would also be transferred to these new institutions.  
However, the persistent image of a physically healthy, manually working 
population meant that the needs and abilities of the aged and infirm were not 
factored into the original plans. This was to prove problematic. When Caterham and 
Leavesden actually opened in 1870, it became clear that the ‘harmless and demented 
[and physically feeble]’ would dominate, rather than the ‘orderly and convalescent 
[and healthy]’.  With hindsight, in 1891, the superintendent of Caterham lamented 
the fact that the asylum had been built with a ‘comparatively physically healthy 
population’ in mind. 51  It was commonly stated in the early discussions of these 
intermediate asylums that ‘for the chronic cases, of course, little attendance is 
required’.52  Caterham and Leavesden decisively disproved this:  in 1876 the 
Commissioners reported that, far from needing a reduced medical staff, both of the 
MAB asylums had hired an extra medical officer, due to the 'unremitting medical 
care' required by their patients.53  As a writer in the British Medical Journal put it, 
‘These patients both require, and receive very careful treatment, and are necessarily 
costly to maintain’.54  Thus, the experience of Caterham and Leavesden highlighted 
a problem in the Commissioners’ thinking about the incurable residue:  it consisted 
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of a class of patients that was significantly less promising than they had originally 
allowed themselves to believe.   
 The experience of Caterham and Leavesden appeared to dampen the Lunacy 
Commissioners’ enthusiasm for intermediate asylums, and they ceased to promote 
them with such vigour.  They came increasingly to view the workhouse as the 
correct site of care for aged and incurable dements.  There was a long history of 
lunatics being housed in workhouses, which predated the 1834 Poor Law 
Amendment Act, and continued throughout the nineteenth century.  As Peter 
Bartlett has pointed out, the 1834 Act made no explicit reference to asylums.  There 
was, however, a reference to lunatics:  clause 42 stated that no dangerous lunatic 
should be kept in the workhouse for more than 14 days.55  Leonard Smith suggests 
that this was widely interpreted to mean that all lunatics should be sent to the 
asylum, which caused a noticeable upsurge in admissions.56  In the 1840s and 50s, 
the Commissioners condemned the practice of retaining lunatics in workhouses.  
Their desire to see more lunatics transferred to the asylum was not confined to the 
‘dangerous’.  According to Elaine Murphy, the Commissioners of this period 
‘assumed that it was merely a matter of time and sufficient expenditure before all 
mentally dependent people were transferred out of the control of the Guardians’.57   
In the 1860s, the situation changed.  For Murphy, the key turning point was the 
passage of the 1862 Lunacy Act, which gave statutory legitimacy to the practice of 
removing incurable cases from the asylum to the workhouse.  This was, she argues, 
‘the first breach of the Lunacy Commission’s treasured principle that all insane 
patients should be removed from the control of the Poor Law authorities to the 
protection of the Justices and the Lunacy Act’.58  From this point on, the 
Commissioners were far less likely to condemn the Guardians for not sending them 
lunatics, and more likely to criticise them for sending them the wrong type of 
lunatic, in increasing numbers.  
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 In the 1870s, the cautious acceptance of the workhouse was replaced with a 
growing conviction that it was the only appropriate place (other than the family 
home) for the senile and other harmless incurables to be cared for.  'When 
conducted with liberality', wrote the Commissioners in 1873, '[workhouse lunatic 
wards] no doubt afford suitable accommodation for the class of chronic patients’.59  
As has already been discussed, the brouhaha over the four-shilling grant both 
reflected and reinforced the notion that the transfer of aged patients from the 
workhouse to the asylum was unacceptable.  In 1880, the Commissioners advocated 
that the medical superintendents of Hanwell use 'every exertion' to remove cases of 
senile dementia under their care back to the workhouse, although they realised that 
the 'bodily weakness' of such patients may make such a transfer impossible.60  This 
was a common complaint made by the MAB as we shall later see:  once aged and 
worn-out patients had arrived at the asylum, they were impossible to remove, 
however much the asylum doctors objected, as the journey back to the workhouse 
was considered potentially fatal to those in a greatly aged or enfeebled state.   
 In the 1840s and 50s, the Lunacy Commissioners had been extremely critical 
of the standard of care offered on workhouse lunatic wards.  As they looked 
increasingly to promote the workhouse as a site of care for certain types of lunatic, 
however, they began to paint these wards in a more positive light, publishing this 
glowing assessment of them in 1909:  
It is impossible not to be struck with the happiness and 
contentment that prevails amongst the older inmates of these 
houses...  It would be hard to find more suitable 
accommodation than is provided in many of the workhouses 
for certified patients of the inoffensive type.61 
Thus, the care of aged and incurable lunatics in the workhouse ward had gone from 
being an unfortunate, but sometimes unavoidable evil, to a key strategy in the relief 
of the overcrowded asylum.  By 1909, the Commissioners saw the workhouse as the 
                                                             
59 The Twenty-Seventh Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1873), p. 18. 
60 The Thirty-Seventh Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1883), p. 240. 
61 The Sixty-Third Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1909), p. 68. 
128 
 
seat of the highest 'happiness and contentment' which could possibly be hoped for 
senile patients.  
Senility at Hanwell 
The annual reports of Hanwell asylum show a similar trajectory, in terms of the 
attitudes expressed towards aged patients.  In the mid-nineteenth century, these 
reports portrayed aged patients as sympathetic figures, and their presence was 
described as an inconvenient but largely benign fact of asylum life.  In 1855 the 
matron, Catherine MacFie, produced particularly sentimentalised sketches of 
favoured, long-term patients who had aged and died under her care.  When the so-
called, ‘Dowager countess’, for example, died in 1855 aged 89, MacFie described her 
in reverent terms: ‘[Her] testimony was always accurate and honourable’; ‘[her] 
bible was her constant companion’; ‘she was… a beautiful old woman’.62  Such cases 
provided a testament to the tranquil, ordered domesticity of the asylum, and the 
success of the moral regime pursued there.  Aged, long-term patients both held and 
embodied memories of the institution.  In his final annual report as resident 
physician in 1844, John Conolly himself drew on the ‘observable improvement’ in 
the older patients as proof of the efficacy of non-restraint, despite ‘the ineffable 
marks of bonds and iron and cord’ on their bodies, which they still bore from the 
bad old days.63  Between 1855 and 1875, Hanwell’s resident population rose by 
almost 80 per cent (from 1,093 to 1,813). By the 1870s, no living testament to 
Hanwell’s glory days remained, and any memories of them served as a reminder of 
how far the asylum had fallen from Conolly’s utopian vision.  Against this 
backdrop of rising patient numbers and mounting external criticism, the 
sentimentalised narratives of the aged disappeared.  The administrators of Hanwell 
came to describe aged patients in the same terms as the Lunacy Commissioners; as 
problematic, unwanted, and inappropriate for asylum care.   
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In his 1874 report for the Lancet Commission on Lunatic Asylums, Joseph 
Mortimer Granville was dismissive of any pretentions Hanwell might have had to 
being a curative institution.  ‘It may be available as a place of refuge for imbecile 
and chronic cases of mental disease in which safe custody is the chief requirement’, 
he wrote, ‘but the notion of sending there acute or recent, and therefore potentially 
curable cases, should be wholly and at once abandoned’.64  Joseph Peeke Richards, 
superintendent of the female department at Hanwell, agreed with Mortimer that 
their recovery rates mirrored the unfortunate character of the patients sent to him, 
but argued that this did not reflect the curative potential of the institution, or the 
medical skill of its staff.  The true recovery rate, he suggested in 1878, could only be 
surmised if one ignored cases transferred from other institutions, and patients who 
were aged 60 or over on admission.  Among the latter group the ‘prospect of 
recovery [was] almost hopeless’, and in any case, they were not truly insane but 
‘simply garrulous and restless from old age’.65  This highlights one of the many 
tensions within the exclusionary discourse of senility:  the aged were described as a 
group whose mental disturbance was so entrenched as to be almost irreversible, yet 
at the same time the seriousness of this disturbance was consistently downplayed as 
‘mere’ or ‘simple’ restlessness. 
Occasionally, the managers of Hanwell directly admonished individual 
Boards of Guardians for sending them cases they deemed to be unsuitable.  In 
November 1869, Sarah Jarman, ‘age said to be 80’, was admitted to Hanwell from 
the workhouse of Westminster Union.  On admission, she was reported as being 
‘very feeble and emaciated [and] not likely to live long’.  In the opinion of James 
Murray Lindsey, Medical Superintendent of the female department of Hanwell, she 
‘ought not… to have been sent to the Asylum in her weakly and aged condition’.  
The Hanwell Visitors wrote to the Westminster Guardians to ‘express [their] 
regret… that such a case should have been thought justifiable to expose the Patient 
to the trial of the journey’.  Their comments, and the report from Murray Lindsey 
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which they enclosed, focussed entirely on Jarman’s physical condition, and made 
no reference to her mental state, other than to say that her ‘restlessness and noise’ 
had prevented them for conducting a thorough examination of her physical 
ailments.  The Westminster Guardians responded with a report from J. G. French, 
the medical officer of their infirmary: 
In the case of Sarah Jarman, - she was admitted into the 
Workhouse on no ground other than her insanity and the 
inability of her relatives to take proper care of her.  In the 
Workhouse she was noisy and restless, perpetually moving 
about, and therefore requiring personal restraint.  The Medical 
Officer deemed this to be the case which the law imperatively 
required to be removed to a Lunatic asylum, in order to protect 
the inmates of the Workhouse from annoyance.66 
French replied to none of the Hanwell Visitors’ concerns about Jarman’s physical 
condition and focussed instead on her mental state and behaviour.  Thus, while 
Lindsey and the Hanwell visitors viewed Jarman primarily as an old, infirm case, 
French and the Westminster Guardians saw her primarily as a lunatic.  Sarah 
Jarman, and other people like her, was caught in between the classificatory schema 
used by different welfare institutions. Her physical state excluded her from the 
asylum (or from being seen as an appropriate asylum case), and her mental state 
excluded her from the workhouse.  She was, in Foucault’s terms, ‘unclassifiable 
[and] inassimilable’.67  Sarah Jarman’s case suggests that the unclassifiable nature of 
the senile sharpened the very contours of what the administrators of lunacy 
imagined them to be.  For both Drs French and Lindsey, the essential facts of Sarah 
Jarman’s case corresponded to the ways in which she failed to adhere to the norms 
of their institutions. 
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Senility and the Metropolitan Asylums Board 
The Metropolitan Asylums Board (MAB) Imbecile Asylum at Caterham received a 
far greater proportion of aged admissions than Hanwell and other county asylums.  
This did not, however, mean that senile patients were more readily accepted there.  
The doctors and managers of Caterham complained about the admission of aged 
patients  more often, in more detail, and with even greater levels of indignation 
than the Lunacy Commissioners.  Their list of reasons to reject aged admissions was 
myriad and somewhat contradictory.  On the one hand, they were said to take up 
an unwarranted amount of space on the wards, and yet, on the other, they 
supposedly often died soon after their arrival.68  They were so ‘easily managed’ that 
there was no reason that they could not be cared for in the workhouse, yet they 
were also said to put too great a strain on the asylum, and necessitated the hire of 
more and more attendants to cope with the difficulty of caring for them. 69  They 
were acutely senescent, coming to the asylum only to ‘linger longer or shorter time, 
and then die’, yet were also ‘perfectly sensible as to their surroundings... and often 
acutely fe[lt] the shock of their enforced removal, becoming depressed in spirits’ 
and ‘bitterly complain[ed] of what they consider an injustice in being sent to an 
Asylum to end their days’.70 
The MAB’s occasionally contradictory reasoning for excluding aged patients 
from their Imbecile Asylums belies a general distaste for the task of caring for 
infirm, demented patients.  Ageing, dependent patients marred the vision they had 
for the asylum, and physically prevented them from running it the way they 
wanted.  Rather than adjusting their expectations, the MAB continued to insist that 
these were the wrong type of patients for the new asylums - despite the fact that they 
were manifestly the type of patients for which such a new locus of care was needed.   
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 As with the lunacy laws generally, there had never been a strict, official 
definition of what constituted a ‘suitable’ patient for the MAB asylums.  Although 
they were championed by the President of the Poor Law Board, Gathorne Hardy, 
and remained under the authority of that body, the inspiration for the MAB 
asylums came from the Lunacy Commissioners, and their calls for an intermediate 
asylum.  When first outlining his proposals to Parliament, Hardy quoted the 1859 
report of the Commissioners at some length, declaring his intention to provide some 
alternative accommodation for chronic lunatics, ‘instead of [their] being kept where 
they would only be in the way of inmates more needing special care’.  As we have 
already seen, the Commissioners’ idea of this group – quiet, docile and healthy - 
was quite inaccurate, as the opening of Caterham and Leavesden eventually 
showed.  Although inspired by the Commissioners’ plans, Hardy’s aims were 
somewhat at odds with them. The Commissioners had hoped to relieve some 
pressure from their own county asylums, while Hardy’s professed goal was ‘to 
classify the different inmates of the workhouses’.71  Indeed, the Metropolitan Poor 
Act, and the institutions built in its wake, was largely aimed at easing the 
overcrowding of the Metropolitan workhouses, and at rationalising the provision of 
Poor Law medical relief across the capital.72  It was Hardy’s vision which came to 
fruition:  the opening of the MAB asylums saw workhouse lunatic wards across 
London empty, while Hanwell and other county asylums in the region felt little of 
the hoped-for relief.73 
 The details of the structure and purpose of the Imbecile Asylums was set out 
for the first time in an Order of the Poor Law Board in October 1875.  It offered only 
this guidance as to who should be sent there: 
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The insane paupers to be received into this Asylum shall be 
such harmless persons of the chronic or imbecile class as could 
be lawfully retained in the Workhouse; but no dangerous or 
curable persons such as would, under the statutes in that behalf, 
require to be sent to a County Asylum, shall be admitted.74 
This definition was more legally than practically oriented.  It made it clear that there 
could be no cross-over between county and MAB asylums, and in doing so 
implicitly supported the status quo: anyone who might previously have been legally 
certifiable as a lunatic, and sent to a county asylum, should still be dealt with in the 
same way.   
Despite having the word ‘imbecile’ in their names, Caterham and Leavesden 
Imbecile asylums shared little in common with the ‘idiot asylums’ and had never 
been intended to house the same class of patients as those provided for under the 
1886 Idiot Act.75  As the medical superintendent of Caterham admitted in 1900, ‘the 
term “imbecile” asylum is a misnomer and somewhat misleading’.76  Having said 
this, the use of that term points to the MAB’s original hopes for these institutions: 
that they would be orderly places filled with healthy, obedient, industrious patient-
inmates.  Indeed in the early years, Caterham did function in this way, with one 
glowing article reporting that ‘by far the greater part of the work’ in maintaining the 
institution was performed by the patients.77  Aged, feeble patients were an 
anathema to this industrious, hopeful vision:  no wonder original and long-standing 
medical superintendent G. Stanley Elliot tried so hard to keep them out.  But 
nothing in the founding documents of the asylum indicated that it should receive 
only healthy, trainable patients.  Elliot and his assistants created the type of 
institution they wanted to work in, but not the one that was needed.  He would look 
back on the early years of the asylum as a golden age, lamenting in 1891, ‘I doubt 
that ever we shall see again a reversion to the class of case for which, in 1870, this 
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asylum was established’.78  His memory of this time was perhaps not quite accurate:  
the proportion of admissions aged over 60 was as high in 1870-75 as in 1890-05.  Yet 
this was not the narrative that persisted in the MAB’s various reports.  Rather than 
an institution which had misjudged its purpose, Caterham was presented as a place 
whose early promise had been thwarted by external agents. 
 Elliot and the other MAB administrators were thus faced with a patient body 
that was more difficult, costly and depressing to deal with than they had 
anticipated, and with a highly ambiguous set of admissions criteria which (they 
claimed) allowed the Guardians to send them anyone they wanted to get rid of.  
They responded to all of this confusion by trying to assert their own definition of a 
‘suitable’ case, with almost exaggerated certainty.  It seems that the very strength of 
the claim that senile cases had to care under the MAB, prompted them to dismiss 
this claim in equally strong terms.  Thus, in the records of the MAB, the 
exclusionary discourse of senility is at its most heightened, as shown in this extract 
from Elliot’s 1874 report (emphases his): 
I would... again repeat the observations I made in my report of 
last year, with regard to the mental condition of many of the 
patients admitted, viz., those suffering from the ordinary effects 
of age…These are not truly insane, imbecile, or idiot, and ought 
in no way to be classed with them; they labour under no 
delusions, they give coherent answers, there is nothing 
irrational in their conduct; in many cases there is only 
"impairment" of mind or memory, which should not prevent 
their being treated in the ordinary hospital or workhouse 
infirmary.79 
Unlike the managers of Hanwell, the MAB administrators could not object to aged 
patients being sent to them on grounds of incurability. Indeed, any patient 
suspected of being curable had by law to be immediately re-certified and sent to a 
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county asylum.  The MAB therefore leaned particularly hard on the insistence that 
the senile were not ‘truly’ insane.  Almost every mention of aged admissions 
contained some objection that they were suffering ‘merely from the helplessness 
and childishness incidental to advanced age’, or ‘only from the form of Dementia 
incidental to Senility’.80  If such people were to be classed as insane or imbecile then, 
according to the Caterham annual report of 1873, ‘every person who lives beyond 
his sixtieth or seventieth year… is liable to be so classed’.81 
The MAB Response to the Problem of the Senile 
The MAB managers placed the blame for the unreasonable proportion of senile 
admittances firmly onto Poor Law Guardians and their officers, for lacking 
‘discretion’ in deciding who to send to the imbecile asylums.82  They were not afraid 
to cast aspersions on workhouse officers for having ulterior motives in removing 
these patients.  In 1874 the Caterham Committee reported that ‘The presumption is 
strong that many are removed to the asylum as the easiest means of getting rid of 
the trouble of nursing them’.83  As far as the MAB were concerned, London’s 
workhouses and infirmaries possessed sufficient resources for coping with senile 
dementia, and were the most appropriate place for such care to take place.  London 
had a particularly well-developed network of workhouse infirmaries:  by 1877, only 
six metropolitan unions lacked an infirmary building separate from their general 
workhouses.84  However, the status of these institutions was also ambiguous.  The 
Lancet commission on workhouse infirmaries was keen to emphasise that they 
should focus on treating the acutely sick, a group distinct from ‘the aged and 
infirm’.85  Thus, as in the case of the asylums, the aged were marginalised in the 
provision of medical care in London workhouses, because their ailments were not 
considered curable.   
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In an attempt to curb the tide of aged admissions to the asylum, the MAB 
managers regularly communicated their displeasure directly to the Guardians of 
those Unions and Parishes which had sent them particularly old and weak patients.  
This was often combined with an appeal to the Local Government Board (LGB) 
formally to condemn the Guardians’ actions.  On 9th December, 1878, a 75-year-old 
woman named Elizabeth Tunks was sent to Caterham from the Fulham Union 
workhouse.  The Caterham Committee reported that she ‘had bed sores, and was 
exceedingly debilitated’.  She arrived at the asylum, they claimed, ‘in such an 
exhausted state’ that she died less than a week later.  An inquest was held, and it 
was found that the strain of the journey from Fulham to Caterham had hastened 
Elizabeth Tunks’ death, thus making the Fulham Guardians in part culpable for her 
demise.  On hearing of this, the MAB managers resolved to send a copy of this 
report to both the LGB and to the Fulham Guardians.  The LGB then entered into 
their own correspondence with the Fulham Guardians, inquiring into the facts of 
the case.  They discovered that Tunks was removed several days after her certificate 
had been signed, during which time her physical condition had deteriorated 
significantly.  The LGB’s action in this case was simply to remind the Guardians to 
‘impress upon their officers’ the importance of medically examining prospective 
asylum patients on the day of their removal.86   
 Occasionally, the MAB sought to elicit more comprehensive action from the 
LGB than just these piecemeal investigations.  Throughout the first half of the 1870s, 
the MAB appealed for firmer regulations regarding appropriate cases for MAB 
imbecile asylum care.87 These regulations did not materialise but in 1875, this rather 
limp paragraph was added to an unrelated circular letter sent from the LGB to the 
metropolitan unions: 
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The removal of helpless bed-ridden persons, whose mental 
weakness is, in many cases, the result of old age, to Asylums 
situated a considerable distance from the Metropolis, is 
calculated, in the one hand to be injurious to the persons thus 
removed; and, on the other, to occupy the District Asylums 
with a different class of persons from that which they were 
constructed.  It is obvious that such a course, if continued, could 
not fail to impose unnecessary expenditure on the Metropolitan 
Ratepayers.88  
These comments, although they echoed the concerns of the MAB, barely amounted 
to a request, let alone a ‘regulation’, and had little effect.  Faced with such equivocal 
support, the MAB tried to take matters into their own hands.   In 1880, they sent 
their own circular letter to the metropolitan Guardians, ‘calling their attention to the 
undesirability of sending to the Asylums of the Managers Patients who are simply 
suffering from Senile Decay’.89  Then, in 1882, they took the further step of 
tabulating the number of cases of ‘Dementia incidental to Senility’ sent to their 
asylums from each Union.  One of the managers moved to have this sent to the 
LGB, along with a further statement that their admission had caused ‘an 
appreciable increase in the expenditure for maintenance and general management’. 
In the end, they voted not to send their findings to the LGB recalling, perhaps, the 
ineffectiveness of their appeals in the previous decade.90   
 There was a slight dip in the proportion of aged cases being sent to 
Catherham in the early 1880s, perhaps due to the actions of the MAB.  However, by 
the 1890s, it had become clear that attempts to limit the number of aged cases 
arriving from the workhouses were having little long-term effect.  The Board began 
to realise that they might have to come up with their own solution to manage the 
                                                             
88 Correspondence from Government Bodies to Holborn Board of Guardians (1875), p.  14. 
89
 Minutes of the Metropolitan Asylums Board, Vol. XIV (1880-1), 29 May 1880, p. 240. 
90 Minutes of the Metropolitan Asylums Board, Vol. XVI (1882-3), 15 April 1882, p. 43; 13 May 1882, 
p. 173. 
138 
 
problem of the aged mentally ill.  In 1892, a sub-committee of the MAB was set up 
to consider ‘the whole question of imbecile accommodation’.  They concluded  
unanimously… that the time has now arrived when the 
Managers should no longer delay the provision of additional 
accommodation for imbeciles… [T]he accommodation 
needed is primarily for patients requiring infirmary 
treatment, your sub-committee consider that the 
establishment of an Asylum Infirmary in or within easy 
distance of the Metropolis for the reception of aged, helpless 
and enfeebled persons of unsound mind is expedient and 
desirable.91 
They quoted from G. Stanley Elliot’s report of the previous year, where he had been 
the first to suggest that an ‘asylum infirmary’ was needed, to care for ‘the very aged 
helpless, and enfeebled persons of unsound mind’ who clearly made up a 
significant proportion of London’s indigent poor.92  This, at last, was a recognition 
that the needs of the aged mentally ill, and other people whose physical needs were 
equal to their mental ones, were not currently being catered for in London, and that 
some new structure of care was needed.  Elliot produced a full proposal for the 
MAB the following year, which attempted to do away with the old notion that this 
care could be cheaply provided, and noted that the patient population would 
consist chiefly of ‘persons requiring exceptional individual attention’.  The proposal 
was quickly accepted by both the MAB and the LGB, and in May 1894, the Tooting 
Lodge estate was purchased. 93 
 It would, however, be almost ten years before the Tooting Bec Asylum 
received its first patient, largely due to the hesitance of the Local Government 
Board.  They did not heed Elliot’s warning that such care could only be provided at 
considerable expense.  Before they would sanction the purchase of Tooting Lodge, 
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they asked repeatedly for reassurance about the ‘class of patients’ it would be 
intended to accommodate.  They insisted that all of the patients at the new asylum 
be certified under the Lunacy Act.  This was less an attempt to protect the patients 
from unlawful detention, than an act of deterrence against ‘cases of ordinary senile 
decay’.94  The opening of Tooting Bec, then, can be seen as a missed opportunity to 
circumvent the dysfunctional exclusionary discourse of senility.  By insisting that its 
residents be certifiable lunatics, rather than ‘cases of ordinary senile decay’, the LGB 
ensured that Tooting Bec would be hampered by the classificatory problems which 
had surrounded aged asylum admissions for decades.  It also highlights the 
continued unwillingness, at the highest levels of the administrative structures at 
least, to accept responsibility for caring for this group of patients, even in an 
institution which was explicitly set up to cater for their needs. The LGB, more 
isolated from the problems with which the MAB had been dealing over the 
preceding thirty years, were also more conservative in their estimates of the scale of 
the problem.  Over the next decade, they wrangled over bed numbers, convinced 
that the numbers proposed by the MAB exceeded the number of prospective 
patients whose problems were ‘within the terms of Dr Elliot's definition’.95  This was 
soon shown to be a grave error on the LGB’s part, and in 1906, only three years after 
opening, the asylums committee had to appeal to the LGB for permission to install 
an additional 207 beds.96   
 In the years leading up to the opening of Tooting Bec, the MAB seemed 
content to believe that it would solve many of their problems.  In 1902, they made 
arrangements for the transfer of 200 healthy, younger patients from Darenth to 
Caterham and Leavesden, in anticipation of the space which would be vacated by 
patients moved out to Tooting Bec.97  The original intention had been to house all of 
the MAB’s aged patients at the new asylum.  Only a year after opening, under the 
weight of new admissions, this policy had to be abandoned, and a group of patients 
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aged between 70 and 80 were transferred back to the other imbecile asylums.98  In 
the same year, Dr Campbell, superintendent of Caterham, submitted a proposal to 
convert two more existing wards into infirmary accommodation.99   Once again, the 
experience of the county asylums was being repeated, as the creation of a new 
institution seemed to increase demand rather than negate it.  It seems that all 
involved had seriously underestimated the extent of the need for asylum infirmary 
accommodation in London.  Caterham did not experience the expected relief and, in 
his annual report for 1905, Campbell stated that ‘in no previous year...have the 
admissions been as unsatisfactory as in the last twelve months’.100   Tooting Bec was 
originally designed as the first real example of the cheap, simple accommodation 
for the senile, which had for so long been touted as the answer to the problem of the 
aged in the asylum.  In reality, Tooting Bec proved that the notion that the senile 
could be cared for cheaply was a fallacy.  When Arthur Downes, senior medical 
inspector for the LGB, appeared before the Royal Commission for the Care and 
Control of the Feeble Minded, he was pressed on the question of whether senile 
dements could be so accommodated.  ‘I am not sure that the senile dements who are 
sent to Tooting Bec could be dealt with cheaply,’ he said, ‘because they are cases 
which require enormous care in nursing’.101  The dream of the cheap institution 
would not die, however:  Downes described Tooting Bec, originally designed to be 
as economical as possible, as ‘of course, of a more expensive type’, while Mr Helby, 
Chairman of the MAB, wondered whether some of Tooting’s patients might be 
cared for in an infirmary ward at the workhouse.  ‘The cost would be less’, he 
stated.102 
 Thus, the opening of Tooting Bec asylum did not actually mark a change in 
attitude on the part of the MAB, nor did it provoke any new insights on the nature 
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of the problem from amongst the managers.  Helby repeated the same old 
arguments as had been made following the opening of Caterham and Leaveden, 
blaming the unexpected expense of Tooting Bec on the admission of the wrong type 
of patient:  ‘nothing more nor less than old men or women suffering from senile 
decay’. 103   The exclusionary discourse of senility was so embedded at the MAB, that 
it was even being applied to an institution set up explicitly to care for senile 
dements.  The managers continued to hold on to the idea of a fathomable, objective, 
and well-understood boundary between senile dementia and natural infirmity, 
when experience clearly pointed to the difficulties of making this distinction 
meaningful in the practical question of institutional care.  Following the opening of 
Tooting Bec, the MAB managers returned to their previous strategy of seeking out 
the Unions who sent them aged patients so that they could be admonished.  In 1904, 
they sent out a return to all metropolitan Guardians, asking how many people over 
70 they had sent to the MAB asylums, and –  in a more direct insinuation of 
illegitimate activity than they had ever previously made – how much they had paid 
the physician who certified them.104  In the end very little came of it:  certain 
Guardians replied only to add their own condemnation to the practice and trumpet 
their own innocence, and no one admitted to the dubious practice of paying for 
medical certificates.105  This episode does, however, show us that the MAB 
managers continued to see the problem of aged admissions in the same terms; as 
one caused by unscrupulous poor-law officials who knowingly sent them 
unequivocally unsuitable cases, to save themselves some trouble.   
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The View from the Workhouse 
The proportion of admissions to Caterham who were aged 60 or over did not 
steadily increase during this period, but neither did they decrease.106  By continuing 
to arrange for aged patients to be admitted to the MAB asylums, workhouse 
officials and Poor Law Guardians showed that they considered senile cases to be 
appropriate for MAB asylum care. Individual Boards of Guardians pushed back 
against the MAB when they sent them letters of complaint about aged patients, 
writing their own letters to defend their decisions.107  In April 1897, the Guardians of 
Poplar Union turned the tables on the MAB, criticising them for the insufficiency of 
provision at their imbecile asylums.  ‘The want of accommodation’, they reported, 
was leading to many difficult patients being detained in the workhouse, an 
‘extremely undesirable’ situation.  In light of this, they requested that the MAB 
provide temporary accommodation for those imbeciles who were currently 
awaiting transfer to one of their asylums.108 The MAB took almost a year to respond 
to this highly unusual missive.  They undertook their own survey of the number of 
imbeciles currently awaiting transfer to a MAB asylum in metropolitan workhouses.  
Excluding those ‘requiring infirmary accommodation’, who, they claimed, would 
soon be provided for by Tooting Bec Asylum, and anyone else under 16 or over 70, 
they declared there to be only 46 such people awaiting accommodation.  Thus they 
were ‘not prepared to incur any expenditure on the provision of temporary 
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accommodation for this class of patient’.109  It is hardly surprising that the results of 
the MAB’s investigation supported the status quo.  Indeed, by excluding the over-
70s and the feeble from their enumeration – potentially discounting many of the 
patients to whom the Poplar Guardians originally referred – the MAB indicated 
from the outset that they would not adjust their own activities and expectations to 
meet the needs of the Guardians.  They were only prepared to tackle the question of 
imbecile accommodation on their own terms.  This episode thus underlines how 
differently the MAB and the Guardians viewed the problem of imbecile 
accommodation. The unions thought that gaining entry for one of their paupers into 
the imbecile asylums was far too difficult; as far as the MAB was concerned, 
Guardians sought their services far too readily. 
 At the turn of the century, the opening of Tooting Bec asylum, and the 
investigations undertaken by two Royal Commissions - on the Poor Laws, and on 
the Care and Control of the Feeble Minded -  brought fresh attention to the issue of 
accommodation for the senile.  In 1905, Dr F. S. Toogood, long-standing medical 
superintendent of the Lewisham workhouse infirmary, spoke out at a meeting of 
the MPA, expressing his concerns about ‘the growing unwillingness of the London 
County Council and the Metropolitan Asylums Board to receive cases of senile 
dementia into their asylums’.  He directed particular criticism to Dr P. Campbell, 
medical superintendent of Caterham. 
[A] tremendous fuss had been made by the Metropolitan 
Asylums Board, on the complaint of the medical officer at 
Caterham Asylum, against the sending of those senile 
dements down there. That gentleman appeared to forget that 
Caterham Asylum was established for dealing with those 
cases. It was a workhouse designed for that class of case.110   
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A year later, Toogood wrote in the Lancet that there had been ‘a growing feeling that 
cases of senile dementia should not be classed as lunatic’, but countered that they 
were equally undesired as infirmary patients: 
Old  people  who cannot  find  their  way about  a ward,  
who are  unable  to  recognise  their  own  beds,  who prowl 
about the place  in a semi-nude condition, who try to get  
into  bed  with  other  inmates  and who  resent  their 
exclusion,  who sing and chatter and  call  upon imaginary 
persons  all  night, who would,  if  not prevented,  light fires 
upon the floor,  are not sufficiently docile to  be retained in 
ordinary workhouse dormitories, while their presence in an 
infirmary ward would be intolerable. 111 
This hardly accords with the image of the ‘quiet and harmless’ patients described 
by the MAB and the Lunacy Commissioners.  Workhouse officials, thus, had their 
own exclusionary discourse of senility, one which portrayed their behaviour as so 
difficult, that it was impossible for them to remain on a general infirmary ward.  
Out of 276 Boards of Guardians asked by the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws 
and the Relief of Distress, only one (rural) Board agreed that ‘senile dements should 
not be treated in lunatic asylums, but should be treated in workhouses’.112 
 In 1908, C.T. Parsons, Honorary Secretary of the Infirmary Medical 
Superintendents’ Society, and medical officer of the Fulham Infirmary, wrote letters 
to both the British Medical Journal and The Lancet, putting forward his perspective on 
‘The Difficulty of Dealing with Cases of Senile Insanity’. 113  His use of the term 
‘senile insanity’ was as strategic and loaded as the use of ‘mere senile dementia’ by 
the Lunacy Commissioners and the MAB.  His argument focussed on the ‘grave 
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accusation’ implicit in the complaints about senile admissions to the asylum:  ‘that 
not only are patients being sent to these asylums illegally, but that they are also 
being detained illegally’.  The law was quite clear, he knowingly suggested:  if an 
individual was not a fit case for the asylum, then they could not legally be certified.  
The unspoken corollary, of course, was that any person who was being detained 
under a certificate of lunacy must, therefore, be insane.114   Like the administrators of 
lunacy, then, C. T. Parsons and other Poor Law officials manipulated the 
uncertainty around what constituted insanity to their own ends.  Both asylum and 
workhouse officials appealed to an objective and externally-verifiable definition of a 
‘true’ lunatic in their arguments about the senile, but their experience showed that 
the only meaningful definition of insanity in this context was a practical one, 
dictated by the type of behaviour different institutions were prepared to tolerate, 
and type of the care they were willing to provide. 
Conclusion 
Historian David Mellett has described the history of lunacy reform as ‘the history of 
the idealization of an expedient’.115  This chapter has shown that, with regards to the 
issue of senile lunatics, the precise opposite was the case.  The continued arrival of 
aged patients at the asylum, apparently in ever-increasing numbers, demonstrates 
that the admission of such patients to the asylum was indeed ‘expedient’ to 
someone.  This situation, however, was in no way idealised:  the Lunacy 
Commissioners, asylum managers, and many psychiatrists continually and 
vociferously complained about their institutions being used in this manner.  Rather 
than accept a role which they were being called upon to perform, and adjust their 
understanding of the asylum accordingly, the administrators of lunacy coveted an 
imagined alternative.  In doing so, they attempted to exclude the senile from the 
legitimate asylum population, rhetorically and literally.  In practical terms, as the 
restricted size of Tooting Bec Asylum demonstrates, this alternative was never 
sincerely pursued.  The expedient triumphed over the ideal.  
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 The admission of aged patients to the asylum was not, by their own 
admission, expedient to those who controlled and organised the institutional care of 
insanity.  This begs the question: for whom was this situation expedient?  This is the 
question which will be addressed in the next chapter.  It will show that, far from 
being an aberration, the admission of aged patients to the asylum was entirely 
consistent with the role that institution performed within nineteenth- century 
English society.  Asylum admission was essentially a pressure-valve for families 
and workhouses when an individual’s behaviour became unmanageably disruptive.  
In this context, any attempt to differentiate between ‘senility’ and ‘insanity’ was 
meaningless.    
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Chapter Three:  Older Patients’ Journeys to Hanwell 
Sarah Townsend was employed for 30 years in the family of a wealthy tea 
merchant, in Hampstead, North London. Her primary role was as a nurse to the 
family’s nine children.  In 1891, the youngest child turned 12, and Sarah turned 60.  
Sarah began to worry about her position.  According to her family, she grew 
melancholy and lethargic, fearing that her employers ‘did not want so old a 
servant’.  Matters came to a head when she reportedly ‘took a razor to bed with her 
intending to cut her throat ‘.  Sarah had never married, and had no children of her 
own, but her sisters stepped in to look after her.  First, she was taken in by her sister 
and brother-in-law, who lived locally.  After a few days, they decided to send her to 
stay with another sister, named Martha, in Southport, Lancashire, hoping that the 
‘rest and change’ would improve her state of mind.  For four weeks Martha made 
sure that Sarah ate and dressed, and generally found her to be ‘tractable’, but in the 
fifth week Sarah’s behaviour deteriorated.  She became very restless, attempting to 
leave the house without any clothes, and reacting violently when prevented.  At this 
point, Martha later explained, her sister became ‘unmanageable’.  Martha’s son 
solicited a certificate of insanity for Sarah, and she was admitted to Lancaster 
Lunatic Asylum.  When the ‘authorities’ there discovered that Sarah was a 
Londoner, chargeable to the Hampstead Poor Law Union, they transferred her back 
down to the metropolis.  Sarah entered Hanwell on 5th February 1892.1     
 Rebecca Tully was a widowed needlewoman, aged 82, when she was 
admitted to Hanwell in 1872.  No one came to the asylum to tell the story of her 
case, and there are no letters attached to her case note.  The asylum had the name 
and address of her grandson, but when the Clerk tried to reach him, his letter was 
returned, with a note saying that he was ‘not known’.  The only description of 
Rebecca’s life prior to her admission comes from her medical certificate.  She was 
living alone, in a single room in a lodging-house.  The certifying doctor wrote that 
he ‘found her at her lodging…in a most disgusting state, her hands covered with 
her own excrement and the room in a most filthy state.’  Her landlady added that 
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‘she had not been off her bed for the last month, that she had laid in her own 
excrement, that she had several times nearly set fire to her own room’.  The 
landlady, it seems, had not seen fit to intervene, beyond soliciting Rebecca’s 
certification and seeing her sent to the asylum.2  
Sarah and Rebecca were both categorised as ‘senile’ by the medical officers 
at Hanwell, but in neither case does their route to the asylum conform to the 
stereotype described in Chapter Two.  There, we saw that the Lunacy 
Commissioners cast aspersions on the motives of families, as well as Poor Law 
officials, for illegitimately sending them senile cases.  They accused ‘poorer’ families 
of sending their ‘worn out’ members to the asylum ‘without reluctance’.3   Sarah 
Townsend’s family, in fact, seemed very reluctant to send her to the asylum, even 
after she showed an intent to commit suicide.  They went to significant lengths to 
manage Sarah’s condition amongst themselves although, in the end, her problems 
proved ‘unmanageable’.  Rebecca Tully, in contrast, was living in abject neglect, 
alone and in clear need of care and support.  
 This chapter will examine critically the journeys which led aged patients to 
Hanwell, and tease out some of the experiential consequences of being old, mad 
and poor.   The question of how and why people entered the asylum has been a 
matter of much historiographic discussion and debate, as has the position of the 
aged with regard to the family, the community and welfare institutions.  This 
chapter will therefore begin with an extended, two-part discussion of these areas of 
historiography.  It will then move on to analyse evidence from the medical 
certificates and case-history narratives of patients who were aged 60 or over when 
they were admitted to Hanwell.  The medical certificate was the document which 
legally gave patients the status of a ‘lunatic’, and allowed them to be confined 
against their will.  The certifying physician – who was not usually affiliated with the 
asylum – had to provide ‘facts indicating insanity’, which he had observed himself, 
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3 The Forty-Eighth Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1894), p. 6. 
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and which had been ‘communicated by others’.4  From the 1870s, these documents 
were copied into the case notes at Hanwell, and often indicate the sequence of 
events leading up to a patient’s institutionalisation.  The case history narratives 
were the product of interviews conducted with a patient’s friends or family 
members by the asylum doctors themselves, shortly after the patient’s admission.5   
They included details of the patients’ experiences, habits and mental condition.  
Although they were not recorded verbatim, these narratives offer a rich insight into 
the lay understanding of mental disorder.  They, like the certificates, also contain 
details regarding patients’ domestic situations, and the circumstances and events 
leading up to their institutionalisation. Together, the certificates and case history 
narratives sometimes allow us to piece together a picture of patients’ journeys to the 
asylum. 
           In examining journeys to the asylum, this chapter seeks to illuminate two 
main themes: personal responses and institutional displacements.  To explore the 
personal, it will first examine the lives of the patients in this sample immediately 
prior to their admittance to Hanwell, focussing on the relationships they had with 
people around them, and the dynamics of obligation and affection which 
underscored these relationships.  It will suggest that there was a general sense of 
social obligation amongst adult children, extended family members, and friends, to 
provide support for older people who became mentally disordered.  It will also 
show that this social ideal was often unfulfilled – due to practical constraints or 
simply a lack of desire and interest – and older people regularly fell on charitable 
organisations and on the Poor Law for support.   
        This chapter will suggest that admittance to Hanwell was usually the last step 
in a chain of institutional displacements:  from the home to the workhouse, and 
from the workhouse to the asylum.  There were also sometimes other displacements 
in this chain, from independent dwellings to relatives’ homes – as in Sarah 
                                                             
4 The ‘facts indicating insanity’ were not included in pauper lunatic certificates until after the 1853 
Asylums Act.  For more detail on the process of certification, see David Wright, 'The Certification of 
Insanity in Nineteenth-Century England and Wales', History of Psychiatry, 9 (1998), pp. 274-282. 
5 For further discussion of the form and purpose of the case history narrative, see pp. 220-224. 
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Townsend’s case – or to charitable institutions.  Viewed in this light, the act of 
admitting a person to the asylum can be seen on a continuum with other attempts 
to manage or contain the behaviour of disruptive individuals.  Institutional 
displacement occurred when a person’s behaviour overwhelmed the resources – 
financial, practical and emotional – available to manage and support them. 
Trying to determine why people were sent to the asylum, even in a small-
scale study, is a highly loaded endeavour.  As historians Joseph Melling and Robert 
Turner have pointed out, ‘we can see the decision to dispatch a family or 
community member as a product of the same complex of forces which gave birth to 
the institution itself.’6   In trying to determine why individuals ended up within the 
asylum walls, the entire meaning of the institution is at stake.  This chapter fully 
embraces this broader implication.  It builds on the argument from the previous 
chapter that attempts to exclude ‘senile’ patients from the asylum – discursively or 
practically – were futile.  In practical terms, the asylum functioned as a place to 
contain a wide variety of disruptive or unmanageable behaviours, including those 
which may have arisen from the ‘natural infirmity of old age ’. 
The Historiography of Asylum Admission 
In the ‘post-revisionist’ historiography of the asylum, described in the introduction 
to this thesis, the role of the family in admitting patients to the asylum came to the 
fore.  David Wright’s 1997 article ‘Getting Out of the Asylum’ is the definitive 
statement of this programme of research.  Wright suggested that historians move 
beyond the history of ‘psychiatry’ – with a focus on medical practices and power 
within the institution – to a history of ‘confinement’.  7  This approach, he stated, 
would highlight the pre-eminence of non-medical actors in the process of committal 
to the asylum, and debunk attempts to paint the growth of the asylum as a 
straightforward product of medical imperialism.  Asylum doctors had very little 
                                                             
6  Joseph Melling and Robert Turner, 'The Road to the Asylum: Institutions, Distance and the 
Administration of Pauper Lunacy in Devon, 1845-1914', Journal of Historical Geography, 25 (1999), p. 
300. 
7 David Wright, 'Getting Out of the Asylum: Understanding the Confinement of the Insane in the 
Nineteenth Century', Social History of Medicine, 10 (1997) p. 139. 
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control over asylum admissions, as was made very clear in the complaints 
discussed in Chapter Two.  The physicians who completed and signed the medical 
certificates did not come from within the asylum:  they were private physicians, or 
workhouse medical officers, and rarely had a specialist interest in psychiatry.8  Poor 
Law officials also often played an important role in instigating and organising the 
process of certification and removal.9  Elaine Murphy has suggested that the 
workhouse medical officer was the key actor in the decision to seek committal for 
paupers in the Poor Law unions of East London.10  The role of Poor Law officials 
and workhouse employees will thus be given significant consideration in this 
chapter.  It is the family, however, which has received the most attention in the 
historiography of asylum admissions.  Akihito Suzuki has described the family as 
the ‘real agent’ in the certification process:  most often, he suggests, a family 
member made the initial approach to the authorities to set this in motion, and their 
testimony was often key to the establishment of a relative’s insanity.  Thus, it was 
the family, not the medical authorities, who turned a sick person into a ‘patient’.11   
In highlighting the role of the family, post-revisionist historians have been 
particularly eager to represent families as agents:  as people exercising choice over 
how to deal with their difficult relatives.  This is a response to the perceived 
structuralist tendencies of revisionist approaches.  As Melling, Forsythe and Adair 
put it, more recent historiography has  
 
 
 
                                                             
8 Joseph Melling, Richard Adair and Bill Forsythe, '"A Proper Lunatic for Two Years": Pauper Lunatic 
Children in Victorian and Edwardian England. Child Admissions to the Devon County Asylum, 1845-
1914', Journal of Social History, 31 (1997), p. 378. 
9 Peter Bartlett, The Poor Law of Lunacy: the Administration of Pauper Lunatics in Mid-Nineteenth-
Century England (London, 1999),  pp. 153-55. 
10 Elaine Murphy, ‘The Lunacy Commissioners and the East London Guardians, 1845-1867’, Medical 
History, 46 (2002), p. 513 . 
11 Akihito Suzuki, Madness at Home: the Psychiatrist, the Patient, and the Family in England, 1820-
1860 (Berkeley, 2006) p. 1. 
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consistently challenged Foucaultian interpretations of the 
asylum as an instrument of social control and have stressed the 
capacity and willingness of working class families to make 
effective use of such facilities.12       
The ‘capacity’ of families to deal with difficult members has been analysed through 
what Melling Forsythe and Adair call the ‘domestic economy of welfare’, which 
echoes the ‘household economies’ approach popular in the social history of the 
family. 13  Historians working in this mode use asylum and Poor Law records to 
uncover the material hardships and practical limitations which preceded instances 
of institutionalisation.  The life course, migration patterns, family size, and the 
pauperising effects of mental disruption have all been named as factors affecting the 
distribution of resources within the family, and their ability to cope with dependent 
or unproductive members.14  This approach, then, aims to reconstruct the 
immediate economic and social context from which asylum patients originated.  At 
the same time, historians of the family have long been well aware that household 
structure only tells us so much about the people it represents.  As David Morgan 
put it, ’sociologically…two households might not, in any sensible way, be the same, 
even if they are demographically very similar.’15  This is one of the strengths of 
asylum records; they add an indispensable further layer of qualitative information 
to allow us to make more informed insights – if not firm conclusions – about the 
nature of the family relationships behind the demographic data.16  The ‘capacity’ of 
families to provide care to old and insane relatives depended on more than just 
                                                             
12 Joseph Melling, Bill Forsythe and Richard Adair, 'Families, Communities and the Legal Regulation 
of Lunacy in Victorian England: Assessments of Crime, Violence and Welfare in Admissions to the 
Devon Asylum, 1845-1914', in Peter Bartlett and David Wright (eds), Outside the Walls of the 
Asylum: the History of Care in the Community 1750-2000 (London, 1999), p. 153;  Michael Anderson, 
Approaches to the History of the Western Family, 1500-1914 (London, 1980)  pp. 49-67. 
13 Melling, Forsythe and Adair, ‘Families, Communities and the Legal Regulation of Lunacy in 
Victorian England’, p. 153. 
14 Melling, Forsythe and Adair, ‘Families, Communities and the Legal Regulation of Lunacy in 
Victorian England’, pp. 154, 172;  David Wright, Mental Disability in Victorian England: the Earlswood 
Asylum, 1847-1901 (Oxford, 2001) p. 83. 
15 D. H. J. Morgan, The Family, Politics, and Social Theory (London, 1985), p. 162; See also Hans 
Medick, 'The Proto-Industrial Family Economy: The Structural Function of Household and Family 
during the Transition from Peasant Society to Industrial Capitalism', Social History, 1 (1976), p. 295 
16 This was recognised by Wright, 'Getting out of the Asylum', p. 152. 
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their economic position and demographic structure:  illness, personal history and 
personality all impacted on the ability of a family to meet the needs of a dependent 
elder.   
This brings us to the second element of Melling et al.’s statement, quoted 
above:  the ‘willingness’ of families to provide care.  A focus on ‘willingness’ has 
kept the agency of families at the heart of the history of the asylum.  By including 
feelings and moral values among the factors which influence domestic decision-
making, post-revisionist historians have avoided painting working-class families as 
automata reacting in an instrumental manner to structural economic forces.17  Thus, 
while the humanitarianism of the medical profession has become a historiographic 
taboo, the humanitarianism of the family holds a place at the centre of post-
revisionist asylum historiography.  John Walton, one of the earliest proponents of 
this approach, insisted that ‘the requirements of [a] theoretical structure should not 
be allowed to disguise the persisting importance of what people thought was 
right’.18   Andrew Scull’s work, described in the Introduction to this thesis, has been 
used as the primary example of a history which serves a ‘theoretical structure’ to 
the detriment of the values and emotions of the people involved.  In particular, his 
description of the asylum as ‘a convenient place to get rid of inconvenient people’ 
has attracted attention, and criticism, from other historians.  This was the title of a 
chapter written by Scull and included in a volume on ‘the social development of the 
built environment’ from 1980.19  It does not appear in his major monograph on the 
Victorian asylum, Museums of Madness, nor in the revised version of that work.  It 
remains, however, one of his most oft-quoted statements.20  Walton invoked it 
                                                             
17
Melling, Forsythe and Adair, ‘Families, Communities and the Legal Regulation of Lunacy in 
Victorian England’, p. 153. 
18 John K. Walton, 'Lunacy in the Industrial Revolution: A Study of Asylum Admissions in Lancashire, 
1848-50', Journal of Social History, 13 (1979), p. 17.   
19 Andrew Scull, ‘A Convenient Place to Get Rid of Inconvenient People:  the Victorian Lunatic 
Asylum’, in Anthony D. King (ed.), Buildings and Society:  Essays on the Social Development of the 
Built Environment (London, 1980), pp. 37-60. 
20A sample of these includes Sarah Wise, Inconvenient People: Lunacy, Liberty and the Mad-Doctors 
in Victorian England (London, 2012); Jonathan Andrews, ‘The Rise of the Asylum in Britain’ in 
Deborah Brunton (ed.), Medicine Transformed:  Health, Disease and Society in Europe 1800-1930 
(Manchester, 2004), p. 309; Edgar-André Montigny, '"Foisted Upon the Government": Institutions 
and the Impact of Public Policy Ipon the Aged. The Elderly Patients of Rockwood Asylum, 1866-1906', 
Journal of Social History, 28 (1995), p. 819; Roy Porter and David Wright (eds), The Confinement of 
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directly, arguing that asylum admittees ‘were not so much “inconvenient” people, 
in Scull’s terminology, as impossible people in the eyes of families, neighbours and 
authorities’.21   
Following Walton’s example, a strain of asylum history has emerged which 
seeks to emphasise that families did not institutionalise their relatives because they 
did not care about them, but because they did.  The only historical article to address 
the admission of aged asylum patients specifically is very much in this vein.22  In his 
study of aged admissions to the Rockwood Asylum in Ontario, Canada, Edgar-
André Montigny asserted that his aim was  
to determine if families…acted in the way Andrew Scull 
suggested and abandoned their burdensome aged relatives to 
insane asylums to be rid of them, or if they committed elderly 
people to institutions only as a last desperate resort in the 
absence of viable alternatives.23    
Such analyses have provided an important corrective to the idea, made explicit by 
David Mellett, that the asylum constituted a ‘first resort’ solution to a variety of 
social problems.24   They emphasise the long gap between the appearance of 
symptoms and institutionalisation, and demonstrate that families might be 
suffering significant hardship when the decision to institutionalise was finally 
made.   Historians like Walton and Montigny thus usefully moderate Scull and 
Mellett’s polemic tone.  However, when historians of the asylum continue to frame 
their analyses in this way – arguing that people were admitted to the asylum 
because they were ‘impossible’ rather than ‘inconvenient’ – they risk overplaying 
                                                                                                                                                                            
the Insane: International Perspectives, 1800-1965 (Cambridge, 2011), p. 4; J. L. Crammer, 'English 
Asylums and English doctors: Where Scull is Wrong', History of Psychiatry, 5 (1994), p. 103. 
21 John K. Walton, 'Casting Out and Bringing Back in Victorian England:  Pauper Lunatics, 1840-70', in 
William F. Bynum, Roy Porter and Michael Shepherd (eds), The Anatomy of Madness:  Essays in the 
History of Psychiatry, Volume II: Institutions and Society (London, 1985), p. 141. 
22 Yorston and Haw do not discuss how or why aged patients came to be admitted to Warneford and 
Littlemore asylums.  Graeme Yorston and Camilla Haw, 'Old and Mad in Victorian Oxford: a Study of 
Patients Aged 60 and Over Admitted to the Warneford and Littlemore Asylums in the Nineteenth 
Century', History of Psychiatry, 16 (2005), pp. 395-421. 
23
 Montigny, 'Foisted Upon the Government' p. 80. 
24 D. J. Mellett, The Prerogative of Asylumdom: Social, Cultural, and Administrative Aspects of the 
Institutional Treatment of the Insane in Nineteenth-Century Britain (New York, 1982), p. 159. 
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the difference between the two positions.25  Historians on both sides of this 
supposed divide agree that people were institutionalised when their disruptive 
behaviour, to use Melling, Forsythe and Adair’s terms, transcended the ‘capacity 
and willingness’ of people outside of institutions to cope with it.  They agree that 
asylum patients had crossed a ‘boundary of tolerance’; but disagree over precisely 
where this boundary lay.26   This chapter is situated in the common ground between 
these two positions, arguing that families institutionalised their older relatives 
because they felt unable to cope.  In his own attempt to reconcile his position with 
that of his critics, Scull suggested that ‘manageability rather than the nature of an 
individual’s mental defect’ was decisive in the admission of an individual to the 
asylum.27   Broadly speaking, this chapter draws the same conclusion. 
Old Age in the Family 
The issue at stake in claiming that asylum patients were institutionalised because 
they were ‘impossible’ rather than ‘inconvenient’ is not why families chose to 
institutionalise their relatives, but how they felt about it.  In ‘Getting out of the 
asylum’, David Wright suggested that the historiographic narrative of the ‘rise of 
the affective family’ might illuminate the family dynamics involved in 
institutionalisation, and the feelings which lay behind them.28  This idea is 
particularly associated with historians Lawrence Stone and Phillipe Ariès, who have 
argued that the family became a more emotionally-centred unit over the course of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  This new type of family was held together 
by affection rather than material need.29  This narrative has been applied to 
                                                             
25 Two recent examples of articles in this this vein are Cathy Smith, 'Living with Poverty:  Narratives 
of Poverty, Pauperism and Sickness in Asylum Records 1840-1876', in Andreas Gestrich, Elizabeth 
Hurren and Steven King (eds), Poverty and Sickness in Modern Europe:  Narratives of the Sick Poor, 
1780-1938 (London, 2012), pp. 117-42; Steven J. Taylor, ''All his Ways are That of an Idiot':  the 
Admission, Treatment of and Social Reaction to Two 'Idiot' Children of the Northampton Pauper 
Lunatic Asylum', Family & Community History, 15 (2012), pp. 34-43. 
26 This is a phrase used in Leonard Smith, Cure, Comfort, and Safe Custody: Public Lunatic Asylums in 
Early Nineteenth Century England (London, 1999), p. 96;  Melling, Forsythe and Adair, 'Families, 
Communities and the Legal Regulation of Lunacy in Victorian England', p. 172. 
27 Andrew Scull, 'Rethinking the History of Asylumdom', in Joseph Melling and Bill Forsythe (eds), 
Insanity, Institutions, and Society, 1800-1914 (London, 1999), p. 300. 
28
 Wright, 'Getting out of the Asylum', p. 153. 
29Philippe Ariès, Centuries of Childhood (Harmondsworth, 1973); Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex 
and Marriage in England, 1500-1800 (New York, 1977) . 
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marriage, and to the relationship between parents and their young children, but has 
not included much discussion of the third generation, and the relationship of older 
parents with their adult children.30  The Hanwell case notes underpinning this 
chapter, therefore, provide the opportunity to add some new historical insight to 
the bonds of duty and affection which tied adult children to their older parents, 
along with other members of the extended family.   
As discussed in the Introduction to this thesis, much of the history of old age 
has been devoted to debunking the ‘golden age’ myth.  This refers to a popular 
historical image of a past in which ‘older people were venerated in their 
communities and cared for by their family’.31  Demographic studies have thrown 
significant doubt on the idea that older parents lived with their adult children in 
pre-industrial England.  In the 1960s, Historical demographer Peter Laslett 
suggested that household size in England remained fairly stable from the sixteenth 
to the late-nineteenth century at around 4.75 people, precluding a widespread 
pattern of multigenerational cohabitation.32  Though he later came to place more 
emphasis on local variation, Laslett continued to stress ‘the relative unimportance of 
extended family living for the historical experience of elderly people [in England]’.33  
Other demographic studies, however, have produced different results.  Stephen 
Ruggles has suggested that extended family living – including the co-residence of 
multiple generations – was a significant feature of the demographic landscape of 
Victorian England.34  Michael Anderson has undertaken small-scale studies of some 
                                                             
30 Stone briefly refers to this relationship, but does not integrate it into his overall narrative. Indeed, 
he suggests that, in the nineteenth century, adult children and their parents became ‘strangers’: 
Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 1500-1800,  pp. 403-4. 
31
 Paul Johnson, 'Historical readings of old age and ageing', in Paul  Johnson and Pat Thane (eds), Old 
age from Antiquity to post-modernity (London; New York, 1998), p. 2; Carole Haber, Beyond Sixty-
Five: the Dilemma of Old Age in America's Past (Cambridge, 1983), p. 5; W. Andrew Achenbaum, Old 
Age in the New Land: the American Experience since 1790 (Baltimore, 1978), p. 4; Susannah R 
Ottaway, The Decline of Life: Old Age in Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge, 2004), p. 1; Richard 
Wall, 'Elderly Persons and Members of their Households in England and Wales from Preindustrial 
Times to the Present', in David I. Kertzer and Peter Laslett (ed.), Aging in the Past:  Demography, 
Society and Old Age (Berkeley, 1995), p. 81. 
32 Peter Laslett, 'Size and Structure of the Household in England Over Three Centuries', Population 
Studies, 23 (1969), p. 200. 
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 Peter Laslett, A Fresh Map of Life: the Emergence of the Third Age (London, 1989), p. 114. 
34 Steven Ruggles, Prolonged Connections: the Rise of the Extended Family in Nineteenth-Century 
England and America (Madison, 1987), pp. 127-34. 
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industrial communities, and found that the 1850s saw high levels of 
multigenerational cohabitation in these areas, offering an important corrective to 
the historical commonplace that industrialisation fragmented the working-class 
family.35  This extends to the overcrowded and supposedly fragmented metropolis 
of London.  Richard Wall’s studies of multigenerational cohabitation indicate that 
around 50 per cent of Londoners aged 65 or over in the 1880s lived with their 
children, although the proportion was slightly lower in inner-city Bethnal Green 
than in the more suburban Walthamstow and Pinner.36   Interestingly, Wall’s 
findings do not reveal any clear gender differentiation:  in his detailed studies of the 
1891 census, he found that almost equal numbers of men and women resided with 
their children.37  
There has been significant disagreement among historians over the extent to 
which families have, historically, been held responsible for the support of their aged 
members.  David Thomson has most vociferously argued that a tradition of 
communal support for the aged was established under the Old Poor Law, and 
survived the changes wrought by Poor Law reform in 1834.38  Richard Smith has 
taken a different stance towards the role of the family in supporting aged members.  
He suggests that the support of adult children for their parents has been a common 
feature of English family relations at least as far back as the medieval period, but 
that this support was ‘conditional’ based on ‘mutual advantage rather than duty’.39   
Pat Thane’s assessments have generally been more optimistic about the role of the 
                                                             
35 Michael Anderson, 'Households, Families and Individuals: Some Preliminary Results from the 
National Sample from the 1851 census of Great Britain', Continuity and Change, 3 (1988), pp. 421-
38; Michael Anderson, 'Household Structure and the Industrial Revolution: Mid-Nineteenth-Century 
Preston in Comparative Perspective', in Peter Laslett and Richard Wall (eds), Households and Family 
in Past Time (Cambridge, 1972), p. 223. 
36 Wall, 'Elderly Persons and Members of their Households', pp. 95-96. 
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38 David Thomson, ''I Am Not my Father's Keeper': Families and the Elderly in Nineteenth-Century 
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1996), p. 44. 
158 
 
family, suggesting that there has been a ‘long continuity of a particular cultural 
tradition in intergenerational relations in English families’.40  ‘There was,’ she 
argues, ‘a strong sense of obligation to give what material and emotional support 
one could to elderly relatives, within reason’.41  
Historians on both sides of this argument are agreed that the last 30 years of 
the nineteenth century was a ‘distinctive’ moment for the balance of responsibility 
between family and community, particularly when it came to aged dependents.  
From the 1870s, Poor Law Unions around the country introduced measures 
designed to restrict and reduce the provision of Poor Law support.42 This so-called 
‘crusade against out-relief’ included the ‘vigorous[] pursu[it]’ of family members 
who were considered ‘liable’ in the assistance of their aged relatives.43  According to 
Thomson, the definition of a liable relative also expanded significantly in this 
period, to include siblings, nieces, nephews, and even friends.44  At the end of the 
nineteenth century, then, the idea of family support for the elderly was culturally 
legitimated, legally reified and, increasingly for those pursued by Poor Law 
crusaders, a social reality.  Yet this situation is only of limited applicability to the 
aged discussed in this chapter.  The crusade was focussed on material support, in 
the form of direct financial contributions.  What the patients who eventually arrived 
at Hanwell needed was practical support.  Smith argues that an assessment of these 
more dependent caring relationships is the next major frontier in the history of the 
family:  ‘The real problem that has yet to be confronted by historians of welfare and 
the family is how far support was given when the element of mutuality was 
absent’.45  This chapter argues that, where mentally disordered older people were 
concerned, Pat Thane’s optimistic assessment of the family as an essentially 
supportive unit is borne out.  The adult children in the Hanwell sources often 
                                                             
40 Pat Thane, Old Age in English History: Past Experiences, Present Issues (Oxford, 2000), p. 11. 
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expressed a sense of obligation to offer care and support to their older parents, even 
when they were unable to fulfil it.  This sense of obligation spread beyond the 
immediate nuclear family:  siblings, nieces, nephews and friends stepped in to offer 
practical, emotional and financial care and support where they could.    
The strains of industrialisation and urban living, then, did not sever family 
ties.  The ideal of family support, however, was often unfulfilled, and older people 
often fell on the Poor Law for maintenance.  Late-nineteenth-century studies of 
urban and aged poverty revealed that a high proportion of people aged 65 and over 
received Poor Law relief: between 20 and 30 per cent. 46  As discussed in the 
Introduction, this proportion was higher in London, and significantly weighted 
towards indoor relief in the workhouse.47  The workhouse did not just offer material 
support to impoverished older people, but a level of medical care to those who were 
infirm.48  The workhouse, then, played a significant role in the lives of many aged 
Londoners.   
The workhouse also played an important role in the lives of insane 
Londoners.  Almost every single one of the patients in these case notes passed 
through the workhouse on their way to the asylum.  Some of these were among the 
large proportion of aged Londoners who found themselves in the workhouse due to 
poverty and infirmity, and developed mental symptoms after their admission.  
Others were sent to the workhouse in response to the appearance of mental 
symptoms.  The workhouse was generally used as a sorting house for lunatics in 
nineteenth-century London:  Elaine Murphy, in her study of mid-nineteenth 
century East London Poor Law Unions, found that the Poor Law relieving officer 
brought suspected cases of insanity into the workhouse in the first instance.  The 
decision over whether to admit to the asylum was made there, often after an 
extended period of observation.49 The events described by Murphy seem to reflect 
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160 
 
the process by which almost all of the patients in this study came to Hanwell.  This 
chapter, then, will therefore take seriously Elaine Murphy and Peter Bartlett’s 
claims that we should see Poor Law officials, and the workhouse, as central to the 
asylums’ admission process.50  The medical certificates of these patients often 
contained evidence from workhouse nurses and attendants.  In these cases, the 
needs and interests of the workhouse were clearly more important in the decision to 
admit someone to the asylum, than those of the family.  In this way, the officials, 
officers and attendants of the workhouse were often the ‘real agents’ in the 
admission of aged patients to Hanwell. 
The rest of this chapter is about unmanageable people moving through a 
series of regimes of management – different homes, charitable institutions, the 
workhouse – before they are finally sent to the institution whose assigned purpose 
was to manage and contain this disruption.   It contains three main sections. The 
first looks at the marital, familial, and friendly relationships revealed through the 
asylum case notes and dynamics of obligation and affection which underpinned 
these relationships.  It asks who cared for these patients prior to their 
institutionalisation, and why they did so.   The second section considers the 
practices of care which were enacted outside of the asylum, and the way that 
families in particular responded to and attempted to manage the patient’s mental 
disturbance.  This includes their response at the moment in which these care 
relationships became overwhelmed, when the decision to institutionalise was made.  
The final section looks at the workhouse in particular, and considers the way that 
the needs and limitations of that institution drove the admissions process.  It was 
the status of an old person as ‘unmanageable’ which led to and legitimised their 
admission to the asylum.  
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Relationships and Care Before Institutionalisation 
Troublesome Husbands, Troubled Wives 
The networks of affection and obligation which underpinned caring relationships 
outside of the asylum were complicated and varied.  This section will examine these 
relationships, beginning with marriages.  A third of the patients aged 60 or over in 
this sample were married at the time of their admission. When viewed from the 
perspective of marriage, a highly gendered picture of the experience and 
representation of insanity in old age emerges.  In both the male and female case 
notes, marital relationships are described in the same way:  husbands are 
troublesome and wives are troubled.   
The male case notes contain stories of wives who cared for their husbands 
despite significant mistreatment.  The wife of 60-year-old Robert Baker described 
him as ‘an unkind husband’, and she told the doctors at Hanwell that she feared his 
tempers.  Yet she had nursed him for ten years while his health was failing.51  
William Ford’s wife described him as ‘artful, scheming…and devoid of affection for 
his children’.  She left him in 1878, 14 years prior to his admission, ‘owing to his 
violence’.  However, in 1890 he sent her a message to say that he was planning to 
commit suicide, and she returned, apparently staying with him for the two years 
leading up to his institutionalisation.52  These cases both undermine any inclination 
to see the caring relationships described in these case notes in a sentimental light.  
Though we do not know the complexities of the emotions and experiences which 
lay behind these wives’ decisions to care for their apparently abusive husbands, we 
do know that they were made in a social and cultural context which gave few 
options to women in abusive relationships.  Both of these institutionalisations took 
place at an important moment in the history of marital conflict, occurring in the 
aftermath of the 1891 R. v. Jackson decision, which unambiguously deprived 
husbands of the legal right physically to coerce their wives.53  This can be seen in the 
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context of a longer-term increase in legal support for the wives of violent husbands, 
and in the public interest in spousal abuse.54  William Ford’s wife had, in the past, 
taken advantage of this legal-cultural shift, and shown significant resistance and 
tenacity in leaving him to raise her children alone.  However, both of these women 
continued to care for (or, at least, tolerate) their abusive spouses during their mental 
deterioration.  This supports Maeve Doggett’s claim that there was little genuine 
change in the overall patriarchal ideals of marriage, or in the day-to-day experience 
of marriage for working-class women.55  The care and tolerance of these wives, then, 
can be seen as expressions of the cultural expectations and social limitations which 
exhorted female victims of spousal violence to continue to perform their wifely 
domestic duties.56  
 Not every male patient had a noted history of abuse.  But the broader theme, 
of husbands causing trouble to their wives, appears repeatedly in the case notes on 
both sides of the asylum.  When a patient’s marriage was mentioned in the male 
case notes, it was discussed in terms of the effect the patient’s insanity had had on 
their marital relationship and their spouse.   When the wife of John Dodge came to 
Hanwell in 1892, and explained that he had been ‘very violent and irritable’ for the 
previous two years, the doctor taking her account noted that John had been ‘a 
constant source of anxiety to his wife’.57  William Dawes’ wife stated simply that 
‘she was afraid of him’.58  When a female patient’s marriage was mentioned in the 
case notes, however, it was usually described as a cause of her mental disorder.  Jane 
Glove and Sophia Leach were both married when they entered Hanwell in 1871 and 
1892 respectively.  Yet it was their friends, rather than their husbands, who came to 
Hanwell to narrate their case.  Jane Glove’s friend told the doctors that her husband 
was ‘a dissolute fellow and never treated her very well’.  He had, according to the 
friend, sent her to the workhouse when her symptoms had first appeared, and had 
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not seen her at all in the 18 months since.59  Sophia Leach’s friend explained that she 
was ‘at times very badly treated by her husband’ and that he used to ‘knock [her] 
about’.  Sophia had obtained a legal separation from her husband at some point in 
the indeterminate past, but this did not preclude her friend – with whom she had 
previously been living – from speculating that his mistreatment was the cause of 
her insanity.60  A husband did not have to be cruel or violent to place a strain on his 
wife.  When Hannah Holder was admitted to the asylum, her daughter claimed that 
her insanity was caused by the burden of caring for her ill husband.   The husband 
himself declined to come to the asylum to narrate her case, being ‘but a working 
man’.61   
 The prominence of troublesome husbands in Hanwell case notes may be a 
reflection of the social reality of nineteenth-century marriage.  Social historians of 
the family have suggested that nineteenth-century marital norms gave a 
particularly raw deal to working-class women, where ‘the wife served as a buffer 
for her husband’.62   Women, of course, were not always docile sufferers.  Elizabeth 
Case had broken two of her husband’s ribs, and ‘went after him with pokers’ prior 
to her institutionalisation.  In response to this, her husband had applied to a 
magistrate to have her ‘bound over to a House of Detention’ to protect him from her 
violence.  When she was released, she went straight to the workhouse, instead of his 
home.  Elizabeth Case’s husband, then, does not seem to have been bound by the 
same obligation of care as the wives of Robert Baker or William Ford.  Together, 
these cases suggest that a burden of care fell on wives which did not fall on 
husbands, even if they had been significantly mistreated.  Many contemporary 
commentators also remarked that working-class husbands were as much a burden 
as a protection to their wives.  In an analysis of the reform literature published on 
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the topic of domestic violence in the second half of the nineteenth century, historian 
James Hammerton found that middle-class writers generally placed the blame for 
marital strife amongst the lower orders firmly on the men.  Reformers and writers 
of all political stripes – traditionalists who sought to strengthen the family by 
encouraging the paternal authority of the husband, and feminists who wanted to 
redress gender inequality – found that ‘the misconduct of poor working-class men 
provided fertile ground for analysis, protest and reform.’63  The doctors who elicited 
and recorded these narratives, then, were reproducing this discourse which 
problematised the working-class husband.     
For both men and women, widowhood could be a significant spur to 
admission on the road to the asylum.  Grief at the death of a spouse was often cited 
as a cause of insanity. Frederick Allen’s daughter explained that he had ‘shown no 
symptoms of insanity’ until the sudden death of his wife three years previously, 
which ‘so upset him that…he became restless…in the middle of the night [and] 
soon developed delusions of persecution’.64  This cause could be given, even if the 
bereavement occurred some time before the appearance of mental disorder.  The 
death of Mary Carter’s husband was recorded as the cause of her insanity, despite 
the fact that it occurred over a year before her ‘excited’ and ‘troublesome’ behaviour 
began.65  The emotional impact of this event was often compounded by a financial 
one.  Widowhood could have significant repercussions for the domestic economy of 
care.  When Sarah Mitchell’s husband died in early 1892, her son also lost his job, 
leaving their small household without an income.  The economic uncertainty of this 
– along with her grief – was cited as the cause of both her insanity and her 
institutionalisation, as her son was left without the means to support her or 
himself.66  Mary Ann May had apparently been ‘eccentric in habits and in very bad 
health’ for a long time before her institutionalisation, and her husband had 
apparently cared for her.  Following his death in June 1872, she was not only left 
without a care-giver, but she also experienced a significant escalation in her mental 
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symptoms.  Her niece – who appears on her certificate – apparently had neither the 
means nor the inclination to take responsibility for her care, and she entered 
Hanwell six weeks later.67  The association of widowhood with pecuniary strife was 
so strong, that it entered the delusory world view of one patient.  Francis McLevy – 
a man of some means – drove to the workhouse in a phaeton carriage immediately 
following the death of his wife, because he ‘felt himself destitute’.  He was swiftly 
certified and sent to Hanwell.68 
Adult Children and the Extended Family 
As discussed above, the level of obligation felt by adult children towards their older 
parents has been a matter of some historiographic and contemporary disagreement.  
For the most part, the evidence in Hanwell’s case notes supports Pat Thane’s 
assertion that, in nineteenth-century England, ‘there was a strong sense of 
obligation to give what material and emotional support one could to elderly 
relatives’.69  Only a small proportion of the patients in this sample can be identified 
as living in a multigenerational household prior to their institutionalisation. 
However, as Thane has emphasised, cohabitation is only one means of offering 
support.  Many relatives who did not reside with the patient visited them at the 
asylum after their admission, and were able to give a detailed account of the 
patient’s life, suggesting significant and sustained contact.  The letters written by 
families who could not visit the asylum are often apologetic in tone, and express a 
sense of unfulfilled obligation.  Hanwell’s case notes suggest that a pervasive sense 
of social and moral obligation encouraged families to take care of their aged family 
members where possible, but that the realities – economic, physical, emotional – of 
working-class family life in the metropolis meant that their ideal could not be 
realised. 
Some adult children did respond to their parents’ mental deterioration by 
bringing them to live with them.  According to the narratives, a wide variety of 
symptoms and situations could trigger this cohabitation arrangement:  Susan 
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Woolley’s son took her in because ‘her strength was beginning to fail’; Honor 
Stafford was taken in by her widowed daughter following a ‘stroke of paralysis’; 
Elizabeth Grey was ‘brought up to London’ by her son because she was 
hallucinating ghostly figures in her garden.70  Some of these arrangements were 
only meant to be short-term, as in the case of George Brown.  His symptoms were 
quite severe, including violence, threats of suicide, delusions of suspicion, shouting 
on street corners and grandiose pronouncements of his ability to save passers-by 
from Hell.  In response to this, his daughter brought him to live with her.  After 
only three weeks, he had sufficiently recovered to return to his former abode, and to 
his job at a factory.  However, he quickly deteriorated again, attempted suicide, and 
was taken to the workhouse.71  For George Brown’s daughter, then, this 
cohabitation arrangement was a short-term response to her father’s acute problems, 
but not a long-term relationship of care.  She could give him the space to recover, 
but it was expected that he would return to his independent existence.   
Unlike George Brown and his daughter, most of the multigenerational 
cohabitations described in the case notes were long-term arrangements.  Honor 
Stafford’s widowed daughter and granddaughter cared for her for seven years 
while her capacities deteriorated until, aged 84, she had ‘scarcely a vestige of mind’ 
left, and went to the infirmary.72  Richard Cullen lived with his son for ‘a long time’ 
according to the narrative in his case notes, during which time ‘medical aid was 
resorted to at home’, in an attempt to deal with his wandering, confusion and 
incontinence.73  Elizabeth Grey had lived with her son and daughter-in-law for five 
years prior to her institutionalisation, during which time she posed significant 
challenges to them, ‘always getting into mischief’.74   William Sadler’s son wrote to 
the asylum to say that he had not seen his father for nine years, but that prior to that 
they had lived together for several years during periods of ‘brain disturbance’.  
William’s ‘extravagance’ eventually made this living arrangement untenable, but 
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his son’s family had shown significant forbearance in the face of his difficult 
behaviour:  they were ’sold up’ on three occasions, due to his expansive spending, 
before they sent him to live elsewhere.75  These cases, then, support the argument 
that the admission of an aged patient to the asylum was not necessarily a sign of 
abandonment and isolation.  They show that some families took it upon themselves 
to provide ‘a great deal of care for their aged kin’, and that they endured significant 
emotional and financial hardships in order to maintain these caring relationships.76   
The role of gender in these cohabitational arrangements is uncertain.  In his 
study of the lives of The Aged Poor in England and Wales, Charles Booth claimed that 
women were far more frequently taken in by their adult children, because they were 
‘more useful in the home’.77  Booth’s assessment has been echoed by historians Peter 
Stearns and Victor Bailey, who have argued that women were more firmly 
embedded in the social and emotional networks of family and community, better 
versed in the domestic tasks which might make them more useful in the household, 
and more ‘psychologically accustomed to dependency’ than men.78  However, more 
recent historical work has complicated this gendered picture.  Richard Wall’s 
demographic studies have suggested that older men and women were equally 
likely to live with their adult children in the nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries.  The ‘stock figures’ of the ‘coresident spinster sister and widowed mother’ 
are not present in Hanwell’s case notes.79  The examples of multigenerational 
cohabitation described above show that both men and women were taken in by 
their adult children, in response to mental deterioration or disorder.   
This does not, of course, mean that these caring relationships were 
unaffected by gender.  The men in this sample were less likely to fall upon their 
children for care, because they were more likely to have a living spouse:  just over 
half of the men in this sample were married at the time of their admission, 
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compared to less than a quarter of the women. This is consistent with wider 
patterns of marital status in London during the second half of the nineteenth 
century, and reflects the abiding mortality gap:  in the nineteenth century, as in the 
present, wives usually outlived their husbands.80  Sons and daughters both took 
their elderly parents into their homes prior to their institutionalisation, and both 
sons and daughters went to Hanwell to narrate their parents’ case histories.  The 
gendered realities of care relationships, however, were hardly likely to have been 
egalitarian.  In her studies of the family and community in Victorian East London, 
Ellen Ross went so far as to suggest that men and women’s ‘daily responsibilities 
[were] so separate that they failed to grasp the major concerns of each other’s 
lives’.81  It was Elizabeth Grey’s son who went to Hanwell to narrate her case, and it 
was he who had apparently made the decision to bring her to live with his family.  
Yet the census shows that he was fully employed as a ‘glass warehouseman’, 
leaving his wife to provide the ‘constant looking after’ than Elizabeth reportedly 
required.  His description of Elizabeth’s behaviour contains certain specific details – 
‘putting an empty kettle on the fire, putting the milk into the sugar ‘ – which 
suggest that her son was not entirely clueless as to what was going on in the home.82  
Yet the case notes offer no indication as to how his wife felt about her primary 
caring role. 
These narratives of adult children taking in their aged parents in response to 
their mental troubles, do not represent the typical experience of Hanwell’s aged 
admissions.  In cases where children did not provide this type of care, however, 
there are indications that they considered themselves to be acting against the social 
ideal.  The case notes contain letters from patients’ children, explaining why they 
could not visit the asylum or undertake the care of their parents.  Illness or financial 
burdens were given as reasons.  Elizabeth Wells’ daughter wrote that she had ‘no 
means to visit so far I am a widow with one child’.83  Ann Crossman’s daughter 
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wrote that she ‘should have been to see you about my poor mother, only I have not 
been well.’    She assured the medical officers that she would ‘come down as soon as 
ever I can for I long to see her’, but this promised visit never transpired.84  Lydia 
Gaston’s son wrote that he could not ‘afford the expense of the journey to see you 
with regards to my poor mother, being a working man’.  He explained that he 
would like to care for his mother himself, but that circumstances prevented it:  ‘I am 
unable to keep her myself or I should have had her with me, but my wife being 
delicate I fear I should have increased the troubles I already have to contend with’.85  
Leonard Smith has interpreted these types of letters as evidence of the ‘apparent 
need for relatives to ventilate and confide their own difficulties to the medical 
superintendent’.86  Catharine Coleborne has suggested that we see such letters as an 
‘emotional performance’, laying out private feelings in the hope of gaining external 
approval.87  Interpreted either way – as emotional performance of love for their 
parents, or as an act of strategic disclosure – these letters point towards a shared 
understanding of familial duty.  These adult children felt the need to make explicit 
their concern for their ‘poor’ parents.  They were compelled to explain the 
straightened circumstances which prevented them from caring for or visiting them.  
The apologetic tone of these letters contains an implicit request for forgiveness, for 
failing to fulfil the ideal social role.  Many children did not undertake the care of 
their aged parents when they showed signs of mental deterioration, but these letters 
suggest that many people thought that they should. 
It was not just children who felt and fulfilled this obligation of care.  The 
case notes contain examples of siblings, nieces and nephews who brought their 
aged relatives to live with them.  When Richard Hicks entered the asylum in 1911, 
his sister informed one of the medical officers that she had been concerned about 
his isolation following the death of his wife.  When she noticed his memory getting 
bad, she had initially arranged for him to live with her son, who was himself 
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married with two young children.  This arrangement, however, quickly proved 
unsustainable, and Richard was sent to the infirmary.88  Sarah Townsend, the 
woman whose experiences were discussed at the beginning of this chapter, was also 
well embedded within a wider familial network.  After her transfer to Hanwell, her 
family wrote letters requesting more information about Sarah’s condition, 
imploring the medical officers to continue the ‘kindness’ extended to her at 
Lancaster Asylum, and asking how soon they could visit.  Sarah’s family, then, 
showed little desire to ‘get rid of her’, indeed, they expressed significant anxiety 
that her care had passed out of their control.89   
It was Sarah’s sisters and brother-in-law who had stepped in to bring her 
into their homes, and who subsequently wrote to the asylum asking for details of 
her case.  It was her nephew, however, who gave the evidence of insanity which is 
included on her medical certificate.  This suggests that he was the one who solicited 
this institutionalisation, at odds with the wishes of the concerned older generation.  
While his mother wrote in a letter that Sarah ‘seemed to me to be sensible and 
rational’, Sarah’s nephew informed the certifying doctor that she ‘becomes violent 
and tries to bite when restrained’.90  Their differing accounts remind us that families 
are not unified entities; they contain members with competing and conflicting 
interests.  The case history narratives were solicited by a circular letter, sent to a 
patient’s nearest known relative soon after their admission.  This letter, however, 
might pass between several hands before a response was sent.  Lydia Gaston’s son, 
who wrote one of the apologetic letters discussed above, lived in Plymouth.  He had 
been sent the Hanwell circular by a brother who lived much closer to the asylum, in 
London.  The son who responded could not afford to travel to Hanwell; the son 
who did not respond apparently did not care to.91  The anxiety caused by cruel, 
inconsiderate, or otherwise disappointing children was sometimes named in the 
case notes as the cause of an older patient’s insanity.  The medical officer who 
recorded the case history narrative for 80-year-old Richard Plumb, supplied by his 
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sister, reported that ‘it seems likely that his children have no behaved well to him’, 
and pointed to their lack of support as a cause of his insanity.92  James Rourke’s 
insanity was supposedly caused by his awareness that his family could not support 
him and his wife, and his fears of having to rely on the Poor Law for support:  ‘two 
of his children being in America, the others dead but one, a seamstress in London 
barely able to support herself, there was no one left to assist them, he was 
constantly brooding over this condition’.93  These examples offer a useful reminder 
that, while kinship networks could offer real support to older people, they were also 
inconsistent.  The social ideal that children would care for their parents, then, was 
not overwhelming:  individual circumstances, relationships and personalities could 
easily override it.  
Where supportive familial relationships were in place, they did not end at 
the point of institutionalisation. Letters written to the medical officers offer some 
indication of the way that friends and family members continued to take 
responsibility for the experience of their loved ones within the asylum walls.94  One 
of the main concerns of these families was to ensure that their loved ones 
maintained a good position, and some kind of social standing, within the large, 
anonymous institution.  One of Sarah Townsend’s sisters, and one brother-in-law, 
wrote to the asylum, asking that she ‘be allowed to wear her own clothes’.  In his 
letter, the brother-in-law made a point of remarking that ‘we are paying 8/9 per 
week for her maintenance’.  Sarah Townsend was one of the very few non-pauper 
patients in this sample, and her family made it clear that the distinction between her 
and her fellow inmates should be respected.95  William Baggott’s brother, Thomas 
Baggott, sought distinction for him in a very different way.  When William was 
admitted to Hanwell, Thomas was an inmate of Banstead Asylum.  He dictated a 
coherent and sincere letter to a fellow patient, offering some details of William’s life, 
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and sent it to Hanwell.  The letter ended with a testament of his brother’s good 
character, and a supplicating request for good treatment: 
He has been a hard working man and is not other than poor at 
present, so that I trust you will find him a worthy recipient of 
the good things distributed to such persons under your 
generous supervision. 
Thomas’ letter offers us a patient’s view of the asylum regime, in which being 
regarded as a ‘worthy’ patient was paramount.  By describing his brother as ‘hard 
working’ and ‘not other than poor’, he implied that idle patients, suspected of vices 
beyond poverty, would receive worse treatment in the asylum.  He suggests that it 
was in power of the superintendent’s own ‘generosity’ to distribute ‘good things’ to 
deserving patients.  Thomas Baggott’s letter thus portrays the asylum as a strictly 
disciplinary institution, in which ‘worthy’ behaviour is rewarded.  At the same 
time, these letters point to a level of flexibility within this regime.  William and 
Sarah’s families were making attempts to shape their relative’s individual 
experience of the asylum regime, using the very different means at their disposal.  
Sarah Townsend’s family used their financial position, and Thomas Baggott used 
his personal knowledge of asylum life, and the deferential tone he had learned to 
adopt there.   
 Stephen Ruggles’ survey of nineteenth-century advice literature has 
revealed an idealised version of family, in which the sentimentalised bonds of the 
nuclear home were extended to more peripheral kin.  ‘The advice books,’ he reports, 
‘are full of admonitions regarding the "duties of brothers and sisters" and the 
"obligations" of married children to their elderly parents.’96  The evidence presented 
here suggests that this ideal was more than just a middle-class fantasy.  Many 
poorer families desired and pursued a situation in which they could care for their 
aged kin.  Clearly, this sense of obligation did not weigh on everyone, and the ideal 
of intergenerational support was often unobtainable.  This situation did not have to 
mean neglect and isolation.  When families proved unwilling or unable to provide 
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care for their older relatives, Hanwell’s cases notes show that friends and charitable 
organisations could also feel compelled to step in.     
Friendship, Neighbourhood and Charity Networks 
Historians Pat Thane and Susannah Ottoway have both concertedly challenged the 
assumption that an independently-dwelling old person in the past was necessarily 
‘neglected and isolated’.  They emphasise the desirability of independence as a 
consistent feature of older English people’s lives, at least as far back as the 
eighteenth century.  This independence, they suggest, was not absolute, but 
‘negotiated’, combining resources gained through work, Poor Law and community 
support, and the family.97  This chimes with a wider interest in the history of the 
family over the last 30 years in non-cohabitational kinship.98  Historians of working-
class Victorian London have emphasised the importance of neighbourhood support 
networks in times of crisis and difficulty, such as childbirth, illness and old age.  
Furthermore, ‘[n]eighbourhood relationships in many London districts overlapped 
with kinship’.99  Many of the patients in this sample were living independently prior 
to their institutionalisation, but were embedded within these wider networks of 
kinship and social support.  Elizabeth Lethbridge, widowed 20 years prior to her 
admission to Hanwell in 1871, is one such case.  She had supported herself as a 
domestic servant, with supplementary assistance from friends by whom she was 
‘loved and respected’.  Well into her seventies, she was the very model of a 
successful, independent older woman, enjoying a negotiated independence.  
Immediately prior to her institutionalisation, she had been lodging in the home of a 
furniture salesman and his family.  Though not related, they were apparently happy 
for her to remain there in the two years leading up to her admission, during which 
time she had reportedly been hearing voices.  Though she lived apart from her 
family, she was clearly not estranged from them; her sister was able to give a 
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detailed account of the development of her condition when she came to Hanwell.100  
Harriet Smith, also, was living alone in two rooms in a multi-household dwelling, 
when a possible suicide attempt prompted friends to ‘take charge of her’ – an 
arrangement which lasted over a year before she became ‘unmanageable’.101   
Charitable institutions provided support and care in lieu of family or 
friends.  Six patients in this sample came to Hanwell from a charitable institution.  
In October 1911, William Sadler, whose extravagant behaviour had apparently 
made him impossible to live with, was admitted to Hanwell from Rowton House in 
Hammersmith.  This was one of a series of hostels set up in the 1890s by 
philanthropist Lord Rowton, dedicated to providing cheap housing for down-and-
out men.102  The Rowton House had apparently provided a stable home for William 
for a significant portion of the time after his son removed him from his home, 
though eventually his behaviour proved too disruptive and he was removed to the 
asylum.103  Five patients came from Catholic homes specifically set up for the care of 
the aged poor.  Such homes, run by orders of nuns, have been described by 
historian Carmen Mangion as a ‘novel and integral part of the framework of the 
mixed economy of welfare in the nineteenth century and an important alternative to 
poor-law workhouses’.104  Four of these patients came from St Joseph’s Home for 
the Aged Poor, in Notting Hill in West London.  St Joseph’s was opened in 1869 by 
the Little Sisters of the Poor, a French order of nuns who were established 
specifically to care for the aged.  By the early 1870s, it was quite an operation, 
housing over 200 inmates, and ‘giving an impression of a large workhouse 
hospital’.  In spite of its mission as a home for the aged, contemporary journalistic 
accounts suggest that it was largely populated by the healthy, younger aged, with 
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the very old confined to the infirmaries, presenting ‘truly a terrible sight’.105  
Mangion argues that the Catholic homes were prepared to offer medical care to the 
type of decrepit and incurable patients who would not have been admitted to 
voluntary hospitals.106  The case notes of one Hanwell patient, however, suggest that 
the Little Sisters’ tolerance for mental infirmity and behavioural disruption was 
rather more limited.  Agnes Ryder was admitted to Hanwell in 1911, at the age of 
62, from Kensington Infirmary, having been sent there from St Joseph’s.  Her 
medical certificate stated that she was ‘constantly talking nonsense, singing, and 
disturbing others’.  Upon her admission, however, the doctors found her to be quite 
rational and calm, and soon wrote to St Joseph’s, asking that she might return.  
They replied that she could not, fearing that she would deteriorate again as others 
had done in the past.  ‘We had an old man for a time,’ they wrote, ‘who also got 
well, but did not last long and got quite bad again in  very short time.’  Agnes was 
discharged, a month after her admission to Hanwell, to the workhouse infirmary.  
Happily, another letter is included in her case note, from Agnes herself, informing 
the medical superintendent Dr Baily that she had made her way back to St Joseph’s, 
and inquiring after some of her fellow patients.  It appears that she was never 
readmitted to Hanwell.107   
Another patient, Ann Howmann, passed through two different 
philanthropic institutions – the Chesham Alms Houses and the Norfolk Home – 
before her arrival at Hanwell.  In both cases, she was expelled for ‘quarrelling with 
the matron’.  In neither instance was her quarrelsomeness taken as a sign of 
insanity.108  Nevertheless, her exclusion underlines the desire for a certain level of 
discipline and order in charitable homes, which made them ill-suited venues for the 
care of the aged mentally infirm.  Philanthropic and charitable institutions could 
offer material necessities, treatments for physical ailments, and a level of personal 
care, but they relied on the submission of a docile population, willing and able to 
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receive this care without challenge.  According to the observer from All The Year 
Round, St Joseph’s provided care for the physically very needy, as well as the 
quietly demented.  The letters regarding Agnes Ryder’s case suggest that those who 
did not conform to this dependent role were considered unsuitable.  By manifesting 
mental symptoms, Agnes had transcended her status as a member of the deserving, 
dependent aged poor.  She was moved into a different institution, and, at the same 
time, transitioned into a different category of person: a lunatic.   
Ann Howmann, the patient expelled from charitable institutions for 
‘quarrelling’, was unusual.  She had no known relatives, but she had her own, 
personal philanthropic benefactor.  This was her former employer, Dr Charles 
Routh, who provided an extended, personally written account of Ann’s life 
following her admission to Hanwell.  Charles Routh was a successful hospital 
doctor, and president of the British Gynaecological Society.109  Ann had worked 
under him as a ‘surgical and medical nurse’.  He was the person who had ‘obtained 
her admission’ to the Chesham Alms House and the Norfolk Home.  When she was 
expelled, he did not allow her to go to the workhouse, but ‘got somewhere for her 
and furnished her room for her’.  Routh had continued to pay for Ann’s upkeep, 
treat her physical disorders, and visit her frequently over a number of years.  This 
was in spite of numerous ‘quarrels’, in which she shut him out of her rooms, 
refused to see him, and threatened violence towards him.  He was moved to have 
her certified, he claimed, only once she threatened suicide.  
 How might we interpret and explain the lengths to which Dr Routh went to 
support Ann, prior to her institutionalisation?  His actions may have been a 
continuation of his philanthropic activity, as a consulting physician to various 
charitable hospitals.  There was certainly a paternalistic element to their 
relationship.    Routh was keen to protect Ann’s status as a ‘respectable’ working-
class woman, making sure she stayed out of the workhouse, and describing her to 
Hanwell’s medical officers as a ‘very worthy, honest, and kindhearted soul’.  Their 
relationship was characterised by attempts on his part to protect her from herself, to 
                                                             
109 The Medical Directory for 1891, (London, 1891), pp. 278-79. 
177 
 
control her environment, and to mitigate her tempers:  at the hospital he ‘never 
allowed her…to nurse a patient longer than 5 weeks’, because of her quarrelsome 
nature.  Routh’s attitude towards Ann had the benevolent, but patronising air of a 
wealthy patriarch.  He offered his aid and protection to her, at the same time as 
objectively noting her ‘several faults’:  her ‘ungovernable temper’; her tendency to 
be ‘suspicious and doubting towards her friends’; her propensity for ‘silly’ quarrels.  
It therefore seems more accurate to describe their relationship as one of 
philanthropic patronage, than friendship.  Yet Routh also expressed a sincere 
respect for Ann as ‘an honest, painstaking Christian [and a] careful and skilled 
nurse, in whom I [have] the greatest confidence’.  There are signs of genuine 
affection and concern in Routh’s letter to the asylum:  he wrote that he ‘believ[es] 
her sufferings were terrible’ and that ‘it is a cause of great sadness to me that she 
has become disordered mentally’.  Ann Howmann and Charles Routh’s relationship 
was a non-familial one, underscored by the tensions of unequal gender and class 
positions, yet it was strong enough to endure 25 years of argument and upset.  
Routh’s letter suggests that he was motivated by philanthropic obligation, but also 
by genuine respect, and even affection.  Ann Howmann’s case thus serves as a 
reminder that difficult older people, even those without a family, could find high 
levels of support outside the asylum.110 
This relationship was, however, unusual.  Over a third of the patients in this 
sample (excluding those who were transferred from another asylum), had no case-
history narrative or letter included in their case notes.  In some of these cases, a 
circular letter had been sent, but no response had been received.  In others, the 
section of the case note for the ‘friend’s address’ simply reads ‘no relatives known’.  
Without these narratives, it is hard to tell what the lives of these isolated people 
were like, prior to their institutionalisation.  The glimpses offered by the medical 
certificates, however, suggest quite horrifying neglect.  As Pat Thane has noted, 
older people’s negotiated independence can only go on ‘until [dependency] became 
physically inescapable’.111  Institutional records – particularly those of a medical 
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institution like the asylum – necessarily shine light on those whose experience of 
ageing was less positive:  either due to the severity of their needs, or their isolation 
from social and economic resources.  Rebecca Tully’s experience of confusion, filth 
and isolation, described at the start of this chapter, is the most unequivocal example 
of isolation and neglect in this sample.  We cannot know how widespread 
experiences like Rebecca Tully’s were.  However, her case serves as a stark 
reminder that we should not consider the more heartening stories contained in 
these case notes to be entirely representative.  Whether due to social isolation, or the 
economic hardship of their surroundings, many of the older patients admitted to 
Hanwell had no discernable support network, and entered the asylum entirely 
alone. 
Care and Management in the Home 
So far, this chapter has argued that Hanwell’s case notes reveal a prevailing sense of 
familial and community obligation, with regards to the care of their older, mentally 
disordered members.  This obligation, however, was more keenly felt by some 
people than others, according to their gender, health, financial situation, and 
personality.  Even for those willing to help, the types of support family and friends 
could offer were limited, beyond the material comforts of food and shelter, or 
simply offering money.  There are a few examples in the case notes of medical help 
being solicited in the home.    In only one of these cases is the form of medical care 
described in any detail.  Henry William Parkes was subjected to leeching, blistering, 
mustard poultices and other medicines before he was admitted to Hanwell in 1852, 
these treatments having had little effect on his mental state.112  When Jane Rose’s 
friends noticed that she was ‘strange’, the doctor was their first resort.  Jane went to 
see a ‘medical man’ on their advice, and afterwards returned straight to her work as 
a domestic servant.  Whatever treatment this doctor had offered, it apparently had 
little effect, and four days later the same friends had Jane removed to the 
infirmary.113  Unsurprisingly, given that all of these patients eventually ended up in 
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Hanwell, there are no reports in these case notes of successful medical treatment in 
the home.  Instead, we are told, ‘medical aid was resorted to without benefit’.114 
Attempts to medically treat aged patients outside of the asylum were 
uncommon.  Instead, most families concentrated on containing and managing their 
relatives’ behaviour.  Only two cases contain evidence of overt and explicit 
mechanical restraint taking place in the home:  Thomas Alcock, admitted to 
Hanwell in 1852, was ‘strapped down to his bed to prevent him from wandering 
about in a state of nudity’ (leaving him with notable bruising on his legs), and 
Samuel Edmunds, admitted in 1891, was ‘tied down’ on account of his violence.115  
In other cases, there are references to surveillance and management which imply 
that physical coercion and restraint might have been resorted to, if necessary.  
Elizabeth Dyer’s daughter, for example, explained that her mother had previously 
wandered out of the house and got lost, so that now she was ‘afraid to leave her 
alone’.116  John Dodge’s wife told the doctor at Hanwell that ‘he has had to be 
watched to prevent him from getting knives’.117  Alternatively, these cases may 
represent examples of the ‘domestic interpersonal psychiatric techniques’ described 
by Akihito Suzuki.  Suzuki argues that the key techniques for managing insanity 
within the home – among the elites at least - were centred on personal relationships 
and persuasion.118  In the enforced intimacy of smaller, poorer living environments, 
such ‘interpersonal’ techniques were unlikely to have been neglected.  John Auger’s 
daughter explained that she had ‘prevailed upon’ him to dress, to wash, and to 
remain within the home, although she had not been successful.119  In all of these 
examples, significant strain was placed on the carer, their lives dominated by 
constant watchfulness, frequent intervention and, sometimes, little success.   
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All of the caring relationships described above ultimately failed:  in the end, 
all of these patients were removed from the home environment, and eventually 
went to Hanwell.  Institutional displacement – in these cases, from the home to the 
workhouse – provided a relief to households and communities, when their attempts 
to manage a person’s behaviour proved unworkable or unsustainable.  In this way, 
the act of institutionalisation can be seen on a continuum with other acts of 
management, such as restraint or persuasion:  it was the next step in the ongoing 
attempt to keep a person from harm, or to stop them from harming others (by 
disrupting their lives, if not physically hurting them).  The medical certificates and 
case history narratives often point towards a ‘tipping point’:  the event which put a 
fatal strain on previous arrangements, and thus precipitated the decision to take the 
step of institutionalisation.120   These documents, then, give us some indication of 
the types of behaviour which constituted a breach of the boundary of tolerance. 
If a person had exhibited symptoms of mental dissolution for some time, 
violent behaviour could be the trigger for institutionalisation.  In February 1851, 
Dalby Scoone’s daughter recounted his many years of ‘extravagant’ behaviour, 
writing reams of letters to men of rank including the King, at one point even going 
directly to Windsor to remonstrate with his Majesty in person.  It was, however, 
when he became violent that ‘it was necessary to send him from home’.121  Henry 
Arnold’s violence frightened his daughter, and she told the certifying doctor, ‘He 
threatens to strike us.  He is not safe at home’.122  This statement carries a dual 
meaning:  Henry Arnold’s violence made him an unsafe person within the 
household, which in turn put his own safety in danger.  His daughter both feared 
him and feared for him.  Attempted or threatened suicide could also prompt 
institutionalisation. Dr Routh kept Ann Howmann in her own furnished rooms 
despite her violent and deluded behaviour, but sought certification when she asked 
if he would ‘see her properly buried’ after she ended her life.123  When George 
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Brown first showed signs of mental confusion, his daughter took him to live with 
her, during which time he apparently recovered quickly. When he later attempted 
to throw himself down a lift shaft, however, he was sent straight to the 
workhouse.124  Suicidal people presented problems of management on practical and 
emotional levels. The doctor recording the case history narrative of John Dodge’s 
wife , whose fear of her husband getting knives has been described above, noted 
that ‘he has been a constant source of anxiety to his wife’.125 
Other forms of disturbance, while less dramatic, could also be extremely 
disruptive.  Harriet Staples’ daughter sent her to the workhouse because she was 
‘very restless and noisy at night, so that it was impossible to have any rest’.126  Lucy 
Ward was similarly reported to be ‘very sullen at night, [and] had to be continually 
watched’.127  As discussed above, Elizabeth Grey had been looked after in her son’s 
home for five years, but when she began to ‘wander in the streets’, and had to be 
‘constantly watched’ to keep her out of ‘mischief’, she was finally sent to the 
infirmary.128  As well as these specific descriptions of disruptive behaviour, a 
general, unspecified unmanageability or troublesomeness was often cited as a 
reason to institutionalise someone.  Benjamin Clark ‘was sent to the workhouse 
being quite unmanageable at home’, while Emma Casswell had previously become 
‘so excited and troublesome that it was found necessary to send her to [the 
asylum]’.129  ‘Unmanageable’ and ‘troublesome’ are words which describe the effect 
of the individual on the people around them:  they demand or refuse to be managed, 
they cause trouble to others.  The frequent use of these terms underlines the fact that 
a patient’s institutionalisation was determined by the limitations of environment 
from which they came, at least as much as the form and severity of their symptoms.  
It was, then, not so much the patient’s behaviour itself, as the effect it had on others, 
which led to institutionalisation. 
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Families and friends who sought institutionalisation for their older charges, 
after a period of providing support for them in the home, had reached the limit of 
what they were willing and able to do for them.  This was an event in which the 
emotional and the practical were intertwined.  It was not simply a lack of financial 
resources, but a broader lack of practical resources, which prompted these families 
to relinquish the care of their older relatives.  A violent loved one in particular 
presented immediate practical and emotional difficulties; their behaviour was both 
distressing and dangerous.  Although less immediately dangerous, being kept 
awake at night by noise, or being tied to the obligation of watching a person who 
may wander out of the house or ‘get into mischief’, are experiences which are both 
physically and emotionally taxing.  In this way, they also imperilled the material 
welfare of the home. According to the census, Harriet Staples’ son, with whom she 
lived, was a boiler fitter, himself aged 51, and his ability to undertake this technical 
and physically demanding job were presumably significantly undermined by her 
keeping him awake at night.130 The need for order or quiet in the home was a 
financial, physical and emotional need.  Faced with an intolerable domestic 
situation, these families and friends had few options.  For families and friends, the 
act of institutionalisation acted as a pressure-valve, displacing the management 
problems they faced onto another site of care and control.  In most of these cases, 
the first institution the patient entered was a workhouse. 
Order and the Workhouse 
The overwhelming majority of aged patients who arrived at Hanwell had passed 
through the workhouse, and it was from there that their certification was solicited 
and their admission to Hanwell secured.  Families could choose to send their 
unmanageable aged relatives to the workhouse, but it was the people who managed 
and worked at London’s workhouses and infirmaries – the Guardians, the masters, 
the medical officers, and the attendants – who were the key agents in the admission 
of aged patients to Hanwell.  Thus, the capacity and willingness of the workhouse 
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and its inhabitants to manage and tolerate senile residents can be considered the 
most important factor in determining the admission of aged patients to Hanwell. 
The asylum records do not contain consistent information about how long 
their new patients had spent in the workhouse prior to admission.  Some, it seems, 
had been there for several years, entering initially due to bodily infirmity or 
financial need, only to have their mental symptoms develop – or be noticed – some 
time after their arrival.  Others were sent to the workhouse by their families – either 
directly or through the Relieving Officer – on account of their mental symptoms, 
and were swiftly certified and sent on to Hanwell in a matter of days.  The practice 
of using the workhouse as a ‘holding area’, or ‘filtering stage’ in the road to the 
asylum took place across the country, and was particularly common in London.131  
Elaine Murphy, in her study of the East London Poor Law Unions in the mid-
nineteenth century, found that the workhouse constituted ‘the first point of 
admission’ for insane paupers, who were brought to the workhouse by the 
Receiving Officer to be assessed in situ, and  often remained there for some weeks to 
see if they would recover.  132  This practice became even more important in 1889, 
when the management of Hanwell and the other county asylums in the new 
administrative county of London was taken over by the LCC.  From this point on, 
any London Poor Law Union seeking asylum admission for one of its paupers had 
to apply centrally to the LCC, and await a decision as to where they would be 
placed.  This did not, however, alter the balance of power in controlling which 
patients were admitted to the asylum.  Even after 1889, the LCC was obliged to find 
space in their county asylums for any patient who had been certified as a lunatic in 
needs of detainment in the asylum.133  Beyond communicating their displeasure to 
the Lunacy Commissioners, the Local Government Board and to the individual 
boards of Guardians, there was essentially nothing the Hanwell management 
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committee could do to prevent the arrival of aged patients.  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, this was a cause of significant tension between the asylum and 
London’s Poor Law Guardians. 
More broadly speaking, money was at the heart of the tensions between the 
Poor Law and the asylum.  For the first thirty years of their existence, the Lunacy 
Commissioners railed against Poor Law Guardians for retaining lunatics in the 
workhouse, where they could be supported much more cheaply, rather than 
sending them to the asylum where they could be cured.  After the introduction of 
the four-shilling grant in 1874, they began to accuse workhouse officials of being too 
eager to send slightly disruptive and difficult inmates to the asylum.  Even after the 
introduction of the four-shilling grant, however, it generally remained cheaper for 
lunatics to be maintained in the workhouse.  Joseph Melling and Bill Forsythe, for 
example, in their study of the administration of lunacy in Devon, have suggested 
that ‘the comparative high cost of asylum care would have led to a reluctance 
among asylum personnel to send paupers on to Exminster [asylum]’, all the way up 
to the early years of the twentieth century.134  In London, however, the situation was 
rather different.  In 1867, the Metropolitan Poor Act introduced the Common Poor 
Fund, designed to equalise the burden of paying for sick paupers between the 
unequally wealthy London Poor Law Unions.  This central fund paid for, among 
other things, the maintenance of London’s pauper lunatics in county asylums.  This 
put London Poor Law Unions – particularly the poorer ones – in a very different 
financial position with relation to lunacy than those in the rest of the country.135  
Furthermore, historian David Cochrane has argued that the differentiation between 
the cost of maintaining a pauper lunatic in a workhouse and an asylum was 
‘flattened’ by the universally high cost of pauper maintenance in London in the last 
three decades of the nineteenth century.  It was not that it was particularly cheap for 
a pauper to be maintained in a London asylum, but rather that it was almost as 
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expensive for them to be maintained in the workhouse.136  There was, then, no real 
financial incentive nor disincentive for London Poor Law Guardians to send more 
or fewer of their paupers to an asylum, or to maintain lunatics in the workhouse. 
 Instead, the evidence from the admissions records of Hanwell supports 
Peter Bartlett’s argument that it was ‘the problem of order’ which ultimately 
determined the movement of an individual from a workhouse to an asylum.137   
Order and the ‘power of rule’ were central to the rhetoric of efficiency in which the 
institutions and policies of the New Poor Law were produced.  Under the New Poor 
Law, the workhouse was framed as a site of moral regulation, in which orderly and 
productive behaviour was to be encouraged.  Peter Bartlett, and workhouse 
historian Felix Driver, have interpreted this drive for order through Michel 
Foucault’s concept of ‘disciplinary power’.138  This can be described as system for 
organising institutional regimes, in which individual behaviour is monitored and 
prescribed to a minute degree, in an attempt to normalise that behaviour, and create 
productive social actors.139  Thus, Emma Sophia Casswell was removed from the 
Hampstead workhouse in part because she ‘[would] not conform to the rules of this 
institution’.140  At the same time, Driver recognises the insufficiency of Foucault’s 
model to account for the multiplicity of roles performed by the Victorian 
workhouse, as spaces of confinement and care as well as moral regulation.141 Whilst 
a useful starting point for thinking about the desire to manage and control activity 
within the workhouse, this model does not quite account for the problems caused 
by senile patients. Disciplinary power is, as Foucault describes it, directed at actions 
performed by a necessarily active body, seeking to make the individual more 
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efficient, more economic, and more controlled.142  What was desired of these aged 
patients was not efficient activity, but inactivity.   
The desire for inactivity is communicated through the frequent reference to 
‘restlessness’ in the medical certificates and the case history narratives.  The term 
‘restlessness’ adds depth to the idea of unmanageability: it suggests a constant 
movement and activity that is neither desired nor controllable.  What is desired of 
the restless person is that they rest.  Thus, senile patients disrupted the order of the 
workhouse by failing to perform the role of docile dependents.  Several of the 
medical certificates in this sample mention the trouble caused by aged patients who 
refused to stay in bed.  The head nurse at the Paddington Infirmary complained that 
she ‘had great difficulty keeping [Mary] in bed, by night or day’.143  John Auger, 
who entered the workhouse apparently for the first time at the age of 79, ‘walked 
about the ward, rattled and knocked at doors [and] asked why he should go to 
bed’.144  Martin Bates ‘cut the head [of a workhouse nurse] open in two places [who 
was] endeavouring to make him comfortable in his bed’.145  These patients not only 
presented the challenge of needing to be looked after, but resisted the attempts of 
those around them to meet this challenge. 
This information, like much of the evidence of insanity included in the 
medical certificates of Hanwell’s aged admissions, was provided by nurses and 
attendants of the workhouse.   Henry Rayner, Superintendent of Hanwell in the 
1870s and 80s, was sceptical of such statements.  In his annual report of 1877, he 
wrote that he was  
frequently at a loss to recognise in the helpless, childish, bed-
ridden and often moribund old man, the dangerous and violent 
lunatic described in the certificate under the head of “Facts 
                                                             
142 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, p. 139. 
143
 Mary Carter, H11/HLL/B/19/23 (1872), p. 69. 
144 John Auger, H11/HLL/B/20/011 (1871), p. 71. 
145 Martin Bates, Hanwell Casebook, Males No. 12, H11/HLL/B/20/012 (1872), p. 167. 
187 
 
Indicating Insanity”, communicated to the medical man, 
usually by the nurse or attendant on the patient.146 
This was a blatant accusation of deceit on the part of the workhouse attendants 
who, he claimed, exaggerated the violent tendencies of their charges in order to 
secure their admission to the asylum.  Henry Rayner’s assessment, however, is not 
borne out by the evidence in Hanwell’s own case books.  The medical certificates 
examined in this study offer few examples of violent and dangerous acts.  Far more 
common were descriptions of comparatively minor, but no less troublesome, acts of 
disturbance.  The nurse of St George’s workhouse informed the certifying doctor 
that Ann Allcock ‘scream[ed] and shout[ed] often at night for hours at a time, 
disturbing everybody in the house at a long distance from the ward.’147  Rebecca 
Brookman ‘[did] not allow[] any of the inmates of the ward to sleep with her 
continual vociferations’.148  Other patients physically spread their disruption about 
the ward by ‘interfering’ with other patients.    Ann Foley ‘constantly undressed 
herself [and] wander[ed] about the house and premises, [got] out of bed at night, 
pull[ed] the clothes off other beds and frighten[ed] the people’.  George Connigton 
took this one step further, ‘throw[ing] off his bedclothes’ and ‘get[ting] into other 
patients beds’.  These were uncontained people, whose disruption and disorder 
leaked beyond the boundaries of their own person and rendered the people around 
them as disturbed as they were.  If their symptoms could not be contained within 
their person, or within a more appropriate time of day, then they were sent to have 
their symptoms contained within the walls of the asylum. 
Conclusion   
In Chapter Two, it was suggested that the administrators of lunacy significantly 
misjudged the role of the asylum, when they complained about the certification of 
‘senile’ patients.  In their annual reports the Lunacy Commissioners argued that 
such patients did not belong in the asylum, because they were ‘manageable’ and 
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because their infirmities were ‘natural’.  This chapter has suggested that the former 
claim – that old asylum admissions were easy to manage – was manifestly untrue, 
and that the latter claim – that senile patients were not insane – was irrelevant.  The 
admissions process should not be seen as ‘two separate decisions, first whether the 
individual was insane, and, second, what was to be done with him or her.  They 
were co-mingled and indisitinguishable issues’.149  Asylum admission was a 
response to a problem of (dis)order, which had subjectifying effects:  it legally 
transformed the unmanageable person into a lunatic.  Thus, the structures of 
welfare which operated in nineteenth-century London, in which asylum admission 
was one of the few available solutions to the problem of unmanageable people, 
rendered the division between ‘insanity’ and ‘senility’ meaningless.  People were 
sent to Hanwell because they had exhausted the financial, practical or emotional 
resources available to those outside the asylum – in the family, the wider 
community, and the workhouse – to manage and contain their behaviour.  This was 
as true for people in their 60s, 70s and 80s, as it was for younger people.   
 In terms of entry to the asylum, then, there was little distinction to be made 
between older and younger patients.  Within the walls of the asylum, however, this 
distinction was being made with increasing frequency and clarity towards the end 
of the nineteenth century.  The determination to distinguish ‘senile’ asylum patients 
from others in the political rhetoric of lunacy made little difference in determining 
who arrived at the asylum.  But this dividing imperative was reflected in (and 
engendered by) the classificatory practices which took place after admission.   The 
next chapter will consider the effects of this:  the emergence, in the asylum records, 
of the ‘senile’ patient. 
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Chapter Four:  The Emergence of the Senile Patient at Hanwell 
In 1851, the word ‘senile’ rarely appeared in the patient records of Hanwell asylum.  
By 1912, it was commonplace.  This chapter seeks to account for this significant 
change.  It argues that this mutation in nomenclature reflected a broader shift in the 
way that mental disorders in old age were classified and understood.  At the 
beginning of this period, the insanity of older patients was placed within a broad 
psychiatric framework, in which age was a marginally important factor.  By the 
beginning of the twentieth century, aged patients were more likely to be viewed as 
old, and the distinctive agedness of their bodies became a prominent factor in the 
way that their insanity was classified and, by extension, understood.   
This thesis has already examined this change in different areas of psychiatric 
discourse and practice.   Chapter Two charted the increasing frequency with which 
‘senile’ patients were mentioned in the administrative discourse of lunacy at the 
end of the nineteenth century.  It showed that the increased commentary on the 
senile was underpinned by a desire to exclude unpromising patients from the 
asylum, and thus went hand-in-hand with an attempt to differentiate the senile 
from the rest of the asylum population. This rendered them a ‘problem’ category, 
rather than an inherent part of the behaviourally disordered population whose 
institutional journeys often led to the asylum (as discussed in the Chapter Three).  
Thus, the senile patient was defined by the criteria which legitimated their 
exclusion from the asylum:  as physically feeble, essentially manageable, and 
inherently and irreversibly aged.  Chapter One similarly argued that the inherent 
agedness of old-age insanity also became increasingly important in theoretical 
psychiatric texts, as psychiatrists sought a somatic basis for psychiatric categories.  
  This chapter brings these two strands of argument together, through an 
examination of Hanwell’s patient records.  It argues that this period saw the 
emergence of a decisively differentiated ‘senile patient’ in the asylum records – 
particularly the case books – identified by their physical characteristics, the form of 
their insanity, and the cause assigned to it.  It suggests that the mutating structure 
of the records themselves was central to bringing about these changes in 
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understanding.  The changing administrative and medical priorities and interests 
described in the first two chapters of this thesis were reflected in, and reinforced by, 
the changing format of asylum patient records.  Thus, this chapter argues that 
changing record-keeping practices played an important part in bringing the ‘senile 
patient’ into being     Over this period, insanity in old age became, to a far greater 
extent than before, insanity of old age; a development both reflected in, and 
constructed through, the changing tools of medical and administrative practice.   
The Aged Subject 
This argument – that a ‘senile patient’ emerged in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century –   echoes a broader observation, made by Karen Chase and Stephen Katz, 
that the nineteenth century saw the emergence of an ‘elderly subject’ or an ‘aged 
subject’.1  The Victorians did not discover old age, but certain social, institutional 
and cultural changes in this period shaped ideas about old people into a clearly 
defined, recognisable subject:  an entity about which general truths could be known, 
and which could be acted upon in particular ways.  This aged subject, argue 
historians such as Katz and Andrew Achenbaum,  had particular physical and 
physiological features - ‘a special type of body with its own signs and fixed lifespan, 
a body whose senescent ills and internal dying required specific senile 
therapeutics’- and occupied a particular social position, one of dependence and 
economic marginalisation.2 It was, then, through the twin disciplines of medicine 
and social research or policy, that the aged subject most decisively emerged.  Over 
the course of the nineteenth century, old people became more visible to these 
disciplines in a number of ways.  The gathering of older people into the large 
institutions of the infirmary, workhouse and asylum, brought them to the attention 
of policy makers.  When these institutions also contained doctors, it also brought 
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them to the attention of the medical gaze.  The accumulation of old people in the 
enormous hopîtaux generales of Paris, for example, stimulated the burst of medical 
research into old age which appeared in mid-nineteenth century France.3  At the 
same time, the new science of pathological anatomy, also flourishing in Paris, made 
the aged body visible in a different way:  it brought to light the internal signs of 
physiological senescence.4  Through observing the structures of the aged body, 
researchers in Paris ‘formulated a definition of old age that separated it medically 
from other groups and demanded doctors’ complete attention’.5   
Institutionalisation was not the only phenomenon through which older people 
became more visible.  When Charles Booth went out into the streets of London to 
conduct his social surveys, designed to explore the problem of poverty, he was 
unexpectedly confronted by large numbers of impoverished old people.  This led 
him to the startling conclusion that ‘on the whole, people are poor because they are 
old’, and to turn his attentions to the welfare of the aged poor specifically, and 
begin to campaign for old-age pensions.6  The turn of the century, then, saw the 
aged subject move from an object of knowledge to a target of social policy.  
Individual scholars have identified other factors to account for the increasing 
prominence of old age in late-nineteenth-century cultural discourses:  Karen Chase 
describes the conspicuous visibility of the ageing Queen Victoria, while Thomas 
Cole points to the importance of old age to the Victorian cult of self-improvement, 
both as a condition to be ameliorated and as a measure of success.7 
The emergence of the senile subject in the asylum records did not take place 
in isolation from these broader developments.  The asylum was one of those 
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institutions in which the aged accumulated: according to officially published 
statistics, the proportion of Hanwell’s resident inmates who were aged 60 or over 
rose from 15 per cent in 1850 to 28 per cent in 1900.  There was also a notable 
increase in the proportion of patients who, at the time of admission, were aged 60 or 
over.8  While important, the ageing of the asylum population does not in itself 
account for the increasing prominence of ‘senility’ in the patient records.  There 
were other factors which contributed to the visibility of old age in the asylum and 
which, as Roy Porter puts it, ‘magnifie[d] its growing reality’.9  As Nicholas Rose 
has argued, institutional confinement renders a large group of people visible within 
‘a single common plane of sight’, which allows the individuals to be observed as 
‘entities both similar and different from one another’.10  The observational and 
classificatory practices of the asylum, therefore, played a central role in constructing 
senility in the asylum, foregrounding certain features that in turn shaped the way 
that the patient population was differentiated.  In particular, the increasing 
prominence of the body in both the theory and practice of psychiatry during this 
period underwrote this institutional differentiation.  Just as the rise of pathological 
anatomy in mid-century Paris influenced the conceptualisation of old age in 
physiology and medicine, the increased focus on the body in psychiatry changed 
the conceptualisation of insanity in old age.  The practice of close investigation of 
the body led to an increased awareness and interest in the physical signs of 
senescence.  This was expressed in Hanwell’s case notes through the creation of a 
new category of bodily condition:  ‘senile’. 
This chapter seeks particularly to examine the importance of changing 
record-keeping practices, and the changing epistemological values they reflected 
and engendered.  ‘Inscribing and recording’ was an important part of the 
‘disciplining of difference’ in all large institutions.11  This point has been 
emphasised by Catharine Coleborne, who highlights the importance of asylum case 
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notes in ‘the process of inventing patients’, and particularly in bringing to light the 
‘difference’ – in terms of gender, race and age – of various patient groups.12  The 
options given to clinicians, in terms of the volume and type of information they 
record, shape what is (or can be) known about the patient.  Shifting emphases in the 
medical record – for example, the increasing space given over to specific physical 
signs and symptoms – both reflect and engender shifting emphases in medical 
knowledge.  Different types of medical record, centring on different types of 
knowledge, thus ‘produce’ different types of body; categorised, imagined and 
understood in different ways.13  The medical record also ‘plays an active, 
constituent role in… medical work’.14  Though not determining it, the record 
structures the medical encounter and directs the methods and targets of observation 
and examination. For example, a space for ‘pulse’ on the case books form, first 
introduced on the female side of the asylum in the late 1880s, directed the assistant 
medical officers to take that particular measurement in the course of their medical 
examinations.   
At Hanwell, the changing structure of the case note also dictated medical 
officers’ encounters with patients’ friends and family members.  As the way in 
which lay narratives were recorded became increasingly prescriptive, the role of 
these outside informants changed:  from narrators of a patient’s subjectivity, to 
holders of discrete, objective information which could be brought to bear on the 
medical assessment.  This in turn reinforced the objectification of patients, and the 
importance of observable, often physical, signs in the classification of mental 
disorders.  As patients’ biographies became less important, and patients’ bodies 
became more so, the aged body often replaced late-life experience as the primary 
explanatory factor in the mental disorders of older people. 
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This chapter will proceed with an overall summary of the changes in the 
form of Hanwell’s patient records between 1851 and 1912.  It will then examine 
three different elements of the case note in turn – the form of insanity, the physical 
condition, and the cause of insanity – which were subject to these changes.  In each 
of these elements of the case note, there was an increasing tendency, in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century,  to describe aged patients as senile.  Through these 
changing records, we can both witness and account for the emergence of the senile 
patient. 
The Structure of the Patient Records15 
Between 1851 and 1911, the structure of Hanwell’s case books changed 
dramatically.  The average number of pages dedicated to each patient rose from one 
to four, and the pages themselves doubled in size.  The case book format became 
increasingly standardised and prescribed, and the information to be recorded about 
the patient became more detailed and disaggregated. Long, open narratives were 
replaced with dense, pre-printed forms requiring short, discrete answers.  Thus, 
Hanwell’s patient records demonstrate one of the central tendencies in modern 
medicine observed by Foucault in Birth of the Clinic: ‘a new “carving up” of things’.16  
The move towards standardisation and prescription is a common feature of hospital 
records during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.17  Developments at 
Hanwell, then, were part of a much broader change in medico-institutional 
practices which took place over this period. 
 Record-keeping practices at Hanwell were shaped by medical, legal and 
administrative requirements.  The 1845 Lunacy Act dictated that all asylums keep 
two types of patient record: an ‘Admissions Book’ and a ‘Case Book’.18  The format 
for the admissions book was prescribed in this legislation, and did not change 
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substantially until the early twentieth century.  The admissions book was essentially 
a list of patients, in the order they were admitted, along with columns for key 
information.  This included social, demographic and financial information – such as 
age, marital status, and the chargeable union – and medical information – such as 
the form, cause and duration of insanity.  The case book, initially, was a more fluid 
document.  It was originally designed to contain an ongoing description of each 
patient’s mental state and bodily health, and to record any treatments applied by 
the medical officers.  In 1851-52, the last years of John Conolly’s employment at 
Hanwell, case book entries were made on blank pages, and consisted mostly of 
open description.  The case note entries for each patient were minimal, usually 
contained within a single page.  Each entry included the patient’s name, a short 
summary of their mental state on admission, and an account of their history as 
given by a friend or relative.  There were often no further entries, other than a final 
one recording the date of discharge or death.  The case notes at this time were 
dominated by the case history:  the narrative of the patient’s condition and 
experiences prior to their institutionalisation took up by far the most space.     Lay 
knowledge – the knowledge held by those who had observed the patient prior to 
their presentation before the medical gaze – was thus central to the 
conceptualisation of the patient.  The progressive marginalisation of these lay 
narratives over the following 50 years is, this chapter will argue, central to the 
emergence of the ‘senile patient’, whose mental state was attributed to their 
physical state, rather than their life experiences. 
 After Conolly left Hanwell, the superintendence of the asylum was split in 
two:  the male and female sides of the asylum each had their own Medical 
Superintendent, operating largely independently of each other.  The significant 
difference in the format of the case books on the male and female sides of the 
asylum in the 1870s demonstrates the significant autonomy of individual 
Superintendents over record-keeping in this period.19  On the male side, much of 
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the pertinent medical information which might have been included in the case book 
was siphoned off into a separate volume, the ‘Clinical Journal’ (which, unlike most 
of Hanwell’s records, has not survived), while the female side retained a single case 
book.  Entries in the male case books of 1871-72 differ little from those produced 20 
years earlier.  The female case books, on the other hand, are far more 
comprehensive.  The entries were still recorded onto blank pages, but the apparent 
openness of these unprinted pages is somewhat misleading.  Conventions as to the 
type and location of information recorded, added a significant level of regularity to 
the female case books.  There was no printed form for the recording of demographic 
information into the case book at this time, but there may as well have been:  
attributes such as gender, age, marital status, occupation, religion, and address, 
were listed in a regular order, at the top of every case note.  Women’s case notes 
always went over at least two pages, with the right-hand page dedicated 
exclusively to information gleaned from the testimony of their friends or relatives.  
In the 1860s, on the female side of the asylum, the practice of copying the patients’ 
medical certificate into the case book first began.  Thus, moves towards 
standardisation in record- keeping were beginning prior to the introduction of 
printed case book forms.   
 Between 1872 and 1891, a number of changes occurred in the format of 
Hanwell’s patient records.  The blank pages of the case books were replaced with 
printed forms, which prescribed and directed the behaviour of the medical officers 
in a much more obvious and codified way.  The forms adopted in the case books on 
the male and female sides were still somewhat different, with a greater level of 
prescription adopted on the female side.  In both the male and female case books, 
the new forms gave space for a much longer and more detailed description of the 
patient’s physical state than had usually been provided in the more open case-book 
format.  As far as the patient case histories were concerned, the 1891-92 case books 
still provided a large space for open narrative but, on the female side, there was 
now also a prescribed list of information to be elicited from the narrator.  The case 
books of the 1890s, then, directed the behaviour of the medical officers more than 
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ever before, and dictated more directly the manner of the interaction between the 
medical officer and the lay narrator. 
In the early years of the twentieth century, Hanwell’s patient records were 
subject to interventions from both the Lunacy Commissioners and the London 
County Council (LCC) who, after the 1889, managed Hanwell through the central 
LCC Asylums’ Committee.  In 1907, the LCC introduced a standardised case book, 
to be used in every LCC asylum.  This case book was even more prescriptive than 
the 1891-92 case books, and the space for open narrative was significantly reduced.  
The space devoted to the patient’s physical condition now took up almost an entire 
page (even though the pages themselves had also increased in size).  With the 
introduction of this standard, the LCC took on the authority of directing the 
medical officers’ observations towards certain physical characteristics, and of 
deciding which pertinent information should be elicited from their friends and 
relatives.  At the same time, they took the further step of directing where – not just 
how – the case books should be completed.  They issued a directive, along with the 
new case books, stating ‘that case-notes [should] be made on the ward on a case-
paper, in the presence of the patient, and that the provisions for the statutory case-
book be copied from the case papers’.20  The case books of 1911-12 thus constitute a 
tamed version of the potentially more chaotic and idiosyncratic original case notes.  
To cope with the increased clerical load, Superintendent Percy Bailey hired a ‘lady 
clerk’, named Maud Forbes, to complete the transcription of the case notes into the 
case book.21  This intervention added a further layer of uniformity to the case books:   
the printed forms (with the exception of the sections elicited from the testimony of 
friends and families, which continued to be completed by the medical officers) were 
all completed in Maud Forbes’ neat, consistent hand.   
The LCC interventions into the asylum patient records of the early twentieth 
century only concerned the case book.  In the same period, the Lunacy 
Commissioners brought about substantial changes to the format of the admissions 
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registers.  The original admissions book, whose format had remained essentially the 
same since the 1840s, was a place where key demographic, biographical and 
medical information about each patient was collected together in one place.  In the 
1890s, the Commissioners began to differentiate between these types of knowledge.  
In 1890, they issued a set of ‘Rules’, which included a stipulation that the ‘form of 
insanity’ should be completed by a medical officer, while the rest of the information 
could be completed by a clerk.22  In 1906, the Lunacy Commissioners extended this 
division of labour and knowledge, by replacing the admissions book with two 
separate admissions registers:  the ‘Civil Register’ and the ‘Medical Journal’.  The 
civil register, they ordered, was to be completed by the clerk of the asylum 
immediately after a patient’s arrival.  It contained only information pertaining to 
their social, demographic and financial status, asking for marital status, previous 
address and chargeability.  Information on the type, aetiology and duration of their 
mental condition was diverted to the dedicated medical journal, which the medical 
officer had three months to complete.23  This change itself suggests there was a new 
way of seeing the patient, echoing the marginalisation of the case history in the case 
books.  By splitting the civil and medical registers, the social aspect of a patient’s life 
was displaced and divided from the medical understanding of their condition.   
The medical journal, it seems, was designed to facilitate large-scale, remote 
statistical analysis.  In order to further facilitate this statistical analysis, schedules of 
approved ‘forms of insanity’ and ‘causes of insanity’ were issued.24  Each of these 
forms and causes was assigned a code.  In order to complete these statutory records, 
asylum medical officers had to assign to their patients a form and cause of insanity 
which was included in this prescribed list.   Consequently, the medical journal 
brought a new level of standardisation and restriction to asylum classificatory 
practices, and shifted authority over clinical decisions away from medical officers 
                                                             
22 ‘Rules made by the Commissioners in Lunacy with the Approval of the Lord Chancellor, 25 March 
1890’, reprinted in James William  Greig, William H.  Gattie and John Frederick  Archbold, Archbold's 
Lunacy and Mental Deficiency (5th edn, London, 1915), pp. 407-8. 
23 ‘Rules made by the Commissioners in Lunacy, 31 October 1906’, reprinted in Greig, Gattie and 
Archbold, Archbold's Lunacy and Mental Deficiency , pp. 556-57. 
24 Copies of these codes are hard to find, but some can be viewed at The Bothwick Institute for 
Archives, NHS/P12, with thanks to archivist Katherine Webb for providing this reference.   
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and towards the central bureaucracy.  Unlike the other forms of standardisation 
described above, the medical journal did more than just direct asylum medical 
officers towards certain aspects of a patient’s disorder, and ensure that sufficient 
information about the patient was being collected and recorded.  The prescribed 
classificatory schedules flattened the significant disagreements between practising 
psychiatrists over the classification of insanity, and enforced a particular set of 
epistemological values.  The 1907 schedules prescribed a national understanding of 
insanity.    
The three types of change described here – increased levels of 
standardisation and prescription, the breaking up of long narratives into 
disaggregated forms, and the marginalisation of biographical information in favour 
of physical description – all had a significant impact on the way that older patients 
at Hanwell were viewed and categorised.  The rest of this chapter will argue that 
these changes both reflected and engendered new priorities in the categorisation 
and description of Hanwell’s patients.  These new priorities brought the agedness of 
old patients to the fore, at the expense of other potentially pertinent aspects of their 
condition.    
The Form of Insanity 
Every patient who arrived at Hanwell was given a diagnostic label – called the 
‘form of insanity’ – which was recorded into both the admissions book (latterly the 
medical journal) and, from the 1870s onwards, the case book.  It is unclear who 
precisely assigned these diagnostic labels, and at what point.  However, the 
changing patterns of diagnosis, reflected in the annual reports, indicate that the 
Medical Superintendents directed the classificatory scheme in use under their 
authority, and that they probably assigned these diagnostic labels themselves.  An 
analysis of the forms of insanity assigned to patients aged 60 or over clearly 
demonstrates the increasing tendency to relate older patients’ mental disorders to 
their aged condition.  In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the proportion of 
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these patients who were assigned a ‘senile’ diagnostic label increased substantially, 
as shown in Table 1. 25 
 
 
Form of insanity on admission 
 
1851-2 
 
1871-2 
 
1891-2 
 
1911-2 
 
Senile insanity 
 
4 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
Senile mania 0 10 6 1 
Senile melancholia 0 2 12 2 
Senile dementia 0 8 34 36 
Senile dementia with paralysis 0 1 5 0 
Other ‘senile’ diagnosis 1 1 4 0 
     
Total patients given ‘senile’ 
diagnosis 
5 22 61 39 
Total patients aged 60 and over 
admitted  
31 122 123 105 
 
 
% patients aged 60 and over given 
‘senile’ diagnosis 
 
16 
 
18 
 
50 
 
37 
 
Table 1.  Senile forms of insanity in patients aged 60 or over on admission to Hanwell, 1851-
1912 
 
Between 1871 and 1891, the number of patients aged 60 and over on 
admission who were given a ‘senile’ diagnosis almost tripled, rising from 22 to 61.   
This increase cannot be accounted for by an increase in aged admissions.  Although 
there was an overall increase in the second half of the nineteenth century in the 
proportion of Hanwell’s admissions  aged 60 or over, the opening of Caterham and 
Leavesden led to a temporary drop in aged admissions during the 1870s and 1880s. 
The number of patients admitted who were aged 60 and over was almost identical 
in 1871-72 and 1891-92.  However, as Table 1 shows, the percentage of patients aged 
60 and over who were given a ‘senile’ diagnosis went up from 18 per cent in 1871-72 
to 50 per cent in 1891-92.  The same pattern can be discerned if the sample is 
restricted to patients aged 70 or over:  30 per cent of patients in this group were 
                                                             
25 Any form of insanity with the word senile prefixed (eg. ‘senile dementia’) or suffixed (eg. dementia 
senile) to it, including those with ‘senile’ written in brackets (eg. mania (senile)). 
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labelled senile in 1871-72, rising to 77 per cent in 1891-92.  At the end of the 
nineteenth century, then, older patients were far more commonly given a senile 
diagnosis than they were in the mid-nineteenth century.  This tendency decreased 
somewhat in the early twentieth century, although the proportion of over-sixties 
given a senile diagnosis remained significantly higher than it had been in the 1850s 
and 1870s.26  Thus, Table 1 indicates that, at the end of the nineteenth century, 
Hanwell’s Superintendents became more likely to characterise aged patients as 
‘senile’ than before, a tendency which is borne out in other areas of the case note. 
Table 1 also indicates a change in the range of senile diagnoses being used.  
‘Senile insanity’, the term used in the 1850s, had entirely disappeared by the 1870s.  
In the 1870s and 1890s, a range of senile diagnoses were being used at Hanwell, 
most notably ‘senile melancholia’, ‘mania’ and ‘dementia’.  Around the turn of the 
century, however, senile dementia became the most prominent, almost to the 
exclusion of all other forms of senile insanity.  This correlates with the classificatory 
trends identified in the theoretical texts discussed in Chapter One:  a refraction of 
senile insanity into its various forms in the mid-late nineteenth century, followed by 
a tendency, around the turn of the century, to restrict the definition of senility to 
‘senile dementia’.  Indeed, classificatory practices at Hanwell can be related to those 
theoretical discussions in certain concrete ways.   
In the 1840s, at the height of his fame, John Conolly gave a series of lectures 
at Hanwell on the ‘Principle Forms of Insanity’, which were published in the Lancet 
in 1845-46.27  Here, he laid out a classificatory system which was essentially 
symptomalogical, bolstered by occasional references to Pinel and Ésquirol (although 
his main referent was his own observation and practice).  He suggested that mania, 
melancholia and imbecility (which was called dementia in its advanced form) were 
the three main categories of insanity.  These diagnoses could stand alone or have a 
                                                             
26 It was far more common in the 1910s for patients to be given a new diagnostic label within a few 
years of their admission, and for this to be recorded in the case notes.  When these re-diagnoses are 
taken into account, the proportion of older patients in 1911-12 who were given a senile diagnosis 
increases to 46 per cent.   
27 John Conolly, ‘Clinical Lectures on the Principle Forms of Insanity’, The Lancet, 46-7 (1845-46). 
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‘complication’ attached: epilepsy, paralysis and hysteria.28  These additional disease 
categories were themselves essentially symptomological:  epilepsy was identified 
by fits; hysteria by a ‘wayward temper’; and paralysis by the very particular 
symptomatic trajectory of grandiosity, tremors, poor verbal articulation and then 
actual physical paralysis.29  Conolly’s classification contained two somato-
aetiological categories – puerperal and senile insanity – but he described these as 
separate forms of insanity, rather than sub-types of mania, melancholia and 
imbecility.30   
The statistical tables of Hanwell show that Conolly adopted this 
classificatory model in his own practice:  precisely the same categories appear.  
These symptomological categories continued to form the basis of classification at 
Hanwell for over a decade after the end of Conolly’s employment at Hanwell in 
1852.  Thus, ‘senile insanity’, supplemented on two occasions by cases of ‘senile 
imbecility’, were the only senile diagnoses applied at Hanwell until 1863.  In the 
mid-1860s, however, ‘senile insanity’ disappeared from the classificatory tables, and 
new additions began to appear.  These began on the female side of the asylum, 
following the appointment of a new Medical Superintendent, James Murray 
Lindsay, who had undertaken his medical training in Edinburgh and St Andrews.31  
It is not certain that he attended lectures given by David Skae, but he did begin to 
inject more somato-aetiological diagnostic categories into Hanwell’s classificatory 
tables, along with categories referring to the duration of the illness (recurrent, acute 
or chronic).  In 1866, he gave the first diagnosis (at Hanwell) of ‘senile dementia’, 
                                                             
28 John Conolly, 'Clinical Lectures on the Principle Forms of Insanity', The Lancet, 46 (1845), p. 414. 
29
  John Conolly, 'Clinical Lectures on the Principle Forms of Insanity', The Lancet, 47 (1846) pp. 171-
75, 233-34, 556. Gayle Davis has noted that British psychiatrists were much slower than their French 
counterparts to accept General Paralysis of the Insane as a separate disease category, rather than as 
a ‘complication’ of insanity.  W.H. O. Sankey the only Hanwell Superintendent (1855-64) besides 
Conolly to publish on the classification of insanity, did in fact recognise this separation.  In 1864, he 
described GPI (or General Paresis, as he preferred to call it) as ‘entirely distinct from all other forms 
of mental disease’.  This conviction did not, however, impact on classificatory practices at Hanwell.  
GPI did not appear as a separate form of insanity in Hanwell’s statistical tables until the adoption of 
the MPA-sanctioned classificatory system in 1885.  W. H. O. Sankey, 'The Pathology of General 
Paresis', Journal of Mental Science, 9 (1864), p. 467. Gayle Davis, The Cruel Madness of Love: Sex, 
Syphilis and Psychiatry in Scotland, 1880-1930 (Amsterdam, 2008), pp. 83-85. 
30 Conolly, 'Clinical Lectures on the Principle Forms of Insanity', p. 414. 
31 'Dr. James Murray Lindsay', Journal of Mental Science, 58 (1912), p. 197. 
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followed by ‘senile mania’ in 1870.32  In 1872, another Scottish-educated young 
doctor, Henry Rayner, joined Hanwell as Superintendent on the male side.33  His 
classificatory style echoed Murray Lindsay’s:  he immediately adopted senile 
dementia and mania on the male side, and introduced senile melancholia.34  The 
patient records of 1871-72, then, show Hanwell at a transitional moment.  
By introducing more categories of senile insanity, Murray Lindsay and 
Rayner opened up new possibilities for categorising older patients’ mental 
disorders.  Now, there were diagnostic categories which could take into account 
both the patients’ symptoms, and a potential aetiological basis in the changes of the 
ageing body.  Patients with widely varying mental conditions – such as Richard 
Jeffreys who ‘mope[d] and crie[d]and wishe[d] he was dead’, and Esther Gurney 
who was ‘noisy excitable and violent’ and believed she was the Queen of England– 
could now also be labelled as explicitly ‘senile’ (senile melancholia and senile mania 
respectively).35  Thus, the introduction of new categories of senile insanity allowed 
more patients to be labelled as senile.  Hanwell’s officially published statistical 
tables suggest that the increase in the proportion of older patients being diagnosed 
with senile disorders, starkly evident in Table 1, began in the mid-1870s.  Simply 
put, the introduction of a wider range of senile diagnostic categories by Murray 
Linday and Rayner, led to a greater number of aged patients being assigned a senile 
‘form of insanity’.  This, however, only tells part of the story.  As the rest of this 
chapter will show, the proliferation of the words ‘senile’ and ‘senility’ to describe 
aged patients was not just confined to the ‘form of insanity’ diagnostic labels.  The 
adoption of new categories of senile insanity, and their increasingly frequent use, 
was part of a wider epistemological shift, which saw aged patients, and their mental 
disorders, become increasingly defined by their aged bodies. 
                                                             
32 The Twenty-First Report of the Committee of Visitors of the County Lunatic Asylum at Hanwell 
(1866), p. 96; The Twenty-Fifth Report of the Committee of Visitors of the County Lunatic Asylum at 
Hanwell (1870), p. 91. 
33 R. Percy Smith, 'Henry Rayner, M.D.Aberd., M.R.C.P.Edin', Journal of Mental Science, 72 (1926), p. 
171. 
34 The Twenty-Seventh Report of the Committee Of the County Lunatic Asylum at Hanwell (1872), p. 
94. 
35Richard Jeffreys, Hanwell Casebook, Males No. 12, H11/HLL/B/20/012 (1872), p. 149; Esther 
Gurney, Hanwell Casebook, Females No. 22, H11/HLL/B/19/022 (1872), p. 89. 
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Throughout this period, the MPA made sporadic attempts to bring a greater 
level of standardisation to the statistical tables, published by different asylums in 
their annual reports.  In the early 1880s, whilst still working at Hanwell, Henry 
Rayner sat on the MPA Statistical Committee.  This committee managed to produce 
a list of approved ‘forms of insanity’ in 1882.36  This list, along with other tables 
produced by the Statistical Committee, was provisionally approved for only one 
year, but the Statistical Committee was not actually convened again for another 
twenty.  In practice, the MPA had no powers to compel asylum Superintendents to 
adopt their standard classification, but it was (unsurprisingly, given Rayner’s 
involvement) adopted at Hanwell in 1883, and became the standard classification 
for all LCC asylums after 1889.  The 1882 MPA classification – which included the 
categories of senile mania, melancholia and dementia – did not depart in any large 
measure from the categories already used at Hanwell, and did not produce  any 
discernable difference in classificatory practices at the asylum.  The same cannot be 
said for the next version, which appeared 20 years later. 
When the Statistical Committee was finally convened again in 1904, it 
eventually (after three attempts) produced a new, broadly accepted classification, 
which departed substantially from what had come before.37  This need not have had 
any great effect on classificatory practices within individual asylums, were it not for 
the intervention of the Lunacy Commissioners.  The Commissioners seized upon 
the new MPA classification as a way to extend and reinforce their wider attempts to 
update and standardise asylum record-keeping.  The 1906 MPA classification was 
issued to all asylum Superintendents by the Commissioners the following year, 
with a corresponding set of ‘codes’ to be entered into the medical journal.38  From 
this point on, classification was no longer at the discretion of individual asylum 
                                                             
36 'Report of the Thirty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the Medico-Psychological Association', Journal of 
Mental Science, 28 (1882), p. 460; 'Report of Committee on the Statistical Tables of the Medico-
Psychological Association', Journal of Mental Science, 28 (1882), pp. 462-64. 
37 'Medico-Psychological Association of Great Britain and Ireland', Journal of Mental Science, 52 
(1906), p. 480. 
38 ‘Rules made by the Commissioners in Lunacy, 31 October 1906’, reprinted in Greig, Gattie and 
Archbold, Archbold's Lunacy and Mental Deficiency , pp. 556-57. 
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Superintendents: the 1906 Rules of the Commissioners in Lunacy, and thus the new 
classificatory codes, were statutorily binding.    
This literally codified classificatory system restricted the ability of asylum 
medical officers to express ambiguity or subtlety in their diagnostic choices.  
Question marks and brackets, which had previously peppered the recording of the 
‘form of insanity’, disappeared.  The categorisation of senile insanities was also 
significantly limited by this move towards diagnostic standardisation.  Under the 
1906 classification, ‘senile dementia’ was the only officially recognised form of 
senile insanity.  Thus medical officers were no longer able to state (through 
diagnosis) that a patient’s maniacal excitement, or melancholic gloom, might be 
partially an expression of their aged state.  Medical officers, presented with a 
conspicuously aged patient who displayed such symptoms, were confronted with a 
new choice of categorisation.  Did the patient’s symptoms reveal the essential 
identity of their mental condition?  Or was their old age a more important factor in 
their disorder?  After 1907, being a senile dement was the only recognised way to be 
a senile asylum patient. 
Although the relationship between the two was not simple, a direct line of 
influence can be drawn between the theoretical discussions outlined in Chapter One 
of this thesis, and the diagnostic patterns at Hanwell demonstrated in Table 1.  This 
relationship was mediated by the personal preferences of the Medical 
Superintendents and, latterly, by decisions made by the MPA Statistical Committee, 
and by the needs and interests of the Lunacy Commissioners.  The assignation of a 
‘form of insanity’ to an asylum patient – and the increasing tendency to label an 
older patient as senile – can therefore be seen as a product of the interaction 
between the theory, policy and practice of psychiatry.  The mid-nineteenth century 
saw a significant refraction of the category ‘senile insanity’ in psychiatric texts.  An 
increased focus on the body, and on underlying physical states as major aetiological 
factors, encouraged alienists to imagine that the senile body could affect, and be 
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expressed through, ‘all the forms of insanity usually delineated’.39  Thus, senile 
mania, melancholia and dementia became commonly used diagnostic categories.  
Subsequently, however, the association of the aged body with insanity in old age 
led to a reversal of this process: the connection between the physiological 
disintegration of ageing, and the mental disintegration of dementia, was reinforced, 
and ‘senile dementia’ became the only recognised category of senile insanity.   
At the end of the nineteenth century, an older person arriving at Hanwell 
became more likely to have their mental perturbations – however they were 
expressed – understood as a manifestation of their aged state.  At the same time, the 
exclusionary discourse of senility, discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, brought 
attention to the inherently aged status of older patients, and encouraged a particular 
understanding of senility as natural and incurable.  At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the restrictive classification enforced by the Lunacy 
Commissioners further limited the ways in which the insanity of old age could be 
understood: as a process of disintegrative, incapacitating, and irreversible dementia. 
 Standardisation did not bring about any direct changes in the way that the 
‘forms of insanity’ were assigned to patients at Hanwell until the Lunacy 
Commissioners issued their classificatory codes in 1907.  However, as the rest of this 
chapter will show, changing record-keeping practices – including increasing levels 
of standardisation – did have a significant impact on the way that older patients 
were viewed and classified at Hanwell prior to 1907.  The changing classificatory 
habits of Hanwell’s medical officers in the latter part of the nineteenth century – 
which saw a wider range of disorders and an increasing number of patients labelled 
as ‘senile’ – was part of a wider epistemological shift, in which greater attention was 
given to asylum patients’ innate physical states.  The aged status of older patients 
came to the fore in the ways in which they were described, and in the 
understanding of their mental disorders.  This shift was reflected and engendered 
by changes to the format of asylum records. 
                                                             
39 William Bevan Lewis, A Text-book of Mental Diseases:  with Special Reference to the Pathological 
Aspects of Insanity (London, 1889), p. 405.  
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The Patient’s Body 
The physical body, though always important to understandings of madness, was at 
the centre of psychiatric knowledge at the end of the nineteenth century.   The rise 
of this ‘first biological psychiatry’, as Edward Shorter has characterised it, did not 
occur in an isolated theoretical realm, but was rooted in asylum practice.40  The 
German system, in which small psychiatric clinics were attached to universities, 
allowed psychiatrists to treat and observe patients in life, and then follow up their 
investigations immediately post-mortem. 41  In Britain, the relationship between care 
and research was more remote, but asylum patients still ultimately provided the 
material – in life and in death – for psychiatric theory.42  The texts described in 
Chapter One of this thesis are filled with case studies, usually observed during the 
writer’s regular occupation as an asylum Superintendent.  After death, some 
asylum patients’ bodies made their way to university research laboratories, 
contributing significantly to the education of medical students.43  At the beginning 
of the twentieth century, laboratory practice began to encroach on psychiatric 
knowledge, as it had in other branches of medicine.44  Gayle Davis has described the 
establishment of pathological laboratories for Scottish asylums at the turn of the 
century, and examined their use of the Wassermann test for GPI.45  More recently, 
work on the development of asylum pathology prior to the 1890s, at the West 
Riding asylum in Wakefield, has painted a vibrant picture of this exceptional 
asylum as a ‘research institution’, and highlighted the interchange between asylum 
                                                             
40 Edward Shorter, A History of Psychiatry: from the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac (New 
York, 1997), pp. 69-112. 
41 Eric Engstrom, 'Researching Dementia in Imperial Germany: Alois Alzheimer and the Economies of 
Psychiatric Practice', Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 31 (2007), pp. 406-8. 
42 Jennifer Wallis, 'Madness Incarnate: The Making of the Patient’s Body in Late Nineteenth-Century 
Asylum Practice', (PhD Thesis, Queen Mary University of London, 2013). 
43 Elizabeth T. Hurren, '‘Abnormalities and Deformities’:The Dissection and Interment of the Insane 
Poor, 1832–1929', History of Psychiatry, 23 (2012), pp. 65-77. 
44
 See, for example, the articles in Andrew Cunningham, The Laboratory Revolution in Medicine 
(Cambridge, 2002). 
45 Davis, The Cruel Madness of Love,   125-46. 
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patients’ bodies and the development of British psychiatric knowledge earlier in the 
century.46 
Hanwell, of course, was no Wakefield.  It remained fairly removed from 
such scientific work, even after the opening of London’s own pathological 
laboratory in 1895, based at the new East London Claybury asylum.  Yet, through 
Hanwell’s case books, we can also trace an increasing interest in the patient’s body 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  The new bodily practices 
encouraged by asylum pathology, and the orientation of psychiatric theory towards 
physical conditions, impacted on even relatively unscientific institutions like 
Hanwell.  This section argues that the increasing interest in patients’ bodies, and the 
new methods of examining and describing them demanded by the changing case 
book format, led to the emergence of a new category of physical condition:  ‘senile’.  
This use of this word to describe the physical condition of aged patients was almost 
non-existent before the turn of the century, but was commonly used in 1911-12.  
This in itself signalled and engendered a new way of seeing older patients:  as 
inherently and particularly aged. 
Describing and Examining the Body 
The amount of information gathered about the patient’s body, the nature of that 
information, and the manner in which it was recorded, changed significantly over 
this period.  Hanwell’s case books of 1851-52 included little information about the 
patients’ physical state.  At most, the case note contained a short sentence 
summarising the patient’s appearance: ‘is feeble, much emaciated, and of a sallow 
complexion’.47  In the 1870s, more physical observations were included, particularly 
regarding any cuts, marks or bruises present on admission, although these 
observations were inconsistently recorded, and sometimes absent entirely.  At this 
time, the purpose of physical observation on admission was practical rather than 
medical:  the asylum’s medical officers sought to protect themselves from any 
                                                             
46 Michael Anthony Finn, 'The West Riding Lunatic Asylum and the Making of the Modern Brain 
Sciences in the Nineteenth Century', (PhD Thesis, University of Leeds, 2012); Jennifer Wallis, 
'Madness Incarnate’. 
47 Sarah Nuthall, Hanwell Casebook, Females No. 5, H11/HLL/B/19/004 (1852), p. 91. 
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accusations of mistreatment by cataloguing any evidence of past injuries on 
admission, and to broadly assess the patient’s physical condition, so that their 
potential care needs might be anticipated. 
In the 1890s, the volume and consistency of physical information included in 
the case notes increased significantly.  Following the Lunacy Act of 1890, asylum 
medical officers were required to send a description of each patient’s ‘bodily and 
mental health’ to the Lunacy Commissioners, which was also copied into the case 
book.48  At Hanwell, the now-printed case book forms on the male side contained 
two sections for physical description: ‘Condition of body on admission’, containing 
the type of physical information previously included in the case notes, and ‘Result of 
the Medical Examination’.  This medical examination involved looking – at the skin, 
the eyes, the tongue, the gait – and listening – to the breath, the heart and the 
speech.  In the female case books, the physical examination and its reporting was 
also guided by a more prescriptive pre-printed case book form.  This form brought a 
measure of consistency and order to the physical observations:  separate entries 
were often made in the spaces allotted to the ‘digestive’, ‘circulatory’ and 
‘respiratory’ systems, and weight and pulse were almost always measured and 
recorded.  The recording of a patient’s physical condition on the two sides of the 
asylum thus differed in form, but not in content.   
The most significant change brought about by the greater prescriptiveness of 
the female case books, was the creation of negative spaces.  Though often left blank, 
the sections for which the medical officer had no particular observation to put 
forward were sometimes completed with a dash, or the word ‘normal’.  As Joel 
Howell has pointed out, ‘Standardised forms could encourage physicians to record 
essential information that might otherwise be overlooked’.49  Given an open space to 
record his observations, the medical officer could choose to examine only those 
elements of the patient’s physical condition which he noticed to be particularly 
unhealthy, or pertinent to their mental state.  If a patient’s breathing was obviously 
laboured, for example, he might examine their respiratory system by listening to 
                                                             
48 The Lunacy Act (1890), s. 38. 
49 Howell, Technology in the Hospital, p. 47. 
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their chest; if a patient was gripped by maniacal excitement, he might check for a 
fever or a rapid pulse.  The prescriptive forms, on the other hand, directed the 
medical officer to observe and comment upon parts of the patient’s body which he 
might otherwise have ignored, and perform acts of physical examination which, 
based on his overall impression of their mental state and bodily health, he might 
previously have deemed unnecessary.  The prescriptive forms for describing a 
patient’s physical condition thus, quite literally, directed Hanwell’s medical officers 
to see the insane body in a new way.  This new form of detailed and prescribed 
looking became more intense at the turn of the century. 
In 1895, the LCC pathology laboratory was opened next to the new Claybury 
asylum in outer East London.  It was designed primarily as a research laboratory; a 
place where post-mortem specimens from asylum patients could be examined, in 
the pursuit of pathological knowledge about insanity.  The LCC pathologists also 
tested tissues from living asylum patients, most notably through the Wassermann 
test for syphilis, introduced at Claybury in 1909.  Before the laboratory opened, 
Hanwell’s Superintendent R.R. Alexander complained of the ‘shameful waste of 
pathological material at Hanwell’.  Though they conducted post-mortems, 
Hanwell’s busy asylum medical officers had ‘little time for more than naked-eye 
observations’.50  In the new pathological laboratory, dead bodies were to be 
examined in minute detail.  In the early twentieth century, this close examination of 
patients’ bodies was extended to the living inmates of all LCC asylums.  When the 
LCC Asylums Committee introduced the standard case book form in 1907, the most 
notable innovation was the increase in the size and prescriptiveness of the section 
on the patient’s ‘physical condition’.  The physical information was now to be 
recorded onto a vast pre-printed form, taking up almost an entire page of the case 
book.  There was little space for open answers: each piece of information to be 
collected was prescribed, with space for only a number or a one-word answer 
(usually ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘N.’ for normal).51  This new physical- condition form both 
                                                             
50 The Fifth Annual Report of the [LCC] Asylums Committee (1893-4), pp. 102-3. 
51
 These sections were not filled in directly by the medical officers, but by Maud Forbes.  However, 
the precision and comprehensiveness of the answers suggests that, either the medical officers had 
their own, loose version of the physical condition form which they used when conducting their 
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implemented and reflected a new approach to the asylum patient’s body.  The 
detailed and prescribed list of attributes to be examined and described supplied a 
method for revealing the hidden reality of the patient’s underlying disorder, 
beyond that which was immediately obvious.  Through this form, the patient’s 
body was fragmented:  not just into the digestive, nervous and vascular system, but 
into teeth, gums and tongue; irises and pupils; capillaries and veins.  It represented 
a new drive to look beyond the unified patient and their overall condition, and to 
probe the secret pathological processes, hidden deep within the body and revealed 
through its disaggregated parts.  
The Senile Body 
In the 1911-12 case books, the first category on the new physical condition form is 
‘General bodily condition’, with space for a one-word answer.   Often, that answer 
was a general term such as ‘fair’, ‘weak’ or ‘feeble’, seemingly designed to indicate 
the place of the patient along a continuum of physical health.  These were not, 
however, precisely or routinely applied labels, designed for statistical analysis.  In 
some cases, a particular disease or physical condition was written into this space, 
such as ‘hemiplegic’ or ‘morbis cordis’.52  One patient was described as ‘weakish’.53  
Sometimes, the word ‘condition’ was crossed out and the word ‘health’ written in 
its place, though this had no discernable effect on the type of answer given. The 
meaning of this category, then, was ambiguous, but its purpose seems to have been 
to give a headline summary of the patient’s physical state.  This category had been 
present in former years, though in a less strictly codified way.  In the 1870s, the 
female case notes usually included a two-word description of the patient’s health in 
the margin of the first page, stating ‘weak health’ or ‘fair health’.  In the 1890s, 
physical descriptions sometimes began with a general statement, such as ‘is 
extremely feeble, weak health, body very thin’.54  The creation of the ‘General bodily 
                                                                                                                                                                            
examinations, or that they had memorised its contents and internalised the type of examination it 
prescribed. 
52 Thomas Davidson, Hanwell Casebook, Males No. 31, H11/HLL/B/20/040 (1911), p. 13; Joseph 
Salling, H11/HLL/B/20/040 (1911), p. 26. 
53 Aaron Priest, Hanwell Casebook, Males No. 30, H11/HLL/B/20/039 (1911), p. 61. 
54 Bridget Harley, Hanwell Casebook, Females No. 14, H11/HLL/B/19/037 (1891), p. 37. 
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condition’ category, then, like many elements of the 1907 case book, was a way of 
regulating and prescribing a practice which was already taking place.   
 While the practice of offering this general statement on bodily health was 
not new, by 1911 a new way of responding to it had emerged:  the word ‘senile’.  It 
was used to describe almost all the patients over 70, but was also attached to a 
significant number of patients in their 60s, from as young as 62.  Old patients might 
be weak or feeble, but – if labelled ‘senile’ – their weakness was understood to be 
manifesting in a way that was intrinsically connected to their age.  This term was 
being used to indicate the presence of a specific, identifiable process which was 
taking place within the patient’s body, with certain predictable effects.  Earlier case 
notes point to a similar understanding of the ageing process.  In 1892, 72-year-old 
James Shaw was described as ‘a very feeble old man with all the evidences of 
senility well marked’.  From at least the 1890s, then, senility was viewed as an 
underlying constellation of physical changes, which went beyond general 
enfeeblement, and which left specific ‘evidences’ on the body.  These included 
phenomena visible on the body (such as arcus senilis, or grey hair), phenomena 
visible through observation and examination (such as poor mobility, ‘senile’ 
tremors, deafness or blindness) and phenomena whose presence within the body 
was indicated by other bodily signs (such as arteriosclerosis).55  In the 1890s, 
Hanwell’s doctors knew how to identify a ‘senile’ body, but rarely did so.  By the 
1910s, when the more prescriptive case book forms demanded a more rigorous 
investigation of the physical signs displayed by patients’ bodies, the description of a 
patient as ‘senile’ had become commonplace.   
There was no Wasserman test for senility, and senescence could not be 
identified in a laboratory.  Gayle Davis has argued that the ‘rhetorical… utility’ of 
the Wassermann test, as a symbol of scientific practice, was more important than its 
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‘practical utility’.56  The emergence of the senile patient shows that a new laboratory 
test was not needed for a new type of patient to emerge; the rhetorical turn towards 
the body was enough to encourage a significant change in the way that older bodies 
were categorised and viewed.  The ‘evidences’ of old age were all identifiable prior 
to 1900, and mostly visible without close examination.  Nevertheless, the increased 
interest in the bodies of the LCC’s asylum patients – fostered by and reflected in the 
opening of Claybury’s pathological laboratory, and engendered by the newly 
detailed physical condition form in the case notes – had a significant impact on the 
way that older bodies in the asylum were viewed.  The use of the physical 
descriptor ‘senile’ in the early-twentieth-century case notes signifies a new 
awareness of a specifically ‘senile’ body, part of the overall growing tendency to 
view older patients as inherently and distinctively senile.  This mirrors Stephen 
Katz, Andrew Achenbaum and Carole Haber’s findings, on the development of new 
understandings of the aged body in nineteenth-century medicine.57  As pathological 
anatomy took on increasing importance in the understanding of disease and the 
body, the physical markers of old age became more visible, prompting a new 
definition of old age which ‘separated it medically from all other age groups’.58  
According to Katz, age was thus reduced to its physical signs: stripped of 
macrocosmic, spiritual and social meaning, ‘[w]hat could be said about old age 
depended on what could be seen of it in the body’.59   He draws on Foucault’s 
argument from the Birth of the Clinic, that changes in medical practice ruptured the 
relationship between the patient and their illness, and reduced understandings of 
disease to the identification of specific pathological processes.  Thus, the patient 
went from being the ‘subject’ of his disease to ‘the accident of his disease, the 
transitory object that it happens to have seized upon’.60  This objectification created 
new categories, and drew all bodies displaying similar pathological traits into a 
defining relationship with one another.  Katz and Haber argue that ‘senescence’ 
became identifiable in the same way as different diseases:  as a universal process 
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which acted on the body in certain predictable ways, the traces of which could be 
seen on or in the aged body.  Thus, as Katz puts it, the increased interest in the 
pathological markers of ill and aged bodies ‘configured a new subjective identity 
based on the imaginary unity and self-referentiality of the human body in old age’.61   
 On a more modest scale, the case notes of Hanwell suggest a similar process.  
Between the 1850s and the 1910s, the aged body became more visible in the asylum 
on both a macro- and micro- level.  By 1912, there were far more aged bodies in 
Hanwell than there had been 50 years previously:  more grey hair, more wrinkled 
skin, more stooped stances and trembling limbs.  At a micro-level, insane bodies of 
all ages were being minutely examined at the LCC pathological laboratory.  On 
admission to Hanwell, patients' bodies were more closely scrutinised than ever 
before:  not just for bruises and scars – signs of lived experiences – but for signs of 
internal pathological processes, including senescence.  The increased visibility of 
aged bodies, and of the signs of ageing, spurred on the creation of a new, unified 
category of bodily type, into which older patients could be organised:  the senile. 
Aetiology and the Lay Narratives 
In their pioneering study of Colney Hatch Asylum in the nineteenth century, Ida 
McAlpine and Richard Hunter described ‘a reorientation of psychiatry from 
listening to looking’.62  At Hanwell, ‘looking’ – represented in the case books 
through the physical description sections – progressively displaced the practice of 
‘listening’ to patients’ friends and families, as the central means through which 
knowledge about a patient’s condition was acquired.  This shift was reflected in the 
‘causes of insanity’ ascribed to each patient, which similarly shifted from the 
biographical and experiential, to the physical.  This led to, and was reflected in, an 
increasing tendency to ascribe the mental disorders of older patients to ‘senility’. 
 The practice of listening was well embedded at Hanwell in the mid-
nineteenth century.  During his tenure as Medical Superintendent in the 1840s, John 
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Conolly had begun interviewing new patients’ friends and relatives, in order to 
ascertain the cause of their disease. Akihito Suzuki has analysed a series of these so-
called ‘lay narratives’ from the male case books of the 1840s.  Suzuki presents the 
lay narratives as a reasonably direct representation of an authentic lay aetiology; a 
window into the understanding of madness and its causes in working-class 
communities. 63  Suzuki’s study ends just as this one begins.  This section will trace 
the development of the lay narratives from the early 1850s to the beginning of the 
twentieth century.  Up to the 1870s at least, the aetiological factors identified by the 
lay narrators at Hanwell were often legitimised as the official cause of insanity.  
Over the course of this period, however, the lay voice was increasingly 
marginalised within the case books.  Printed forms placed new restrictions on the 
eliciting and recording of lay knowledge, and by 1911 the ‘physical condition’ form 
had literally displaced the lay narratives in the case books.  Traces of a distinctive 
lay aetiology, which tended to prioritise life experiences over physical phenomena, 
remained.  By the early twentieth century, however, it had been largely expunged 
from the official record of the asylum, now guided by the codified categories of the 
medical journal.  The body was increasingly viewed as the seat of insanity and 
physical causes, including old age, were prioritised over psychological ones in the 
list provided by the MPA.  The marginalisation of the lay voice can thus be coupled 
with the rise of senility as a cause of insanity.  By the early twentieth century, aged 
patients were largely removed from their biography – an epistemological shift 
which was reflected and engendered by the format of the patient records – and had 
instead become thoroughly embodied. 
Economic Anxiety 
In his study of lay narratives dating from the 1840s, Suzuki found that the ‘worry’ 
caused by loss of employment, or other pecuniary difficulties, was the most 
prominently featured aetiological factor.64  This continued to be the case throughout 
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this period.  Even when friends and relatives described other potentially traumatic 
phenomena, they often emphasised the effect these had on the patient’s 
employment prospects, and the anxiety this caused them.  Some years prior to his 
admittance to Hanwell in 1852, Thomas Stokes’ arm was injured.  He underwent 
significant pain and difficulty as a consequence of this, including a rather alarming-
sounding procedure called ‘exfoliation of the bone’.  It was however the ‘grief at 
[his] inability to work’ due to the state of his arm, rather than anything connected to 
the injury itself, which was described as the cause of his insanity. 
 The effects of a patient’s age on their ability to find and retain employment 
was often mentioned in these narratives.  Retirement was a possibility for only a 
minority of older people in this period.  Friendly societies – mutual assurance co-
operatives into which some poorer workers paid in an attempt to protect 
themselves from later poverty – offered some hope for those who were too 
debilitated to work, and Poor Law out-relief was more widely available to old 
people than to others, but for most, continued employment was necessary to avoid 
the dreaded fate of ending their days in the workhouse.65  Of course, this was not 
always possible.  At the age of 74, Richard Cullen had become unable to find work, 
‘owing to age and infirmity’.  Without earnings he was eventually forced to 
withdraw his savings from the bank.  According to his son, he ‘fretted at this’, and 
soon began to show signs of mental infirmity.66  James Rourke’s ‘fretting’ was 
apparently caused by being ‘passed by in the labour market for younger men’.67  At 
the age of 63, carpenter James George Charlick was told by his employers that he 
was ‘too old to take a change of jobs’. His wife had ‘struggle[d] to keep the home 
together’ over the following three years, before James was admitted to Hanwell, but 
she told the medical officer that ‘the pinnacle of poverty was very keen’.68  This is 
the manner in which old age appears in these narratives:  not as a pathological 
process leading to mental disintegration, but as a practical barrier to the 
maintenance of a stable life.  According to these lay interpretations, it was not the 
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physical decline of old age which caused mental infirmity, but the psychological 
hardships faced by the aged.  Karen Chase has described the importance of issues 
surrounding work (or the lack thereof) and poverty to the late-nineteenth- century 
understandings of old age.69 The mental strain placed on the aged by their difficult 
financial position was not lost on the campaigners for the welfare of the aged poor, 
and formed a part of the justification for old-age pensions.70  These asylum 
narratives offer a stark reminder that the biggest concern facing many old people in 
this period was not failing health, but the looming fear of the financial hardships it 
might bring.   
 In his article drawn from these narratives, Akihito Suzuki situates male 
patients’ anxieties over the loss of work in the context of the rise of a ‘new working 
class respectability and concomitant notion of manhood’.71  He draws on Anna 
Clark’s argument that the role of the ‘male breadwinner’ became established in the 
first half of the nineteenth century, relegating women to the domestic sphere, and 
moving men to the economic centre of the family.72  According to Suzuki, the 
prominence of economic anxieties in men’s case histories indicates a particularly 
masculine form of mental strain occasioned by this breadwinner role.  The burden 
of primary economic responsibility, Suzuki argues, and the fear of failure in this 
task, ‘tormented [the working man’s] psyche’.73  The fear of loss of economic 
independence, and of letting down the family, is undoubtedly present on Hanwell’s 
male side in this later period.    When John Wyburn Hills was ‘let go’ by the 
company where he had worked for 37 years, ‘because he was getting too old for his 
work’, he was referred to the Charity Organisation Society.  It was this act of 
dependency and the humiliation it occasioned which, according to John’s son, 
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‘preyed on his mind’ and led to his insanity.74  When 81-year-old Henry Arnold was 
admitted to the asylum, his daughter suggested that it was ‘seeing his wife in want’ 
which had caused him the most worry.75  Similarly, Emma Greenstreet and 
Elizabeth Barnard’s husbands mournfully explained to Hanwell’s medical officers 
that it was their failures in business which had caused their insanity.76    
 However, Hanwell’s case notes demonstrate that economic responsibility, 
and the anxieties it caused, was not an exclusively male concern.  Single and 
widowed women, and those with irresponsible, ill or incapacitated husbands could 
not rely on a male breadwinner for their economic stability.  One widowed patient 
had successfully run her husband’s chimney-sweeping business for a decade after 
his death, while another kept a bakery shop; in both cases, decline in business, and 
the worry it caused them, was named as the cause of their insanity.77  Old age 
affected women’s abilities to earn a living as much as men’s.  According to 71-year-
old Rebecca Arden’s daughter, she had become melancholy due to being ‘poorly off 
in consequence of her not being able to work in consequence of her advancing 
years’.78  As workers and business owners, or as women dependent on economic 
troubles could also have a significant impact on older women’s mental health, a fact 
which was recognised in the case histories. 
 Economic anxieties were marginally the most frequently-cited cause of 
insanity in the case notes, but there were many others.  Anxiety caused by domestic 
situations was also frequently cited in these narratives, in both the male and female 
case books.  Families could be a source of concern as much as a source of care, and 
many of Hanwell’s older patients were worried about feckless adult children, or 
cruel spouses.79  Grief was another commonly mentioned aetiological factor.  While 
most of the lay narratives refer to these kinds of emotional or mental distress, there 
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are also references to accidents and injuries, illnesses, other physical conditions, 
such as sunstroke, and intemperance.  Amongst this wide range of causes, however, 
there are no explicit references to the ageing process itself.  This suggests that, 
outside of the asylum, insanity of old age (as at other ages) was still broadly 
understood in the context of a person’s biography.  Within this lay aetiology, the 
troubles of the ageing mind were more likely to be attributed to difficult or harmful 
experiences, than to problems associated with the aged body. 
The Marginalisation of the Lay Voice 
The same themes – economic anxiety, domestic trouble, grief and injury – persisted 
in the lay aetiology of insanity from the 1850s to the 1910s.  However, that lay 
aetiology becomes increasingly difficult to discern in the case books.  The latter part 
of the nineteenth century saw a significant marginalisation of the lay voice in the 
case books and with it, a decreasing reliance on the lay aetiologies described above.  
Akihito Suzuki has described a similar change in the case books of mid-century 
Bethlem. He suggests that the case notes of Bethlem, prior to 1852, deal with two 
different chronological phases:  the patient’s life before institutionalisation, and 
after.  Knowledge of the former phase – in which the person made the journey from 
sanity to madness - was considered essential to a full understanding of the mental 
disorder.  However, it was knowledge that the doctors could not access without an 
outside informant.  Thus, the lay narrators who were invited to supply this 
information ‘had a clear epistemological advantage over the doctors, because they 
usually observed the crucial transitional process first hand’.  Because of this 
‘epistemological advantage’, Suzuki suggests that the doctors were compelled to 
record the lay narratives in a fairly direct way, rendering these texts useful as 
reasonably unmediated accounts of lay understandings of insanity.   The ideas 
contained within these narratives formed a key part of the medical knowledge 
which was constructed around the patient in the case books.80  At Bethlem, 
however, the ascendency of lay aetiologies was suddenly and decisively 
overthrown in 1852, when a new Superintendent, William Hood, took charge.  He 
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did away with the lay narratives, and instead came to his own conclusion as to the 
cause of his patients’ insanity, through intensive one-on-one interviews.  At 
Bethlem, then, there was a ‘disenfranchisement of the family as a proper component 
of psychiatric discourse’.81 
Although there was no such dramatic change at Hanwell, the second half of 
the nineteenth century did see a progressive marginalisation of the lay voice in the 
case notes, and in the ascription of the cause of insanity.  Through Hood’s 
interviews, Suzuki suggests, the patient’s own voice came to replace the voice of the 
lay narrators in the case notes, shifting the emphasis over to the other side of the 
patient-doctor-narrator knowledge ‘triangle’.82  This was not the case at Hanwell.  
Hanwell’s patients were not asked to give an account of their condition in the same 
way as those who were interviewed by Hood at Bethlem.  However, the 
increasingly detailed practices of physical examination and description, outlined 
above, called upon the patients’ bodies to ‘speak’ to the underlying cause, and 
nature, of their mental disorder.  The practice of soliciting information from a 
patient’s friends and family members continued throughout this period.  However, 
there were increasing limitations placed on the type of information solicited, and 
the manner in which it was recorded.  The connection between the family narratives 
and the medical classification of Hanwell’s patients decreased significantly, as 
drives towards standardisation – along with the enhanced emphasis on underlying 
physical pathologies – produced a more restricted aetiological framework.    
Recording the Lay Narratives 
As with other sections of the case note, the manner in which the lay narratives were 
recorded changed over this period.  In the 1850s and 1870s, the case histories were 
recorded into the case books as straight prose.  As with the physical descriptions, 
there was a level of regularity to the way that case histories were recorded, even 
prior to the introduction of a prescribed form.  Certain recurring themes indicate 
the types of questions being asked by the medical officers regarding, for example, 
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past injuries, pregnancies, traumas and habits.  At the same time, the open 
framework gave more scope for families and friends to guide the interview and 
shape the narratives, which are consequently varied in content and emphases.  In 
the 1890s, the prescribed forms brought more order to the lay narratives.  In 1891-
92, the male case book forms provided dedicated, but open, spaces for the patient’s 
‘family’ and ‘personal’ history.  On the female side there was a more prescriptive 
form, with 29 categories and questions, eliciting information about children, 
previous attacks, and habits.  At this time, however, the prescribed form and the 
open narrative coexisted, and the open narratives were just as long as they had 
been in the 1870s.  
This coexistence wilted following the introduction of the 1907 case book.  
Here, there were 48 prescribed questions under the ‘case-history’ form, on both the 
male and female sides.  There was still comparable space allotted to an open 
narrative of the case history, but this was pushed to the third page of the case note, 
and often left blank.  The open narratives which were written were generally much 
shorter.  Hanwell’s medical officers thus continued to elicit information about the 
patient’s history from friends and relatives, but in a much more limited way.  The 
space for lay narrators to provide their interpretation of their friend or relative’s 
insanity was pushed aside; now, they were firmly positioned as providers of 
objective information, for the medical officer to interpret.  Just as the increasingly 
prescriptive ‘physical condition’ form directed the medical officers to examine the 
body more intensively, seeking signs of disorder which might be hidden from 
view, so the new case history form called upon the lay narrators to provide 
information about the patient’s life which they may not have considered 
particularly relevant to their insanity.  The lay narrators’ interpretation of the 
patient’s condition was no longer deemed relevant: the prescribed forms were 
designed to reveal the objective aetiological reality underlying the patient’s 
condition.  
Throughout this period, families who could not visit the asylum directly 
were asked to send a letter providing details of the case history, many of which are 
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stuck into the case books.  By 1911, friends and family members were being sent a 
form to fill out.  It is unclear to what extent this ‘Inquiry Form’ replaced face-to-face 
interviews, as the information was usually transcribed into the case book.  The 
sparseness of many of the case-history forms in the 1911-12 case books suggests 
that the use of postal interviews may have been quite common.  The first two pages 
of the inquiry form contained limited questions about the patients themselves, 
although only two out of the 23 related directly to the current attack.  The rest 
concerned the patient’s childhood development, physical health, habits, and 
personal history of insanity.  A full third page was allocated for questions about the 
patient’s family, with informants asked to provide information about the death, 
health and habits from a wide range of family members, from parents to their 
cousins.  The final, full page was left blank, with the title ‘Additional Information’, 
soliciting ‘any other facts’ about the patient.  The form is attached, rather than 
transcribed, in one case in this sample, sent by the brother of a patient called Joseph 
Murphy, admitted in 1912.83  Joseph’s brother had not seen him for ten years, and 
appeared to know little of their shared family history.  Thus, most of the prescribed 
questions are answered with ‘unknown’.  The final page, however, is half-full, with 
Joseph’s brother’s own interpretation of his mental state.  He explained that his 
brother had never had steady work, and that he had been sending him money for 
some years.  He speculated that the recent sinking of the Titanic may have aroused 
memories of an accident at sea which Joseph had experienced some years before.  
He wondered how this attack could have come on so suddenly, as Joseph’s recent 
letters had seemed quite sane.  These were details he found important, but could 
find no place for in the prescribed form.  This example, then, demonstrates the 
limitations of the inquiry form for expressing the knowledge and interests of the 
lay informants.  Information which Joseph’s brother deemed pertinent could not be 
contained within the prescribed categories, while the asylum’s own questions and 
interests were of little relevance to his relationship with his brother, and his 
knowledge of him.  There may have been other inquiry forms like this, full of 
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observations which were never transcribed into the case book, made irrelevant by 
the drive for codification and standardisation. 
As the lay narratives became more standardised, the emphasis on heredity 
and family medical history grew, even in the case of aged patients.   In the 1850s, 
insane parents or siblings were occasionally mentioned in the narratives, but there 
was usually no reference to heredity.  By 1871, the medical officers were actively 
seeking out a family history of insanity, entering ‘not hereditary’ into the case books 
if none could be found.  Thus, the status of a patient’s insane heredity was 
demonstrated to be central to the understanding of their mental disorder.  In 1891-
92, the volume and scope of information about the family history included in the 
case books had significantly expanded.  On the male side, the space allotted to the 
patient’s ‘family history’ and ‘personal history’ were of equal size.  On the female 
side, specific questions about the patient’s family were included in the case book 
form, regarding any family history of insanity, nervous disorders, phithisis and 
intemperance.  On both sides, the printed case book form provided a space to 
indicate if there was any ‘consanguinity’ in the patient’s hereditary past.  The 
female case book also contained a space for the general ‘habits’ of the parents.  An 
insane inheritance was thus not all that was at stake:  the entirety of their 
underlying genetic makeup, revealed through the habits and health of their parents, 
was now thought to have a bearing on their mental condition.  In the 1907 case 
book, an extended list of family members was included in the section on family 
history.  Now, it was not just the health and habits of a patient’s siblings and 
parents that were elicited, but their cousins, aunts and uncles, and nieces and 
nephews. 
The increasingly precise questions about the patient’s family history probed 
the hidden realities of their mental disorder.  Just as the detailed physical 
examination sought signs of underlying pathology – buried deep within the body 
and potentially displayed by minute or seemingly innocuous external signs – the 
detailed investigation of the patient’s family history was designed to reveal the 
hidden pathologies in the patient’s genetic past.  In theoretical terms, an insane 
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heredity was usually regarded as unnecessary for the manifestation of senility 
insanity.  A ‘neurotic inheritance’ might weaken a person’s resistance to the 
damaging effects of ageing, and potentially bring on senility prematurely, but a 
person with no family history of insanity could still succumb to senility.84  Indeed, 
in many ways, senility reproduced the effects of an insane inheritance:  both 
conditions constituted a constellation of potentially damaging physical 
circumstances, which could give rise to mental disorder, and alter its course.  The 
growing emphasis on heredity was another manifestation of the increasing 
emphasis on the somatic aetiology of mental disorder:  a dangerous potentiality, 
embedded within the patient’s physical structure. 
Senility as a Cause of Insanity 
In the 1850s, the cause of insanity was entered into the admissions book.  Although 
it was spatially removed from the narratives recorded in the case books, 
particularity and individuality of the lay aetiology found in those narratives were 
preserved.  For example, the cause of insanity entry in the admissions book for one 
patient reads ‘anxiety about a lock which he was making for the great exhibition in 
Hyde Park’ and ‘overwork and loss of rest while engaged upon the lock’.85  In the 
1870s, the recorded causes were usually more general: ‘domestic troubles’ or 
‘anxiety over work’.  Nevertheless, the contribution of the individual narratives in 
informing the doctor’s estimation of the ‘cause of insanity’ remained strong.  In the 
female case book of 1870s, the cause of insanity was recorded on the second page of 
the case book, alongside the rest of the patient’s case history.  In the 1890s, the 
space for the cause of insanity was printed alongside the case history form.  
Aetiological knowledge, then, was spatially and conceptually embedded within the 
patient’s history, accessible only through the reports of lay informants.   
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In the first decade of the twentieth century, however, the codification 
brought about by the 1907 Order of the Lunacy Commissioners pushed this lay 
aetiology to one side.  Codes were provided for a standard list of the ‘causes of 
insanity’ to be entered into the new medical journal, as they had been for 
diagnoses.  These were overwhelmingly somatic:  of the 53 listed, 51 related to a 
physical illnesses (such as tuberculosis), conditions (such as senility), activities 
(such as masturbation) or experiences (such as sunstroke).  The two others were 
‘sudden mental stress’ and ‘prolonged mental stress’.86  The precise details of a 
patient’s life experiences were thus rendered irrelevant.  In 1911-12, the case book 
still contains a space to record the cause, as it was reported by the lay narrator, but 
it was now explicitly labelled as such:  ‘causes ascribed by friends’.  Sometimes, the 
entries made to the medical journals represented these ascribed causes, but often 
they were entirely different.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, then, lay 
aetiologies were significantly excluded from the official records of the institution.  
The doctor’s own assessment, guided by the categories provided by the Lunacy 
Commissioners and the MPA, had taken over the formation of knowledge about 
insanity.  
Unsurprisingly, the increased focus on a patient’s physical state as a cause of 
their insanity, and the marginalisation of life experiences in Hanwell’s aetiological 
framework, led to a significant increase in the number of older patients whose 
insanity was assigned to their ‘senility’.  Quantifying the ‘cause’ of insanity in the 
case notes over time is not simple, as the way in which causes were recorded 
changed over time.  Taking into account all parts of the case note in which a cause 
was recorded, including those provided explicitly by the lay narrators, and those 
recorded using the 1907 schedule, the proportion of cases aged 60 or over in which 
‘senility’ or ‘old age’ was given as a cause of insanity rose from 6 per cent in 1871-
72, to 42 per cent in 1891-92.  It then dropped to 30 per cent in 1911-12.  In 1851-52, 
old age did not appear as a cause in a single case, although it was included as a 
category in Hanwell’s official tables.  This mirrors the pattern of ‘senile’ diagnoses 
                                                             
86 NHS/P12. 
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shown earlier in Table 1.87  These classificatory changes demonstrate that agedness 
was increasingly accessible within the medical officers’ practical epistemology, as a 
defining characteristic of older patients. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that new practices of looking and recording – driven by an 
epistemological imperative to probe the insane body for indications of their 
underlying pathology – made the agedness of old bodies more visible.  At the same 
time the marginalisation of patients’ individual life stories allowed their 
experiential differences to be overshadowed by their shared physicality. Thus, the 
‘senile’ emerged as a distinct group of patients, whose bodies and minds were 
indelibly marked by their age.  This is reflected in the increased use of the words 
‘senile’ and ‘senility’ to describe the form and cause of older patients’ mental 
conditions, and their physical condition.   
These mutations can in turn be related to the theoretical changes outlined in 
Chapter One, and the discursive differentiation of the ‘senile’ described in Chapter 
Two.  Through the innovations of fresh, young Medical Superintendents, changing 
trends in record-keeping practices, and the direct intervention of the LCC and the 
Lunacy Commissioners, changing theoretical models of insanity entered asylum 
practice.  The concerted attention paid to somatic aetiology which emerged in the 
third quarter of the nineteenth century, and the determination to relate that 
aetiology to the classification of mental disorders, was made explicit in the 
published writings of psychiatrists, but was also reflected and extended in asylum 
practice through the changing format of the patient records.  As argued in Chapter 
One, the focus on somato-aetiology brought fresh attention to senility as a key 
factor in older people’s mental disorders.  In theory, this was expressed through the 
multiplication of senile insanities employed in different psychiatrists’ classificatory 
                                                             
87 As these figures suggest, not every case which was given a ‘senile’ diagnosis was also assigned 
‘senility’ as a cause in the case notes.  While this may represent something interesting about the 
conceptualisation of aetiology and the aged body, and of the way that ‘senility’ as a state of being 
was understood, it is more likely to be a product of inconsistent record-keeping practices. 
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schemes.  In practice, it was reflected in the increasing frequency with which 
senility was used to describe older patients. 
Furthermore, the increasing visibility of older patients, as a problematic 
group in the asylum, was echoed and reinforced by the increasing visibility of the 
physical signs of ageing in older patients.  The burgeoning attribution of aged 
patients’ disorders to their senility both confirmed and was, perhaps, encouraged 
by, the fear of an ever-worsening senile burden.  However, the exclusionary 
discourse of senility, described in Chapter Two, did not operate within the asylum 
in the same way as it did in those more externally directed reports.  Through their 
interventions in the death and discharge of older patients, Hanwell’s medical 
officers showed that they were committed to the care of even the most decrepit 
patients when they were actually in front of them, and that they understood that 
they had a role to play in easing the sufferings of the most unpromising of cases.  
This will be examined further in the final chapter.  
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Chapter Five:  Leaving the Asylum; the Death and Discharge of 
Aged Patients 
As discussed in Chapter Two, aged patients’ proximity to death was often cited as a 
reason to exclude them from asylum care.  In his annual report from 1875, Hanwell 
superintendent, Henry Rayner, complained that  
in several instances [newly admitted] patients have been so 
old and feeble, that they have had to be carried direct from 
the vehicle that brought them to bed, and there they remain 
until they die…Should this practice still be continued, some 
one of them, sooner or later, will die on the journey.1 
Rayner’s fears were never realised:  there are no reports, up to 1912, of a patient 
dying on the journey to Hanwell, although several patients died within days of 
arriving at the asylum.  Broadly speaking, Rayner’s concerns about the morbidity of 
aged admissions were well founded, but not all-encompassing.  As Figure 6 shows, 
at least 60 per cent of patients in this sample died in the asylum , but at least 30 per 
cent were discharged or transferred.  Most aged admissions to Hanwell died, and 
some died quickly, but a sizeable proportion left the asylum alive.   
 
                                                             
1 The Thirtieth Report of the Committee of Visitors of the County Lunatic Asylum at Hanwell (1875), p. 
23. 
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Figure 6. Outcome of residence of patients aged 60 or over on admission at Hanwell, 1851-1912.  
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This chapter will consider the two ways out of the asylum – death and 
discharge – in turn.  It will look at the role of asylum medical officers, attendants 
and managers, and at the role of the patients and their families, in both of these 
events.  A counterpoint to some of the claims discussed in Chapter Two will be 
offered; for example, the chapter will show that some patients’ families were eager 
to have them home, and to take over their care.  Similarly, it will show that the 
asylum superintendents were not always eager to see old, decrepit patients 
removed from their care.  Ultimately, however, the evidence does not support an 
optimistic assessment of aged admissions’ chances of life after Hanwell.  Indeed, the 
case notes of aged patients are particularly useful for providing an insight into the 
experience and management of death in the asylum. 
Dying and Death 
Death was a constant presence at Hanwell.  Between 1860 and 1900, a patient died, 
on average, every two days.2  Attending to the dying was thus a quotidian feature 
of asylum life for the doctors, nurses and attendants.3  On Hanwell’s crowded 
wards, few patients died alone and, although attempts were made to contain it, the 
spectre of death hung over the patients and staff of Hanwell alike.4  As Jonathan 
Andrews has recently noted, death and dying are currently given scant coverage in 
asylum historiography,5 with dying particularly neglected.   The dead body was 
central to the creation of psychiatric knowledge in the late-nineteenth century, and 
so there have been studies of pathology, of post-mortems, and of the movement of 
                                                             
2
 Hanwell’s annual reports indicate that 6505 patients died at the asylum between 1860 and 1900. 
3 Historians Pamela Michael and Jonathan Andrews have suggested that patients were also involved 
in attending to the dead in the asylum.  There is no direct evidence of this in the records at Hanwell, 
but the case notes do record the presence of other patients at the moment of death.  Pamela 
Michael and David Hirst, 'Recording the Many Faces of Death at the Denbigh Asylum, 1848–1938', 
History of Psychiatry, 23 (2012), p.42; Jonathan Andrews, 'Death and the Dead-house in Victorian 
Asylums: Necroscopy Versus Mourning at the Royal Edinburgh Asylum, c. 1832–1901', History of 
Psychiatry, 23 (2012), p. 9. 
4 Jonathan Andrews has found evidence of ‘graveyard humour’ in references to death in 
Morningside Asylum’s patient publication, The Morningside Mirror, whose writers made wry 
references to post-mortem and the asylum’s disposal of the dead.  Andrews, 'Death and the Dead-
house in Victorian Asylums', pp. 8, 13. 
5 Jonathan Andrews, 'Introduction: Lunacy’s Last Rites', History of Psychiatry, 23 (2012), p. 3. 
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dead bodies from the asylum to anatomical research schools for dissection.6  
Nineteenth-century psychiatrists were far less interested in the dying body, and this 
gap in interest has translated into a gap in the historiography. A recent collection of 
essays on death and the asylum included discussions of causes of death, attitudes 
towards death, and the disposal of dead bodies, but contained little mention of the 
experience of dying in the asylum.7  This lack of attention to dying as opposed to 
death is not unique to asylum historiography.  As Clare Humphreys has noted, in a 
unique study of hospice care in nineteenth-century Britain, the meaning and 
mourning of death has drawn significant interest from historians of this period, but 
‘the dying person’ themselves has been neglected.8  Pat Jalland’s Death in the 
Victorian Family, one of the few historical studies to touch on the experience of 
dying, focussed on middle- and upper-class dying in the home.9  The experience of 
dying in an institution has gone largely unresearched.  This is particularly 
surprising, given how common this experience was.  A large-scale, quantitative 
study of death certificates from the turn of the century has shown that one third of 
deaths in London in 1900 took place in an institution (workhouses, hospitals or 
asylums).10  This section will consider several aspects of dying in the asylum, with a 
view to casting some light onto the significant historiographic blind-spot of 
                                                             
6 Jennifer Wallis, 'Madness Incarnate: The Making of the Patient’s Body in Late Nineteenth-Century 
Asylum Practice', (PhD Thesis, Queen Mary University of London, 2013); Michael Anthony Finn, 'The 
West Riding Lunatic Asylum and the Making of the Modern Brain Sciences in the Nineteenth 
Century', (PhD Thesis, University of Leeds, 2012); Elizabeth T Hurren, '‘Abnormalities and 
deformities’: the dissection and interment of the insane poor, 1832–1929', History of Psychiatry, 23 
(2012), pp. 65-77. 
7 History of Psychiatry, Special Issue:  Lunacy’s Last Rites:  Dying insane in Britain, c. 1629-1939, 23 
(2012). Jonathan Andrews’ article discusses the practical and special management of the dead in the 
asylum (though not of the dying), and the meaning of death and post-portem to patients, families 
and psychiatrists.  Chris Philo and Elizabeth Hurren’s contributions both concern the disposal of the 
asylum’s dead, in asylum burial grounds and in University dissection laboratories.  Pamela Michael  
and David Hirst’s article primarily concerns funeral rites at Welsh asylums.  Leonard Smith, Cathy 
Smith, Hilary Marland, Jeremy Boulton and John Black all discuss death from insanity:  its prevalence 
and its meaning.  Hilary Marland’s article does include some discussion of the experience of dying in 
the asylum, amongst women diagnosed with puerperal insanity.  She also examined the womens’ 
feelings about death.  Marland and Leonard Smith both discuss the experience of dying in the 
asylum through suicide.  There is only one apparent suicide in these case notes, discussed below.    
8 Claire Humphreys, '"Waiting for the Last Summons": The Establishment of the First Hospices in 
England 1878-1914', Mortality, 6 (2010), pp. 148-49. 
9 Patricia Jalland, Death in the Victorian Family (Oxford, 1996), pp. 17-189. 
10
 Graham Mooney, Bill Luckin and Andrea Tanner, 'Patient Pathways: Solving the Problem of 
Institutional Mortality in London during the later Nineteenth Century', Social History of Medicine, 12 
(1999), pp.236-37. 
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institutional dying.  It will look at the way that patients’ dying days were narrated 
in the case notes, and argue that Hanwell’s medical officers made substantial (and 
successful) efforts to shape and control the official narrative of death in the asylum.  
It will look at the interventions that were made when patients were believed to be 
dying, drawing on Pat Jalland’s contention that palliative care formed a significant 
part of nineteenth-century medical expertise.11 Finally, it will consider the role 
played by families in the death of asylum inmates. 
A shown in Figure 6, the majority of patients aged 60 or over at the time of 
their admission died in the asylum.  Over half these patients died within 18 months 
of their arrival.  This suggests that the discourses examined in Chapter Two of this 
thesis - in which the Lunacy Commissioners, managing committees, and asylum 
medical officers complained about the phenomenon of moribund, aged patients 
being sent to the asylum only to die – were not unfounded.  My sample contains 
several examples of patients dying within weeks or days of their admission to 
Hanwell.  Some of these live up to the image of the ailing, harmless, close-to-death 
senile patient described by the administrators of lunacy in Chapter Two.  Ann 
Allcock was admitted in August 1872, aged 81.  The initial entry to her case note, 
written shortly after her admission, is notably perfunctory:  ‘She is very aged and 
imbecile[,] totally unable to do anything for herself and cries and mumbles all day’.  
She embodied many of the key features of an ‘undesirable’ asylum case:  very old 
(and therefore probably incurable) dependent, unable to work, and, although 
‘imbecile’, seemingly benign.  There is only one further entry to her case note, made 
three weeks later:  ‘Is becoming weaker and does not take her food so well.  Is wet 
and dirty in her habits.’  Four days later, she died, her death attributed simply to 
‘senile decay’.12   
On arrival at the asylum, Ann Allock, and other patients who died quickly, 
appeared to be far too feeble to pose the kinds of problems of management which 
                                                             
11 Jalland, Death in the Victorian Family, pp. 78-81. 
12
Ann Allcock, Hanwell Case Book, Female No. 22,  H11/HLL/B/19/022 (1872), p. 215; see also Emma 
Triggle, Hanwell Case Book, Female No. 15, H11/HLL/B/19/038 (1892), p. 91; Maria Johnstone, 
Hanwell Case Book, Female No. 40, H11/HLL/B/19/063 (1912), p. 137. 
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usually prompted asylum admittance, as referred to in Chapter Three.  Yet their 
certificates reveal a rather different picture.    The certificate of Maria Johnstone – 
who died a mere two days after her arrival at Hanwell – showed a litany of difficult 
and unpleasant behaviours.  A nurse from Paddington Workhouse claimed that she 
was ‘very restless and talks incessantly, disturbing the whole ward.  She is spiteful 
when attended to, attempting to bite and scratch.  She tried to bit another inmate 
without provocation’.  Cases like this were presumably what erstwhile Hanwell 
superintendent, Henry Rayner, was referring to when he accused workhouse 
medical officers of exaggerating the insane behaviour of senile patients, declaring 
that, ‘It would often be ludicrous, were it not so pitiful, to hear of the dangerous 
ferocity of a poor decrepit old man, whose limbs will scarcely support him.’13 Yet, as 
was discussed in Chapter Three, an inmate did not need to be ‘dangerously 
ferocious’ in order to present a serious problem for the orderly running of the 
workhouse.  On Ann Allcock’s certificate, the nurse at Kensington Infirmary 
declared that ‘she screams and shouts for hours at a time, disturbing everybody in 
the house at a long distance from the ward.’  These women, then, came up against 
the restrictive institutional norms described in Chapter Two of this thesis:  too 
behaviourally troublesome for the orderly workhouse, but too physically feeble for 
the asylum.   
An asylum patient’s dying days were often the most rigorously 
documented, after their admission.  If an officer or attendant noticed that a patient 
was showing signs of significant deterioration which indicated proximity to death – 
such as a particularly violent fit, a high temperature, a diminished appetite, 
difficulty swallowing, lack of consciousness, a bad cough, or laboured breathing – 
this observation would be entered into the case book.  This was followed by 
continued observations of the patient’s decline over the subsequent days.  The case 
notes of Mary Ann May, admitted in August 1872 at age 61, are typical in this 
respect.14  Her physical health had been unremarkable for most of her stay, but took 
                                                             
13
 The Thirty-Third Report of the Committee of Visitors of the County Lunatic Asylum at Hanwell 
(1878), pp. 35, 41. 
14 Mary Ann May, H11/HLL/B/19/022 (1872), p. 251. 
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a sudden turn on 9th July 1875.   Her case notes were subsequently completed as 
follows: 
July 10.  Was taken ill last night at about 11:20.  Breathing short 
and hurried.  Pulse quick and weak.  Has broncho-pneumonia.  
Removed to infirmary.   
July 11.  Much worse.  Can scarcely swallow; features dusky; 
breathing hurried and shallow; expression anxious and 
distressed; pulse small… 
July 12.  Rapidly sinking:  is moribund. 
Cause of death=pleuro-pneumonia 
Duration=one week 
[signed] J Peeke Richards [Medical Superintendent] 
When she was perceived to be showing the signs of serious decline - the shallow 
breathing, the quick pulse, the darkened skin – Mary Ann was closely watched.  
Once the doctors were convinced of her imminent demise, the precise nature of her 
condition ceased to be relevant.   It sufficed to record that she was ‘sinking’ and 
‘moribund’.  In cases where a patient had been ill for some time, the case notes still 
suggest that the doctors and attendants of Hanwell had a keen sense of when ill 
health was becoming senescent decline.  For example, Harriet Staples, admitted in 
February 1891 at the age of 78, was put to bed in May of that year, but the doctors 
did not deem it necessary to begin closely narrating her condition for another 
month, when she began to ‘complain[] of pain’.  They then closely narrated her 
physical decline and ‘collapsed condition’ over the following weeks until her 
death.15 
The confidence with which Hanwell’s doctors were able to determine that a 
patient was ‘sinking’ should not surprise us.  Dying was, in practical terms, one of 
nineteenth-century medicine’s most developed areas of expertise.  As Pat Jalland has 
argued, late-nineteenth-century medical professionals had extensive training and 
observational experience, but little access to curative technologies.  They therefore 
‘compensated for their limited power to cure with a remarkably good record of 
                                                             
15 Harriet Staples, Hanwell Case Book, Female No. 13, H11/HLL/B/19/036 (1891), p. 154. 
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terminal care and palliative management’.16  Watching people die was a key part of 
all medical professionals’ working lives.  Having said this, the role of the nurses and 
attendants should not be overlooked.  In several cases it is made explicit in the case 
notes that an attendant alerted the medical officers to a patient’s critical physical 
condition.  It seems likely that this was the usual sequence of events, in an asylum 
with well over 1,000 patients and only a handful of doctors.  As in the case of Harriet 
Staples above, it was the nurses – especially those who worked in the infirmary – 
who were most often present at the point of death and cared for the dying.  They 
had as much intimate experience of death as the asylum’s medical officers, if not 
more.   
Of course, sometimes a patient’s death caught Hanwell’s medical officers by 
surprise.  In these cases, an hour-by-hour, post-hoc account of events was recorded 
in the case notes, instead of the day-to-day entries made during made protracted 
deaths. 17  Very rarely, a patient would be discovered dead.  There is only one such 
example in my sample, from November 1892, when medical superintendent, R.R. 
Alexander, came across the body of a patient on one of his regular rounds.18 
Nov 26.  This morning at 11:05, RR Alexander, on going round 
second infirmary saw [John] Dodge lying on his belly with the 
back of his head turned upwards, he immediately went in and 
found Dodge near dead quite dead, no signs of the faintest 
hearts action being obtainable.  Artificial respiration was tried 
for some time to no avail.  The face was rather cyanne the lips 
full and blue.  At 10:40 the attendant had lifted him off a 
commode and seen him comfortably ensconced in his bed 
looking the same as past, there being no indication that he was 
so near death.   
                                                             
16 Patricia Jalland, 'Victorian Death and its Decline', in Peter Jupp and Clare Gittings (eds), Death in 
England:  an illustrated history (Manchester, 1999), p. 240. 
17 For example, Ann Hart, H11/HLL/B/19/022 (1872), p. 387. 
18 John Dodge, Hanwell Case Book, Male No. 13, H11/HLL/B/20/022 (1892), p. 47. 
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This example alerts us to the fact that case notes constitute constructed narratives, as 
much as a straightforward representation of events.  The facts of the matter are 
unclear:  was John Dodge ‘near dead’, or ‘quite dead’ when Dr Alexander found 
him?  The evidence given – the lack of a pulse, the unsuccessful respiration - 
suggests that Dodge was dead when he was found, but the presence of the crossed 
out ‘near dead’ inserts some ambiguity.  The report is written in Dr Alexander’s 
hand, so this textual inconsistency was not a result of miscommunication, but seems 
instead to be an artefact of the doctor’s attempts to construct a coherent narrative of 
events.  The attendant’s claim, that there was ‘no indication’ of Dodge’s critical state, 
suggests a rather questionable sequence of events, in which the patient went from 
entirely stable to completely dead in a matter of minutes.  However, Dr Alexander 
repeats it as fact, and there is no evidence of disciplinary action being taken against 
the attendant for dereliction of duty.  Dr Alexander’s actions and words in the case 
of John Dodge indicate  the Superintendent’s desire to provide, in the official record, 
a contained, uncomplicated narrative of death. 
Medical Superintendents had to guard against accusations of mistreatment 
or neglect of asylum patients, which was a prosecutable offence under the Lunacy 
Acts.  Under the 1862 Lunacy Act, they were required by law to inform the Lunacy 
Commissioners of any sudden deaths and to inform the county coroner of all 
deaths.19  In theory, the coroner could choose to conduct an inquest into any death 
he deemed suspicious.  In practice, according to Pamela Michael and David Hirst, it 
was often down to the medical officers themselves to draw the attention of the busy 
coroners to any notable deaths.20  Inquests were rare at Hanwell.  Only one death in 
my sample ended in an inquest.  John Auger was admitted to the asylum on 15th 
December  1871, and died the next day.  The inquest returned the verdict that the 
infirm 79-year-old died of ‘natural death from general debility’.  The doctor who 
recorded this verdict into the case book was not satisfied.  ‘It is represented in the 
verdict,’ he wrote, ‘that the death was sudden, whereas the death was not sudden 
                                                             
19 Jennifer Wallis, 'The Bones of the Insane', History of Psychiatry, 24 (2013), p. 199.  This accounts 
for the dearth of detail regarding patients’ deaths in the case notes of 1851-52, compared with the 
later samples. 
20 Michael and Hirst, 'Recording the Many Faces of Death at the Denbigh Asylum', p. 44. 
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and no mention of suddenness was made at the inquest.’  He wished it to be made 
very clear that the death of John Auger was well underway before he arrived, and 
that his brief time at Hanwell by no means contributed to it.21  
At Hanwell, it seems, asylum doctors also held the upper hand in 
determining whether or not an inquest would take place.  In this way, they could 
continue to control the official narrative about a patient’s death, even if there were 
unusual circumstances or familial concerns.  In 1912, a 61-year-old charwoman 
named Martha Dane was admitted to the asylum, only to die four days later.22  
During this time she reportedly attacked and fought with nurses and other patients, 
biting and scratching.  Before long, she was sent to a padded cell.  Each outbreak of 
violence, along with the response of the officers and attendants, was recounted in 
detail in the case book.  On the morning of her third consecutive day in the padded 
cell, Martha was found dead.  In the case book, the probable cause of death was 
given as an ‘epileptic seizure’.  The subsequent post-mortem, undertaken by one of 
Hanwell’s assistant medical officers, revealed a ‘mass of soft chewed bread’ at the 
back of her larynx. Percy Baily, the Medical Superintendent, then gave a second 
verdict of ‘death from asphyxiation’.  He conceded that ‘whether this was suicidal 
or accidental [he was] unable to say’.   These details were all included in the report 
of Martha’s ‘unusual’ death which Dr Baily sent to the coroner.  This report 
included a brief but dramatic sketch of Martha’s behaviour: ‘She was…brought to 
the asylum strapped to a stretcher and the Attendant who accompanied her stated 
that she had been violent…She was subject to frequent attacks of violent frenzy 
during which she became very excited and fought with and tried to bite those who 
approached her’.  The report continues with an hour-by-hour account of the 
comings and goings of nurses and doctors to Martha’s cell in the night before her 
death, and an assurance from one nurse that the intervals between visits had ‘never 
exceeded half an hour’.  The purpose of the report seems to have been to exonerate 
the asylum and its staff as far as possible; by providing a clear narrative of the 
appropriate manner in which they fulfilled their duties, and by demonstrating that 
                                                             
21 John Auger, Hanwell Case Book, Male No. 11, H11/HLL/B/20/011 (1871), p. 71. 
22 Martha Dane, H11/HLL/B/19/063 (1912), p. 113. 
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Martha was a truly uncontrollable and unpredictable person.  The coroner was 
perfectly satisfied with Baily’s account, agreeing that ‘no further light [could] be 
thrown’ on the case by an inquest.   
This decision did not satisfy Martha’s family.  Her brother-in-law wrote a 
letter to the Commissioners of Lunacy, complaining that ‘the explanation given is 
not at all satisfactory’ and that ‘it rather looks like something is being hushed up’.  
They had evidence to bolster their concerns. Martha’s sister and sister-in-law, on 
visiting Martha at the asylum during her brief stay there, had found that some of 
her lower teeth were missing, and that there was ‘a quantity of congealed blood in 
her mouth’.  There was no mention of this in any of the asylum’s own records.  Her 
brother-in-law wondered if the same ‘rough treatment’ which caused this injury 
might also have caused her death.  ‘I feel very strongly,’ he concluded, ‘that anyone 
who has the misfortune to lose their reason requires all the protection that the law 
allows.’  He was to be disappointed.  The Commissioners took no further action 
beyond forwarding this letter to Hanwell. No inquest was held, and it seems that 
there was no further communication with the family.  Percy Baily clearly felt he had 
nothing to fear from this challenge, inserting the families’ letter – and thus, an 
alternative version of events – into Martha’s case note.   
On one hand, Martha Dane’s case demonstrates the permeability of the 
asylum walls.  Martha was not abandoned to the asylum; her family came to 
witness her condition with their own eyes, and felt empowered to bring their 
concerns after her death to a higher authority.  On the other hand, her case also 
shows how firmly the balance of power was tipped towards the asylum medical 
staff.  Baily used his authoritative position, his role as witness and reporter of 
events, and his professional relationship with the coroner, to smooth over any 
irregularities in the story of Martha Dane’s death. In the face of outside challenges, 
which in this case seem to have had some merit, asylum officials were still very 
successful in controlling the official narrative of deaths which occurred under their 
jurisdiction.  
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The case notes offer a good sense of what the doctors and attendants at 
Hanwell did when they believed a patient was dying.  These were not heroic 
measures.  John Dodge’s case provides the single example in my sample of an 
attempt to revive a patient, which seems only to have been attempted because of the 
apparent suddenness of his death.  Once the doctors at Hanwell had judged that a 
person was ‘sinking’, they were generally content to observe the patient’s inevitable 
demise.  Their observation was not passive:  the case notes suggest that the doctors 
monitored the patients’ vital activities: their pulse, their temperature, their 
breathing.  They listened to sounds of their lungs, checking for pneumonia and 
other respiratory afflictions.  The aim of this monitoring, however, appeared to be 
an assessment of the patient’s proximity to death, rather than a precursor to 
treatment.  They had, in the words of one contemporary physician, ‘dismiss[ed] all 
thoughts of cure, or of the prolongation of life’.23  This statement appeared in a book 
published in 1887 by a physician named William Munk.  It was entitled Euthanasia, 
meaning simply ‘a good death’.  Munk emphasised that the role of a doctor at the 
death-bed was to ensure that the patient was as comfortable – physically and 
mentally – as possible.24  His attitude was apparently shared by the doctors of 
Hanwell.  They kept the patients nourished, feeding them extra milk and food in 
liquid form if they could no longer eat solids.  The ‘appropriate remedies’ referred 
to in the case of Ann Hart probably meant alcohol or ‘stimulants’.  Although Munk 
cautioned against the too-liberal use of these, doses of brandy or ‘stimulating cough 
mixture’ were the most frequently-administered substances to dying or weak 
patients at Hanwell.   In 1893, an assistant medical officer noted that 82-year-old 
William Kent was ‘being kept alive on milk and brandy, [though] his life is a mere 
flicker’.25 When Dalby Scoones’ breathing became ‘greatly oppressed’, he was given 
‘winetic and tonic medicines’ as well as simple ‘wine’, to no avail.26  Munk was 
more enthusiastic about the use of opiates, as a treatment for the physical and 
                                                             
23William Munk, Euthanasia; or Medical Treatment in Aid of an Easy Death (London, 1887), p. 86, as 
quoted in Jalland, 'Victorian Death and its Decline', p. 241. 
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mental anguish prior to death.  At Hanwell, opium seems to have been used only in 
cases where the patient was in significant pain from some identifiable source, such 
as a hernia, or cancer.27 
Before any of these actions were taken, the patient was usually taken to an 
infirmary ward, if they were not there already.  There are a number of practical 
reasons for this.  The infirmary was, of course, where all patients in need of 
significant physical care were sent.  It had the resources to make the patients more 
comfortable, such as waterbeds, which were commonly used to prevent and soothe 
bed-sores.  Moving dying patients to the same place also maximised the efficiency 
of post-mortem procedures, and enabled the swift and unobtrusive removal of 
patients to the ‘dead-house’.28  The moving of critically ill patients away from the 
general wards may also have been an act of propriety.  Ann Hart’s case notes 
quoted above suggest that the ‘appropriate remedies’ were administered prior to her 
removal to the infirmary.  Her physical needs were provided for on the general 
ward, and it was only just before her death that she was moved.29  The removal of 
dying patients to the infirmary wards allowed Hanwell’s staff to minimise the 
distress of other patients, and to keep death at the asylum spatially contained.  If 
death was contained within the infirmary, the general wards could continue to be 
viewed as spaces of recovery.  In such a large and overcrowded institution, it was 
important to try to keep the spectre of death as hidden as possible.  The removal of 
dying patients to the infirmary was one way to ensure this. 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Pat Jalland argues, lay people’s 
priorities regarding death shifted from the spiritual to the physical, and increasing 
numbers of people sought out medical expertise to ensure as comfortable a death as 
possible.30  Jalland’s work is based on the interests and behaviour of middle-class 
families, who could bring a doctor into their home.  The growing importance of 
institutional death, however, can also be understood as part of this wider shift.  
                                                             
27 Emma Cecil, H11/HLL/B/19/036 (1891), p. 576; Edward Carwell, H11/HLL/B/20/022 (1892), p. 211. 
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Within the asylum, there were attempts to retain a spiritual presence.  Hanwell 
employed a resident Anglican Chaplain throughout this period, who was joined by 
a Free Church Minister in the early 1900s.31  The Chaplain’s official duties were to 
hold services for the patients and make regular rounds of the wards. The Chaplains’ 
annual reports suggest that they tried to minister to the dying, but that this often 
proved challenging.  In his annual report of 1872, Chaplain John May wrote that ‘To 
the dying…my visits are very unsatisfactory’.  By the time he was alerted to the fact 
that a patient was dying, he complained, most were unconscious, and few had the 
capacity to ‘derive benefit from [his] ministrations’.32  The marginalisation of 
spiritual ministration to the dying in the asylum, it seems, was less a conscious shift 
in emphasis, from the spiritual to the medical, and more a result of practical 
institutional limitations.   The institutionalisation of dying necessarily impeded 
spiritual involvement in death, and put dying people directly in front of medical 
practitioners.  Thus, the nineteenth-century medicalization of death, identified by 
Pat Jalland, was not just a result of bourgeois fears, and of the rise of medical 
legitimacy, but a product of the increasing prevalence of institutional death. 
Michael and Hirst have suggested that removal to the asylum constituted a 
‘social death’ prior to the patients’ actual deaths.  The Victorian ideal of a ‘good 
death’ involved being surrounded by family, in the home. 33 Having already been 
removed from their social context, the death of an asylum patient was an 
institutional event, rather than a familial one.   Yet there is evidence from the case 
notes that patients’ families could be involved in the death of their insane relatives.  
One of the most common ways was through assent to, or refusal of, a post-mortem.  
Under the 1832 Anatomy Act, institutionalised paupers could legally be ‘dissected’ 
for research, teaching or medical investigation.  This practice operated under a 
system of ‘presumed consent’, but families had the power to refuse permission for 
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post-mortems to take place.34  This power, it seems, was rarely used at Hanwell.  
The Lunacy Commissioners consistently praised the high proportion of deaths at 
Hanwell which were followed by a post-mortem, and very few case notes in this 
sample are adorned with the bright red heading ‘P.M. refused’.  Families and 
friends could also intervene to provide funeral expenses for patients, and protect 
them from the fate of a pauper burial.  When Esther Racker was admitted to 
Hanwell in 1892, she was said to have ‘no friends known’.  Yet, a year later, a friend 
wrote to say that ‘several ladies [were] interested in her case’ and that ‘she should 
not be subjected to a post mortem nor have a pauper burial’.  They offered up to 
five pounds towards her funeral expenses.35  
 In 1891-92, the case books contain references to a ‘sick note’ being sent to 
families when a patient was seriously ill or seemed close to death.  By 1911, this was 
common practice.  This was an important facet of the continued contact between 
patients, their friends and families and the asylum, reaching far beyond the time of 
admission.  The increased use of the ‘sick note’ shows that, even while the family 
voices were becoming marginalised in psychiatric knowledge, their actions, feelings 
and ideas remained an important influence on asylum practice.  When patient 
Fanny Osborne’s breathing became somewhat troubled, the medical officers 
decided to send a sick note as ‘her friends [were] rather fussy’ even though they felt 
that she did ‘not appear to be ill’.36  The sick note gave friends and families the 
opportunity to visit their relative before they died.  There is one case in my sample 
of a patient’s husband being present at her death, even though she had spent nine 
years in the asylum. Some years earlier, the same patient’s husband had asked 
permission for her to continue to wear her wedding ring, which was granted.   He 
had certainly not considered her ‘dead’, socially or otherwise, when she entered the 
asylum.37  The daughters of another patient, Catherine Johnson, responded to the 
news of their mother’s illness by asking for her to be released to them, so that they 
might nurse her in her dying days.  However, the superintendent judged that ‘the 
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nursing of their mother would throw too great a strain on their health and 
resources’ and the application for discharge was refused.38  This suggests that the 
administrators of Hanwell had, by this point, gone some way towards accepting the 
role of the asylum as a provider of palliative care to the old.  At the end of her life, 
Catherine represented the type of patient many asylum physicians claimed to be 
loath to treat:  infirm, dependent and, ‘altogether requir[ing] the greatest care and 
attention’.  Yet when offered relief from this burden, the superintendent and the 
managing committee chose not to take it.  Four weeks later, Catherine died, in the 
asylum, in the presence of a nurse.  
Discharge 
Death was not the only way out of Hanwell for older patients:  over a quarter of 
patients in this sample were discharged, or transferred to another institution.  There 
were three categories of ‘discharge’ set out under the 1845 Lunacy Act:  ‘recovered’, 
‘relieved’ and ‘not improved’.39  These categories were used at Hanwell, although 
the nomenclature changed over time:  in the 1850s, ‘recovery’ was sometimes 
referred to as ‘cure’, and in the 1850s and 70s ‘improved’ was used more regularly 
than ‘relieved’.  These assigned categories indicate that it was possible for a patient 
over 60 to recover; or rather, that patients over 60 could be categorised as such.  
Forty per cent of the patients in this sample who were discharged were said to be 
recovered.  Recovery rates, of course, diminished significantly with age, but older 
patients could still recover:  11 of the 124 patients who were 70 or over on admission 
were discharged recovered.   
 For the most part, however, this tripartite categorisation of patients obscures 
more than it reveals.  The different categories were used inconsistently.  The 
category ‘relieved’ almost disappeared in the 1910s, replaced by the more 
ambiguous term ‘discharged’.  Across this period, patients who were transferred to 
other asylums might be classified as relieved, or as not improved.  Clinically, the 
lines between all of these categories were blurred. Discharge, just like admission, 
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was not decided on purely clinical grounds:  it was a process negotiated between 
the asylum, the family, and the Poor Law Union, taking into account the needs and 
capacities of each.40  A more meaningful classification of these discharges, then, 
would take into account the party which instigated the discharge, and the patient’s 
destination.  The rest of this chapter will consider discharges instigated by the 
medical superintendent, discharges instigated by families and friends, and 
discharges to other institutions.   
The Medical Superintendent had significant power in the discharge process, 
far more so than in the admissions process.  Most of the patients who left the 
asylum did so because they had been identified as suitable candidates for discharge 
by the Medical Superintendent.  As Mary Fisher has pointed out, the category 
‘recovered’ was reserved entirely for such patients:  it was, after all, the professional 
and legal duty of the Medical Superintendent to release patients who were no 
longer insane as soon as possible.41  Unlike newly certified patients, to whom the 
asylum medical officers had no access prior to their admission, discharged patients 
were entirely under the purview of the Medical Superintendent’s medical 
judgement.  As David Wright puts it, ‘identifying patients for discharge was one of 
the few areas in which medical superintendents could attempt to establish expertise 
in the new field of mental disease.’42 They were not, however, the only authority in 
the discharge process.  In legal terms, it was the managing Committee of Visitors 
who had the most responsibility in deciding if a patient was to be discharged.  
Under the 1853 Lunatic Asylums Act, a patient could be discharged through the 
assent of three asylum Visitors, or two Visitors with additional support from the 
Medical Superintendent.43  Discharge decisions were made at the monthly meetings 
of the Hanwell Committee of Visitors prior to 1889, and at the meetings of the LCC 
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Asylum Committee thereafter.  For the most part, this was a simple process, in 
which the Committee signed off on the recommendations for discharge brought 
forward by the Superintendent.  In some cases, friends or relatives of a patient 
requested permission to remove them from the asylum on an ‘undertaking’.  This 
was a legally prescribed process, which took into account practical and financial 
considerations, rather than medical ones:  undertakings were to be granted only if 
the asylum Visitors were satisfied that the patient would be properly taken care of, 
would pose no danger to themselves of others and, crucially, would not be 
chargeable to the Union upon their release.44  Legally, the Medical Superintendent 
had no official role in granting these undertakings; that decision belonged purely to 
the justices.  In practice, it seems, the Medical Superintendent was generally happy 
to agree to these requests, discharging the patients ‘relieved’.  Their opinion was not 
decisive, however, and this sample contains two cases of patients who were 
discharged on undertaking without the Medical Superintendent’s approval.  
The clinical criteria for recovery were as ambiguous as the criteria for 
insanity.  In an article in the Journal of Mental Science, private asylum physician, 
Hebert Hayes Newington, suggested that the most important question in deciding a 
discharge was ‘How far has the residence of the patient answered the purpose for 
which he was sent there?’45 In the few cases where precise details of a patient’s 
recovery are included in the Hanwell case notes, they were often a reflection of the 
patient’s condition on admission.  Patients who had been described as desponding 
or melancholic on admission were, in their last case note entries, described as bright 
and cheerful; patients who had been excited were described as calm or quiet; 
patients who had been incoherent were said to be rational; patients who were 
delusional or hallucinating had finally realised their errors.  In clinical terms, then, 
recovery was depicted as an amelioration of the most salient aspects of an 
individual patient’s insanity.  However, as shown in Chapter Three, the ‘purpose 
for which the patient was sent’ was only partially dependent on their clinical state, 
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and was predicated on the manageability of their behaviour.  Recovered patients 
were not expected to be fully compos mentis, and a certain level of mental 
enfeeblement was tolerated in supposedly ‘recovered’ patients’.  Prior to his 
discharge ‘recovered’ to the workhouse, Thomas Adams’ delusions of suspicion had 
disappeared, but his ‘memory remain[ed] very defective’.46  Catherine Burke had 
also lost her delusions of suspicion when the medical officers began to consider her 
discharge, but she was still ‘liable to be depressed’ and ‘timid and apprehensive’ at 
the thought of going home.47  An imperfect level of recovery, then, was sufficient to 
be categorised as ‘recovered’.     
Just as a patient’s unmanageability was often key to the decision to 
institutionalise them, order and quiet were referred to as signs of recovery.  Orderly 
behaviour in the case notes was often aligned to ‘industriousness’.  A return to 
productive work had practical and therapeutic implications, for both the individual 
and the institution.  The work performed by patients was essential to the asylum’s 
smooth and economical operation.  Hanwell was remarkably self-sufficient, with its 
own farm and even its own brewery.    A patient with specific occupational skills, 
such as shoemaking and carpentry, would find those skills put to use in the 
asylum’s workshops.48  Others would work in the garden, the kitchens, the laundry, 
or at cleaning and maintaining the ward.  This work was not confined to younger 
patients:  Richard Chassell was 72 when he entered Hanwell, lauded as a ‘hale and 
hearty old man’, and worked as a carpenter during his year of residence there.49  A 
return to productive work was a necessity for many patients, and the ability to be 
self-sufficient was taken into account in discharge decisions.  George Stuck was 
insistent that he could ‘easily support [his wife] by hawking’, if he was discharged, 
and so was sent out on trial.50   
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At the same time, there was clearly no expectation that all of the discharged 
patients would support themselves in the outside world.  Work at the asylum was 
understood partly as therapy, ‘chiefly regarded as valuable in relation to its salutary 
influence on the patients themselves’.51  Many patients were discharged – 
‘recovered’ or otherwise – to the workhouse, including patients whose employment 
in the asylum was described as a sign of their mental recovery.  A return to 
‘industriousness’, then, was not valued purely as an indication that the discharged 
patient would not be a burden on the rate payer, as historian Lawrence Ray has 
argued.52  Industriousness was valued in and of itself, as a sign of orderliness and 
tractability, and of re-entry into the social body.53  Notably, being ‘quiet’, ‘orderly’ 
and ‘cheerful’ appear to have been equally valued traits amongst recovering older 
patients.  As discussed in Chapter Three, many older patients were removed to the 
asylum because they did not conform to the role of a docile dependent.  A quiet, 
orderly and essentially pleasant old person, even if they were ‘simple’ and largely 
unable to care for themselves, did not pose the management problems which led to 
asylum admission. If a patient underwent such a transformation in the asylum, then 
the ‘purpose for which [they] were sent’ had indeed been fulfilled.    
The availability of support outside the asylum was crucial to all discharges.  
As in the case of admission, the ‘capacity and willingness’ of families, friends or the 
Poor Law Union to take responsibility for the patient was as important in securing 
discharge from the asylum as the patient’s clinical state.54 However, the interactions 
which occurred between the family, the Poor Law and the asylum at the point of 
discharge were far less well-documented than those which occurred at the point of 
admission.  All the family interactions described here come from the 1911-12 
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sample.  These case notes reveal that the desires and capacities of the family were 
taken into account in discharge decisions, even when they had not specifically come 
forward and asked for the patient to be discharged. 55  George Ostick’s final case 
note entry before his discharge states that, as well as being ‘much improved’, ‘his 
children [were] anxious to have him with them’.56  When Catherine Thompson was 
discharged, Superintendent Percy Baily noted that she was ‘not in very robust 
health’ and ‘rather senile’, but that she ‘proposed to live with her daughter in the 
country’ and was therefore suitable to be released.57   
 Although the families were clearly involved in the decision to discharge 
George and Catherine, they were discharged at the behest of the Superintendent, 
who recommended them to the Committee himself.  Families were more directly 
involved in ‘undertakings’, in which a friend or family member came forward to 
take a patient out of the asylum, even if they had not been deemed ‘recovered’.  
These discharges took place throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, 
and there are examples in the case notes of children, siblings, spouses, and friends 
undertaking an older asylum patient’s care.  For the most part, the Superintendent 
was happy to allow these discharges to take place, and the patients were 
categorised as ‘relieved’.  Two patients, both of whom were admitted in 1911, were 
discharged without Superintendent Percy Baily’s approval.  These problematic 
discharges are far more thoroughly documented than the successful ones, and offer 
an interesting insight into Baily’s attitude towards older patients, and his 
understanding of role of the asylum. 
When Mary Ann Vale was discharged three months after her admission, 
Baily entered his disapproval into her case note: 
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Sept 18 [1911].  A friend applied for her discharge on an 
undertaking today.  This I opposed on the grounds that drink 
was the cause and that more prolonged abstinence would 
benefit her and also keep her out of prison.  The application was 
successful and she left this afternoon.  Not improved.58 
Prior to her recovery, a different medical officer had noted that she ‘worr[ied] a 
good bit to go home’.  This desire, along with the assurances of the friends who 
sought to fulfil it, apparently carried more weight with the Committee than Baily’s 
concerns about her need for sobriety.  Mary Ann’s case demonstrates the significant 
agency of herself and her friends in the face of opposition from the medical 
authority.  Her case also suggests a difference of opinion between the managing 
committee and the Medical Superintendent over the role of the asylum.  Baily 
clearly held a long-term and reformative view of what the asylum could offer its 
patients: his desire to keep Mary Ann in the asylum, in order to keep her away from 
drink, suggests a belief in a duty of care, as well as a practical desire to prevent 
readmission.  This is despite the fact that she was diagnosed as a case of ‘senile 
dementia’, whose ‘simple and demented’ mental state identified her as the type of 
case that Medical Superintendents often derided.  The managing committee were 
either swayed by assurances that Mary Ann would be kept away from drink, or 
they were motivated by more short -term concerns.  There was no suggestion in 
Baily’s report that there was any more actively curative treatment of which she 
could be availed, nor that she was in any way dangerous; there was no legal reason 
to keep her in the asylum.  The undertaking signed by her friends stated that she 
would not claim poor-relief, thus her removal from the asylum removed her from 
public assistance entirely.  When such considerations won out against Baily’s 
advice, he was able only to register his opposition by categorising her discharge as 
‘not improved’.   
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 In the second case of this nature, the clue to Baily’s opposition is not found 
in the case note itself, but in a letter attached to it.  The penultimate entry in Sarah 
Ann Burt’s case note paints a picture of a particularly difficult inmate:   
Oct 2.  Is very obstinate and demented.  Tries to get away and 
wanders all over the place.  Needs constant supervision and is 
wet and dirty in her habits.  Is spiteful and excitable. 
Five days later, the final entry informs us that ‘[s]he was discharged not relieved to 
care of sister at Cheltenham.’  Her case note reveals nothing more about the 
circumstances of her removal, but there is a revealing letter, sent by Sarah Ann’s 
sister, Martha, some time after her discharge.  Martha begins by telling Dr Baily that 
she was ‘so sorry I took [Sarah Ann] from under your care’.  Soon after her arrival at 
her sister’s home, Sarah Ann ‘became so troublesome that the person helping me 
could not manage her’.  Martha called for a doctor, who was of the opinion that 
Sarah Ann was ‘stark raving mad’, and arranged for her removal to Gloucester 
County Asylum.  Martha wrote that she was ‘verry [sic] penitent’ and ‘so grieved to 
think that I have been so much trouble to you to get her under my care’.  
Mournfully, she explained her motivation for having done so: ‘I having no one but 
her hoped she would get allright and be company for me.  I am so lonely and think 
much of her when I am sitting sewing’.59   
Sarah Ann Burt’s case demonstrates that family assurances could carry 
significant weight in the eyes of the Committee, even in the face of unequivocal 
opposition from the Superintendent.  It is also a useful reminder that the decision to 
care for an insane relative was not always entirely selfless. Sarah Ann Burt’s sister 
wanted her with her, to keep her company.  This may seem slightly naive, given the 
doctors’ assessment of her mental state, but this is not how her sister saw her.  Sarah 
Ann Burt’s sister did not see her as a lunatic, or an asylum patient, but as a person, a 
loved one and a companion.  She, and perhaps other family members who acted in 
a similar way, was not only removing her sister from the asylum, but also seeking 
to re-establish her identity as someone who was more than a ‘patient’.   
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 Sarah Ann Burt’s was not the only discharge to go wrong.  Other discharges, 
endorsed by the medical superintendent, resulted in re-admittance.  A year after her 
admission, Dr Baily noted that Emma Haselton’s friends were ‘anxious to have her 
home’, and so recommended her discharge on trial for four weeks.  This was usual 
practice in cases of discharge initiated by the superintendent.  Twelve days later, 
she was brought back to the asylum ‘in a now depressed condition, sleepless, 
constipated, and quite unable to do anything but groan at her miserable lot.’  A year 
later, an entry to Emma’s case note indicated that she was ‘always expecting to go 
home’, but that ‘her friends don’t want her home unless she is quite well after their 
previous experience’.60  Discharge was an unpredictable process; neither the doctor 
nor the friends and families could know how they or the patient would respond.  In 
this instance, it seems that Emma Haselton’s friends were expecting her to be 
convalescent, and were not prepared to take on the responsibility for caring for her 
in the depths of her illness.  She died in the asylum a year later.  George Stuck, who 
had assured the doctors that he could ‘easily support [his wife] by hawking’ before 
his discharge on trial, was also readmitted two weeks later.  He was ‘noisy, excited 
and incoherent’, admitting to ‘having been drinking heavily’.  Two days later, he 
died.61   
 These stories of relapse and readmittance undercut the optimism inherent in 
the idea of discharge from the asylum.  Indeed, discharge from the asylum did not 
necessarily mean a return to the home.  Of the 115 patients in this sample who were 
discharged from Hanwell, at least 30 were transferred to another asylum.  Patients 
who were chargeable to Poor Law Unions outside London were transferred to 
asylums in their home county.  Jewish patients were transferred to Hanwell’s 
sibling institution, Colney Hatch, which was treated as the de facto asylum for 
London’s Jewish population, although it was never officially designated as such.62  
Maria Waterman, although 73 and ‘in very weak health’ on her arrival at Hanwell, 
was transferred to Colney Hatch ‘to be quartered along with the other Pauper 
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62 Carole Reeves, 'Insanity and Nervous Diseases Amongst Jewish Immigrants to the East End of 
London, 1880 - 1920', (PhD Thesis, University of London, 2001), pp. 30-2. 
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Jewesses of unsound mind’ a year after her admission.63 The case notes also show 
that Hanwell’s officials also used the MAB imbecile asylums as a place to remove 
some of their aged and incurable patients, though not as many, perhaps, as they 
might have hoped.  In 1870, soon after the opening of the MAB asylums, the 
Committee of Visitors reported that they ‘look[ed] forward at no distant period, to 
the removal from this Asylum to the whole of this class of Patients, thus creating a 
large number of vacancies for recent and severe cases.’64  By ‘this class of patients’, 
they meant incurable, enfeebled and unmanageable patients, many of whom were 
aged.  Eighty-four-year-old Sarah Wilford was discharged within weeks of her 
admission to Hanwell in January 1871, ‘to the workhouse for removal to an imbecile 
asylum’.65  Sarah Wilford’s swift discharge demonstrates the enthusiasm with which 
the medical officers and managers of Hanwell embraced the new MAB asylums as a 
potential source of relief from the burden of aged care.  Sarah Wilford was not an 
isolated case, but her experience was not common.  Within this sample, only ten 
patients were discharged with an explicit intent to remove them to a MAB asylum, 
although others may eventually have found their way to those institutions.  None 
left Hanwell as swiftly as Sarah:  three were at Hanwell for less than six months, but 
four remained there for over a decade.  Leaving Hanwell in this manner, being 
shuttled in the direction of the MAB imbecile asylums, was in many ways the 
opposite to being discharged ‘recovered’.  It was a continuation of the institutional 
displacements described in Chapter Three.  Patients were sent to the MAB asylums 
not because they were recovering, but because the medical officers of the asylum 
believed that they never would.  Patients removed to the MAB asylums faced a 
lifetime of institutionalisation, and an institutional death, much as if they had 
remained at Hanwell. 
 
 
                                                             
63 Maria Waterman, H11/HLL/B/19/022 (1872), p. 291. 
64
 The Twenty-Fifth Report of the Committee of Visitors of the County Lunatic Asylum at Hanwell 
(1870), p. 8. 
65 Sarah Wilford, H11/HLL/B/19/019 (1871), p. 177. 
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Conclusion 
The older a patient was when they were admitted to Hanwell, the less likely 
they were to leave.  An institutional death was therefore a significant part of the 
asylum experience of aged patients as a group.  Those that did die in the asylum 
benefitted from the developed palliative expertise of the asylum medical officers, 
but were denied the trappings of a ‘good death’:  although families were alerted in 
the case of serious illness (at least, in the early twentieth century), and may have 
achieved a final visit, there is only one case of a relative being present in the final 
moment.  Religious ministration was available, but marginalised:  an institutional 
death was a medical event, not a spiritual one.   
Yet some aged patients did make it out alive, and a few even went home.  
The evidence in these case notes suggests that Hanwell’s Medical Superintendents 
were generally happy to see older cases removed from their care, provided they 
were satisfied that the circumstances into which they were sending the patient 
would be broadly favourable.  They did utilise other institutions – particularly the 
workhouse and the MAB asylums – as places to offload undesirable cases, but not 
as much as the rhetoric discussed in Chapter Two would suggest.  Indeed, perhaps 
the most significant finding of this chapter is Percy Baily’s resistance to certain 
discharges, which suggest that he still considered older patients to be his 
responsibility, and did not seek to remove older cases out of his asylum whenever 
the opportunity arose.  The examples in this chapter show that there was not only a 
recognition that recovery could take place, even when a person fell ill in their 
sixties, but also a recognition that even ‘senile’ cases, in which there was little 
apparent hope for recovery, could still benefit from asylum care. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis was originally conceived as a history of senile dementia in the 
nineteenth century:  how it was understood, how it was responded to, and what it 
was like to suffer from such disorders during this period.  What has emerged is 
something at the same time more complicated and more limited. The object of study 
became old-age mental disorder, and the variety of ways in which it was 
categorised and understood became part of the investigation.  The institutional and 
intellectual reference point for this thesis became psychiatry alone:  its ideas, its 
institutions, its patients.  Thus, the question became: how was old age-mental 
disorder understood, categorised and responded to in the theory, policy and 
practice of psychiatry?  This conclusion, then, will take the two sections of this 
question in turn: understandings and categories, and responses.  It will outline the 
major findings of this thesis in each of these areas, relate these to current 
scholarship, show the limitations of its findings, and suggest new areas of research.  
Ultimately, it will show that this thesis – the first substantial study of old age in the 
context of the asylum and psychiatry – has provided a number of starting points for 
further study, whilst also offering somewhat of a corrective to particular historical 
narratives.  Its overall argument is this:  in the late-nineteenth century, senility 
became more prominent in psychiatry – as a category of mental disorder, as a type 
of patient, and as a problematic group within the asylum.  Yet this prominence did 
not yield great benefits for the patients themselves:  the senile were a perpetual 
residuum, a problem to be removed but not to be solved, whose fate – if they did 
end up in the asylum – was likely to be a well-managed, but ultimately rather 
isolated, institutional death. 
Understandings and Categories 
The conceptual history of old-age mental disorder in the nineteenth century has 
largely been written from the perspective of the twentieth century, by historians 
who are primarily interested in the emergence of Alzheimer’s disease as a major 
category of old-age mental disorder in the 1970s.    In both critical and celebratory 
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histories of the emergence of Alzheimer’s disease, the narrative presented is one of a 
shift from confusion to clarity:  the replacement of the vague and uncertain 
categories of ‘senility’ and ‘senile dementia’, with the unambiguous disease 
category of Alzheimer’s disease.1  This thesis has attempted to rescue the 
understanding of old-age mental disorder in nineteenth-century psychiatry from 
the condescension of this present-centric historiography, by imbuing it with ‘the 
positive structure of a perception, not the negativity of a confusion’.2  It has argued 
that the understandings of old-age mental disorder which developed in nineteenth-
century psychiatry were set within, and shaped by, the carefully considered 
structures of psychiatric knowledge. By the end of the nineteenth century, an 
understanding of senile dementia had emerged which was predicated on the widely 
influential model of psycho-physiological dissolution, which tied both senility and 
dementia to a straightforward material process of disintegration, and a predictable 
progressive dismantling of the mental faculties.  That is not to say that there was no 
ambiguity surrounding the category of senile dementia, particularly when it came 
to the question of whether it should be considered natural or pathological.  This was 
not, however, due to the ‘confusion’ of the psychiatric knowledge in which this 
category was embedded, but due to the deeper uncertainties surrounding the status 
of the ageing process and its effects. 
 With regards to the ‘perception’ of old-age mental disorder in nineteenth-
century psychiatry, this thesis has made one key claim:  in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the agedness of older, mentally disordered people became more 
important to the way in which they were categorised by psychiatrists, and the way 
in which their disorders were understood.  It has presented two main pieces of 
evidence to support that claim.  Firstly, the range of senile insanities, described in 
                                                             
1 For characterisations of nineteenth-century medical understandings of old-age mental disorder as 
‘vague’ and ‘confused’, see Thomas Beach, 'The History of Alzheimer's Disease: Three Debates', 
Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 42 (1987), p. 327; Martha Holstein, 'Aging, 
Culture and the Framing of Alzheimer's Disease', in Peter Whitehouse, Konrad Maurer and Jesse 
Ballenger (eds), Concepts of Alzheimer Disease:  Biological, Clinical and Cultural Perspectives 
(Baltimore, 2000), pp. 159, 162-64. 
2 This phrase is used by Gary Gutting to describe what Foucault’s Madness and Civilization 
attempted to do to the understanding of insanity prior to the twentieth century.  Gary Gutting, 
'Foucault and the History of Madness', in Gary Gutting (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault 
(Cambridge, 1994), p. 59.  
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psychiatric classifications, expanded in the second half of the nineteenth century.  
This is clearly demonstrated in the changing classificatory schemes produced by 
individual British psychiatrists in their own textbooks and treatises, and collectively 
by the Statistical Committees of the MPA.  From the late 1860s, several different 
categories of senile insanity appeared in these classifications.  Senile mania, 
melancholia and dementia were the most frequently mentioned, but senile epilepsy, 
paralysis, imbecility and convulsions also appeared.  Thus, senile insanity – the 
umbrella term for all these forms of insanity – came to be understood as a disorder 
which could manifest in a wide variety of ways: indeed, through ‘all the varied 
forms of insanity usually differentiated’.3  By the same token, this meant that an 
older person suffering from any mental disorder, manifested through any 
combination of symptoms, could be classified as ‘senile’. The refraction of senile 
insanity allowed any type of mental suffering to be attributed to the inevitable 
degeneration of their ageing body.   
 The second major piece of evidence supporting this claim – that old age 
became a more important factor in the classification of mental disorder in later life, 
and in the description of its sufferers – is the increase in the use of the word ‘senile’ 
in the patient records of Hanwell asylum in the latter part of the nineteenth century.  
An older patient admitted to Hanwell in the 1890s was far more likely than a 
patient admitted in the 1870s to be defined and described as old.  Between the 1870s 
and the 1890s, the proportion of older patients who were given a ‘senile’ diagnosis, 
or whose insanity was attributed to senility, increased dramatically.  At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, a new category of physical condition also 
emerged in Hanwell’s case books:  old patients were now often described as ‘senile’ 
rather than simply as ‘weak’ or ‘feeble’. Thus, the differentiation of the senile 
patient, in which older patients and their mental disorders came to be defined as 
inherently and particularly aged, was manifested in texts produced through the 
institutional practice of psychiatry in the asylum, as well as in more theoretical 
textbooks and treatises.  The emergence of the senile patient at Hanwell is striking, 
                                                             
3 William Bevan Lewis, A Text-book of Mental Diseases:  with Special Reference to the Pathological 
Aspects of Insanity (2nd edn, London, 1899), p. 406. 
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in numerical terms, but this phenomenon demands further investigation to see if it 
was more widely applicable.  In her largely literary study of The Victorians and Old 
Age, Karen Chase makes reference to one Poor Law Union in which aged 
workhouse inmates were reclassified from ‘imbecile’ to ‘senile’ between 1880 and 
1890.4  It would be interesting to know if similar patterns of classification and 
description are discernable at asylums with a more clearly defined intellectual 
character:  such as Morningside in Edinburgh where Medical Superintendent 
Thomas Clouston took personal responsibility for the assignation of diagnostic 
labels to his patients.5 The Lunacy Commissioners’ investigation into old age in all 
English and Welsh asylums in 1895, in which they identified a ‘gradual but 
continual advance’ in the proportion of patients whose mental disorder was 
attributed to old age, does suggest that the emergence of the senile patient in 
English and Welsh asylum records was a wider phenomenon.6   
The emergence of the senile patient in nineteenth-century psychiatry, 
described in this thesis, echoes a broader narrative within the history of old age: 
that nineteenth-century medical writers and researchers re-imagined the ‘aged 
body’ as a decisively differentiated physical type.  Carole Haber has argued that the 
‘elite clinicians’ of the Paris School in the early nineteenth century, who drew a new 
map of the physical effects of ageing through their detailed examinations of dead 
bodies, ‘formulated a definition of old age that separated it medically from all other 
age groups’.7  Stephen Katz has similarly argued that post-mortem investigations of 
old bodies in the nineteenth century, and the medical texts which arose from them, 
‘transformed [the aged body] into an inherently separate and inevitably 
pathological aged subject’.8   Haber and Katz’s conclusions were primarily based on 
an examination of ‘canonical [medical] texts’ which focussed specifically on ageing.9  
                                                             
4 Karen Chase, The Victorians and Old Age (Oxford, 2009), pp. 40-41. 
5 Gayle Davis, The Cruel Madness of Love: Sex, Syphilis and Psychiatry in Scotland, 1880-1930 
(Amsterdam, 2008), p. 49.  
6The Forty-Ninth Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (1895), pp. 3-4 
7 Carole Haber, Beyond Sixty-Five: the Dilemma of Old Age in America's Past (Cambridge, 1983), p. 58 
8Stephen Katz, Disciplining Old Age: the Formation of Gerontological Knowledge (Charlottesville, 
1996), p. 8. 
9 Particularly Jean-Martin Charcot, Leçons Cliniques sue les Maladies des Vieillards et les Maladies 
Chroniques (Paris, 1867); George M. Beard, Legal Responsibility in Old Age (New York, 1874); and the 
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This thesis has drawn on a very different set of texts, but it employs the same 
overarching narrative of the development of modern medical knowledge:  that, in 
the early part of the nineteenth century, pathological signs within the body came to 
dominate the identification and categorisation of disease, which, at the same time, 
created a stable and thoroughly embodied aged subject (in medicine, at least).  In 
Chapters One and Four of this thesis, the differentiation of the senile patient in late-
nineteenth-century psychiatry was attributed in large part to the attempts of David 
Skae and other psychiatrists to relate categories of mental disease to underlying 
pathological processes, and to the consequent reorientation of asylum knowledge 
practices ‘from listening to looking’.10  The similarity between the findings of this 
thesis and those of Haber and Katz is encouraging:  it suggests that the 
differentiation of aged bodies in the nineteenth century was part of a wider shift in 
medical knowledge, beyond texts which were focussed exclusively on old age or on 
psychiatry.  In Chapter One, it was shown that the major medical models of ageing 
in nineteenth-century medicine – depletion of vital energy and arteriosclerotic 
atrophy – were employed by psychiatrists in their understanding of old-age mental 
deterioration.   Work remains to be done, however, to link the psychiatric 
understandings examined in this thesis to other medical understandings of old age 
in the same time and place.  
 A multitude of senile insanities were described and employed by British 
psychiatrists in the final three decades of the nineteenth century.  At the turn of the 
century, however, the classification and categorisation of senile insanity became 
more limited.  Senile dementia was the only form of senile insanity to appear in the 
classificatory scheme produced by the MPA Statistical Committee in 1906 and – 
through the Lunacy Commissioners’ adoption of this scheme as the basis of its 
legally-enforced standard classificatory codes – it became the only senile diagnostic 
label used at Hanwell. This thesis has argued that the crystallisation of dementia as 
the prototype of senility was a product of the way in which both categories became 
                                                                                                                                                                            
work of Ignatz Nascher, particularly Geritatrics:  The Diseases of Old Age and its Treatment 
(Philadelphia, 1914). 
10 Richard Hunter and Ida Macalpine, Psychiatry for the Poor: 1851 Colney Hatch Asylum--Friern 
Hospital 1973: a Medical and Social History (Folkestone, 1974), p. 184. 
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more decisively, and precisely, embodied during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century.  The development of the model of the psycho-physiological nervous 
hierarchy in the mid-nineteenth century, and in particular John Hughlings Jackson’s 
theory of dissolution, drew the categories of senility and dementia closer together.  
Thus, the language and concepts of the evolutionary nervous hierarchy – and of 
dissolution and degeneration – shaped and reinforced the idea that both senility 
and dementia constituted a progressive, material unmaking of a person’s mind and 
body: from the highest and most evolved elements of their humanity, to the lowest, 
animal, automatic parts of their underlying nature.  The role of senility as a 
metaphor for ‘degeneration’ – the ‘model (or series of models) of decline [which] 
permeated nineteenth-century feeling [and medicine] with images of decay’ – and 
vice versa, is curiously absent from the historiography of both degeneration and old 
age.11  This thesis has argued that ageing and dementia were both imagined as 
processes of phylogenic retrogression by several late-nineteenth-century 
psychiatrists, which brought the aged and demented closer to childhood, and closer 
to our primitive ancestors.   This has opened up a significant new line of inquiry.  
The tripartite analogy of old age, childhood and primitivism is unlikely to have 
been limited to psychiatric discourses. 
At the same time as Hughlings Jackson’s model of dissolution was drawing 
the categories of senility and dementia into a clearly defined, psycho-pathological 
relationship, asylum medical officers being faced with a seemingly unceasing load 
of old people disintegrating and dying under their care, sinking into ‘helpless and 
hopeless…senile decay’.12  The second chapter of this thesis argued that the senile 
emerged as a residual category in the administrative discourses of lunacy and the 
                                                             
11 In an early edited collection on the phenomenon of degeneration, J. Edward Chamberlin refers 
obliquely to this analogy, but does not discuss it J. Edward Chamberlin, 'Introduction', in J. Edward 
Chamberlin and Sander L. Gilman (ed.), Degeneration : the dark side of progress (New York, 1985),  
p. ix.  This pattern is repeated in other studies of degeneration, such as Sherwood Williams, 'The Rise 
of a New Degeneration: Decadence and Atavism in Vandover and the Brute', ELH, 57 (1990), pp. 709-
36. There is no mention of the analogy in the major work on degeneration in Britain, Daniel Pick, 
Faces of Degeneration : a European Disorder, c.1848-c.1918 (Cambridge, 1989).  In works on old age, 
Helen Small’s study of literary and philosophical accounts of old age contains a discussion of post-
Darwinian evolutionary accounts of senescence, but not the impact of Spencerian models of 
evolution, or the analogy with degeneration.  Helen Small, The Long Life (Oxford, 2007). 
12 Minutes of the Metropolitan Asylums Board, Vol. XXXVI (1902), p. 596. 
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Poor Law:  too disorderly for the workhouse, but too old, dependent and incurable 
for the asylum.  In particular, it suggested that the administrators of lunacy – the 
Lunacy Commissioners, the managers of Hanwell and Caterham asylums, and 
Medical Superintendents at asylums across the country – mobilised an exclusionary 
discourse of senility, in their attempts to legitimate their desire to exclude aged 
patients from their institutions.  A particular understanding of old-age mental 
disorder emerged in this discourse:  as a benign, incurable and natural phenomenon, 
which should not be classed as a form of insanity.  Just as it has proved politically 
expedient, in the twentieth century, for neurologists to define Alzheimer’s as a 
pathological disease, it was expedient to the nineteenth-century administrators of 
lunacy to define senility as a natural, inevitable part of ageing.13   
Responses 
Displacement is a running theme in this thesis, and is a term which broadly 
describes the range of responses to old-age mental disorder which it has examined.  
These responses were characterised, not by a desire to ameliorate their sufferings of 
the afflicted, but to mitigate the problems they caused to the people around them.  
In Chapter Three, it was argued that aged patients were moved from one site of care 
and management to another – from homes and charitable institutions to the 
workhouse and the asylum – because they had transcended the capacity and 
willingness of the people within those sites to manage their behaviour and 
condition.  This is hardly a new insight into the history of the asylum, indeed, it is 
an argument from which few asylum historians – from Andrew Scull onwards – 
have truly deviated.   As John Walton put it, when it came to asylum admissions, 
‘what counted was the degree of inconvenience or danger presented by a person’s 
behaviour, and whether anyone was willing to look after him, or capable of 
                                                             
13 One further area of psychiatric practice on which this thesis has not touched is the legal 
assessment of mental capacity.  Nineteenth-century psychiatrists were often called to attest to the 
insanity or sanity of parties in legal cases, including those which asked them to judge to capacity of 
an older person.  This had significant implications for the understanding of senility, and both Henry 
Maudsley and Crichton Browne dedicated a substantial section of their writings on old age to this 
matter.  Peter Bartlett has set out a method for using legal records to access understandings of 
insanity, which points to another fruitful area of research in the area of old-age mental disorder.  
Peter Bartlett, 'Legal Madness in the Nineteenth Century', Social History of Medicine, 14 (2001). 
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controlling him outside an institution’.14  It is, however, this congruence with the 
findings of other historians of the asylum which makes this argument significant in 
the context of this thesis: aged patients, it seems, were admitted to the asylum for 
essentially the same reasons as people at any age.   
 At a policy level, however, the (unsuccessful) exclusion of senile patients 
from county asylums and from the MAB asylums was both predicated on, and 
reinforcing of, an understanding of senility which differentiated them from the rest 
of the asylum population.  At the same time, the responses imagined and enacted 
by the administrators of lunacy at an institutional level were also characterised by 
displacement.  Senile patients embodied both of the characteristics of the least 
desirable type of asylum patient: incurability and physical infirmity.  In the 1850s 
and 60s, the Lunacy Commissioners imagined the creation of intermediate asylum 
institutions into which these less desirable cases could be siphoned off.  However, 
Caterham and Leavesden Imbecile Asylums, the institutions which partially 
represented the fruition of these plans, established their own set of desired norms 
for their ideal population – namely trainability and inexpensive needs – which also 
excluded aged and infirm patients.  Forty years after the Lunacy Commissioners 
had first imagined their plans for an intermediate asylum – essentially a holding 
space for undesirable cases – the MAB adopted the same strategy, building Tooting 
Bec as an institution into which Caterham and Leavesden’s undesirable cases could 
be displaced.  Beyond the perpetual siphoning off of senile cases into increasingly 
cheaper and less ‘elaborate’ institutions, it became the policy of the administrators 
of lunacy from the 1860s to accept, and then promote, the workhouse as the most 
appropriate site of care for the aged mentally-disordered.  However, as discussed at 
the end of Chapter Two, this position was not supported by workhouse medical 
officers and Poor Law Guardians, who were well aware of the difficulties even very 
aged and frail mentally-disordered patients could cause on mixed infirmary wards.  
For the administrators and officers of both the workhouse and the asylum, then, the 
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 John K. Walton, 'Casting Out and Bringing Back in Victorian England:  Pauper Lunatics, 1840-70', in 
William F. Bynum, Roy Porter and Michael Shepherd (eds), The Anatomy of Madness:  Essays in the 
History of Psychiatry, Volume II: Institutions and Society (London, 1985), p. 4. 
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answer to the question ‘Where should [the senile] be accommodated?’ was usually:  
anywhere but here.15     
 In this way, the problem of accommodating senility highlights the limitation 
of social policy at the end of the nineteenth century.  Around the turn of the 
century, beginning in the early 1880s, Britain was ‘something of a cauldron for the 
production and discussion of ideas about social life, the aims of social policy, and 
the roles of charity and government’.16  The aged mentally-disordered intersected 
with many of the groups targeted by these discussions, but were denied the kind of 
positive reforms and policy changes which were directed towards these groups.  
The Royal Commission of the Aged Poor, for example, was focussed on the problem 
of ‘destitution…occasioned by incapacity for work’, not on problems relating to 
infirmity and care. The eventual policy outcome of these discussions, the 
introduction of the state pension in 1908, was aimed entirely at alleviating poverty, 
and was designed to be supplemented by additional income, potentially from work.  
The needs of the aged beyond financial support were not, therefore, a part of the 
debates and discussions surrounding the aged poor.17  The congenitally ‘idiot’, 
‘imbecile’ or ‘mentally enfeebled’ were also a subject of the ‘Social Question’.  This 
was a group which had historically been closely associated with the senile, legally 
and medically.  The category of idiocy also existed in a slightly ambiguous 
relationship with that of insanity and, as the nineteenth century progressed, the 
idiot and imbecile were also progressively and more decisively differentiated from 
the ranks of the insane.  Unlike the senile however, the differentiation of the 
congenitally mentally enfeebled was productive of, and reinforced by, policies, laws 
and institutions targeted particularly towards their needs and problems, such as 
                                                             
15 C. T. Parsons, 'The Difficulty of Dealing with Cases of Senile Insanity:  Where are they to be 
Accommodated?', The Lancet, 172 (1908), pp. 1706-7. 
16 John Offer, 'Dead Theorists and Older People: Spencer, Idealist Social Thought and Divergent 
Prescriptions For Care', Sociology, 38 (2004), pp. 890-91.  
17 This assertion is based on a reading, but not a close analysis, of the report and evidence of the 
Royal Commission of the Aged Poor.  There is certainly more work to be done on issues of 
independence and dependence in the discourses surrounding the problem of the aged poor at the 
turn of the century. 
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Idiots Act of 1886.18 This is because the feeble-minded and mentally deficient were 
imbued with meanings, and enmeshed within institutions, which had significant 
implications for the health and well-being of the nation as a whole.  They were 
‘emblematic of broader political fears about social decline’ (such as criminality and 
racial degeneration) ‘but also of progressive aspirations for social improvement’ 
(through education).19   The senile, however, were connected by contemporary 
commentators to neither the destruction of society, nor its salvation and, as such, 
were marginalised by Victorian and Edwardian policy-makers.20  
The case of the aged mentally disordered, then, supports an interpretation of 
late-nineteenth-century social policy at the end of the nineteenth century as ‘limited’ 
and ‘restricted’.21  In many respects, the aged mentally disordered represented the 
most deserving of the deserving poor:  they were incapacitated by a seemingly 
inevitable physiological decline, and intersected with one of the most 
comprehensively provided-for groups of paupers – the insane.   Yet the 
intractability of the senile problem made it an unattractive prospect for the fiscally 
conservative policy makers who continued to dominate in British politics at the turn 
of the century.  As discussed in Chapter Two, cost was a central concern to the 
administrators of lunacy in their consideration of alternative provision for the 
senile.  As Martin Gorsky has recently argued, health care provision for the aged 
                                                             
18 For more on institutions and policies related to idiocy and mental deficiency in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, see Mathew Thomson, The Problem of Mental Deficiency: Eugenics, 
Democracy, and Social Policy in Britain c.1870-1959 (Oxford, 1998); David Wright, Mental Disability 
in Victorian England: the Earlswood Asylum, 1847-1901 (Oxford, 2001); Mark Jackson, The 
Borderland of Imbecility: Medicine, Society and the Fabrication of the Feeble Mind in Later Victorian 
and Edwardian England (Manchester, 2000). 
19 Jackson, The Borderland of Imbecility, p. 2. 
20 ‘Persons who through mental infirmity arising from age…are incapable of managing themselves or 
their affairs’ were originally included in the Mental Deficiency Bill, but were removed from the final 
Act.  R.A. Leach, The Mental Deficiency Act, 1913, Together With the Regulations and Rules Made 
Under the Provisions of that Act, The Departmental Circulars, The Elementary (Defective and Epileptic 
Children) Acts, 1899 and 1914, and Introduction and Annotations (London, 1914), p. vii. 
21 This interpretation of the early-twentieth century liberal reforms, and the discussions of the 
‘Social Question’ which preceded them, has become particularly popular in the last decade.  See 
Robert F. Haggard, The Persistence of Victorian Liberalism: the Politics of Social Reform in Britain, 
1870-1900 (Westport, 2001); E. P. Hennock, The Origin of the Welfare State in England and 
Germany, 1850-1914: Social Policies Compared (Cambridge, 2007). 
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continued to be dominated by the ‘engrained assumption[] that facilities should be 
only of a modest or mean standard’ well into the twentieth century.22   
 At the same time, the focus on responses to old-age mental disorder from 
the perspective of psychiatry provides only a limited picture of responses to old-age 
mental disorder in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Britain.  Within 
other medical institutions, it seems that similar exclusionary attitudes towards the 
aged in general prevailed.  Aged patients often failed the selection criteria of 
voluntary hospitals, which prioritised patients who were curable, and could be 
returned to productive work.23  As demonstrated by the case of Agnes Ryder, 
discussed in Chapter Three, charitable homes for the aged poor also had limited 
tolerance for disruptive and disorderly inmates.  Conversely, evidence given before 
the Royal Commission for the Aged Poor hints at a more positive response to the 
aged mentally disordered within the structures and institutions of the Poor Law.  
When questioned about the activities of Poor Law relieving officers with regards to 
‘very old people…who are suffering from senile dementia’, Mr J. H. Thomas, Clerk 
to the Guardians of the Carnarvon Poor Law Union in North Wales, responded that 
‘If [the relieving officers] cannot get such people to come into the workhouse, they 
try to get the neighbours to turn in occasionally to see how they are getting on’.24  
Similarly, the Rev. Canon Hinds Howell, Chairman of the Board of Guardians of a 
Poor Law Union in Norfolk, suggested that ‘if there was anyone to take care of 
[senile dements]’ they were left at home, but otherwise they would be brought ‘into 
the [work]house’.25  This suggests that, in these rural areas at least, officers of the 
Poor Law played an active role in ensuring the well-being of the elderly mentally 
disordered.  A study of old-age mental disorder which held the Poor Law at its 
centre, then, may well produce a very different picture of the response to old-age 
mental disorder in nineteenth-century Britain. 
                                                             
22 Martin Gorsky, 'Creating the Poor Law Legacy: Institutional Care for Older People Before the 
Welfare State', Contemporary British History, 26 (2012), p. 457. 
23 Claudia Edwards, 'Age-Based Rationing of Medical Care in Nineteenth-Century England', Continuity 
and Change, 14 (1999), p. 237. 
24 Report of the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor (Cd. 7684, 1895) p. 367. 
25 Ibid., p. 408. 
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The geographic focus on London, though it provided the interesting case 
study of the Metropolitan Asylums Board, has also limited the applicability of the 
findings of this thesis.  As David Thomson has stressed, London was not 
representative of the way that the aged poor were dealt with and accommodated in 
England and Wales generally. In 1891, 1 in 3 aged paupers in England and Wales 
received indoor relief, but this ratio rose to 1 in 2 in London.26  A case study of a 
different part of the England might produce quite a different picture of the care and 
management of old-age mental disorder. A study focussed on Scotland, in which 
the practice of ‘boarding out’ supposedly harmless lunatics into private dwellings 
and small licenced houses was legally sanctioned and commonly used, may well 
have revealed a very different model of aged care.27  Such a study would provide an 
extra-institutional dimension which is lacking in this thesis.  It seems fair to assume 
that the majority of people who experienced mental deterioration in their old age 
remained in the home.  As shown in Chapter Three, asylum records can offer us 
some insight into practices of care within the home.  Another potential source is 
personal documents – letters, diaries and memoirs – of sufferers and those around 
them.  This type of material, if it could be identified, would also offer an extra class 
dimension to the understanding of the care of senility in old age.28  Senile paupers 
were responded to as an intractable problem.  A study of responses to old-age 
mental disorder amongst wealthier people might illuminate whether the exclusion 
of senility described in this thesis was ultimately driven by an economic motivation, 
to keep poor-rates low, or if it was part of a deeper unease with the problems of old-
age mental disorder.  
This thesis has argued that nineteenth-century psychiatry – both in theory 
and in practice – was an important site for the production of understandings of old-
                                                             
26 David Thomson, 'Workhouse to Nursing Home: Residential Care of Elderly People in England Since 
1840', Ageing and Society, 3 (1983), p. 47. 
27 Harriet Sturdy and William Parry-Jones, ‘Outside the Walls of the Asylum: the History of Care in 
the Community 1750-2000’ in Bartlett and Wright (eds), Outside the Walls of the Asylum: The History 
of care in the Community (London, 1999), pp. 86-114. 
28 Robert Southey, the early-nineteenth-century poet who was held up as the archetype of the senile 
dement in Bucknill and Tuke’s Manual, and whose mental decline is a feature of many of the 
memoirs, letters and reminiscences of his illustrious friends, provides one such case study.  John 
Charles Bucknill and Daniel Hack Tuke, A Manual of Psychological Medicine (2nd edn, London, 1862), 
pp. 127-28. 
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age mental disorder in nineteenth-century Britain.  But it was not, of course, the 
only site in which such understandings were produced.  As psychiatrist Thomas 
Clouston admitted in his 1883 Clinical Lectures on Mental Diseases 
I am well aware of the imperfect view of the whole senile 
condition, bodily and mental, that a physician to an asylum is 
apt to get from seeing the very worst cases only.  His picture is 
filled in with very black shadows.  To keep himself right, he 
must take all opportunities he has of seeing and studying 
senility outside of an asylum, trying to look at it with a medico-
psychological and pathological eye.29 
The historian, too, must be aware that a focus on the asylum, and on psychiatry, can 
only give us a partial and ‘imperfect view’ of the understandings of, and responses 
to, old-age mental disorder in nineteenth-century Britain.  Yet ‘to keep [themselves] 
right’ in the search for understandings of old-age mental disorder beyond 
psychiatry, the historian is compelled to do the opposite of what Clouston advises, 
and avoid looking at old-age mental disorder with the ‘objectivist complicity’ (to 
use Borch-Jacobsen’s term) of the ‘medico-psychological and pathological eye’.30  
This thesis, then, which examines old-age mental disorder through the categories 
and institutions of psychiatry, is only the first step towards  a deeper understanding 
of what this condition, and this experience, meant to people ‘before Alzheimer’. 
 
                                                             
29
 T. S. Clouston, Clinical Lectures on Mental Diseases (London, 1883), p. 589. 
30 Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, Making Minds and Madness: From Hysteria to Depression (Cambridge, 
2009), p. 1. 
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Appendix 1:  The 1882 Medico-Psychological Association ‘Form 
of Insanity’ Classification 
Congenital or Infantile Mental Deficiency 
  With epilepsy 
  Without epilepsy 
 Epilepsy Acquired 
 General Paralysis of the Insane 
 Mania 
  Acute  
  Recurrent 
  Chronic 
  A Potu 
  Puerperal 
  Senile 
 Melancholia 
  Acute 
  Chronic 
  Recurrent 
  Puerperal 
  Senile 
 Dementia 
  Primary 
  Secondary 
  Senile 
  Organic (ie. from tumors, coarse brain disease, &c.) 
  
'Report of the Thirty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the Medico-Psychological 
Association', Journal of Mental Science, 28 (1882), p. 460 
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Appendix :  The Format of the Case Books at Hanwell 
Figure a.  Male case book entry, first page.  The female case books are in the same 
format.  William Crick, H11/HLL/B/20/002, p. 252
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Figure b.  Male case book entry, second page.   William Crick. H11/HLL/B/20/002 
(1852), p. 253 
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Figure c.  Male case book entry.  Joseph Forster, H11/HLL/B/20/011 (1872), p. 449. 
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Figure d.  Female case book entry, first page.  Ann Adams, H11/HLL/B/19/022 
(1872), p. 191.  
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Figure e.  Female case book entry, second page.  Ann Adams, H11/HLL/B/19/022 
(1872), p. 192. 
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Figure f.  Male case book entry, first page, top section.  Thomas Miller, 
H11/HLL/B/20/022 (1892), p. 5. 
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Figure g.  Male case book entry, second page, lower section.  Thomas Miller, 
H11/HLL/B/20/022 (1892), p. 5. 
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Figure h.  Male case book entry, second page.  Thomas Miller, H11/HLL/B/20/022 
(1892), p. 5. 
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Figure i.  Female case book entry, first page, top section.  Sarah Westcott, 
H11/HLL/B/19/037 (1892), p. 463. 
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Figure j.  Female case book entry, first page, lower section. Sarah Westcott, 
H11/HLL/B/19/037 (1892), p. 463. 
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Figure k.  Female case book entry, second page, top section.  Sarah Westcott, 
H11/HLL/B/19/037 (1892), p. 463. 
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Figure l.  Female case book entry, second page, lower section.   Sarah Westcott, 
H11/HLL/B/19/037 (1892), p. 463. 
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Figure m.  Female case book entry, first page.  Jemima Burns, H11/HLL/B/19/062 
(1911), p. 142.  The male case books are in the same format. 
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Figure n.  Female case book entry, second page.  Jemima Burns, H11/HLL/B/19/062 
(1911), p. 142. 
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Figure o.  Female case book entry, third page.  Jemima Burns, H11/HLL/B/19/062 
(1911), p. 142. 
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Figure p.  Female case book entry, admissions statistics insert.  Jemima Burns, 
H11/HLL/B/19/062 (1911), p. 142. 
 
 
 
